APARC's Southeast Asia Program was pleased to host a diplomatic delegation on June 20, 2023, to delve into the state of trade engagement in the region and examine the challenges that could impede the advancement of democratic values. Guests included U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN Yohannes Abraham, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Marc Knapper, U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia Brian McFeeters, and Ambassador Ted Osius, President and CEO of the US-ASEAN Business Council. This forum provided a platform for the esteemed diplomats to exchange insights and perspectives on the crucial interplay between trade, democracy, and diplomacy in Southeast Asia.

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At the meeting, participants considered the future of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), an economic partnership that the United States and a dozen initial regional counterparts launched in May 2022 with the goal of advancing cooperation, stability, prosperity, development, and peace for the 14 IPEF economies.. The IPEF partners have been actively involved in dialogues to outline the scope of the four foundational elements of the Framework, encompassing Trade, Supply Chains, Clean Economy, and Fair Economy.

In considering  great power competition with China, participants considered the effects of the global democratic recession on receptiveness to partnerships with the U.S. and its potential ramifications on the international community’s ability to work together effectively on development projects and other initiatives. These challenges have made it harder to compete with China for investment and strategic partnerships. However, participants stated that Beijing does not always deliver on its investment promises, and when it does, there can be “serious strings attached.”

The group also discussed the work of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, which aims to foster economic growth and trade ties between the U.S. and ASEAN’s ten member countries. The Council remains an integral part of the U.S.’s approach to bolstering diplomatic, strategic, economic, cultural, and social ties in the region.

As for the future of U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia, the group discussed the evolving role of minilateral groupings — small, issue-based, informal, and noninstitutionalized partnerships that offer means of coordinating international policy action.

Minilaterals stand in contrast to older and larger partnerships like ASEAN, which has come under scrutiny for its inability to address the human rights crisis in Myanmar. Despite ASEAN’s persistent challenge of presenting a unified message, it is still relevant. “ASEAN has to be important to us because it is important to countries like Indonesia and Singapore, which are critical partners to the U.S.,” said one participant. Yet, while ASEAN remains at the center of debate in the region, the future of ASEAN is uncertain and many stakeholders are cognizant of the grouping’s limitations.

When considering areas where the U.S. has a competitive advantage in the region, the participants agreed that education, science and technology partnerships, national labs, human resource information, corporate social responsibility, the rule of law, transparency, and diversity all remained desirable attributes for potential partners. Furthermore, a partnership with the U.S. implies access to its vast network of like-minded democratic governments.

The meeting concluded with a reaffirmation of the longstanding and crucial relationship between the U.S. and Southeast Asia and the continued importance of fostering fruitful economic and strategic engagement with the region.

 

This interview was first published by The Diplomat magazine.

The growing strategic and economic competition between China and the United States has prompted renewed U.S. attention to the nations of Southeast Asia, a region of 11 nations that sprawls at the center of the Indian and Pacific oceans. Yet, as Ambassador Scot Marciel details at length in his new book, “Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia” (Shorenstein APARC & Rowman & Littlefield), Southeast Asia remains poorly understood by many in Washington.

That’s certainly not true of Marciel, a U.S. diplomat who has spent a large part of his 35-year career based in and working on Southeast Asia. After an initial posting to the Philippines that coincided with the 1986 People Power revolt that overthrew President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Marciel would go on to serve as the first U.S. ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and as ambassador to Indonesia (2010-2013) and Myanmar (2016-2020), the latter at a time of great turbulence. These postings were preceded by a period during which he oversaw U.S. relations with Southeast Asia as principal deputy assistant secretary for East Asia and the Pacific at the U.S. State Department.

Marciel, now a member of the Southeast Asia program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, spoke with The Diplomat’s Sebastian Strangio about the recent trajectory of U.S.-Southeast Asia relations, the “enigma” that is ASEAN, and how Washington should approach a region that desires fruitful relations with the U.S., but is congenitally leery of superpower tensions.

In the introduction to the book, you write, “My friends in the region often talk about how the United States does not truly understand Southeast Asia or how to engage effectively with it. They are not wrong.” This is something that we have seen most recently with the response of some nations in the region, Indonesia chief among them, to the formation of AUKUS, which has been accused of stoking regional tensions. What do you think U.S. policymakers most often get wrong about Southeast Asia?

