Team members of the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL) recently presented findings from several of the lab’s research projects at forums and meetings with policy and academic communities in Washington, D.C. Their activities included a joint symposium with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a presentation at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, and meetings with think tanks and Congress members. These policy engagements are supported by a Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies grant.

SNAPL, which is housed at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), is led by sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, a senior fellow at FSI, and the director of APARC and the Korea Program. SNAPL is committed to generating evidence-based policy recommendations and promoting transnational collaboration with academic and policy institutions to advance the future prosperity of Asia and U.S.-Asia relations.

On September 16, 2024, SNAPL and CSIS co-hosted the symposium “A New Cold War?: Congressional Rhetoric and Regional Reactions to the U.S.-China Rivalry.” At this event, SNAPL team members presented fresh perspectives on the U.S.-China relationship, grounded in two original studies that challenge the application of the “new Cold War” narrative to frame the competition between the two powers. Both studies are part of SNAPL’s U.S.-Asia Relations research track.

Research Fellow Xinru Ma shared the first study, “A New Cold War? An Analysis of Congressional Discourse on U.S. Rivalries with the USSR, Japan, and China.” Discussant Evan Medeiros, Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies and the Cling Family Senior Fellow in US-China Relations at Georgetown University, commented on the study. In a following session, Postdoctoral Fellow Gidong Kim presented a second study, “The U.S. Alliance and Public Attitudes toward China: Evidence from the Asia-Pacific Region.” Discussant Matthew Kroenig, professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, offered feedback on the research.

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Moving Beyond Cold War Comparisons

Ma’s study, which analyzes over 41,000 Congressional speeches, upends the notion that today’s U.S.-China tensions mirror Cold War dynamics. The research shows that Cold War debates historically focused on two primary themes — ideological expansion and military aggression — with the former as the dominant concern. By contrast, current concerns about China center on human rights issues more than outward ideological expansion, while military concerns focus on budgetary issues rather than the kind of direct confrontations that defined the Cold War.

Ma’s findings also reveal that the current U.S.-China rivalry bears more resemblance to the U.S.-Japan economic competition of the 1980s, where economic concerns and domestic priorities took center stage rather than ideological or military threats. With these findings, the study establishes an empirical baseline for defining the current state of the U.S.-China relationship, illuminating the risks of framing it by the misleading “new Cold War” label.

Risks of the Cold War Analogy: Policy Implications

Ma’s study highlights that Cold War-era strategies are ill-suited for addressing the challenges posed by China today. Clinging to a Cold War analogy presents several risks:

• Misguided Focus: Framing China as a Cold War-like rival risks overemphasizing military buildup and ideological competition globally, overlooking the true nature of today’s competition, which is primarily economic and technological.
• Paranoia and Isolationism: The new Cold War analogy could foster a climate of paranoia and isolation, undermining the principles of open engagement and collaboration that have historically supported American leadership. Maintaining open dialogue and people-to-people exchanges that promote democratic values and human rights is more effective for preserving U.S. leadership in addressing ideological differences with China than confrontational ideological warfare.

The study has even further implications for U.S. domestic debates:
 

• Impacts on the American Workforce: At a bilateral level, the economic tensions that constitute the backbone of today's challenges with China, such as concerns over the loss of American jobs, were virtually missing from the dynamics of the Cold War era. Addressing these tensions requires new strategies and measures such as reinforcing free trade practices, upgrading infrastructure, upskilling the workforce, and fostering technological innovation.
• Overlooked U.S. Domestic Challenges: The Cold War analogy can also lead to ignorance about challenges rooted in pressing U.S. domestic issues — such as education inequality, the opioid crisis, and political polarization — which could be more consequential to American global leadership than the challenges China poses.

Public Perceptions of China in U.S. Allies

Kim’s study examines how geopolitical contexts such as the U.S.-China tensions and alliance relationships shape public attitudes toward China among citizens of U.S. allies. It analyzes data from the Gallup World Poll (2006-2022) covering 22 Asia-Pacific countries and the Asian Barometer Survey (2010-2021) from 14 countries.

The study shows that U.S. alliances and the U.S.-China rivalry influence public attitudes toward China. It finds that, as U.S.-China tensions escalate, citizens in U.S. allied countries — unlike those in non-allied nations — are more likely to develop unfavorable views of China. Additionally, public opinions of China and the United States tend to move in opposite directions as the great power competition intensifies because U.S. alliance relationships help strengthen a sense of shared identity during times of geopolitical crisis.

