The Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL) has received two grants to offer guidance for more effective U.S. foreign policy strategies in Asia and propose structural reforms that propel the region toward growth, innovation, and democratic resilience. The first grant, from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), supports SNAPL's policy engagements with stakeholders in Washington, D.C., forthcoming this September. The second grant, from Stanford Global Studies, funds a series of SNAPL-hosted research workshops throughout the 2024-25 academic year.

Both funded initiatives underscore SNAPL's commitment to generating evidence-based policy recommendations and promoting transnational collaboration with academic and policy institutions to advance the future prosperity of Asia and U.S.-Asia relations.

Housed at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), SNAPL is led by Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, a senior fellow at FSI, and the director of APARC and the Korea Program. The lab’s mission is to address emergent social, cultural, economic, and political challenges facing Asia-Pacific countries and guide effective U.S. Asia policies through interdisciplinary, comparative research and collaboration with academic and policy research institutions in Asia and the United States.  

“We are grateful to FSI and Stanford Global Studies for supporting SNAPL's interdisciplinary, policy-relevant research,” says Shin. “The two grants provide a tremendous boost as we work to contribute evidence-based recommendations to advance a more nuanced understanding of Asia's role in global affairs and informed new directions for U.S. Asia policies.”

Policy Considerations for U.S.-China and U.S.-Asia Relations

With a grant from FSI to support policy engagement, SNAPL team members will share research findings from several of the lab’s flagship projects. The SNAPL team — including Shin, Research Fellow Xinru Ma, and Postdoctoral Fellows Gidong Kim and Junki Nakahara — will travel to Washington, D.C. in September 2024 to present these findings at forums and meetings with academic and policy communities. The trip includes a joint symposium with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a presentation at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, and meetings with think tanks and Congress members.

Three core projects the team will share guide U.S. policies in Asia, particularly toward China. The first project challenges many pundits’ framing of the U.S.-China competition as a “new Cold War.” In contrast to this narrative, a recent SNAPL study reveals that contemporary U.S.-China relations are markedly different from the U.S.-Soviet Cold War dynamics. “Our analysis of over 41,000 Congressional speeches spanning 36 years suggests that current U.S. discourses on China mirror those on the past economic competition with Japan rather than the ideological or military conflicts with the USSR in the Cold War era,” says Ma. “Applying Cold War analogies to today's geopolitical landscape would thus misguide efforts to navigate current U.S.-China tensions.”

The research findings from a second SNAPL study offer a better understanding of how U.S. alliance relationships and U.S.-China tensions shape public attitudes toward China in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, another study challenges the conventional wisdom that democracy promotion gives the U.S. a competitive edge in its foreign policy over China. “Our research indicates that liberal values do not serve as a key lens through which Asia-Pacific citizens view recent geopolitical developments,” notes Kim. “The United States should therefore pivot from focusing on liberal rhetoric to emphasizing its role in promoting shared benefits with Asia-Pacific citizens in economic, trade, and military security areas.”

These studies are part of SNAPL’s U.S.-Asia Relations research track.

Racism in Global Context

At George Washington University, the SNAPL team will discuss findings from a project the lab explores as part of another research track, Nationalism and Racism. Recognizing that racism is a global problem with diverse roots and manifestations, this research track examines how nationalism and racism intertwine to create forms of exclusion and marginalization in Asia and provides policy recommendations to advance more inclusive societies in the region and beyond.

At this discussion, to be hosted by the Elliott School of International Affairs’ Sigur Center for Asian Studies, the team will present findings from a study that analyzes how 16 Northeast, Southeast, and South Asian nations discuss and justify their positions on race and racial discrimination. “Our study reveals various forms of racism ‘denial’ rooted in nationalist and religious ideologies, hindering efforts to address ongoing inequalities,” says Nakahara. “Addressing these forms of denial is crucial for promoting critical dialogue on race and racism in Asia and dismantling systems of oppression in the region and elsewhere.”

A Platform for Interdisciplinary Research on Contemporary Asia

SNAPL’s second grant, awarded by Stanford Global Studies, will enable the lab to host throughout the 2024-25 academic year a research workshop series focused on projects from the two research tracks above. Involving scholars and students from Stanford and Asia, the six-part series will foster cross-disciplinary dialogue and share policy-relevant findings grounded in the lab’s research.