The AUKUS example highlights the high degree of sensitivity that many in Southeast Asia have toward major powers either raising the geopolitical stakes in the region or establishing mechanisms that might challenge what ASEAN considers its central role in regional diplomacy and security. The advent of the Quad is another example. It’s not that these initiatives were mistakes. Rather, they reflect a tendency that U.S. policymakers sometimes do not fully appreciate just how nervous such developments make Southeast Asian partners. Although I don’t know if this was the case with the AUKUS announcement, U.S. policymakers often assume that Southeast Asian governments will view U.S. foreign policy moves in the region as being as benign or even helpful as the United States sees them. This reflects Washington’s own view of itself as being on the “right side” of most issues, and a failure to recognize that some in Southeast Asia view the United States with some wariness, just as they do China.

The main point I was making in the quote you noted, however, was broader. U.S. policymakers, including me, have struggled for years to figure out how best to work with Southeast Asia as a region. This reflects both the lack of expertise (in academia and government) about the region and the inherent difficulty of dealing with a highly diverse group of countries that has neither a powerful central institution nor a dominant member that can speak on behalf of the members. Attending ASEAN meetings tends to be underwhelming, and visiting multiple Southeast Asian countries regularly is impractical for top officials. That reality, along with the sheer size and importance of some other countries in Asia, means that U.S. policymakers tend to focus on China, Japan, Korea, and India. Absent a major crisis, policy toward Southeast Asia tends to be a corollary of policies toward those major powers, most notably China. This leads to episodic engagement and excessive U.S. emphasis in those limited engagements on broader strategic concerns (i.e., China) rather than on issues of importance to Southeast Asians.

You argue that the U.S. approach toward Southeast Asia “cannot be simply a corollary of its China strategy,” with the implication that U.S. policy toward the region remains to some extent hostage to the increasingly confrontational relationship with Beijing. How can the U.S. convince the region that it is not bolstering its engagement only because of its concerns about China? And how would you assess the Biden administration’s approach on this front over the past two years?

The Biden administration’s approach on this front has been better than that of the Trump administration, which unabashedly made many if not most of its interactions with Southeast Asia about China. Although they probably still talk too much about China when they are in Southeast Asia, senior Biden administration officials and the President himself have made a greater effort to talk about U.S. cooperation with Southeast Asia. This is critical. Southeast Asians are fully aware of the benefits and costs of their relationships with China. They don’t need the United States to “educate” them, and U.S. officials should trust that they have agency in protecting their independence and sovereignty.

Rather than worry excessively about what China is doing in Southeast Asia, Washington should focus on building strong and durable partnerships with the region on its own merits, based on a positive agenda – trade, investment, climate change, health, education and security – and on building confidence in the region that the United States is committed to Southeast Asia long term. That means showing up consistently at all levels, implementing a substantive trade and investment agenda – whether via IPEF or other initiatives – and investing more in key issues that matter to the region. Building that strong partnership, without talking much about China, will ease regional concerns about why Washington is engaging. It also is the best way to bolster the freedom of maneuver of Southeast Asian nations, which should be a U.S. priority.

In the context of the growing strategic competition between China and the United States, the mantra that one often hears from Southeast Asian states is that they don’t want to be forced to choose between the two powers. Do you agree with this framing, and what are the implications for U.S. policy toward the region?

The framing has limited value, in the sense that no one is asking Southeast Asian states to choose between the two powers, and it is not even clear what “choosing” would mean in practical terms. That said, the broader message represented by this mantra is accurate: most if not all of the region wants to enjoy good relations with both China and the United States (as well as with other partners) and resents attempts by either power to pressure them to do otherwise.

The implication for U.S. policy is that the focus should not be on discouraging the countries from having good relations with China but rather on ensuring the United States is a good and reliable partner itself. That means not worrying too much when a Southeast Asian leader visits Beijing and celebrates close ties with China, or when a particular country seems to be leaning more toward China. That is going to happen at times. The United States should focus instead on making sure it is doing all it can to be a good partner with Southeast Asia. I’ll offer a specific example. Indonesia under President Jokowi has moved somewhat closer to China, which causes consternation in some quarters. Washington should not worry unduly about this, as Indonesia is fiercely independent and has moved closer to China in part because the Belt and Road Initiative is funding priority infrastructure projects in the archipelago. Rather, U.S. policymakers should consider what they can do to bolster their own relationship with Jakarta, without making it about China. Among other things, vigorously implementing the recently announced $20 billion Just Energy Transition Partnership would be a great way to do just that.