Shapers of Anti-China Sentiments: Policy Implications
 

• Strengthening Alliances Amid U.S.-China Tensions: The United States should understand that alliance relationships increasingly matter as U.S.-China tensions intensify. Strengthening these ties can be particularly effective in managing escalating tensions with China.
• Alliance Diplomacy vs. Traditional Value Diplomacy: During periods of geopolitical rivalry, U.S. alliances may have a greater impact than traditional diplomacy based on democratic values. In such times, alliances serve as critical frameworks for shared identity and mutual defense.
• Understanding Anti-China Sentiment: U.S. allies should recognize that rising anti-China sentiments among citizens are closely related to broader geopolitical dynamics. While anti-Japan or anti-America sentiments in countries like South Korea and the Philippines were historically bilateral issues, today's anti-China views are more structural issues and unlikely to diminish unless U.S.-China relations improve.
• China’s Need for a Shift in Strategy: China should consider the geopolitical factors contributing to rising anti-China sentiment in U.S.-allied nations. China’s public diplomacy efforts to strengthen its soft power through financial and non-financial measures may be ineffective when applied to U.S. allies. The Chinese government should therefore prioritize improving its relationship with the United States to mitigate anti-China sentiments in U.S. allies.
   

National Understandings of Race and Racism in Asia

On September 17, 2024, Postdoctoral Fellow Junki Nakahara shared findings from a SNAPL project that is part of another Lab research track, Nationalism and Racism, at a discussion titled Deconstructing Racism “Denial” in Asia, hosted by George Washington University’s Sigur Center for Asian Studies.

Nakahara’s study examines how nationalism and racism intersect to create exclusion and marginalization across Asia. By analyzing state reports from 16 Asian countries submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the research investigates how these official reports conceptualize race and racism, uncovering pervasive patterns of their denial — literal, interpretive, and ideological. Nakahara thus offers a comparative view of how these perspectives by Asian nations align with or deviate from global norms. Her analysis also illustrates how historical identities and dominant social, political, and religious values shape national attitudes toward race in Asia.

Following Nakahara’s presentation, discussants Hiromi Ishizawa, associate professor of sociology at George Washington University, and Erin Aeran Chung, the Charles D. Miller Professor of East Asian Politics and Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, provided insightful commentary. They emphasized the importance of studying race and racism in the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for marginalized communities. The event also sparked an engaging dialogue with the audience, addressing how racism in Asia remains a “blind spot” overlooked in policy, media, and public discourse.

See the coverage of the event in George Washington’s student newspaper >

The United States remains a leader in the global economy, yet over the past decade, it has taken a sharp turn away from its traditional support of free, rules-based trade. Since 2016, Washington has withdrawn from international trade agreements it once championed, opting for a more unilateral approach and pivoting from many of the obligations and norms it had shaped and insisted others honor to make trade fair, equitable, and mutually beneficial. How did the United States arrive here, and what steps should it take to leverage its strengths in the global trade system moving forward?

APARC visiting scholar Michael Beeman addresses these questions in his new book Walking Out: America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (published by APARC, distributed by Stanford University Press). As a former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC, Beeman brings an insider’s perspective to the recent transformation of U.S. trade policy. He provides a timely analysis of the forces driving this shift, examines its implications for America’s role in the global economy, and offers prescriptions for a robust U.S. trade policy that still serves American interests while allowing for compromise among competing ones.

Join Dr. Beeman on campus for our book launch event on October 17. Reserve your spot today >

Beeman joined APARC Communications Manager Michael Breger to discuss his new book. Listen to the conversation on our SoundCloud or YouTube channels. You can also download a transcript of the conversation.

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A Departure From the Norm

In Beeman's analysis, the tactic of "walking out" as a means to renegotiate international agreements reflects a fundamental shift in U.S. trade policy, marked by a rejection of established conditions, obligations, and norms that had previously facilitated global trade and reduced conflict. This shift has had significant repercussions, as Washington has increasingly distanced itself from the principles it once championed, such as non-discrimination, transparency, openness, and reciprocity in trade. The change represents more than the inability to agree to a specific trade deal. According to Beeman, it is a rejection of Washington's long-held principles in pursuit of new goals.

Beeman attributes the collapse of the decades-long bipartisan consensus supporting free trade to a domestic political climate, where “the emergence of America’s zero-sum-centered politics [is] the new, defining feature of its political system.” In this new system, trade is viewed not as mutually beneficial but as a competition for limited resources. This transformation began gaining traction during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which galvanized new political movements, like the Tea Party and the so-called New Right, that simultaneously criticized free trade agreements.

Acknowledging the effects of domestic politics on trade policy, Beeman explores how the current political landscape, marked by extreme division, shapes trade decisions and reflects broader societal tensions. The author draws parallels between historical trade policy and the contemporary environment, noting that just as the 1930s saw dramatic swings in U.S. tariff policies, today’s new political geometry is “forged from extreme new levels of domestic political division [...] On trade, it is a geometry of acute angles and no longer one of curves and tangents.”

