China Program faculty and fellows regularly author books, book chapters, and articles that appear in peer-reviewed academic journals and acclaimed scholarly and trade presses. We also share the outcomes of our research projects and the proceedings of our conferences, workshops, and policy outreach activities in monographs and other volumes that are disseminated through the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center’s publishing program jointly with Stanford University Press and the Brookings Institution. Browse our publications below.
'A Decade of Upheaval,' by Dong Guoqiang and Andrew Walder, chronicles the surprising and dramatic political conflicts of a rural Chinese county over the course of the Cultural Revolution.
Entrepreneurship, Education, and Finance in Asia
In Strategy in the Contemporary World, edited by John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Jeannie L. Johnson, Oriana Skylar Mastro examines the evolution of Chinese grand strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, its drivers, and its implications.
Oriana Skylar Mastro reviews Rush Doshi’s book The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).
From Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation: Managing Deterrence in the 21st Century, edited by Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil, published 2021 by ANU Press, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
Chapter from Engaging China:Fifty Years of Sino-American Relations, Anne F. Thurston, ed. Columbia University Press
Air Purification, Gender, and Cigarettes in the People's Republic of China
The Cultural Revolution in Rural China
Statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on “Deterring PRC Aggression Toward Taiwan”
During the past eight months of the global COVID pandemic, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been active in promoting China’s claims in the South China Sea. This essay evaluates PLA statements, military exercises and operations, and deployment of relevant platforms and weapons in the South China Sea during this period. I leverage Chinese-language sources in addition to my own operational knowledge from over a decade of military experience to provide greater context for these activities.
China’s Factional Warfare of 1967–1968
To explore how business leaders and entrepreneurs in China responded to the COVID-19 lockdown and how they’re planning for the future, the China Program conducted a survey in coordination with the Stanford Center at Peking University and Stanford Business School alumni Christopher Thomas and Xue (Xander) Wu.
To explore how business leaders and entrepreneurs in China responded to the COVID-19 lockdown and how they’re planning for the future, the China Program conducted a survey in coordination with the Stanford Center at Peking University and Stanford Business School alumni Christopher Thomas and Xue (Xander) Wu.
Explore our series of multimedia interviews and Q&As with the contributors to this volume:
The easy phases of China’s quest for wealth and power are over. After forty years, every one of a set of favorable conditions has diminished or vanished, and China’s future, neither inevitable nor immutable, will be shaped by the policy choices of party leaders facing at least eleven difficult challenges, including the novel coronavirus.
By May 1966, just seventeen years after its founding, the People’s Republic of China had become one of the most powerfully centralized states in modern history. But that summer everything changed. Mao Zedong called for students to attack intellectuals and officials who allegedly lacked commitment to revolutionary principles. Rebels responded by toppling local governments across the country, ushering in nearly two years of conflict that in places came close to civil war and resulted in nearly 1.6 million dead.
Ties between individuals and institutions in the United States and the People’s Republic of China have become broader, deeper, and stronger during the four decades since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1979 and the relationship can no longer be described as fragile. However, it also cannot yet be considered a normal relationship, at least not from the perspective of American citizens, companies, and commentators on international affairs. The relationship between the two largest economies and military powers has many asymmetries.