North Korea’s military provocations including ICBM tests and spy satellite launches have intensified tensions on the Korean peninsula and beyond, and many questions have arisen about how South Korea and its allies will manage this increased threat. APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin recently joined Arirang News for a conversation in an episode of “Within the Frame” to examine the geopolitical uncertainty surrounding the Korean Peninsula in 2024. 

The conversation covered a wide range of topics, including North Korea's intentions and recent provocations, Japan-U.S.-South Korea trilateral cooperation, Seoul-Beijing relations, tensions over Taiwan, and South Korean politics and soft power. Watch the full interview below (an excerpted version is also available here):

Shin said that North Korea’s intentions to become a nuclear state are clear and that it will continue to develop its nuclear arsenal and conventional military capabilities in 2024. He also argued that few in the international community are currently focused on halting North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. 

In terms of the Japan-U.S.-South Korea alliance, Shin mentioned that the Yoon government has done a very good job of strengthening trilateral cooperation, but the outcome of the 2024 U.S. election may affect the dynamics of the alliance, especially if Donald Trump becomes President again. 

When asked about a potential “new Cold War” paradigm focusing on China, North Korea, and Russia's alignment, Shin warned that this characterization is strategically risky and stated that “we shouldn’t be creating a Cold War that doesn’t exist.” Shin pointed out that the current paradigm is much more interdependent and much more complicated. “I don’t think China wants to side with Russia or North Korea all the time because its relations with the global community are different from those of Russia or North Korea. We shouldn’t fall into this false logic of a Cold War in Northeast Asia.” 

Another topic discussed was South Korean relations with China. In Shin’s view, South Korea must deal with its domestic anti-China sentiment to improve Seoul-Beijing relations and must also promote more people-to-people exchange. He noted the sharp drop in the number of South Korean students going to China to study and the number of Chinese students coming to South Korea.

Shin also discussed the tensions surrounding a potential military conflict in Taiwan, suggesting that a contingency might become one of the most difficult foreign policy challenges for the South Korean government, perhaps even more challenging than its relations with North Korea. 

U.S.-China relations have deteriorated to a level unforeseen since the early 1960s. China’s rapid military modernization, maritime posturing, and diplomatic withdrawals signal a persistent security-focused approach from Beijing. What is to be done in an era of great power competition, where policies promoting careful coexistence and reduction of tensions are deprioritized?

In a new article for The Washington Quarterly titled “China’s America Policy: Back to the Future,” co-authors Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC fellow, and David M. Lampton, a senior research fellow at the Johns Hopkins—SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and a former Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at FSI, explain the current tensions through a comprehensive analysis of the historical drivers of Chinese policy. The article enhances the understanding of Chinese grand strategy and proposes a series of policy prescriptions to help reduce the dangerous externalities of the diplomatic feud between Beijing and Washington.

March 2024 update: Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton joined Kaiser Kuo, host of the Sinica Podcast, to discuss their Washington Quarterly article. Listen:

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) sponsored the talk entitled "China's America Policy: Origins and Implications" by Dr. Tom Fingar on February 15, 2024. Watch:

Unhelpful Caricatures of China

Fingar and Lampton begin the article by acknowledging that U.S. policy is an important driver of Chinese behavior. They argue that U.S. policy has often been based on inaccurate and oft-counterproductive characterizations of China.

The authors challenge reductivist portrayals of Chinese strategy as purely ideological are misleading, asserting that “describing the PRC as an autocracy means interpreting its behavior as part of an ideological crusade to preserve the regime and thwart U.S. ambitions” and that  “Beijing’s Communist Party leaders, like leaders in all countries, seek to preserve their political system, but that is not their only objective.”

Fingar and Lampton also dispute the prevailing view in Washington of China as an “unstoppable juggernaut determined — and/or destined — to displace the United States and remake the international system,” emphasizing instead that current PRC behavior is better understood as the product of perceived weakness and fragility.

To manage the current impasse, the authors suggest that Washington must avoid exacerbating the situation and must shape Chinese perceptions in a way that might facilitate a transition to a more cooperative coexistence.

The True Drivers of China’s Strategy

The authors purport that, over the centuries, China’s policy options have coalesced into one of two comprehensive approaches: one that prioritizes national and regime security, and another prioritizing economic and social development.

The first approach assumes a hostile international environment and promotes “economic autarky, tighter domestic social control, ideological conformity, a leader-in-charge approach to governance, and deep suspicion of foreigners.” The second “emphasizes the gains to be made through interdependence and openness, places less emphasis on ideology, and instead underscores the importance of experts, pragmatism, initiative and innovation.”

These two drivers, in the authors’ view, neatly explain the last century of Chinese grand strategy and frame the current administration’s emphasis on security and coercive Wolf Warrior Diplomacy.

Theories of Encirclement

The authors add that, both historically and currently, an important category of factors shaping Chinese policy is assumed subversion, that is, “persistent attitudes […] centered on suspicion and fear of outsiders (foreign countries and groups) and social forces swirling in China itself [...] Almost any action that could be negative for China is perceived as taken to weaken the regime.”