This political backdrop has resulted in an increasingly politicized trade policy that hampers efforts to find consensus. Beeman emphasizes that the transformation of U.S. trade policy is not merely a reflection of external pressures but a byproduct of internal political dynamics that redefine the goals and assumptions underpinning U.S. trade strategy.

Trade Policy Tensions
 

Among the many trade agreements that the U.S. has recently abandoned was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). According to Beeman, internal divisions regarding the TPP's stringent rules and demands — especially concerning auto manufacturing — highlighted a rift between America's expectations of its trading partners and its willingness to accept compromise.

Various rules and regulations dictated by the TPP stoked domestic contention and “had scrambled the usual pathways to achieve the vote margins needed for these agreements. [They] also revealed the sharp new tension between what America expected and wanted from others and what it was willing to agree upon and accept for itself.” The Biden administration's decision to abandon its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) trade agreement in late 2023 further illustrated ongoing tensions in U.S. trade policy, underscoring a lack of coherent strategy following the TPP's collapse.

The book explores how the Trump and Biden Administrations have grappled with the contradictions in their trade policies. While Robert Lighthizer, the former trade representative under Trump, embraced a confrontational approach, Beeman criticizes the fallout from these decisions, arguing they often left established commitments unfulfilled and damaged international relationships. But Beeman also maintains that the Biden Administration's attempts to repair and redefine trade relationships have resulted in a series of inconsistent policies, reflecting internal domestic tensions yet to be resolved.

“As a set of social values and domestic priorities in search of a means to express themselves through America’s external trade policies, [the Biden] Administration attempted to explain its approach in ways that often only raised contradictory distinctions.” Once these “became harder to explain and justify, [it] began developing what amounted to a new theory of global trade disorder and dysfunction in an attempt to more convincingly frame its decisions.”

According to Beeman, disruptions from Covid-19 were a “helpful backdrop,” but, he argues, “if set against the vastly more immense challenges of the late 1940s and early 1950s, when America made an intentional policy choice to work with other countries to commit to open, rules-based trade to lead the world out of crisis, the problems of 2020-21 were challenges that policymakers from that time undoubtedly would have preferred.”

Barriers to Progress
 

The current political landscape has made it challenging for Congress to reach a consensus on trade issues. The failure to renew the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which provided tariff relief to developing countries, exemplifies the paralysis in U.S. trade policy. Beeman remarks upon how, “after the bipartisan mainstream that advanced open and freer trade […] was swept away by America’s New Right and progressive Left, their shared interest in adding new and ever more conditions to America’s imports was insufficient to overcome their sharp disagreements over which conditions to add.” For Beeman, the inability to agree on new conditions for trade reflects broader ideological divides that hinder progress.

Ultimately, Beeman warns that America’s zero-sum approach to trade may lead to a cycle of self-inflicted isolation. He argues that this shift is not solely a reaction to China’s rise but represents a deeper ideological rift in American politics. “International trade adds a foreign, or external, dimension to zero-sum thinking that has facilitated a surprising degree of alignment between the New Right and the progressive Left,” he writes, specifically the “zero-sum belief that America is made worse off by freer trade, which benefits ‘them.’” Such an alignment has created an environment where bipartisan support for trade agreements has eroded, complicating efforts to establish a coherent and effective trade policy moving forward.

An essential read for anyone interested in the international political economy of trade and the future of America’s role in the global economy, “Walking Out” highlights the urgent need for the United States to reconcile its domestic divides to reestablish its role in the global economy. The current trajectory, characterized by a rejection of its foundational principles, risks fostering new conflicts with allies and adversaries alike, contradicting the original goals of the international trading system.

As right-wing populism surges around the world, immigrants and their descendants often face discrimination and become targets of political scapegoating. Yet, the question of which groups of immigrants are targeted by anti-immigrant rhetoric is dependent on a host of factors, and there remains a lack of clear evidence on the reasons underlying xenophobic behavior and the othering of immigrant populations.

A new study, published in the American Political Science Review, introduces a novel international relations perspective, particularly the concept of geopolitical rivalry, into the literature on anti-immigrant sentiment. The study indicates citizens strongly prefer immigrants from non-rival countries over those from rival countries.

The study’s co-authors — including Kiyoteru Tsutsui, APARC deputy director and director of APARC’s Japan Program and Dartmouth College’s Charles Crabtree, a former visiting professor with the Japan Program, shift the research focus of anti-immigrant sentiment to the political dynamics between the immigrants' countries of origin and the destination countries. In doing so, the authors emphasize the importance of going beyond the existing preoccupation with the individual background characteristics of migrants and integrating the study of xenophobia within the global context of political competition and alliances.

Geopolitical Relations and Public Perceptions 

Traditionally, research on anti-immigrant attitudes has concentrated on factors such as race, culture, and labor market impacts. By contrast, Tsutsui and his co-authors build on the view that the political relations between immigrants’ origin and host countries shape citizen attitudes toward them. The researchers draw on this international relations perspective to argue that immigrants (as opposed to refugees) from countries with contentious or conflictual relationships with the host country are generally less welcomed than those from allied nations.