You served as the first U.S. ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an organization that you describe as an “enigma” and note has often been a subject of disappointment for many in Washington. What do you think U.S. officials fail to understand about ASEAN, and how can the U.S. work more constructively with it?

ASEAN has disappointed many not only in Washington but even in Southeast Asia. It is by design not a powerful, supranational organization, but rather a relatively loose association of countries that see the institution as a useful way to promote cooperation and avoid interstate tensions, amplify their collective voice, and discourage great power meddling. ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making and its practice of not interfering in member states’ domestic affairs render it largely incapable of bold action, whether on the South China Sea or during Myanmar’s current crisis. What U.S. policymakers sometimes don’t appreciate is that, for Southeast Asian governments, maintaining broad unity and relationships among member states, along with setting the agenda for the region, are essential priorities that make up for these weaknesses.

For the United States, it is important to accept ASEAN for what it is and to recognize that it still offers value. First, I don’t think it’s a coincidence that there have been no inter-state conflicts among ASEAN member states in decades. Second, ASEAN is steadily making progress in reducing trade barriers between member states, making it a more compelling investment destination. Third, its annual meetings provide an excellent opportunity for senior U.S. officials to engage not only with ten Southeast Asian counterparts but also with key leaders from the region and the world. By showing up and engaging consistently at these meetings and supporting ASEAN’s own work, U.S. leaders bolster America’s relations with all ten ASEAN member countries and increase the region’s confidence that the United States is a reliable and good partner.

You write that since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has “tended to measure countries and adjust the quality of our relationships – including with our treaty allies – based on their progress, or lack thereof, on democratic and human rights grounds.” Given the prickly response that this has garnered from some leaders – Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia is perhaps the most obvious example from your book – do you think it is possible to pursue these moral and strategic goals in tandem? How can the U.S. balance these two imperatives?

Yes, I think it is possible to pursue both goals in tandem. It’s a matter of how we do so. Promoting democracy and human rights is an essential part of American diplomacy, and many in Southeast Asia appreciate our support for these goals. The problem is that some of the tools the United States has come to rely on to advance these goals – critical public statements and even grading of other countries, reducing or eliminating engagement with “offending” governments, and on occasion sanctions – have become both less effective and more obligatory, in the sense of U.S. domestic constituencies demanding their use. These tools might have worked to some extent when the United States was in ascendancy after the Cold War, but countries now have other choices and are increasingly critical of what they see as U.S. double standards.

This does not mean the United States should stop promoting human rights and democracy. Rather, Washington needs to recognize that the world has changed and adjust its tactics accordingly. That means accepting that public criticism isn’t always the best option, that sanctions rarely work, and that promoting democracy and human rights requires more nuance and humility. This will be more controversial, but it also means continuing to talk with the governments in question – while avoiding “business as usual” – in the face of setbacks, except in extreme circumstances such as the appalling junta in Myanmar now. I’m not advocating a 180-degree shift in approach, just some tactical adjustments to make U.S. efforts more effective and more in line with the realities of the world today.

Of the challenges facing Southeast Asia, none carries as much moral and political urgency as the conflict in Myanmar, where you served as ambassador from 2016 to 2020. How would you assess ASEAN’s approach to the crisis, and do you think the U.S. can best help the situation, given the extreme complexity of the conflict and the limitations imposed by China’s proximity?

I give ASEAN credit for trying, via the Five-Point Consensus of April 2021 and its unprecedented decision not to invite junta representatives to key ASEAN meetings. The Five-Point Consensus, however, has failed, both because of the junta’s refusal to compromise and because the consensus itself depended on the flawed assumptions that the generals were reasonable people and that the crisis could be resolved via a dialogue leading to a political compromise. The problem now is that ASEAN is divided and so cannot reach agreement on a different or bolder approach, which is why it continues to tout the Five-Point Consensus. While I hope Indonesia as ASEAN Chair will take more initiative, such as meeting publicly with the National Unity Government (NUG) and key ethnic groups and making clear that it will not accept the junta’s sham elections, I don’t see ASEAN as a whole acting decisively. That is why I have called for Washington to take more of a leadership role in supporting the pro-democracy forces, including through greater assistance and improved coordination with like-minded countries on sanctions.

