This Q&A originally appeared in Al Jazeera. 

Southeast Asian nations are stuck in “troubling divisions” over Myanmar’s coup crisis and China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, according to Scot Marciel, a veteran United States diplomat.

And the former US ambassador to Indonesia and Myanmar, who has just published the book Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia, argues the US should use this time not to focus on countering Chinese influence in the region, but instead to prioritise its own engagement efforts.

Washington should focus “more on showing itself to be a consistent, reliable, trusted, and good partner across the board”, Marciel told Al Jazeera.

Imperfect Partners is a hybrid of personal memoir and foreign policy analysis of relations between the US and Southeast Asia, based on Marciel’s decades-long diplomatic career.

Joining the State Department in 1985, he was the first US diplomat to be posted to Hanoi since the Vietnam War. His career took him across the region, from witnessing the People Power revolt in the Philippines to responding to coups in Thailand and the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar.

Marciel retired from the foreign service in 2022 and is currently an Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Stanford University’s Walter H Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Al Jazeera spoke to Marciel about his book and regional politics.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Al Jazeera: Imperfect Partners covers different countries in Southeast Asia over an extended period. The Philippines and Vietnam are strengthening their relations with the US, while Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos appear to be firmly in China’s orbit. Are divisions in Southeast Asia deepening amid big power rivalry?

Scot Marciel: There are certainly some troubling divisions within Southeast Asia, but I wouldn’t necessarily attribute them primarily to the US-China rivalry, and I don’t see a division within ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] between a pro-China and a pro-American group.

What we’re seeing is all the countries of Southeast Asia wanting to have good relations with China and the US. Some will lean more one way than the other, depending on the issue and the time, but they’re also working very hard to bolster their relations with other countries such as Japan, Australia and India.

The divisions are concerning when it comes to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the situation in Myanmar, and the South China Sea, which may have some relationship to the US-China rivalry. But that rivalry isn’t the cause of the South China Sea tension.

Al Jazeera: The US and Vietnam upgraded their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership recently. This represents a massive change from several decades ago when Ho Chi Minh’s regime and the US were fighting each other in the Vietnam War. You were the first US diplomat to work in Hanoi since the end of the Vietnam War. Could you tell us more about what it was like back then?

Scot Marciel: I arrived in Hanoi in August of 1993. We still didn’t have diplomatic relations. But we, over the previous handful of years, had begun talking. The Vietnamese, after the fall of the Soviet Union, which they had depended on, were looking to diversify their relationships but also build economic partnerships because they had begun their economic reform efforts.

For the US, it was more about healing the divisions from the war. At the end of the Cold War, the US wasn’t looking at it so strategically, but we were very interested in getting Vietnam support for a Cambodian peace process.

When I first arrived, Vietnam’s reforms had been under way for only a few years. It was still quite poor but you could feel the energy in the country. You could see lots of little shops opening up. During those early days, we were trying to build basic trust after the war by working on issues that were in effect legacies of the war, such as accounting for missing Americans.

The economic relationship began to develop rapidly after those early years, and that in my view has driven the relationship ever since. Very quickly it became a trade and investment relationship and broadened to include health, climate change, a little bit of security and so on. The upgrade to a comprehensive strategic partnership has a significant economic component, with both countries seeing an opportunity for Vietnam to play a bigger role in global supply chains.

Al Jazeera:  You were ambassador to Indonesia. Indonesia’s presidential election will take place soon, in February next year. What’s at stake in the upcoming election in terms of geopolitics and what the US is watching?

Scot Marciel: Indonesia’s transition to democracy is one of the more underappreciated stories of Southeast Asia. It’s truly a remarkable achievement.

If you look back at the Soeharto years, and then in 1998, and the next several years, they marked a very turbulent transition to democracy, but the transition has held up and deserves a lot of admiration.

The elections next year will hopefully reinforce that democracy. The Indonesians have run good elections, very transparent and fair, with high voter turnout.