To test this argument, the researchers used a method known as a forced-choice conjoint experiment, a technique whereby social scientists present survey participants with a series of hypothetical scenarios in which they must choose between two or more options — in this case, potential immigrants — each described by a set of varying attributes. Tsutsui and his co-authors had survey participants choose between two candidates for permanent residency, differentiated by their country of origin and various other attributes typically used in experiments to determine if labor market concerns outweigh preferences for specific immigrants.

The researchers fielded the experiment with nationally representative samples in 22 democracies, mostly in Europe and the Americas but also Asia and South Africa. They assigned four countries of origin to the immigrant profiles: two countries of origin with a similar racial and cultural make-up as the majority of the survey respondents, a rival country and an ally; and two countries with a different racial and cultural make-up.

The results strongly support the geopolitical rivalry argument: “In each of the survey countries, immigrants from non-rival countries are strongly preferred over those from rival countries,” the co-authors write. “The effect is so large that it results in a net preference for immigrants from countries with a dissimilar racial and cultural makeup than the majority of the host country.”

The researchers also show that the greater the respondents’ sense of their own country’s superiority, the stronger the international relations of their governments are mirrored in their preferences for immigrants. Furthermore, they find that members of ethno-racial majorities are more prone to the rivalry effect because they are more strongly identified with their nation compared to minority members.

The authors demonstrate that, for instance, in Western Europe, immigrants from Russia are less favored, while in East Asia, Chinese immigrants face similar hostility. This animosity towards immigrants from rival nations leads to a net preference for those with different racial or cultural backgrounds compared to the more favorable reception of immigrants from allied countries.

“The mechanisms we document in this article play an important part in the overall dynamic leading to the selective rejection or acceptance of immigrants,” Tsutsui and his colleagues summarize.

Addressing Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

In their empirical analysis, the researchers found minimal evidence of broad anti-Asian sentiment or “Sinophobia” beyond the effects of political rivalry. This conclusion holds consistently across various survey countries, continents, and immigrant origin countries. The detailed examination by survey country indicates that generalized racial or cultural biases did not significantly influence the observed preference for immigrants from politically aligned countries. The authors propose that future research expand the sample of survey countries, update and refine measures of political rivalry, and include a broader range of immigrant origins.

The study offers a new lens connecting geopolitical rivalries with xenophobia, providing a more nuanced understanding of public attitudes toward immigrants. Policymakers and researchers can use this framework to better anticipate and address potential backlash against immigrants from countries with politically contentious relations. Informed immigration policies that promote multiculturalism and social inclusion start with a deeper grasp of the forces shaping public perceptions and attitudes toward immigrants.

On May 2, 2024, Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) marked the inauguration of its new Taiwan Program at the conference Innovate Taiwan: Shaping the Future of a Postindustrial Society. The program will produce policy-relevant research to tackle the challenges facing Taiwan’s economy and society in a new era of global relations. It will also prepare the next generation of students to become experts on Taiwan and foster interactions between the Stanford community and Taiwanese stakeholders.

The program’s inaugural conference reflected this triadic mission. It gathered leading industry and academic experts from the United States and Taiwan with Stanford students to engage in diverse panel discussions. The all-day event saw a high turnout of attendees from Stanford and the broader community, including alumni and stakeholders from Taiwan.

Stanford President Richard Saller congratulated the program's establishment, noting it will advance Stanford as a global university by producing scholarship that transcends academic boundaries. “The program will do what Stanford does best — provide a cross-disciplinary, university-wide hub, where scholars from across campus and beyond can convene to study contemporary Taiwan,” said Saller. He described Taiwan as a beacon of democracy and the program’s establishment as demonstrating the university’s belief in the importance of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.

APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and a professor of sociology in the School of Humanities and Sciences, remarked that students and community members have increasingly expressed interest in studying Taiwan. “This is an opportune time to launch a Taiwan program with a comprehensive focus on economic, social, cultural, educational, and health-related matters,” he said. Shin underscored the program’s commitment to inspire new generations of Stanford students to engage with Taiwan.

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Taiwan's Evolving Cultural Landscape

The first panel delved into contemporary research on Taiwan's societal and cultural trends and reflected on the nature of Taiwan studies. Pei-Chia Lan, a professor of sociology at National Taiwan University, shared findings from her research into the emerging formation of second-generation identity in Taiwan. She explained that an influx of immigrants and their bicultural children are transforming Taiwan’s self-perceived racial and ethnic homogeneity. For Lan, “Migration provides a critical lens for investigating Taiwan's history, transformation, and globalized development.”