The four workshop installments in fall and winter quarters 2024 will be dedicated to the projects discussed above. The spring quarter 2025 workshops will focus on two additional projects: one that examines the discursive construction of U.S. rivals and the respective roles of the media, executive, and legislative branches in this process, and the second that investigates elite articulation of “multiculturalism” in four Asia-Pacific nations.

“These workshops will be invaluable to advancing exchange and partnerships with academics and experts from Stanford and across Asia,” says Shin. “They directly promote SNAPL’s mission to serve as a platform that facilitates trans-Pacific, network-based collaboration."

Visit SNAPL's website for information about the workshops’ schedule and discussion topics.

In recent years, China's military modernization and assertive actions have led to more frequent and dangerous encounters between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the militaries of key regional players in the Indo-Pacific. Each encounter heightens the chance of a military conflict in the region. A new report published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) assesses the PLA’s strategic thinking on escalation control, analyzing the potential for conflict in the region and exploring regional responses and implications for deterrence.

Edited by Chinese military expert Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at APARC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the report, "Encounters and Escalation in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives on China’s Military and Implications for Regional Security," comprises six essays, each detailing an encounter with the PLA. These case studies include China’s maritime disputes with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam and its increasingly aggressive military activities vis-à-vis Australia, India, and Taiwan.

The authors of the essays are current and former practitioners with insight into their government’s experiences and thinking. Their assessments emphasize the need for Asia-Pacific countries to reevaluate their defense capabilities and adopt clear and consistent policy approaches to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape in the region.

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Tactics, Intentions, and Shared Threat Perceptions

As the PLA adopts a more assertive approach beyond its maritime boundaries, nations across the Indo-Pacific region have increasingly experienced perilous encounters with the Chinese military. For example, the PLA's intensifying aggression around Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea led to several incidents of maritime tension with the Philippines. Likewise, a Chinese fighter aircraft intercepted an Australian surveillance aircraft during its routine activity in international airspace over the South China Sea, posing a safety risk to the Australian aircraft and its crew.

The authors of the six case studies in the NBR report agree "that China harbors problematic intentions and is using increasingly aggressive and risk-acceptant tactics to accomplish its goals." While they show that China uses different tactics in different situations and differ in their evaluations of the most troublesome tactics for their respective countries, their analyses share several common themes, which Mastro reviews in her introduction to the report, titled "Close Encounters with the PLA: Regional Experiences and Implications for Deterrence."

First, “China doctrinally does not take any responsibility for the deterioration in the strategic environment,” writes Mastro. “All six case studies mention China’s tendency to publicly blame the other country for whatever crisis unfolded.”

China also sees crises as opportunities, Mastro explains, and most case studies indicate that the crises at stake were deliberate acts of PLA escalation. All case studies also reflect Chinese strategic thinking on deterrence as serving dual purposes: firstly, to discourage adversaries from certain actions, and secondly, to influence their behavior in line with the deterrer's intentions, ultimately requiring them to comply with the deterrer's preferences.

Another common theme is that the PLA's assertive actions have prompted all six nations studied in the report to boost security cooperation with the United States and other regional powers, albeit to varying extents. For example, in addition to enhancing its strategic partnership with the United States, India has enhanced its defense ties with the two other Quad members (Japan and Australia) and regional partners such as Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines.

Moreover, based on their encounters with the PLA, almost all regional players have concluded that strengthening their military capabilities will discourage Chinese aggressive behavior in the future, Mastro says, noting that “changes in defense posture have perhaps been the most drastic in Japan.”

Policy Implications

The report's case studies offer policy recommendations for deterring China, emphasizing the importance of a consistent approach that includes strengthening deterrence capabilities through military modernization, firm stances on border disputes, and close security cooperation with the United States, its allies, and other like-minded nations. While there is consensus that military deterrence needs to be balanced with diplomatic engagements to reduce tensions, each regional player views the effectiveness of diplomacy and cooperation with China differently.

“Ultimately,” Mastro concludes, “the path forward for maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region requires a cohesive strategy that prioritizes long-term security interests, demonstrating the essential role of international cooperation and the strategic interplay between military readiness and diplomatic efforts in navigating China’s aggression.”

Learn more about the report and download Mastro’s introductory essay > 

This commentary was originally published by The Diplomat.