In terms of geopolitics, one never knows for sure. But there appears to be a consensus in favour of what Indonesians call a free and active foreign policy. They’re not going to suddenly align with any major powers. I think Indonesia will continue to play a very strong, independent role within ASEAN and within the broader world, and will still speak with their very own Indonesian voice on regional and global issues.

Al Jazeera: Laos is taking over the ASEAN chairmanship in 2024. What do you expect to change regarding the South China Sea and Myanmar under the leadership of Laos?

Scot Marciel:  ASEAN member states agree on a lot of issues but also disagree on some important ones, including the South China Sea, where the disagreement is mostly between those who have claims and those who don’t and therefore don’t want to pick a fight with Beijing.

I’d be surprised if Laos would lead a major change regarding the crisis in Myanmar. ASEAN doesn’t really know what to do. Even under Indonesia’s chairmanship, with all due respect, the bloc didn’t do all that much. There’ll unlikely be anything dramatic under Laos.

Laos may be more inclined to engage with the State Administration Council than Indonesia. I assume bringing the Burmese junta back to ASEAN’s top political meetings is a decision of the whole ASEAN, instead of the chair. Laos could certainly take a trip to Naypyidaw and talk to the generals, but that – while unfortunate – wouldn’t change much on the ground.

Al Jazeera: How have China’s diplomacy and behaviour changed during your decades-long diplomatic career? The US appears keen to counter China’s influence in Southeast Asia.

Scot Marciel: When I started in the mid-80s, China wasn’t a big factor in Southeast Asia. It was in the early days of Deng Xiao Ping’s reforms and kept a relatively low profile. It was also coming out of that era when Beijing backed communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia. For more than 20 years beginning in the late 1980s, China increased its engagement and economic ties with all the Southeast Asian countries.

From around 2008 onwards, we started seeing China shifting from a charm offensive to being a little bit more muscular in its diplomacy, particularly in the South China Sea. In recent years, Chinese diplomacy could be quite assertive and even aggressive – throwing its weight around.

China’s influence has increased significantly. That’s a fact. I think there’s an unfortunate tendency to worry about China because it has influence, as opposed to worrying about specific Chinese behaviour that is problematic, such as in the South China Sea.

The US should focus less on countering China, because China’s going to be there and countries are going to want to have the relationship, and more on showing itself to be a consistent, reliable, trusted and good partner across the board.

I think the US in general has done that, but not always with the consistency that the region would like to see. It’s been lagging on the economic side, most notably by pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. So Washington should focus on improving its own efforts in the region, rather than countering China.

Al Jazeera: Thai journalist Kavi Chongkittavorn brought up the US Burma Act in a column and warned of a ‘mini proxy war’ in Myanmar. Is this based on a misunderstanding about the Burma Act?

Scot Marciel: With all due respect to my good friend Kavi, I don’t see the Burma Act or anything else that the US is doing is in any way stoking a proxy war. Between the US and China, only one of the two countries is providing weapons to one party in this conflict, and it’s not the US.

America has offered rhetorical and diplomatic support, as well as humanitarian aid to the people of Myanmar. After all, we have to remember the people of Myanmar overwhelmingly don’t want the military to be in power. This is a horrific junta that has no popular support. The US very much sympathises with and supports the people of Myanmar, but it’s not providing weapons.

The Myanmar crisis is not at all about the US and China. It’s about what’s going on inside Myanmar and the Myanmar people saying, ‘We’ve had it with the military. We need to get them out once and for all.’ I think they’re right about it. It’s unfortunate that so many countries are not supporting them, with some neighbours even supporting the junta.

I do fear that the Burma Act may have led some in China to worry excessively that the resistance was some US-backed group, and that misunderstanding led Beijing to be more supportive of the junta.

China enjoyed perfectly good relations with a democratically elected government under Aung San Suu Kyi. If and when democratic forces return to power in Myanmar, they will want to have good relations with China, too. That makes sense. So Beijing doesn’t need to worry about the resistance being a US proxy and should not see the crisis there as a US-China matter.