One potential constraint on U.S. action is that Beijing seems to see U.S. support for the pro-democracy forces as somehow a threat to its interests, so greater U.S. support could result in China doubling down on its backing of the junta. Already, we see China pressing the ethnic resistance organizations in Myanmar’s northeast to strike a deal with the junta, which has a remarkable track record of not honoring such deals. China’s approach is unfortunate, as this is not or should not be a U.S.-China issue. Whatever government emerges out of this crisis is inevitably going to want and need to have reasonably good relations with China. I would assume that the NUG and others within the pro-democracy coalition are making this point regularly to Chinese officials. To the extent that U.S. and Chinese officials are talking about Myanmar, it would be useful for U.S. officials to emphasize that they also would welcome good relations between any future Myanmar government and China. In the end, the United States should step up its support for pro-democracy forces despite China’s concerns because those forces are the only hope for Myanmar to enjoy stability, peace, and prosperity.

This commentary was originally published by The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.

Over the past three decades, the relationship between the United States and Vietnam has undergone a remarkable transformation from foes to friends.¹ Today, Vietnam ranks as the United States’ tenth-­largest trading partner,² and the two countries have established a broad range of bilateral cooperation that spans traditional diplomacy, health and education, and even more sensitive areas such as maritime security. The partnership is characterized by regular and constructive engagement at all levels, demonstrating levels of trust and confidence that were unimaginable not so long ago. Though there is still progress to be made, the US–Vietnam relationship is a testament to the power of reconciliation and the potential for cooperation between former foes.

The development of the relationship was not inevitable. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the two nations seemingly shared nothing but mistrust and antipathy toward one another. Initial postwar efforts to normalize relations stalled due to Washington’s belief that Vietnam was not cooperating in accounting for missing Americans from the war and Hanoi’s demand for reconstruction assistance that it claimed Washington had promised. Moreover, Vietnam’s 1978–1979 move into the Soviet bloc, invasion of Cambodia, continued use of reeducation camps, the plight of the “boat people” refugees further deteriorated the relationship and pushed each government to view the other as being on the wrong side of the Cold War.³

Geopolitical Change and Pressing Issues to Address

In the mid-­to-­late 1980s, a shift began to occur as Vietnam initiated economic reforms and sought to reduce its dependence on a faltering Soviet Union. Then–Foreign Minister Nguyễn Cơ Thạch played a key role in this transformation, as Hanoi intensified its efforts to diversify its economic and broaden its diplomatic relationships, demonstrating a greater willingness to cooperate with the United States.

With the easing and ultimate end of the Cold War, the George H.W. Bush administration saw an opportunity to bring about a peace agreement in Cambodia, which would require Hanoi’s support. The prospect of improved Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA accounting and the hope to encourage Vietnam to empty its reeducation camps and expedite the movement of refugees to the United States also played a role. These issues provided the two governments with a reason to increase dialogue and begin limited cooperation.

A Confidence-­Building Road Map 

In 1991, after much internal debate, the Bush administration offered Vietnam a “road map” toward normalization. The document proposed that, as Vietnam bolstered POW/MIA cooperation, emptied reeducation camps, allowed refugees to leave for the United States, completed its withdrawal from Cambodia, and helped achieve a Cambodian peace agreement, Washington would respond with increased humanitarian assistance, gradual easing of its economic embargo, and other measures important to Vietnam. Although Vietnam never officially accepted the road map, it largely followed it in practice, leading to a positive cycle of increased cooperation on issues of concern to the United States and concrete steps to toward establishing diplomatic relations.⁴

This process yielded consistent outcomes. In 1991, Vietnam permitted the United States to establish a POW/MIA accounting office in Hanoi and shortly thereafter joined Washington in supporting the long-­sought Cambodian peace agreement. The United States delivered humanitarian assistance to Vietnam, reduced restrictions on Vietnamese diplomats at the United Nations, and loosened constraints on US citizen travel to Vietnam.⁵ As Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA accounting grew, the following year, Washington provided additional humanitarian assistance, allowed telecommunications links between the two countries, and permitted US companies to assist in meeting basic human needs in Vietnam.⁶ In 1993, the Clinton administration ended US opposition to multilateral development bank lending to Vietnam and opened the first US Department of State office in Hanoi.⁷

Normalization

With growing trust between the two countries, the pace of progress toward normalized ties depended heavily on improved Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA accounting. Although some influential groups in the United States continued to argue that Vietnam was not cooperating sufficiently, a growing number felt otherwise. Essential political cover for movement toward normalization was provided by influential members of Congress, led by former POW Senator John McCain (R–AZ) and Vietnam veteran Senator John Kerry (D–MA).