Chinese commentators often cite U.S. foreign policy activities — including Secretary of State Clinton’s statements about maritime claims at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, the Obama Administration’s 2011 “Pivot to Asia,” NATO’s and other security groupings’ involvement in Asia, and alleged U.S. efforts to foment regime change through “peaceful evolution” — as a rationale for Beijing’s increased assertiveness.

However, Fingar and Lampton see these as excuses and contributing factors to decisions primarily motivated by concerns about a perceived growing danger of domestic instability that would impede economic growth and erode regime legitimacy.

What can be done?

In the final section of the article, the authors reflect on the poor state of U.S.-China ties, arguing that “relations will spiral unless domestic factors persuade Beijing to reprioritize growth and development.” Indeed, Xi Jinping’s return to the security-minded policy package signifies a departure from the cooperative approach prevalent in the latter half of the 20th century. The authors emphasize that an escape from the current downward trajectory in U.S.-China bilateral relations “will not occur without joint efforts and a change in the domestic politics of both societies.”

For this to happen, Beijing must first perceive less hostile intent from Washington. According to the authors, this will be no easy feat. Despite common expressions of intent to improve relations and to put a “floor” under the relationship voiced at ministerial-level meetings and recent meetings between Biden and Xi, little has improved in real terms. “Even limited and tangible efforts to pick low-hanging fruit such as mutual reduction of tariffs, restoration of academic exchanges, and reopening closed consulates remain dormant or ineffective.”

For Fingar and Lampton, Washington needs an approach that does not depend on prior or simultaneous moves by Beijing. The authors provide three concrete areas that may help bolster U.S.-China ties. The first is to avoid behaviors that push “PRC hot buttons” and trigger predictable reactions that stymie meaningful dialogue. The U.S. must continue to conduct necessary and appropriate military exercises in international waters and airspace and should call out dangerous or unprofessional actions by the PLA Navy or Air Force.

To this end, the U.S. should also avoid making statements and take actions that make it difficult for Beijing to respond positively, as “many third country observers are spring-loaded to criticize US inaction to reduce tensions [...] Conversely, PRC initiatives should be treated seriously, examined carefully, and addressed appropriately.”

The second area of improvement is to avoid declaring preconditions for discussions or taking actions that may not be in U.S. interests. Such preconditions rarely, if ever, have eased or accelerated desirable outcomes, and imposing conditions further complicates the resolution of issues and indicates to third countries that the United States is solely responsible for tensions.

To start the process, the authors suggest that “both sides ought to pick some low-hanging policy fruit like reopening consulates in Houston and Chengdu and increasing mutual media access [...] Both sides should see the benefit of having more than 350 American students studying in China.”

The third and most complicated issue is Taiwan. “Taiwan-related issues are the elephant in the room that cannot be ignored, but there is nothing to be gained by abandoning the policy of strategic ambiguity or further muddying the US position,” write Fingar and Lampton.

The authors suggest that the correct response to speculation on this issue should be “restatement of the USG position that the use of force in the Taiwan Strait is unacceptable, that there will be absolutely no support for Taiwan independence unless Taipei and Beijing peacefully reach agreement, and that relations between the people of Taiwan and the United States will remain unofficial [...] Washington needs to stop nibbling around the edges of the One China Policy.”

Only when progress is made on these three areas will perceived threats to Beijing begin to diminish. In the meantime, the current U.S. and Chinese framework of great power competition that “justifies efforts to hobble the other, is harmful to both countries and impedes international efforts to address global challenges.”

The authors deploy the “first law of holes” as a good place to start: “When you are in a hole as we are now in the relationship with China, stop digging. Making things worse is a poor way to seek improvement.” A reduction in tensions will not be easy, but tangible and modest measures to avoid hostility and work toward bounded competition and even cooperation on transnational challenge areas like pandemic disease and climate change mitigation should remain a possibility. 

This article first appeared in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. You can also download its PDF version.

With the conclusion of the Cold War, Southeast Asia entered a transformative era that spanned approximately 25 years. During this period, the geopolitics of the region underwent profound changes, reshaping the foundations of regional security. Washington’s two pivotal alliances in Southeast Asia, which had been cornerstones of stability, struggled to find purpose. In the post-Cold War era, U.S.–Philippine relations weathered a turbulent course, while the alliance between Washington and Bangkok drifted. Policymakers in Washington relegated both alliances to secondary roles in U.S. Asian foreign policy.

However, since the inauguration of the Bongbong Marcos administration, the past year has witnessed a revitalization of the U.S.–Philippine alliance. A series of proactive measures have been taken to strengthen defense ties, highlighted by Marcos’ successful visit to Washington and a continuous stream of high-level US officials visiting Manila. In stark contrast, US–Thai relations have continued to amble along, characterized by senior-level visits but a conspicuous lack of momentum, leading some to question whether the relationship qualifies any longer as an “alliance.”[1]

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How Did We Reach This Point?