New United Nations Special Envoy for Myanmar Julie Bishop faces what seems to be an impossible mission. Even setting aside the long history of failed U.N. envoys to the country, the current situation is not at all welcoming to a would-be foreign peacemaker. The Myanmar military, in addition to being xenophobic, misogynistic, dishonest, and brutal, is by nature uncompromising and absolutely committed to maintaining political power. This is true even in the face of significant resistance gains, a worsening economy, and a severe humanitarian crisis.

For its part, the broad resistance – and arguably the population at large – is dead-set on removing the military from power and unlikely to accept anything short of that. In addition, despite improved inter-group communication and broad unity on the goal of ousting the military, its various elements represent a host of different interests, and there is no one person who can speak for all or even most of those interests.

There is no foolproof path to success for Bishop, but past experience and an analysis of the current Myanmar situation suggest an approach that includes the following elements.

First, recognize that – at least for now – there is virtually zero chance that any envoy will be able to (a) persuade the military to reduce violence or (b) bring the parties to the table for serious dialogue on a potential compromise deal. Myanmar now is a zero-sum situation; there is no compromise to be had and pushing one will do little more than alienate everyone involved. The best hope for an environment that would allow for genuine dialogue/negotiations would be for the military to be weakened to the point that it seriously begins to seek an exit strategy. That has not yet happened.

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Second, Bishop should use the interim period to put herself in the best possible situation to be helpful should that inflection point be reached. That would involve first talking at length with credible experts on Myanmar, most of whom should be Myanmar people. The next step would be to very carefully begin to develop relationships with key players – in the military, the resistance, and among other political and civil society players.  The emphasis here is on “very carefully” because the junta will use any visits/meetings as photo ops to confer legitimacy, which will undermine the envoy’s standing with the resistance and the broad Myanmar population.

Bishop should insist that any meetings not be photographed. If that proves impossible, any meetings/photos with the generals need to be matched in a timely way with similar events with the National Unity Government and other resistance officials. Bishop’s public appearances and media engagements should be limited and restrained, though she likely will need to “clarify” any meeting readouts from the junta.

Third, as Morten Pedersen noted in a recent article for the Lowy Institute, Bishop can use her discussions with the broad resistance to encourage further coordination and development of a shared vision, along with work toward a more detailed blueprint for any future transition. There is less to do with the generals, frankly, though encouraging them to think of a realistic exit strategy might have some limited value (mostly among officers other than the top one or two generals).

Fourth, Bishop can use her position to push the United Nations as well as Myanmar’s neighbors and other interested parties to review and rethink their approach on humanitarian assistance. To date, the U.N. and the neighbors have largely played by the junta’s rules, and in doing so have both conferred legitimacy on it and ensured that most of the assistance does not reach those who truly need it. Bishop will have the standing and the clout to insist on a more creative approach. Key will be her discussions with the Thais, who have generally backed the generals but under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin seem to be more open to new ideas than in the past.

Finally, Bishop would do well to coordinate and exchange ideas with key regional players, including current Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Special Envoy Alounkeo Kittikhoun, including before any visits to Myanmar. These players have had limited influence to date but could play important roles if and when the situation changes and there is a genuine need for regional and international support for negotiations and a potential “deal” to end the crisis. Again, such a deal is very unlikely – or if it somehow happened would not be durable – until and unless the military is desperate enough to make massive concessions, which means patience will be a necessity.

Indonesia’s “New Order,” the authoritarian military regime led by General Suharto from 1966-1998, originated following the kidnapping and killing of six Army generals on September 30th-October 1, 1965. The conventional narrative often depicts this regime change as a sudden event, but historian Norman Joshua, APARC's 2023-24 Shorenstein postdoctoral fellow on contemporary Asia, challenges this view.  Joshua’s research explains why the civil-military relationships and social militarization that emerged in Indonesia from the period under Dutch colonial rule in the preceding decade allowed the New Order to solidify power in 1965.

In a recent seminar hosted by APARC’s Southeast Asia Program, “Militarization Overlooked: Rethinking the Origins of Indonesia’s New Order, 1950-1965,” Joshua shared his insights into the complex phenomenon of militarization within Indonesian society, spanning from the tumultuous post-independence era to the present day. Through a historian's lens, he traces the origins of militarization and its far-reaching impacts on political, social, and cultural dynamics in Indonesia.