In early 1994, President Bill Clinton lifted the embargo and announced the opening of liaison offices in each other’s capitals, which was a significant step toward establishing full diplomatic relations. These moves came were made possible by the further expansion of POW/MIA cooperation and continued US humanitarian assistance.

Leading With Commercial Ties/Building Business Constituencies

The establishment was a major milestone, but it was just the beginning of a continuing effort to strengthen the relationship between the United States and Vietnam. Commercial diplomacy was a driving force in this process, marked by the signing of a bilateral trade agreement in 2001 and Vietnam’s subsequent accession to the World Trade Organization in 2007. These steps led to a considerable surge in trade and US investment, creating a strong business constituency that continues to support closer ties between the two countries.

Addressing War Legacies

Addressing issues stemming from the Vietnam War has been another essential ingredient of the improving relationship between Vietnam and the United States. Vietnam’s increased cooperation on accounting for missing Americans was essential to early progress, including President Clinton’s 1995 decision to normalize relations, and remained a critical element in the subsequent strengthening of the relationship. Moreover, regular and close cooperation on the issue proved critical in building personal relationships and trust between the two governments. Remarkably, an issue that had deeply divided the two countries ended up being the catalyst for bringing them together.

Vietnam’s leadership also needed to see that Washington would address legacy issues affecting the Vietnamese people, particularly the continuing impact of unexploded ordnance and the health and environmental effects of the Agent Orange defoliant that US forces widely sprayed during the war. Senator Patrick Leahy (D–VT) played a crucial role in supporting Washington’s provision of assistance, beginning in 1989, to help victims of landmines and unexploded ordnance. While the response was slower on Agent Orange, the United States steadily increased assistance starting in the mid-2000s. The programs initially focused on helping individuals with disabilities and later expanded to include significant assistance to address so-­called chemical “hot spots” in former US military bases.⁸ This was important for the Vietnamese people and demonstrated Washington’s willingness to address issues that were critical to Vietnam’s domestic audience.

Managing the Irritants

The United States has consistently raised concerns, both publicly and privately, about Vietnam’s human rights record and its respect for religious freedom, which has been an ongoing source of tension in the relationship. In turn, Hanoi has expressed concern about US-­based Vietnamese groups that have advocated for regime change, in some cases labeling them “terrorists.”⁹

Importantly, while the two governments have regularly discussed and even clashed over human rights and related issues, they have not let them define the entire relationship. In other words, the governments have not ignored these issues but have not prevented broad progress in the overall relationship. This reflects the view in Washington that changing Vietnam’s communist political system was infeasible and the recognition in Hanoi that the benefits from the relationship far outweighed concerns about US political goals.

China and the Beginnings of a Security Relationship

Although analysts today often consider shared concerns over China a key factor in the US–Vietnam relationship, security cooperation lagged behind the overall relationship for many years due to Vietnamese suspicion of US intentions and Washington’s human rights concerns. It was only when China became increasingly assertive in the South China Sea that the two countries began regular low-­level dialogue on security matters in the early 2000s. Over the next decade, cooperation gradually increased, bolstered by China’s growing aggression and the Obama administration’s decisions to provide security-­related assistance with a focus on the maritime arena.¹⁰

Regular High-Level Engagement/Quality Diplomacy

 A crucial but often overlooked factor in the strengthening of the US–Vietnam relationship has been a combination of regular high-­level meetings and skillful diplomacy. From early on, senior Vietnamese officials have been actively seeking high-­level meetings with US leaders, setting themselves apart from other Southeast Asian diplomats who have taken a more low-­key approach. Even after John McCain lost the 2008 presidential election to Barack Obama, Hanoi wasted no time in reaching out to the new administration and securing a series of high-­level visits that ultimately led to the announcement of a “comprehensive partnership” in 2013.¹¹ When Donald Trump was elected in 2016, Vietnam made a concerted effort to be the first Southeast Asian government to secure a meeting with the new president.¹² These regular top-­level bilateral meetings are crucial in keeping the busy Washington foreign policy community focused on Vietnam.