Numerous factors have contributed to the erosion of the alliance, which reached its zenith during the Vietnam War, driven by mutual concerns regarding communist expansionism. Rewinding to 1975, the fall of Saigon and the broader U.S. withdrawal from the region left Thai officials bewildered, shaking their confidence in Washington. Consequently, they embarked on diversifying their international relationships, notably by establishing ties with China.

The conclusion of the Cold War severed the alliance from a shared threat or adversary, and it marked the loss of the strategic lens through which Washington had previously viewed Thailand and Southeast Asia as a whole. The United States began exerting pressure on Thailand on a wide array of issues, spanning from trade matters to democracy and human rights. Thai officials voiced discontent, asserting that they were no longer receiving the special treatment befitting an ally. Furthermore, during the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis, Washington offered minimal support and encouraged Thailand to follow the International Monetary Fund’s stringent prescriptions. In contrast, China provided more substantial support to its new partner. This period of U.S. policy remains a source of disappointment, if not anger, for many Thais.

Relations experienced a modest warming in the early 2000s. Washington embraced Thailand’s democratic progress, its cooperation in the Global War on Terror, and its role as a regional hub for security cooperation, humanitarian relief, and US diplomatic endeavors. The US military and American officials working closely with Bangkok highly valued Thailand’s collaboration on an array of issues. The George W. Bush administration even bestowed major non-NATO ally status upon Thailand and initiated negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement. However, this period of the alliance paled in comparison to its former “glory days.” This was evident in the absence of a shared threat perception, the dearth of substantial personal connections between senior Thai and US officials, and the relatively limited attention Washington—outside of the Pentagon—paid to Thailand.

The downward trajectory of the relationship gained momentum in 2006 when the Thai military ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s government in a coup. Washington denounced the coup and suspended military assistance in compliance with the law, though this reaction did not precipitate a complete breakdown in the relationship. Over the subsequent years, Thailand’s deep-seated political polarization, persistent street protests by the “yellow shirts” and “red shirts,” and occasional judicial interventions in electoral politics led to bewilderment and frustration among US officials.[2] They struggled to comprehend why the Thai establishment found it challenging to accept the outcomes of competitive elections.

The turning point came in 2014 with another military coup, which prompted a sharply critical response from the United States. This included another suspension of military aid and a deliberate distancing of the United States from the new Thai government. In response, the coup government and its conservative supporters bitterly criticized Washington, alleging double standards and a lack of understanding of the Thai situation. The government also began leaning increasingly toward China, which offered diplomatic backing, arms, and additional defense cooperation. Bangkok maintained a distinct chilliness toward the United States for several years, even initiating a brief ‘investigation’ of US Ambassador Glyn Davies for public comments related to the lèse-majesté law.[3]

The Trump administration, with a focus on the geopolitical rivalry with China rather than democracy and human rights, reengaged with Thailand in 2017-2018. It invited then–Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha to the White House and restored military-to-military relations following Thailand’s pseudo-democratic 2019 elections. These actions stabilized bilateral relations, albeit at a less enthusiastic level than what the two countries had enjoyed for decades.

Where Relations Stand Today

After a sluggish start, the Biden administration ramped up its efforts in 2022 to enhance the United States’ relationship with Thailand. This included hosting Prime Minister Prayut as part of the US–ASEAN Summit, convening the inaugural bilateral Strategic and Defense Dialogue, dispatching Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Bangkok for discussions on military modernization, and publicly lauding the signing of a communiqué by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai. The communiqué was framed as an expansion of the renowned 1962 Rusk-Thanat communiqué, which had solidified the alliance half a century earlier.[4]

Despite these advancements, the relationship has yet to approach its previous heights for several notable reasons. Foremost, the two nations lack a shared perception of common threats. Notably, the United States perceives China as a threat, while Thailand regards China as a significant partner. Consequently, Washington has no doubt felt dissatisfaction with the deepening security ties between Thailand and China, including arms sales and joint military exercises.

Secondly, the United States has voiced its discontent with Thailand’s robust support for the Myanmar junta and its neutral stance regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Thirdly, the Biden administration continues to be disappointed with the Thai conservative establishment’s employment of legal and parliamentary tactics to impede the restoration of full democracy in the kingdom. As an indication of this disappointment, the Biden administration opted not to invite Thailand to participate in its December 2021 and March 2023 Summits for Democracy. These decisions irked Thai authorities, as did President Joe Biden’s choice to skip the Thailand-hosted Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders meeting in late 2022.[5] Furthermore, Washington’s recent refusal of Thailand’s request to purchase F-35 fighter jets, possibly influenced by concerns regarding Thailand’s deepening security ties with China, undoubtedly contributed to Bangkok’s frustration.[6]

The Way Ahead

As previously highlighted, the current reality has prompted some to question the relevance of the U.S.–Thailand alliance in its current form. Some wonder if it might be more accurate to reclassify the relationship as something other than a traditional alliance, considering the glaring lack of strategic alignment and Thailand’s burgeoning closeness to China. Considering these factors, it appears that the objectives of the two nations are increasingly divergent. In fact, discreet voices in Thailand have been quietly suggesting for years that their “alliance” with the United States appears less meaningful and valuable when compared to Washington’s “partnerships” with non-allies, such as Singapore and even Vietnam.

