U.S.-Asia Relations

This research theme tracks historical and present tensions between the United States and regional actors such as the Philippines, Japan, and China, exploring scapegoating and rival-making and their impact on regional stability. It provides descriptive and causal analysis of perception and reality in the American rival-making of Asian nations, past and present. 

This research is part of the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL).

Projects in this research track include:

A New Cold War?

It is often argued that we have entered, are entering, or will enter a new Cold War. But is this assertion empirically accurate? To answer this question, we analyze over 36 years of U.S. Congressional speeches, comparing the similarities and differences in discourses concerning China with ones concerning past rivalries between the United States and other nations, including Japan and the USSR.

By examining speech similarities, topics, and framings, we find that U.S. political discourses on China are more similar to those on Japan than those on the USSR across social, economic, and even ideological dimensions. These findings establish a baseline understanding of current U.S.-China relations and bear significant policy implications for China and the United States.

U.S. Rivals: Construct or Reality?

What motivates political elites to engage in discourses concerning foreign rivalries? Do they react to the behaviors — either threatening or positive — exhibited by these rivalries? Or do they construct perceptions of rivalries based on their states of insecurity and political agenda? Surprisingly, little research and analysis has directly assessed the impact of domestic dynamics on foreign policies. By applying computational methods to Congressional debates on past rivalries between the United States and regional actors such as Japan and China, we find that the U.S. Congress debates the two countries uncannily similarly. Moreover, rivalries are discussed in bland generalities, often as an empty signifier, a backdrop, or a scapegoat for domestic debates. We support the findings from our quantitative analysis by two in-depth case studies. 

Issue Attention and Rivalry Framing by Legislators, Presidents, and the Media

Using the latest computational and causal inference methods, we examine Congressional debates, presidential speeches, and media coverage of China from 2009 to 2023 to unravel the intricate relationship between political leaders and the media in shaping U.S. threat construction concerning rising powers. We aim to investigate causally whether political leaders primarily drive the media's narrative or if the media significantly influences political discourse in the context of U.S.-China relations. This analysis clarifies the role of political leaders' statements in the evolution of framing of perceived threats, specifically regarding who leads whom in agenda-setting and framing rivalries.  

Altogether, the projects in the U.S.-Asia Relations track aim to identify and contrast varying perceptions between the United States, its allies, and other regional actors in Asia, providing not only a descriptive analysis of threat perception by U.S. politicians and the public but also a causal analysis of perception and policy outcomes. Through these projects, we aim to contextualize the escalating tension between the United States and China, offer theoretical insights into threat perception and construction, advance methodological rigor in measuring threats and perceptions, and ultimately facilitate informed policymaking on effective engagement with rising powers.

The U.S. Alliance and Public Attitudes toward China: Evidence from the Asia-Pacific Region (Gidong Kim and Gi-Wook Shin)

Research description
In recent years, scholars and policymakers have been paying close attention to the rise of anti-China sentiments worldwide. They tend to focus on factors related to China’s economic, ideological, and military threats. Thus, by stressing areas of threats from China per se, they do not fully appreciate the importance of larger international contexts such as the U.S. alliance relationships and U.S.-China tensions.

Yet, these larger international contexts matter because there is geopolitically important cross-national and temporal variation in public views toward China. For example, according to a recent Pew Research Center survey, anti-China sentiments have grown sharply in recent years in Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific region, where the United States has its allies. In contrast, public attitudes toward China are more favorable in Latin America and Africa.

How can we explain such cross-national and temporal variations? With proper attention to the larger international contexts, we analyze the role of the U.S. alliance relationship and the U.S.-China rivalry in shaping anti-China sentiments. Specifically, we argue that the growing tensions between the United States and China (the temporal variation) reinforce the role of the U.S. alliance in serving as a perceptual lens by which citizens of U.S. allies — but not those of non-allies (the cross-national variation) — view China based on a shared identity. By looking at the international and geopolitical contexts, we enhance the current understanding of the rise and growth of anti-China sentiments that have largely focused on the factors related to China itself.

Empirical findings
We test our argument in the Asia-Pacific region, where the United States has several allies and its tensions with China are most acute. Our analysis of two datasets — Gallup World Poll (2006-2022) and Asian Barometer Survey (Wave 3-5) — demonstrates that, as the U.S.-China rivalry grows, citizens of U.S. allies — but not of non-allies — are more likely to show unfavorable views toward China and exhibit contrasting attitudes toward the United States and China.