Another factor contributing to the strengthening of the US-­Vietnam relationship has been Hanoi’s adeptness at working Washington. Vietnamese diplomats have actively engaged key players in the US capital, while top officials in Hanoi have made it a point of welcoming and working productively with US visitors. Vietnam has also cultivated a reputation in the United States for being pragmatic and results-­driven, which is hugely important when dealing with senior US officials or business executives who may be hesitant to invest significant time and effort in engagement unless they are confident it will yield tangible benefits.

The Limits of Partnership

Over the past 30 years, a pragmatic approach, shared interests, and sustained effort have propelled the US–Vietnam relationship forward, resulting in a partnership that benefits both countries. However, the consistently positive trajectory of the relationship has at times led analysts to become overly optimistic about its potential, with some suggesting the United States might gain regular access to the Cam Ranh Bay naval base or establish a significant security partnership with Vietnam.¹³ Vietnam’s reluctance to elevate the relationship to a strategic partnership should serve as a reminder that while bilateral ties have advanced, Hanoi remains concerned about antagonizing China and is wary of how Washington views its one-­party system. Similarly, US concerns about Vietnam’s human rights record continue to limit how far the relationship can progress. While this may disappoint some, the reality remains that the journey from former foes to current friends has been a remarkable achievement and serves as a case study in successful diplomacy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the journey of the United States and Vietnam from foes to friends has been a remarkable one, marked by significant progress in diplomatic and economic relations. Despite initial mistrust and antipathy after the Vietnam War, the two countries were able to build a constructive partnership through a confidence-­building road map, improve cooperation on issues of concern, and develop a willingness to address war legacy issues. The establishment of normalized ties, commercial diplomacy, and addressing war legacies were all essential ingredients of this process. The ongoing cooperation and growing partnership between the United States and Vietnam highlight the power of diplomacy and the potential for nations to put aside past conflicts and work together toward a shared future. 

Notes

1 This article is derived from Ambassador Marciel’s recently published book, Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia (Lanham, MD: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-­Pacific Research Center, Stanford University and Rowman & Littlefield, 2023).

2 Office of the US Trade Representative, “Vietnam,” 9 March 2023, https://ustr.gov/.

3 Richard C. Holbrooke, “Statement before the Asian-­Pacific Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,” 13 June 1979, reprinted in Department of State Bulleting 79, no. 239 (October 1979), https://heinonline-­org.stanford.idm.oclc.org/.

4 Marciel, Imperfect Partners, 134–35.

5 Marciel, Imperfect Partners, 135; and Steven Greenhouse, “U.S. Open to Talks on Ties with Vietnam,” New York Times, 23 October 1991.

6 Mark E. Manyin, “The Vietnam-­U.S. Normalization Process,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 17 June 2005), 3, https://fas.org/.

7 Thomas Lippman, “U.S. Drops Opposition to Loans to Vietnam,” Washington Post, 3 July 1993. The author opened the Department of State office in Hanoi in August 1993.

8 Michael F. Martin, U.S. Agent Orange/Dioxin Assistance to Vietnam (Washington:, Congressional Research Service, 21 February 2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/; and Michael F. Martin, U.S. Agent Orange/Dioxin Assistance to Vietnam (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 15 January 2021, https://fas.org/.

9 “Vietnam Declares California-­based Group Terrorist,” Reuters, 7 October 2016, https://www.reuters.com/.

10 See: Marciel, Imperfect Partners, 161–62.

11 “Joint Statement by President Barack Obama of the United States and President Truong Tan Sang of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” (press release, The White House, 25 July 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/.

12 Mark Landler, “Trump Hosts Prime Minister Phuc of Vietnam and Announces Trade Deals,” New York Times, 31 May 2017.

13 See, for example, John R. Wilkinson, “U.S.-Vietnamese Security Cooperation for Access to the SCS” (student paper, US Naval War College, 16 June 2015), https://apps.dtic.mil/; and Dov S. Zakheim, “America’s Presence in Cam Ranh Bay Should Be More than Occasional,” The Hill, 29 September 2020, https://thehill.com/.