The Burma Act expresses support for the restoration of democracy and offers the possibility of nonlethal assistance but not weapons. This is about people who have been brutalised by a horrific military for decades saying, ‘Enough. We want to restore our own power’. They’re not doing this at anyone’s behest.

Al Jazeera: Russia has kept a very high profile and gone further than China in backing the Burmese junta, such as recent talks about supporting the regime’s ambition to develop nuclear energy. Is Moscow’s behaviour in Myanmar and other parts of the region troubling?

Scot Marciel: We can see every day in the news what kind of destructive power Russia is and its support for the Burmese junta reflects that attitude: It is an absolutely, completely amoral and unprincipled foreign policy, and an opportunity to sell weapons.

Moscow is also seeking to expand its influence, although I don’t think it’s ever going to be very influential in Myanmar. It’s creating chaos and suffering. Myanmar is the most extreme case. Russia still has some influence in Vietnam and Laos due to a historic legacy of past support.

Compare this with China. Beijing could play a more helpful role in Myanmar’s crisis because the instability isn’t in China’s interest and any democratic government that takes power will likely want to be on good terms with Beijing. But there’s no hope for Russia as long as Putin is in power.

This essay originally appeared in The Diplomat.

With major crises in Gaza and Ukraine, the Biden administration might be tempted to overlook the importance of Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s mid-November visit to Washington. That would be a mistake. Indonesia is an important country that is heading into crucial presidential elections in early 2024, and the results of Jokowi’s visit could go a long way to shaping the next Indonesian government’s attitudes toward its relations with the United States.

Although U.S.-Indonesian security cooperation is good and trade has grown, by all accounts Jokowi and his team are heading to Washington feeling less than satisfied on several fronts. First, Indonesians remain upset by President Joe Biden’s decision to skip the recent Indonesia-hosted East Asia Summit, which they took as a serious snub. Biden invited Jokowi in part to make up for that absence, but the White House might have underestimated the extent to which Indonesians remain upset over the initial affront. The protocol-conscious government no doubt will also contrast their modest White House schedule with the lavish welcome recently received by Australian Prime Minster Anthony Albanese.

Indonesian authorities also remain unhappy with what they see as Washington’s failure to deliver on the high-profile Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), under which the U.S. committed to lead G-7-plus efforts to mobilize $20 billion to support Indonesia’s accelerated transition from coal to cleaner energy. Indonesian officials have complained publicly for months that the U.S. has pressed them to take difficult steps while offering little in the way of concessional financing to pay for it. The reality is more complicated, but the perception in Jakarta that Washington “sold them a bill of goods” is real. Some Indonesian officials have contrasted that with substantial Chinese funding on priority infrastructure initiatives, highlighting the regional perception of U.S. weakness vis-à-vis China as a reliable economic partner. (The Indonesians have largely ignored the fact that the U.S. is their second-largest export market and has risen rapidly to be their fourth-largest source of foreign direct investment.)

Jokowi also is looking for Biden to move forward on a proposed limited free trade agreement under which Indonesian critical minerals (namely nickel and processed nickel) would meet the criteria for inclusion in the electric vehicle tax credits provided for in the Inflation Reduction Act. The Biden administration reportedly is interested in such a deal, which by promoting diversification of both suppliers for the U.S. and markets for Indonesia would be in the U.S. national interest. It has, however, hesitated to proceed due to concerns about the congressional reaction, environmental and labor issues, and heavy Chinese investment in Indonesian nickel mining.

Finally, one has to assume that the Gaza crisis will be at the top of Jokowi’s agenda (if not Biden’s) when the two presidents meet. Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, has long supported the Palestinian cause and has vigorously pursued diplomatic efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire. While working hard to keep the issue from blowing up domestically, there is no question but that Indonesian public opinion (and genuinely held beliefs among top officials) has put the two governments at odds over the crisis.