An Environment Conducive to Militarization

At the heart of this narrative lies the period following Indonesia's revolutionary struggle and independence from Dutch colonial rule. Scholars have portrayed the 1950s favorably as a time when Indonesia embarked on an experiment with liberal and constitutional democracy. Joshua, however, argues that, instead of heralding an era of stability and democratic governance, “the post-revolutionary landscape was fraught with underdevelopment, persistent conflict, and political instability.” This environment provided fertile ground for the gradual militarization of Indonesian society, as the military sought to quell armed groups and revolutionary violence.

"In essence, my current project is an endeavor to write a social and cultural history of Indonesian authoritarianism," Joshua explains. He frames this process as militarization, wherein civil society organizes itself for the production of violence.

Joshua's scholarly curiosity about Indonesian authoritarianism stems from his deep-seated interest in the country's post-revolutionary period. He is particularly drawn to the oft-overlooked years of the 1950s and 1960s, which he deems pivotal in comprehending Indonesia's authoritarian trajectory. He was also drawn to the topic by a family member’s involvement in the revolutionary and Communist movements, leading to their exile from Indonesia after the 1965 massacres, “which sparked my interest in studying ‘those who were on the wrong side of history,' so to speak.”

Joshua sheds light on the role of armed revolutionary factions like the Gerombolan, whose lingering presence posed a challenge to the nascent Indonesian government's efforts to establish control and maintain order, even bearing responsibility for the murder of Yale professor Raymond Kennedy and Time-Life reporter Robert Doyle.

"Militarization produced a militarized society that was regimented and conditioned towards the use of violence," Joshua asserts. His analysis reveals how militarization permeated various facets of Indonesian society, from the adoption of military symbolism to the normalization of violence in everyday life.

An Enduring Legacy of Militarization

Joshua cites the continuing role of the military and police in post-1998 Indonesian society. The Army—and the Police, which is in many ways a constabulary force—have retained their territorial organization, and former and active-duty military and police often participate in non-security affairs. He also highlights the important role of security forces in facing domestic challenges such as the ongoing insurgency in Papua.

Joshua considers militarization from a cultural standpoint, including the fetishization of uniforms, marches, and militia-like organizations. Militarization, he notes, is often manifested in slogans, songs, ceremonies, and indoctrination programs. For example, the slogan "Ganyang Malaysia," originating from Sukarno's call to "crush" Malaysia, became emblematic of Indonesian nationalism and militarism.

Challenges for Democracy

Despite the downfall of the New Order regime, Joshua underscores the implications of the enduring legacy of militarization in contemporary Indonesia. Just two months ago, Indonesian voters elected Prabowo Subianto, a former special forces commander with a controversial history, as their next president. Expressing apprehensions about the potential for further militarization, Joshua points to the ascendancy of leaders like Prabowo. "Militarization under Prabowo would be evident in two ways," he cautions, citing increased military budgets and an expanded role for the military in non-security affairs. “While we have yet to hear about the shape of Prabowo’s cabinet, I believe that we will see an increasing role for the military and police—whether active-duty or retired—in non-military affairs,” he said.

“This trend started during the Jokowi administration and will continue under Prabowo, and has invited concerns from civil rights organizations and human rights groups. Ultimately, I think Prabowo’s election is a test for Indonesia’s democratic values and how resilient the civil society is.”

Assessing the health of Indonesian democracy, Joshua notes fluctuations that warrant concern. "Indonesian democracy is still working well, especially compared to neighboring countries," he observes. “I think the election of Prabowo shows the robustness of Indonesian democratic procedures, as the 2024 Presidential Election was conducted peacefully and with relatively minor complaints of voting fraud or irregularities.” However, he highlights potential challenges ahead. “It appears that Indonesian democracy will face a great challenge in the next four years, and we will see if the guardrails of democratic procedure will hold or not.”

An Interdisciplinary Scholar Community

As a Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow, Joshua connected with APARC scholars to further his research. “I work mostly with Southeast Asia Program Director Don Emmerson and am glad to be connected with APARC faculty Stephen Kotkin, who I found as an inspiration for my work,” he notes. Engaging with Lee Kong Chian Fellow on Southeast Asia Soksamphoas Im, who works on authoritarian politics in Cambodia, with fellow scholar Yuya Ouchi, and Visiting Scholar Gita Wirjawan, who is an expert practitioner of Indonesian politics, has also been an enriching experience, Joshua says. conversations with .”