On April 26, 2023, in recognition of the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-Korea alliance, President Joe Biden will host President Yoon Suk Yeol for a State Visit to the United States. According to Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin, the fact that Yoon received the second such invitation of the Biden administration is a testimony to the centrality of the Korea-U.S. alliance to the peace and stability of the East Asian regions, especially at a time when the frayed U.S.-China relationship continues to degrade into a new Cold War, with a potential Taiwan contingency looming on the horizon. 

Shin, former South Korea's ambassador to China and former director general of the Asia Pacific Affairs Bureau at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, is the Winter 2023 Payne Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a visiting scholar at APARC. He headlined this quarter’s Payne Lecture, speaking to an audience that gathered on March 1 for a timely discussion titled Sino-U.S. Relations and South Korea, co-hosted by APARC and FSI.

The Payne Lectureship at FSI, named for Frank E. Payne and Arthur W. Payne, aims to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community and advance international cooperation. The lectureship brings to Stanford internationally esteemed leaders from academia and the policy world who combine visionary thinking and a broad, practical grasp of their fields with the capacity to provide insights into pressing challenges of global concern. Throughout the 2022-23 academic year, the Payne Lectureship hosts experts from Asia who examine crucial questions in U.S.-China relations.

Ambassador Shin is uniquely qualified to offer insight into South Korea's response to the pressures created by the U.S.-China rivalry, said APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin, who chaired the event that included a discussion with Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military and Asia security.

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China’s Dreams

Painting a picture of Chinese ambitions, Ambassador Shin enumerated China’s goals and the steps it has taken to achieve them. “The Chinese dream,” he said, “is to regain the colonial behavior of the Qing Dynasty, when China was a great power with about one-third of the global GDP.” To achieve this dream, China's leaders have pushed for its continued economic development while arousing patriotism and nationalism domestically. Through its military modernization campaign, China has rapidly shown its ambition to become the top-rated global military power by 2049, the centennial of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, he noted.

Ambassador Shin indicated that China has prepared for a long-term competition with the U.S. in the economic arena, as Xi Jinping introduced the dual circulation economic policy, which aims to reorient the country's economy by prioritizing domestic consumption while remaining open to international trade and investment. This policy, Shin argues, “is designed, in part, to make the [Chinese] economy less affected by external factors including the supply chain reset of the U.S.” As such, China has stressed the importance of innovation and has made massive investments in science and technology to reduce its reliance on Western economies. Moreover, China has promoted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its political and economic influence.

“China became the second largest economic power and began to show assertiveness in its foreign policy, particularly by emphasizing the safeguarding of Chinese interests, namely, sovereignty and territorial integrity, state security and development interest,” stated Shin. To achieve these goals, “Chinese diplomats have voiced their arguments in an abrasive style, ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’ as it is called by Westerners.” This form of proactive engagement with the rest of the world has resulted in an intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China, which has made it increasingly difficult for South Korea to maintain simultaneous ties with both great powers.

No Longer on the Fence

Shin noted that “The strategic distrust and intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China have put substantial pressure on South Korea…and South Korea's long-term policy to make a Korea-U.S. alliance compatible with its partnership with China is becoming more difficult.” In recent years, South Korea has moved even closer to the U.S.

The joint communique issued when President Moon Jae-in visited Washington two years ago, already showed South Korea’s tilt toward the U.S. At the time, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula by the North Korean nuclear and missile provocation necessitated the alliance. Now, an ascendant China, “together with the lessons of Ukraine, have made South Korean people pay close attention to the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance,” stated Shin, noting that both nations openly stress the importance of freedom, democracy, and rule-based order. South Korea has become enthusiastic about tripartite cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, in tune with American policies. 

On the other hand, China warned South Korea to respect China's core interests while expressing its concerns on several strategic issues. Shin stated that “China began to demand the Yoon government to continue the three policy positions of the previous government, namely, no more deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), no participation in the American missile defense system, and no military alliance among Korea, Japan, and the U.S.” However, the current Foreign Minister Park Jin made it clear to the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang that the policy positions of the previous government do not bind the new government, Shin indicated.
 