Policy implications
Our contribution to understanding the dynamics of public opinion in U.S. allies versus non-allies during the geopolitical crisis offers important policy implications for the United States, its allies, and China. First, the United States should recognize that the publics of U.S. allies not only form an alliance-based shared identity with the United States but also exhibit anti-Chinese sentiments based on the alliance relationship during the era of geopolitical rivalry. Therefore, because alliances can be an effective tool in containing China by influencing public opinion in U.S. allies, strengthening the relationship with allies can be more effective, particularly in the face of the intensifying bilateral tensions with China. 

Second, U.S. allies need to understand that the recently growing anti-China sentiments among their publics have, in large part, to do with the geopolitical context. In other words, such anti-China sentiments are unlikely to decline in allied countries unless the U.S.-China competition decreases.

Third, China needs to approach and address the recently rising anti-China sentiments as a geopolitical structural issue, rather than a public diplomacy issue. Although China actively uses diverse public diplomacy strategies, including financial and non-financial measures, to strengthen its soft power, such strategies may not work in U.S. allied countries. Because citizens of U.S. allies tend to exhibit unfavorable views of China based on their alliance relationships as the U.S.-China tensions intensify, the Chinese government should recognize that it would be difficult to mitigate those anti-China sentiments in U.S. allied countries unless its tensions with the United States weaken.
 

Democracy and Public Attitudes toward China in the Asia-Pacific Region

Research description
Relying on the conventional wisdom that democracy plays a central role in forming public opinion on foreign policy, the United States has emphasized democracy as a value (i.e., democratic promotion). In particular, this perspective is based on the premise that liberal values can work as deeply embedded beliefs and serve as one important source of shared identity, thereby shaping unfavorable views toward China. 

By focusing on the Asia-Pacific region, where the U.S.-China tensions are most acute, we challenge the conventional wisdom and share myth-breaking findings. Analyzing what aspect of democracy (i.e., procedural vs. substantive) leads citizens in the region to form the democracy-based shared identity, we demonstrate that electoral institutions (procedural) play a bigger role as a foundation of the shared identity, rather than liberal values (substantive), in increasing unfavorable attitudes toward China, which is a non-democratic country. This is because democratic countries in the Asia-Pacific region have short historical experiences of democracy and a lingering influence of past authoritarian regimes.

Indeed, recent studies find that people in young democracies, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, still hold authoritarian values and even show pro-dictator bias after democratization due to nostalgic sentiments based on economic performance achieved by their past authoritarian regimes and the existence of authoritarian successor parties as viable actors under new democratic regimes. Thus, the public shapes their political attitudes and behaviors based on authoritarian legacies and values. This suggests that liberal values may play only a limited role in many Asia-Pacific democracies. 

As a result, people in young democracies are more likely to exhibit both unfavorable attitudes toward China and favorable attitudes toward the United States when their electoral institutions are threatened by China, compared to when their liberal values are under China’s threat. Moreover, given the ‘democracy vs. autocracy’ competition in the U.S.-China rivalry, we further show that China’s threat to electoral institutions can be more salient when the threat arises in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry compared to when the threat stems from China per se.

Empirical findings
To empirically test our argument, we adopt a mixed-method approach. In particular, we maximize both external and internal validity of our analysis by combining (1) country-level time-series cross-national analysis, (2) individual-level cross-national survey data analysis, and (3) survey experiments in Japan and South Korea, two leading democracies in the Asia-Pacific region that represent an empirically hard test.

The U.S. Alliance and Public Support for Military Spending

Research description
Conventional wisdom suggests that citizens prefer ‘butter’ (i.e., social/welfare spending) to ‘guns’ (i.e., military spending). Recent studies, however, find that citizens’ military spending aversion weakens when they perceive external military threats directed toward their own countries. We argue that, in addition to direct military threat, indirect military threat perceived through alliance relationships can increase public support for military spending. Specifically, by focusing on the U.S. alliance and U.S.-China rivalry, we predict that citizens of U.S. allied countries are more likely to support military spending as they perceive China’s military threats in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry. Moreover, beyond the military threat, we expect the alliance-based shared identity to increase public support for military spending even in response to economic and ideological threats.

Empirical findings
To test our theoretical expectations, we first offer comparative evidence from public opinion survey analysis using the International Social Science Program (ISSP, the Role of Government module). Second, we conduct an original survey experiment in Japan and South Korea, the two U.S. allies in Northeast Asia.