Delving into the Hoover Institution archives, Joshua examined the papers of Guy Pauker, an Indonesianist and “Cold Warrior” in the 1960s, and his engagement with Indonesian poet, writer, and scholar Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, who was a fellow at Stanford’s Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

“I am grateful to have spent my postdoctoral fellowship at APARC, as it allows me to spend more time working on my dissertation toward transforming it into a monograph,” said Joshua.

“The interdisciplinary nature of APARC is particularly helpful for a young scholar like me and helped the process of refining my arguments, especially in terms of engaging with people outside of my field and academic discipline."

After his time at APARC, Joshua will serve as the Hoover History Lab’s Research and Teaching Fellow at the Hoover Institution under Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Kotkin.

Joshua’s research provides a comprehensive exploration of the nature of civil-military relations within Indonesian society. By tracing its historical roots and examining its contemporary manifestations, he provides valuable insights into how militarization has shaped Indonesia's political, social, and cultural milieu.

His analysis of the militarizing process offers scholars insights into an understudied period in Indonesian history and helps us better understand the origins of authoritarian military regimes worldwide. As Indonesia continues to navigate its path forward, grappling with the legacies of its militarized past will undoubtedly remain a complex and pressing challenge.

“I believe that history serves as more than just a chronicle of the past,” Joshua reflects. “It serves as a vital lens through which we can comprehend and contextualize the events that are still unfolding in our contemporary world.”
 

This essay originally appeared in The Diplomat.

With major crises in Gaza and Ukraine, the Biden administration might be tempted to overlook the importance of Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s mid-November visit to Washington. That would be a mistake. Indonesia is an important country that is heading into crucial presidential elections in early 2024, and the results of Jokowi’s visit could go a long way to shaping the next Indonesian government’s attitudes toward its relations with the United States.

Although U.S.-Indonesian security cooperation is good and trade has grown, by all accounts Jokowi and his team are heading to Washington feeling less than satisfied on several fronts. First, Indonesians remain upset by President Joe Biden’s decision to skip the recent Indonesia-hosted East Asia Summit, which they took as a serious snub. Biden invited Jokowi in part to make up for that absence, but the White House might have underestimated the extent to which Indonesians remain upset over the initial affront. The protocol-conscious government no doubt will also contrast their modest White House schedule with the lavish welcome recently received by Australian Prime Minster Anthony Albanese.

Indonesian authorities also remain unhappy with what they see as Washington’s failure to deliver on the high-profile Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), under which the U.S. committed to lead G-7-plus efforts to mobilize $20 billion to support Indonesia’s accelerated transition from coal to cleaner energy. Indonesian officials have complained publicly for months that the U.S. has pressed them to take difficult steps while offering little in the way of concessional financing to pay for it. The reality is more complicated, but the perception in Jakarta that Washington “sold them a bill of goods” is real. Some Indonesian officials have contrasted that with substantial Chinese funding on priority infrastructure initiatives, highlighting the regional perception of U.S. weakness vis-à-vis China as a reliable economic partner. (The Indonesians have largely ignored the fact that the U.S. is their second-largest export market and has risen rapidly to be their fourth-largest source of foreign direct investment.)

Jokowi also is looking for Biden to move forward on a proposed limited free trade agreement under which Indonesian critical minerals (namely nickel and processed nickel) would meet the criteria for inclusion in the electric vehicle tax credits provided for in the Inflation Reduction Act. The Biden administration reportedly is interested in such a deal, which by promoting diversification of both suppliers for the U.S. and markets for Indonesia would be in the U.S. national interest. It has, however, hesitated to proceed due to concerns about the congressional reaction, environmental and labor issues, and heavy Chinese investment in Indonesian nickel mining.

Finally, one has to assume that the Gaza crisis will be at the top of Jokowi’s agenda (if not Biden’s) when the two presidents meet. Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, has long supported the Palestinian cause and has vigorously pursued diplomatic efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire. While working hard to keep the issue from blowing up domestically, there is no question but that Indonesian public opinion (and genuinely held beliefs among top officials) has put the two governments at odds over the crisis.

At this late date, there is little prospect of major initiatives coming out of the Biden-Jokowi meeting that would ease Indonesian concerns or generate significant positive momentum. There is, however, still time to make some small investments that could result in Jokowi and his team leaving Washington feeling more positive about the relationship.