The Taiwan Contingency

Shin indicated the precarious nature of the contingency, stating, “South Korea has no intention of challenging the One China claim. However, the peace and stability of Taiwan Strait are also very important for South Korea, as the security situation of the Taiwan Strait is connected to the Korean peninsula.” Indeed, a military collision in the Taiwan Strait would be impossible to contain locally. “The U.S. and Japan are supposed to immediately help Taiwan to repel China’s military attack, and American bases are located in South Korea and Japan, including Okinawa,” he said.

Therefore, military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is likely to escalate to Northeast Asia, and a certain portion of American forces in South Korea could move to the Taiwan Strait in the contingency according to the strategic flexibility of forces, “which might induce North Korea's misjudgment to invade South Korea,” Shin predicted.
 

Looking to National Identity

The Cost of Deterrence

Preventing Overextension

Overextension represents one of the largest limits on U.S. power projection. According to Mastro, one of the primary reasons that the Biden administration has not been talking about North Korea significantly, is the fact that the U.S. cannot fight a war on the Korean Peninsula and compete effectively with China.

Thus, Mastro proposes that the South Koreans play a greater role in their defense, a topic that comes up with NATO partners and allies in Europe as well. More specifically, Mastro suggests that the U.S. transfer operational command to South Korean forces, and that the South Korean military should allow the U.S. to practice greater strategic flexibility, to use its forces on the Korean Peninsula for operations or contingencies that are off the peninsula. Up until this point, that permission has been denied, but Mastro contends that it would be useful and could enhance deterrence. 

“If the South Koreans, along with their statements about wanting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, also explicitly allowed for that strategic flexibility to take place to say that they understand that the role of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula is primarily to deter and defend South Korea against North Korea, that could also play a potential role in wider contingencies,” she said.

Furthermore, Mastro believes that South Korea must play a greater role in the production and provision of certain types of munitions. “This is an area where the U.S. has struggled with its own manufacturing base that is considering licensing production and potentially doing it elsewhere. So the question is whether the U.S. could count on South Korea for some critical supplies during a conflict that could reduce the U.S. logistical burden,” she speculated.

South Korea is a small country, and it has limited resources, but it also has the second-largest reserve force and paramilitary force in the world, and the eighth-largest active duty force in the world. According to Mastro, “The South Korean military is technically 20 times larger than that of Japan's…it has punched above its own weight, like the Australian military has.”

It remains to be seen whether the U.S.-South Korea alliance will need to be tested in the coming years, but tensions with China will likely continue to define the two nation’s foreign policies. A potential Taiwan contingency remains one of the largest looming threats to the status quo and the most probable pathway to regional escalation, which, in Shin’s view, could draw North Korea and its nuclear arsenal into the fold.

The Payne Lectureship will return in the spring quarter, continuing with the theme of Asian perspectives on the U.S.-China relationship. We will be joined by Kokubun Ryosei, professor emeritus at Keio University and adjunct adviser at the Fujitsu Future Studies Center.

The United States can do much more to build closer partnerships with Southeast Asian countries, according to Scot Marciel, the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at APARC, whose previous long career in the U.S. foreign service focused on Southeast Asia and included the roles of U.S. ambassador to Myanmar and Indonesia. He notes, however, that a deeper, more consistent engagement with Southeast Asian nations requires the United States to adopt a more systematic strategic approach to the region, one that draws on a positive agenda that transcends the U.S.-China great power competition.

Marciel recently joined APARC Visiting Scholar Gita Wirjawan, host of the popular Endgame video podcast, to discuss the geopolitical evolution of the Southeast Asian countries and how their relationships with the United States have been unfolding

Marciel is the author of the forthcoming book Imperfect Partners, which provides his on-the-ground witness account of the ups and downs of critical U.S. relationships in Southeast Asia. In his conversation with Wirjawan, he urges U.S. policymakers to design a positive agenda for engaging Southeast Asian countries in areas like health, climate change, and economic development.

The wide-ranging discussion addresses multiple other issues, including the unlucky history of Myanmar and how the international community can help Myanmar’s resistance prevail; the relevance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); the dynamics between ASEAN and the Quad, the minilateral grouping comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States; and more.

This conversation with Marciel is part of an Endgame interview series Wirjawan is recording with Stanford experts during his residency at APARC.