Jing Tsu, Yale University’s Jonathan D. Spence Chair Professor of Comparative Literature & East Asian Languages and Literatures, offered a captivating account of the increasing appeal of Taiwan’s folk religious tradition exemplified in Mazu pilgrimages honoring the Goddess of the Sea or Taiwan’s “heavenly mother.” Tsu positioned the phenomenon of Mazu worship relative to Taiwanese identity, framing Taiwan's cultural heritage within a global context.

Ruo-Fan Liu, a PhD candidate in sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and incoming postdoctoral fellow at APARC, zoomed out from her research on education and culture in Taiwan to a larger vision of Taiwan studies in North America. She outlined three strategies to propel the field forward: enhancing data accessibility, bolstering theorizing capability, and expanding transnational and global comparisons. APARC Deputy Director and Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui moderated the conversation, integrating the diverse perspectives into a discussion of Taiwan's societal milieu.

Technology, Innovation, and Economic Growth

The conference emphasized Taiwan's success as a modernization exemplar while addressing its challenges on the journey toward a sustainable economic future.

The second panel examined Taiwan's strides in healthcare innovation and biotechnological advancements, with industry leaders offering glimpses into the transformative potential of AI-driven healthcare solutions. Ted Chang, CTO of Quanta Computer, Bobby Sheng, Group CEO of Bora Pharmaceuticals, and C. Jason Wang, Stanford’s LCY Tan Lan Lee Professor of Pediatrics and Health Policy, reflected on the convergence of technology and healthcare delivery and the new era it heralds for personalized medicine and digital health solutions. APARC’s Asia Health Policy Program Director Karen Eggleston moderated the discussion, prompting the panelists to consider questions of equitable access and trust in healthcare technology.

Larry Diamond, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, led a following conversation on the strategic imperatives for Taiwan's economic future and global positioning. Four experts joined him: Steve Chen, co-founder of YouTube, Jason Hsu, former legislator of the Legislative Yuan Taiwan, investment banker CY Huang, founder and president of FCC Partners, and digital commerce leader Rose Tsou, a former executive at Verizon Media, MTV, and Yahoo.

The panelists agreed that Taiwan must address its strained cross-Strait relations, develop a more diversified economy, move beyond sole reliance on semiconductors, and modify its energy policy to meet growing electricity demand and the transition to a low-carbon economy.

Another consensus emerged about the need for government intervention to create an environment more conducive to entrepreneurship and global talent. Chen, who relocated his family to Taiwan in 2019 after two decades in Silicon Valley, shared his efforts in cultivating the island's startup ecosystem and experience being the inaugural recipient of the Taiwan Gold Card Visa, issued by the Taiwanese government to attract foreign talent for residence and employment.

Taiwanese Identity and Taiwan Studies at Stanford

Highlighting the role of youth and community engagement, the conference also included a student panel centered on Taiwanese identity and Taiwan studies on campus. Second-year student in Management Science and Engineering Tiffany Chang, who is also a pageant queen and research assistant at APARC, shared her introspective journey of self-discovery through her experience becoming Miss Asia USA, representing the Taiwanese community, and acting as an ambassador for Asian communities at large.

Carissa Cheng, a third-year student in International Relations, described her advocacy for community cohesion via Stanford’s Taiwanese Cultural Society. Yi-Ting Chung, a PhD candidate in the Department of History, recounted her experience designing and teaching a course in Taiwanese history. She argued that Taiwanese history merits being taught in a dedicated history class rather than as a subset of Chinese or Japanese history. ”The existence of a Taiwanese history class at Stanford is a statement and a way for students to have a vested interest in Taiwan,” she said. Third-year student in international Relations Marco Widodo moderated the dynamic conversation.

Marked by multidisciplinary inquiry and cross-cultural exchange, the conference ignited dialogue on Taiwan’s future and generated enthusiasm for collaboration on building a leading program on Taiwan at Stanford.

Media coverage of the "Innovate Taiwan" conference is available via:

Central News Agency >
Radio Taiwan International >

The possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan has been front and center to the simmering tensions between China and the United States, but American and other world leaders are failing to take the measures necessary to deter China from taking Taiwan by force, argues Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and an expert on Chinese military and Asia-Pacific security. Mastro, who is also affiliated with APARC, joined the Center's Visiting Scholar Gita Wirjawan, host of the "Endgame" video podcast, to consider the likelihood of a war over Taiwan, Chinese military modernization, Beijing's ambitions in the South China Sea, and the future of Asia. 

Mastro believes Xi Jinping will use force to compel Taiwan to unite with the mainland once he is confident in the Chinese military’s ability to succeed in relevant joint operations, like an amphibious attack. She predicts that the flashpoint is likely to occur in 2027 — by which time, "if the pieces are on the board in a relatively similar manner" and the Chinese military is convinced it can quickly take over the island before the United States can intervene with force, then there will be nothing left "to convince Xi not to resolve this most important issue for the Communist Party."