While it is true that the current state of the relationship is more aptly described as a partnership rather than a conventional alliance, this does not necessarily imply that the governments should terminate the alliance altogether. In the realm of diplomacy, such a move would inevitably be perceived as a downgrade of the relationship, regardless of any new title applied to it. It would be more prudent for both governments to focus on enhancing the substance and tone of the relationship while accepting the inherent ambiguity of being somewhat misaligned allies.

The key to strengthening these ties lies in both countries adjusting their expectations regarding each other and the relationship itself. The United States should accept that Thailand is not currently strategically aligned with Washington nor a full-fledged democracy. Nevertheless, Thailand can still play a crucial role as an important partner. This recognition, among other factors, necessitates patience concerning Thailand’s domestic politics and faith that the kingdom will not fall excessively under China’s influence. Instead, like Indonesia and Malaysia, it can seek to maintain positive relations with both major powers as well as numerous middle powers.

On the other hand, Thailand should realize that its relationship with Washington holds significance for its own strategic autonomy, security, and economic interests. It should strive to be a more constructive partner.

Moving forward, both nations can capitalize on the numerous strengths within their broad and deep relationship. The United States remains Thailand’s leading export market and its third-largest source of foreign investment. Thailand has also aligned itself with Washington’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Health cooperation, notably the long-standing partnership in health research, continues to thrive. The security relationship, which has long been at the core of the alliance, remains robust, albeit less exclusive than in the past. The United States and Thailand jointly host the influential annual Cobra Gold exercise and engage in cooperation and training across various domains. Washington continues to be a key supplier of weaponry and equipment to the Thai military. The two countries also collaborate closely on law enforcement, including counternarcotics efforts. People-to-people connections, including the Peace Corps program, educational exchanges, scholarships, and various initiatives, help maintain a deep reservoir of goodwill between the two nations.

The recent Thai elections represented a missed opportunity. The establishment of a new government led by the victorious political party could have triggered a surge in US enthusiasm for the relationship, not because Washington endorsed a particular party, but because it would have marked a triumph for democracy. Regrettably, Thailand’s conservative establishment obstructed that party from forming a government, resulting in a less democratic outcome.

Despite the disappointing outcome, the emergence of a new Thai government and a fresh Thai foreign minister provides an opening to strengthen cooperation between the US and Thailand on regional and subregional issues. Thailand has traditionally been influential in these areas, but its diplomacy lacked vigor during the Prayut era. This potential cooperation encompasses expanded efforts to safeguard the crucial Mekong River ecosystem, increased collaboration on mitigating and addressing climate change, and the enhancement of economic ties among mainland Southeast Asian nations.

A new government could also facilitate more constructive dialogue regarding Myanmar, offering a prime opportunity to increase cross-border humanitarian assistance. On the defense and security front, both countries should reinitiate discussions on the earlier proposal to transform U-Tapao Air Base into a regional disaster relief hub. Additionally, regular dialogues on potential security concerns, such as the possibility of Chinese access to Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, are essential.

While a return to the alliance’s heyday seems unlikely, a path to a more productive and robust relationship between these long-standing allies exists through patience, persistence, and a willingness to embrace new geopolitical realities.

NOTES

[1] Several authors recently have discussed this alliance versus partnership question. See, for example, Benjamin Zawacki, “U.S.-Thai Relations Have an Alliance Problem,” Foreign Policy, 12 May 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/; and Murray Hiebert, “The United States Makes Up Critical Terrain in Thailand,” CSIS, 2 September 2022, https://www.csis.org/.

[2] See: Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “Two Thailands: Clashing Political Orders and Entrenched Polarization,” in Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia: Old Divisions, New Dangers, ed. Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020), 67–80, https://carnegieendowment.org/. The red shirts initially emerged as backers of the deposed former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who faced removal in a military coup in September 2006. Over time, this support shifted to Thailand’s ruling Pheu Thai party, led by Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra. Conversely, the yellow shirts signify those who stood in opposition to Mr. Thaksin and played a pivotal role in the street protests that precipitated the 2006 coup.

[3] Thomas Fuller, “Thai Police Investigate U.S. Ambassador on Suspicion of Insulting the King,” New York Times, 9 December 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/. This law makes it illegal to defame, insult, or threaten the monarch of Thailand.

[4] “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai Remarks to the Press” (press release, US Department of State, 10 July 2022), https://www.state.gov/.

[5] Masayuki Yuda, “Thailand Belittled Again as U.S. Ostracizes It From Democracy Summit,” Nikkei Asia, 9 December 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/; and “Thailand Shut Out of U.S. Democracy Summit Again,” Bangkok Post, 29 March 2023, https://www.bangkokpost.com/.

[6] Matthew Fulco and Chen Chuanren, “U.S.-Thai Military Alliance Is At A Crossroads,” Aviation Week, 19 July 2023, https://aviationweek.com/.