At this late date, there is little prospect of major initiatives coming out of the Biden-Jokowi meeting that would ease Indonesian concerns or generate significant positive momentum. There is, however, still time to make some small investments that could result in Jokowi and his team leaving Washington feeling more positive about the relationship.

First, on Gaza, the meeting will not resolve the two countries’ differences, but it is important that Biden listen to and engage with Jokowi seriously on the issue and that he highlights his efforts to encourage Israel to show restraint and to promote a humanitarian pause. Jokowi’s post-meeting public comments about this discussion likely will have a significant influence on the Indonesian public and media perceptions of the U.S. role, so it is critical that Biden do all he can to ensure those comments are positive.

Second, it is important that Biden understand that Jokowi and many Indonesians are still upset over the president’s decision to skip the recent Jakarta summit. Biden cannot undo that, but he can and should acknowledge it in his discussion with Jokowi and emphasize that he appreciates how important Indonesia is.

Even such moves will only go so far without some movement on JETP and the critical minerals trade question. On the former, there isn’t time to achieve major progress before the meeting, but President Biden should instruct his team to redouble their efforts to mobilize funding and get the initiative moving. This goes beyond Indonesian concerns and gets to the heart of regional wariness about Washington being able to put meat on the bones of its various economic initiatives.

On critical minerals, Biden should agree to send trade officials to Jakarta to discuss the outlines of a possible agreement, though he will have to be careful not to overcommit absent confidence he will be able to deliver. Indonesia, for its part, needs to stop rotating ambassadors through Washington so quickly and install an envoy who can effectively make the case for a limited trade deal to Congress and others.

Some serious, last-minute work needs to be done to ensure that next week’s meeting between the leaders of the world’s second and third-largest democracies does more than highlight the differences and problems in the relationship.

Today’s geopolitical climate has created new and dangerous challenges for America’s defense and the support of democracy and freedom worldwide. These challenges demand a reexamination of the U.S. defense budget to ensure that America’s forces retain the capabilities to defend the nation and deter aggression abroad. The expert authors of the new volume Defense Budgeting for a Safer World (Hoover Institution Press) review the significant areas of debate in the U.S. defense budget and provide recommendations for aligning it with new global realities. Chief among these new realities are China’s modernized military and the nation’s objectives in the South China Sea and for reunification with Taiwan, testing U.S. dominance in the world order and raising questions about allies’ security and the U.S. ability to counter threats from the People’s Liberation Army.

In her contribution to the new volume, in a chapter titled “The Military Challenge of the People’s Republic of China,” Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro reviews the last quarter-century of developments in China’s strategy for reunification with Taiwan. Mastro explains that the original shape of that strategy, strengthening ties with Taiwan to persuade the population, “has failed” and now takes the form of belligerent air and sea incursions, increasingly sophisticated military exercises, and official Chinese rhetoric about the inevitability of reunification and the impossibility of Taiwan’s independence has intensified.

Mastro notes that “China’s military modernization has focused on the ability to prevent a decisive U.S. response, referred to as its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy." The United States, as a non-resident power in the Asia-Pacific, depends on its aircraft carriers to project power in the South China Sea, but these carriers are vulnerable to Chinese ballistic systems. Because it will likely have to operate outside the first island chain — that is, the “barrier” extending from Japan, past Taiwan and the Philippines, to maritime and peninsular Southeast Asia — the U.S. military depends on “enablers” to accomplish its missions, like aerial refueling and satellites for cyber capabilities. These assets are likewise vulnerable to Chinese disruption/attack, as are U.S. forward bases in Asia, such as Okinawa.

Mastro’s recommendations to mitigate current U.S. weaknesses to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan include "more access, basing, and overflight," "more mass on targets," and "leveraging partners." While Chinese military power has not surpassed that of the United States, Mastro warns that if U.S. deterrence is not maintained and improved, Chinese leadership may become confident enough to move against Taiwan, resulting in a war with the United States. On the other hand, she assesses that the needed deterrence is possible if the proper steps are taken now.