This conversation with Mastro is part of an "Endgame" interview series Wirjawan is recording with Stanford experts during his residency at APARC.

As Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine reaches the two-year mark, the geopolitical reverberations of the assault have changed the dynamics of Western alliance systems, taxed the "no-limits" China-Russia partnership, and created an unexpected U.S.-E.U. alignment on China policy, tells Stanford historian and Russia expert Stephen Kotkin, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, to APARC Visiting Scholar Gita Wirjawan, host of the popular 'Endgame" video podcast.

Kotkin, who is also APARC faculty and the Kleinheinz Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, posits that the war in Ukraine has shocked Western European nations out of a dependence on Russian energy and increased scrutiny on partnerships with autocratic states that flaunt the rules-based international order. He calls this new dynamic a revival of Transatlanticism, arguing that a Transatlantic alliance could be deemed as a "pivot to Asia" and that the strengthening of institutional ties between the U.S. and the E.U. is vital to counter an ascendant China. 

In contrast with the popular portrayal of the U.S.-China competition as purely bilateral, Kotkin argues that, to compete with China, the United States must incorporate allies and other like-minded "institutional Western" nations (as opposed to geographically Western nations) in multilateral engagement.

"We have to share the planet with China," says Kotkin, but what are the terms of such coexistence, he asks, "and how do we negotiate those terms so that we preserve the free and open societies, the rule of law, the institutional West that accounts for our peace and prosperity?"

Throughout the conversation, Kotkin also addresses the perception of the increasing hegemony of China with respect to Southeast Asia, shares his intellectual influences, and talks about the importance of history in navigating the future.

This conversation with Kotkin is part of an "Endgame" interview series Wirjawan is recording with Stanford experts during his residency at APARC.

This commentary first appeared in Foreign Affairs.

North Korea has long been a source of instability, but a new development over the past year threatens to make things even worse: the country is teaming up with Russia. At a meeting in Pyongyang last July, North Korea’s defense minister, Kang Sun Nam, and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, vowed to expand their countries’ military cooperation to “resolutely stand against” their “common enemy,” the United States. Then, at a September summit with President Vladimir Putin in Russia, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un toasted the Kremlin’s “sacred struggle” against “a band of evil”—a reference to Western countries—and called Putin the “Korean people’s closest friend.”

The North Korean–Russian convergence goes beyond rhetoric. Russia has been propping up the Kim regime with food aid, along with fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, and equipment for ballistic missile production. There are signs that Russia is sharing its expertise, too. In July, North Korea conducted a test launch of a technologically sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile, and in November, it managed to send its first military reconnaissance satellite into orbit after several failed attempts.

The transfer of critical supplies goes both ways. North Korea is sending Russia much-needed artillery shells to use in its war in Ukraine, with U.S. officials confirming in October that more than 1,000 containers of arms had arrived in Russia by ship and by train. Pyongyang’s equipment is hardly world-class—its shells have a 20 percent failure rate, whereas most advanced U.S. munitions have failure rates in the low single digits—but many of North Korea’s missiles are difficult for Ukraine to defend itself against because they are long-range, which allows Russian forces to fire from deep within their own territory, and low-tech, which helps them evade detection. North Korean military assistance could therefore be decisive in Russia’s campaign to halt Ukrainian troops’ progress. For Pyongyang, meanwhile, the arms transfer is an opportunity to test its wares in battle.

In addition to undermining U.S. and allied efforts to defend Ukraine, expanding North Korean–Russian cooperation threatens to destabilize the Korean Peninsula. On January 5, less than a week after reports emerged that Russia had launched its first North Korean–made ballistic missiles into Ukraine, North Korea fired hundreds of artillery rounds into the sea near its disputed border with South Korea. On January 14, North Korea conducted its first intermediate-range ballistic missile test of the year and formally announced that it no longer considered South Korea a “partner of reconciliation and reunification” but an enemy that had to be conquered—through nuclear war, if necessary.

As if this were not enough, China is playing a counterproductive role. Beijing’s security relationship with Russia has deepened: Russia has provided critical weapons and defense-industrial expertise to China, and the two countries are engaging in more frequent and sophisticated joint military exercises. Beijing, in effect, has sanctioned a larger Russian military role in Asia and provided the political cover and economic lifeline Putin needs to continue fighting in Ukraine. China has also shielded North Korea from international sanctions and pressure designed to force Kim to give up his nuclear weapons program. There is historical precedent for the three countries’ working together, too. During the Cold War, China, North Korea, and Russia were all committed to “opposing imperialism”—code for their anti-Western activities. Their cooperation facilitated conflict around the world, including in eastern Europe, on the Korean Peninsula, and across the Taiwan Strait.