From the League of Nations to the United Nations, multilateral institutions have come to define the landscape of modern international relations. Large and diverse groupings like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have served as a venue for facilitating regional collaboration. Yet, as the world enters a new era of great power competition between the United States and China, many question the relevance of these institutions and multilateralism more broadly. The declining quality and quantity of multilateral deliverables and the increasing prevalence of so-called “minilaterals'' has spurred numerous scholarly inquiries into the future relevance of groups like APEC.

On December 5, in the wake of the APEC 2023 convening in San Francisco, the China Program at Shorenstein APARC presented “The Future of Multilateral Institutions in the Era of Great Power Competition,” the concluding session in the Center's autumn 2023 seminar series on APEC's role in facilitating regional cooperation.

The speakers included Matthew P. Goodman, a distinguished fellow for global economic policy and Director of the Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and Michael McFaul, director at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. APARC China Policy Fellow Laura Stone moderated the conversation.

The panel opened with a discussion of how, in the past, APEC was deemed especially relevant and productive as it generated agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), fostered cooperation on initiatives aimed at encouraging women’s participation in the economy, and facilitated some of the first regional sustainability policy protocols.

Goodman provided background context of the current debate around APEC’s relevance, stating that “advancing APEC’s agenda is very hard and always has been […] you are dealing with 21 diverse economies.” The upside, said Goodman, is that the convergence of representatives of multiple countries holds significant influence. “[APEC] is very powerful when it comes to sharing best practices and interacting with the business community, something hardwired into APEC via the business advisory council.”

Goodman sees multiple positive outcomes from this year’s convening in San Francisco, such as coordination on the Alliance for Just Energy Transformation (AJET), food security initiatives, women's empowerment initiatives, and “lots of sustainability work, with a specific mandate of tripling energy capacity […] This sets an agenda and creates a mandate for bureaucracies.”

McFaul elaborated on Goodman’s analysis by providing anecdotal context from his time serving in the Obama administration, stating that “Obama was committed to multilateralism, particularly in Asia, and his theory was that multilaterals are a way for us to advance economic security and U.S. interests.”

McFaul proceeded to describe some of the outcomes of this approach, including the TPP, the Open Government Partnership (OGP), and nonproliferation efforts, stating that the early Obama era represented “a moment focused on multilaterals, and was needed to manage the financial catastrophe of 2008.”

“What we see in 2023 is weak tea in comparison to 2009, yet compared to how things were going over the last few years, this year represents a great achievement.”

For McFaul, APEC 2023 was a success because there was “no hollering, no walkouts, and no drama, but the actual deliverables were modest. The Golden Gate Declaration is better than nothing, but it is not great.”

McFaul described some of the leaders' meetings as the pivotal aspects of the 2023 convening, emphasizing that, more broadly, multilateral events create opportunities for meaningful bilateral meetings. “We need to create opportunities for Biden and Xi to meet, even if these confabs produce only modest outcomes, just to get them in the room is a success,” he said.

McFaul also remarked on the strong showing of the United States as a host, stating that “APEC is an opportunity for the hosts to highlight who we are, and we did a good job showing off San Francisco and Silicon Valley […] the traffic of various world leaders to Stanford and Silicon Valley is a deliverable unto itself.”

After the event, APARC Visiting Scholar Michael Beeman, former assistant U.S. trade representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, weighed in on APARC’s fall series and noted key takeaways from APEC 2023. According to Beeman, APARC’s series effectively highlighted the rich and diverse economic engagement still taking place among APEC's 21 members, coming against the backdrop of increasing regional tensions.

For Beeman, an important takeaway is the fact that “APEC members still meet over a hundred times a year at the technical level to engage, learn, and cooperate. This underscores APEC's value as a stabilizing and positive force, albeit one with less ambition than in prior decades.”

Like Goodman and McFaul, Beeman sees APEC 2023 as a modest success, indicating that “bilateral meetings like the one between Presidents Biden and Xi on the margins of APEC often overshadow the formal APEC announcements, and this year was no different. With new, high-level political commitments for APEC increasingly difficult to come by, the official APEC announcements were predictably modest.”

As for the outcomes of the convening, Beeman considers the most important to be a renewed leader-level commitment to supporting and furthering APEC's pursuit of economic cooperation, most of which takes place at the technical level. “APEC would be well served to more understandably demonstrate how its diverse work can improve the lives of people in the region,” he said.

Despite the relative decline of multilateralism in an era defined by geopolitical rivalry, the analysts agreed that the existing mechanisms are efficient in fostering cooperation between leaders and providing frameworks for high-level deliverables that drive progress in individual member states’ bureaucracies. While the dynamism of these groupings has diminished, they still play  a significant role in the geopolitical arena.

This article originally appeared in the Stanford Report.

The future of clean energy, quantum technology, and innovation were among the topics of discussion between Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol at an event held at Stanford University.

The historic meeting, which took place on Nov. 17 during the last day of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, was hosted by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and the Hoover Institution. It was one of seven convenings between the two leaders this year to strengthen bilateral relations between their countries. Such a meeting would have been unthinkable just over a year ago because of decades of tense relations. Since Yoon and Kishida took office, they have taken steps towards rapprochement and building trust that their predecessors could not achieve.