First, on Gaza, the meeting will not resolve the two countries’ differences, but it is important that Biden listen to and engage with Jokowi seriously on the issue and that he highlights his efforts to encourage Israel to show restraint and to promote a humanitarian pause. Jokowi’s post-meeting public comments about this discussion likely will have a significant influence on the Indonesian public and media perceptions of the U.S. role, so it is critical that Biden do all he can to ensure those comments are positive.

Second, it is important that Biden understand that Jokowi and many Indonesians are still upset over the president’s decision to skip the recent Jakarta summit. Biden cannot undo that, but he can and should acknowledge it in his discussion with Jokowi and emphasize that he appreciates how important Indonesia is.

Even such moves will only go so far without some movement on JETP and the critical minerals trade question. On the former, there isn’t time to achieve major progress before the meeting, but President Biden should instruct his team to redouble their efforts to mobilize funding and get the initiative moving. This goes beyond Indonesian concerns and gets to the heart of regional wariness about Washington being able to put meat on the bones of its various economic initiatives.

On critical minerals, Biden should agree to send trade officials to Jakarta to discuss the outlines of a possible agreement, though he will have to be careful not to overcommit absent confidence he will be able to deliver. Indonesia, for its part, needs to stop rotating ambassadors through Washington so quickly and install an envoy who can effectively make the case for a limited trade deal to Congress and others.

Some serious, last-minute work needs to be done to ensure that next week’s meeting between the leaders of the world’s second and third-largest democracies does more than highlight the differences and problems in the relationship.

During the first three years of the Vietnam War, the United States made over 2000 attempts to open negotiations with the North Vietnamese. North Vietnam ignored or denied all of these overtures to open talks. By April 1968, following repeated rebuffs, Hanoi changed its position after President Johnson announced that the U.S. would halt bombing above the 20th parallel. What explains Hanoi’s initial firm position against talks and the sudden policy change in 1968? What are the drivers behind a state’s willingness to talk with the enemy while fighting, what considerations do leaders account for when deciding when and how peace talks can begin, and why do some states reject or ignore overtures to come to the negotiating table?

In a new Journal of Theoretical Politics article, FSI Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro and Duke University’s political scientist David Siegel advance a new theory of wartime diplomacy to answer these questions. Using a formal model, they find that states are inclined to initiate negotiations when two conditions are met: firstly, when their adversaries perceive escalation as excessively costly, and secondly, when there is an indication of exceptional resilience that only those possessing high resilience value. To shed light on the dynamics of the second condition, Mastro and Siegel present an in-depth case study examining the evolving negotiation approach of North Vietnam throughout the Vietnam War.

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The second condition arises when the opponent does not view escalation as overly costly and when the likelihood of successful escalation is hard to assess, but there is a signal of high resilience that helps identify resilient entities. “States will choose typically open stances, potentially inviting escalation, only when they have demonstrated enough resilience to mitigate the escalation risk,” write Mastro and Siegel. This dynamics explains why North Vietnam’s diplomatic posture changed during the second phase of the Vietnam War.

Early on in the war, both the United States and North Vietnam believed that a willingness to talk would convey weakness. North Vietnam needed to sense hesitancy in U.S. confidence in the effectiveness of escalation before opening to negotiations. In 1968, the Tet Offensive allowed North Vietnam to demonstrate its resilience and constrain U.S. strategic capacity by inflicting casualties and steadily depleting its resources.

Even though North Vietnam was materially weaker and Tet failed by all operational measures, it represented a psychological shock to U.S. leadership and “finally convinced the U.S. of Hanoi’s resilience, reducing the likelihood that an open diplomatic posture would be interpreted as weakness.” North Vietnam had been reluctant to negotiate before it could adequately signal its resilience, maintaining a closed diplomatic posture for three years. But after Tet, having communicated its resilience to Washington, Hanoi “no longer viewed an open diplomatic posture as a liability in the war effort.”

The authors’ findings suggest that states are concerned about the negative material consequences that their diplomatic approach might have on the enemy. Thus, face-saving measures from the adversary are limited because the enemy would still perceive an open stance as a sign of weakness, potentially leading to further escalation. These findings are significant, as they demonstrate how counterproductive attempts to coerce opponents to negotiate can be.

At the same time, the study highlights new opportunities for external mediators “who can provide guarantees in ways that lessen the strategic costs of conversation,” Mastro and Siegel argue.