The good news, however, is that this trilateral alignment turned out poorly for all three countries during the Cold War—and if the United States plays its cards right, it can fail this time around, too. Chinese and Soviet backing helped North Korea fight South Korea and its allies to a draw, leading to an armistice agreement in 1953, but subsequent decades of poverty and international pariah status can hardly be considered a victory for Pyongyang. As for Beijing and Moscow, cooperation soon gave way to the Sino-Soviet split and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Although today’s circumstances are different, familiar signs of unease are already visible among China, North Korea, and Russia—rifts the United States can exploit.

An Unstable Triangle
 

China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union’s falling out over the course of the 1950s is instructive. The decade began with the two larger powers, China and the Soviet Union, committed to each other’s security and to supporting other communist countries, including North Korea. In 1950, Beijing and Moscow signed an alliance agreement vowing mutual defense in the event of an attack and pledging to coordinate their activities against the West. Both supported Kim Il Sung, the founding father of North Korea and the grandfather of Kim Jong Un, in his bid to attack South Korea the same year. When China sent its own forces into the brutal fighting on the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union backed the Chinese effort with military aid and expertise. 

But this cooperation was not to last. After the death of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, introduced political reforms and pursued “peaceful coexistence” with the United States. The Soviet Union’s pivot threatened to undermine the Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s domestic project, which emulated Stalin’s harsh governance. Meanwhile, Chinese attacks on Taiwanese-controlled islands, China’s 1962 border war with India, and the Great Leap Forward—Beijing’s disastrous economic and social program of that period—elicited contempt in Moscow. Mao’s personal jabs at the Soviet leadership did not help matters, either. By 1960, the Soviet Union had canceled 12 aid agreements and roughly 200 science and technology projects in China.

Back then, as now, Beijing and Moscow were revisionist great powers with limited willingness to advance the other’s ambitions. Both expected more from a partnership than mere protection. Beijing sought financial assistance for its defense-industrial base and political support to lend legitimacy to the regime. Moscow wanted to lead an ever-expanding communist bloc and to secure China’s help in undermining the United States’ position in Asia. Although the two sides shared many of the same interests, their priorities differed. And they would clash over tactics, especially when it came to dealing with third parties. Beijing and Moscow disagreed, for instance, about how to respond to Polish and Hungarian resistance against Soviet control in 1956: Mao even warned that China would support Poland if the Soviet Union dispatched troops to quell the unrest. 

Chinese and Soviet leaders weighed the benefits and risks of teaming up. Great powers can use alliances to strengthen their militaries and enhance their deterrence, but forming a partnership can also provoke a potential adversary or draw one of the great powers, against its wishes, into its ally’s disputes. During the 1950s, for example, Soviet leaders grew concerned that China’s dispute with Taiwan would undermine their plans to discuss détente with the United States. 

Similar stresses could now be opening fissures between China and its partners. Closer cooperation between North Korea and Russia has highlighted a fundamental tension in Russia’s relationship with China: unlike Pyongyang, Beijing has been unwilling to aid Moscow’s war effort directly. Russia’s requests for military equipment and aid from China have gone unanswered. (Russian officials have claimed that China secretly agreed to provide lethal weapons, but U.S. assessments have found no evidence that this is true.) Beijing’s official stance on the war in Ukraine is to remain neutral. It has called for de-escalation, reiterated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, and affirmed the sovereignty of all nations. None of China’s statements have contained explicit rebukes of Russia, but they have not expressed full-throated support, either. The fact that Russia had to turn to North Korea for aid shows how little material assistance Moscow is receiving from Beijing. In the immediate term, Russia has no choice but to take what help it can get, but eventually the discovery that its “no limits” partnership with China does, in fact, have limits may force a reckoning with the risks of relying on Beijing. 

For China’s part, the North Korean–Russian relationship undermines Beijing’s influence on the Korean Peninsula. With no indication of having consulted China, Russia opted to ignore United Nations trade sanctions (which both China and Russia had signed on to) and sell North Korea the advanced military technology its leaders have long desired. Now that Russia is willing to provide benefits that China will not, Pyongyang is turning closer to Moscow, and Beijing has lost significant leverage. To be sure, China is still North Korea’s largest trading partner. And even when North Korea was almost wholly dependent on China, Kim sometimes felt free to dismiss Chinese leaders’ preferences. But Russian support gives Pyongyang a stronger hand to take action that could impede Beijing’s regional and global ambitions. For example, Beijing will not want North Korea—or Russia, for that matter—to jeopardize its attempts to unify Taiwan with mainland China. But a crisis on the Korean Peninsula could spoil China’s plans by driving the United States and its allies toward deeper defense integration, just as the North’s 1950 invasion of the South pushed the United States to rethink its security interests in the region and sign a defense pact with Taiwan in 1954.