“We at Stanford are deeply honored to be hosting these two leaders on the same stage for another historic chapter in relations between their two countries,” said Michael McFaul, the director of FSI, in his opening remarks.

Condoleezza Rice, the Tad and Dianne Taube Director of the Hoover Institution, moderated the discussion, which centered around innovation and the future of science and technology.

“Democratic allies need very much to discuss both the challenges and the opportunities that technologies bring,” said Rice, who served as the 66th secretary of state of the United States.

The event was one of several visits that saw dignitaries from Asia visiting the Stanford campus while they were in the Bay Area for the APEC summit in San Francisco.

Calls for collaboration

Balancing the risks and opportunities of technology was a recurring theme during the discussion between the leaders of Japan and South Korea, with each of them calling for increased collaboration and cooperation among countries with shared values.

“In the field of science and technology, no one country alone can drive innovation that will change the world,” said Kishida in his opening remarks.

For example, Kishida said, various countries now contribute key elements to innovations such as semiconductors, quantum computing, and generative AI.

“If there is one element missing, there will be no innovation,” Kishida said. “New ideas emerge through a multi-layered exchange between diverse people.”

Convening at Stanford

In Yoon’s opening remarks, he reflected on how Stanford is entwined with Korea’s own efforts to expand educational opportunities in the field of science and technology.

Yoon shared how in the 1960s, then-President Park Chung Hee reached out to the U.S. for help in cultivating South Korea’s engineering talent.

Frederick Terman – who served as dean of the School of Engineering from 1944 to 1958 and provost from 1955 to 1965 and is known as “the father of Silicon Valley” – visited Korea and compiled his observations in The Terman Report. This report, which included contributions from four other experts, led to the creation of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science in 1971, which later was renamed Korea Institute of Science and Technology, or “KIST.”

“At that time, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, but policies for establishing a scientific and technological state with KIST at the core has resulted in Korea achieving the current status of freedom and prosperity,” Yoon said. “Just like the motto of Stanford, the winds of freedom blew all the way across to Korea.”

Now, Yoon said he and Kishida are expanding the scope of Korea-Japan relations to include cultivating collaboration in science and technology in their diplomacy.

Technology can propel economic growth, creating new jobs and opportunities, Yoon said. But he also warned that technology can leave some people behind.

Yoon emphasized that the three countries must work together to reduce the digital divide and ensure that the world has fair access to new technologies – “and thereby contribute to the sustainable peace and prosperity of the international community through such trilateral cooperation,” he said.

Yoon also urged for trilateral cooperation in accelerating the pace of advancement towards carbon neutrality goals with carbon-free energy technologies such as nuclear power and hydrogen. Yoon also said he “is looking forward to proposing the establishment of a hydrogen ammonia global value chain in which Japan and Korea will be the main participants.”

Addressing the climate challenge

The leaders referenced equity, carbon neutrality, and clean energy again when Rice asked them about their plan to address the current climate challenge.

Yoon shared his concerns about the uneven effects of carbon emissions, pointing out how advanced economies have emitted more carbon dioxide compared to developing or low-developed countries, yet it has been the developing nations that are most negatively impacted.

“We have to cooperate internationally to help bridge the climate divide,” Yoon said.

Kishida cited the Doerr School of Sustainability – which was made possible through a generous gift by the engineer and venture capitalist John Doerr – as an example of entrepreneurs making investments in innovative, sustainable solutions to the climate crisis.

The potential in quantum technology

Rice also asked the leaders about quantum technology, which the Biden administration has invested over $1 trillion in advancing.

Kishida said how the full transformation of quantum technology has yet to be imagined – “quantum technology is a complete game changer,” he said.

For example, Yoon said, quantum technology has the potential to disable encryption systems or wiretapping. He also pointed out how it can also lead to improvements in the detection of submarines – prompting new implications for national security.

Yoon and Kishida both saw opportunities for Japan, Korea, and the U.S. to work together, emphasizing how each country has strengths and weaknesses that can complement one another.

“Quantum technology, I believe, is the area where global cooperation is the most crucial because there is no one country in the world that has a complete understanding of it,” Yoon said.

New mindset to advancing carbon neutrality

During the Q&A portion of the event, the leaders were asked how their countries are ensuring the world is united in solving the global climate crisis.

“Climate change is the biggest global challenge we face today and I think all countries share a common sense of crisis,” Kishida responded. Kishida emphasized Yoon’s earlier point about how each country experiences climate change differently – therefore, there must be “diverse pathways” to innovation that “transcend national borders.”

Yoon said that transitioning to carbon-free energy should not be viewed as a cost but rather as an investment in a new market and industry.

“It should be understood as an asset or an industry that would translate into this becoming a market,” said Yoon, who reiterated the need for cooperation to be fair and just. “We need to change our mindset.”

The event closed with remarks from Gi-Wook Shin, the director of APARC and a professor of sociology in the School of Humanities and Sciences.

“This momentous occasion has built on deepening ties between Japan and the Republic of Korea,” said Shin. “We are so honored to be part of this journey.”

In the Media

The historic meeting of the Japanese and South Korean leaders on the Stanford campus received wide coverage in the media. Selected coverage includes:

• KTVU
• ABC News
• Bloomberg News
• Reuters
• Nikkei Asia
• Mainichi Shimbun
• Japan Times
• Dong-a Ilbo
• Korea Herald
• Korea Times
• Korea JoongAng Daily
• Yonhap

See also the report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

This essay originally appeared in The Diplomat.

With major crises in Gaza and Ukraine, the Biden administration might be tempted to overlook the importance of Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s mid-November visit to Washington. That would be a mistake. Indonesia is an important country that is heading into crucial presidential elections in early 2024, and the results of Jokowi’s visit could go a long way to shaping the next Indonesian government’s attitudes toward its relations with the United States.

Although U.S.-Indonesian security cooperation is good and trade has grown, by all accounts Jokowi and his team are heading to Washington feeling less than satisfied on several fronts. First, Indonesians remain upset by President Joe Biden’s decision to skip the recent Indonesia-hosted East Asia Summit, which they took as a serious snub. Biden invited Jokowi in part to make up for that absence, but the White House might have underestimated the extent to which Indonesians remain upset over the initial affront. The protocol-conscious government no doubt will also contrast their modest White House schedule with the lavish welcome recently received by Australian Prime Minster Anthony Albanese.

Indonesian authorities also remain unhappy with what they see as Washington’s failure to deliver on the high-profile Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), under which the U.S. committed to lead G-7-plus efforts to mobilize $20 billion to support Indonesia’s accelerated transition from coal to cleaner energy. Indonesian officials have complained publicly for months that the U.S. has pressed them to take difficult steps while offering little in the way of concessional financing to pay for it. The reality is more complicated, but the perception in Jakarta that Washington “sold them a bill of goods” is real. Some Indonesian officials have contrasted that with substantial Chinese funding on priority infrastructure initiatives, highlighting the regional perception of U.S. weakness vis-à-vis China as a reliable economic partner. (The Indonesians have largely ignored the fact that the U.S. is their second-largest export market and has risen rapidly to be their fourth-largest source of foreign direct investment.)

Jokowi also is looking for Biden to move forward on a proposed limited free trade agreement under which Indonesian critical minerals (namely nickel and processed nickel) would meet the criteria for inclusion in the electric vehicle tax credits provided for in the Inflation Reduction Act. The Biden administration reportedly is interested in such a deal, which by promoting diversification of both suppliers for the U.S. and markets for Indonesia would be in the U.S. national interest. It has, however, hesitated to proceed due to concerns about the congressional reaction, environmental and labor issues, and heavy Chinese investment in Indonesian nickel mining.

Finally, one has to assume that the Gaza crisis will be at the top of Jokowi’s agenda (if not Biden’s) when the two presidents meet. Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, has long supported the Palestinian cause and has vigorously pursued diplomatic efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire. While working hard to keep the issue from blowing up domestically, there is no question but that Indonesian public opinion (and genuinely held beliefs among top officials) has put the two governments at odds over the crisis.

At this late date, there is little prospect of major initiatives coming out of the Biden-Jokowi meeting that would ease Indonesian concerns or generate significant positive momentum. There is, however, still time to make some small investments that could result in Jokowi and his team leaving Washington feeling more positive about the relationship.

First, on Gaza, the meeting will not resolve the two countries’ differences, but it is important that Biden listen to and engage with Jokowi seriously on the issue and that he highlights his efforts to encourage Israel to show restraint and to promote a humanitarian pause. Jokowi’s post-meeting public comments about this discussion likely will have a significant influence on the Indonesian public and media perceptions of the U.S. role, so it is critical that Biden do all he can to ensure those comments are positive.

Second, it is important that Biden understand that Jokowi and many Indonesians are still upset over the president’s decision to skip the recent Jakarta summit. Biden cannot undo that, but he can and should acknowledge it in his discussion with Jokowi and emphasize that he appreciates how important Indonesia is.

Even such moves will only go so far without some movement on JETP and the critical minerals trade question. On the former, there isn’t time to achieve major progress before the meeting, but President Biden should instruct his team to redouble their efforts to mobilize funding and get the initiative moving. This goes beyond Indonesian concerns and gets to the heart of regional wariness about Washington being able to put meat on the bones of its various economic initiatives.

On critical minerals, Biden should agree to send trade officials to Jakarta to discuss the outlines of a possible agreement, though he will have to be careful not to overcommit absent confidence he will be able to deliver. Indonesia, for its part, needs to stop rotating ambassadors through Washington so quickly and install an envoy who can effectively make the case for a limited trade deal to Congress and others.

Some serious, last-minute work needs to be done to ensure that next week’s meeting between the leaders of the world’s second and third-largest democracies does more than highlight the differences and problems in the relationship.

In 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court passed a series of rulings requiring Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Nippon Steel of Japan to compensate 14 Korean citizens for their unpaid labor. As of yet, neither company has agreed to comply with the ruling. The South Korean government has since announced plans to compensate survivors who were forced to work in Japanese mines and factories during the wartime period, but this remains a unilateral decision on the part of the Yoon administration, not a bilateral position between South Korea and Japan.