The most damning consequence of North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia may be that it is damaging China’s broader diplomatic and security environment. An emboldened North Korea and an aggressive Russia do nothing to improve China’s image or help it compete with the United States. Nothing unites U.S. allies more than shared concerns about North Korean or Russian belligerence. And as a partner of both countries, China is expected to use its own political capital to solve the problems they cause. At a December summit with EU leaders in Beijing, for example, Chinese officials wanted to focus on long-term plans for bilateral relations and caution against a European “de-risking” strategy that threatens China’s technological ambitions and economic interests. But the European delegation instead opened the talks by urging China to leverage its economic influence over Russia “to put an end to the Russian aggression against Ukraine.” 

China has long regarded a trilateral alliance among Japan, South Korea, and the United States as a critical threat to its security, even seeking guarantees from Seoul and Tokyo that they would not enter such a pact. Part of the case Beijing is making to reassure both capitals is that China is prepared to serve as the “stabilizer” of Northeast Asia—a message it repeated in a meeting with Japanese and South Korean officials after North Korea launched its spy satellite in November. At the same meeting, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin urged Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to encourage North Korea to halt its provocations and pursue denuclearization. But China’s commitment to playing “a constructive role” could amount to little if North Korea, bolstered by Russia, does not respond to Beijing’s overtures. At a certain point, even if other countries in the region do not see China as complicit in North Korea’s bellicose actions, Japan, South Korea, and the United States are bound to make defense decisions that will be unwelcome in Beijing.

China, recognizing the danger of being grouped with North Korea and Russia, has tried to publicly distance itself from the two countries. In late January, Liu Pengyu, the spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington, told Voice of America that he was “unaware” that North Korea and Russia were cooperating on military matters. China has also denied playing any role in the two countries’ recent collaboration. In line with that claim, when Moscow suggested that North Korea join Chinese-Russian naval drills in September, Beijing did not respond. The official Chinese media has also downplayed the idea of a trilateral alliance among China, North Korea, and Russia. In China’s telling, such a partnership is “concocted” by Western media to justify closer military cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States and generate a Cold War mindset by framing regional politics in terms of two opposing blocs. Beijing still sees real, if limited, benefits from its relationships with North Korea and Russia, but it is clearly concerned that Moscow and Pyongyang’s actions will do China more harm than good.

Let the Chips Fall

The United States and its allies can encourage fissures in the emerging autocratic bloc, but they must proceed with caution. Erecting obstacles is the wrong approach. Taking a page from history, Washington should recognize that China, North Korea, and Russia will sabotage their triangular alignment all on their own. During the Korean War, for instance, Soviet air support for Chinese forces was not forthcoming despite promises from Moscow, and in the 1960s, the Soviet Union reneged on commitments to lend its nuclear expertise to China. Moscow’s continued reluctance to support Beijing, let alone extend security assistance, in times of crisis was a major contributor to the Sino-Soviet split.

Recently, the war in Ukraine provided a perfect opportunity for China to disappoint its partner by refusing to fully back Russia’s military campaign. But the Biden administration squandered that opportunity by threatening China with “consequences” should it assist the Russian war effort and by adding Chinese companies that it asserted were supporting the Russian military to a trade blacklist. Even without these warnings, Beijing would have been unlikely to provide significant aid. Now, however, Beijing can contain the damage to its relationship with Moscow by blaming the United States for China’s failure to help a friend. If Washington had left the issue alone or confined its threats to private channels, China and Russia’s disagreement might have snowballed into an even larger rift.

The best way for the United States to counter the Chinese-Russian alignment is by using it to rally U.S. allies and partners. Shared perceptions of a threat create a fertile environment for deepening alliances and breaking ground on new areas of defense cooperation. Such a mindset has already allowed Japan and South Korea to look past their historic animosities and work together more closely than ever before. Each country decided to reinstate the other’s preferred trade partner status last spring, and in December they resumed high-level economic talks after an eight-year hiatus. U.S. allies in Europe that were previously reluctant to push back against Beijing may also change their minds as they come to see China and Russia as a unified threat—perhaps enough to persuade them to help the United States deter Chinese aggression in Asia. China has been reluctant to support Russia’s military and political goals in Europe in part because Beijing values its economic relationships with European countries. If those countries join the United States in taking a harder line on China, Beijing may conclude that an association with Russia and its disruptive tactics comes with too high a cost.

For now, coordination between North Korea and Russia makes it harder for the United States and its allies to compel either country to leave behind its revisionist, aggressive tendencies and assume a constructive role in the international community. But if their relationship sufficiently threatens China, Beijing may choose to distance itself from both Moscow and Pyongyang. It might even go so far as to try to push North Korea and Russia apart. The United States and its allies were not the primary reason for the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War, and they will not be the cause of the next Chinese-Russian rift—but they can make the most of the regional dynamics hastening a divide.