These tensions have ripple effects far outside of East Asia. Writing for Toyo Keizai, Daniel Sneider, an FSI Lecturer in International Policy with a focus on Asia, explains the broader geopolitical implications of these issues:

“The Americans have been urging the two countries to settle these problems in order to ease the way to the kind of security cooperation that has become visible in recent months. Joint military exercises for missile defense and other small steps to intensify trilateral coordination are taking place and a resolution of the history of problems may be key to moving ahead.”

Steps Forward

The last year has seen increased efforts to restore more functionality to the South Korea-Japan relationship. President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida met briefly on the sidelines of the September 2022 UN General Assembly meeting in New York, which was followed by respective visits of Yoon to Tokyo in March 2023 and Kishida to Seoul two months later in May, the first such visits in over 11 years.

The Camp David summit, which brought the U.S., South Korea, and Japan together as strategic partners, is the latest step on the hoped-for road to institutionalized security cooperation between the three nations.

Speaking to NBC, Shorenstein Fellow Thomas Fingar explained the significance of the weekend.

“The importance of this [summit] is that it was a genuine trilateral meeting, which means the Japanese and the Koreans are talking to one another as opposed to the U.S. dealing separately with each of them.”

In contrast to the idyllic Camp David setting, the three leaders are faced with a weighty set of issues, noted Sneider, including the crisis triggered by the Ukraine war, North Korea’s aggressive posture, as well as growing concerns about China.

Oriana Skylar Mastro, an FSI Center Fellow and an expert on security, conflict resolution, and the Chinese military elaborated further on the mutual pressures South Korea, Japan, and the United States face:

“Since President Biden came into office, he’s really stressed strengthening alliances and partnerships as a way of protecting U.S. interests abroad. I'm sure there has been much work behind the scenes to try to get these two countries to come together. In terms of the timing [of this summit], it's of course partially because of the accumulation of these concerns over China. I think also the war in Ukraine has done a lot to really open up leaders' eyes to the dangers of having neighbors with territorial hopes and claims that also have strong militaries that could potentially be undeterred from using force. I think it's fair to say that this has also pushed these two countries to rethink their own strategies for security.”

An Uncertain Future

The official summit documents outline both a vision of partnership and offer a variety of practical agreements on everything from annual leadership summits to meetings on economic and cyber security, and a proposal for how to move forward with joint military exercises. Notably, the two-paragraph ‘commitment to consult’ on responses to ‘regional challenges, provocations, and threats affecting our collective interests and security’ — while not a fully embodied collective security agreement — is nonetheless a “stunning achievement,” says Daniel Sneider.

Despite agreeing on a hefty laundry list of shared concerns and security goals, the way forward for additional trilateralization between the United States, Japan, and South Korea is not necessarily clear. Oriana Mastro explained: 

“Even though they might have shared threat perceptions, there is still a lot of trust that has to happen between nations for them to take coordinated military approaches. If two countries, for example, exercise together — and that's one of the things that the Biden administration is hoping to get out of this summit: more routine trilateral exercises — you get to learn a lot about another country's military, and that only really happens between friends. That’s also true of intel sharing. When you share intelligence, you’re not only sharing information, you're sharing how you get intelligence, which can also be sensitive. So while they've shared these threats for a while, it hasn't really gotten to the level in which they were willing to take risks in terms of the relationship between South Korea and Japan to become closer in the security space in a way that would help them combat these issues together.”

Besides the challenges of international diplomacy, Yoon, Kishida, and Biden also face domestic hurdles that could hinder further cooperation.

In a comment to the Wall Street Journal, Gi-Wook Shin noted that, “Yoon only entered politics a few years ago. If his party loses the election, I don’t know who will stay with him.” Improving South Korea-Japan relations was a major platform of the Yoon campaign, and backlash against his administration could yield disinterest or even renewed hostility toward continuing his efforts. 

Daniel Sneider sees similar challenges for Biden and Kishida. Writing in East Asia Forum, he cautioned:

“President Joe Biden is already embroiled in an election campaign that threatens to bring Donald Trump and his isolationist views back to power. The Camp David summit was barely noticed amid the constant flow of domestic political news, though it mostly received welcome praise in the media. . . Imprisoned by domestic politics, the White House will likely be unable to give substance to this emergent partnership.”

In the case of Kishida, the decision to release wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear site, which came just days after the conclusion of the summit, has been particularly counterproductive. Sneider continued:

“Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been waiting for a bump from the Camp David summit. But he is experiencing a deepening slide in opinion polls. The Fukushima release faces opposition within Japan, including from fishermen and others worried about boycotts of Japanese products in China and South Korea. Talk of an early parliamentary election in Japan, intended to consolidate Kishida’s claim to long-term leadership, is now on hold.”

Where is the trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea relationship headed next? Follow FSI scholars to stay informed about the latest developments. Register to receive alerts to your inbox either weekly or monthly.