As right-wing populism surges around the world, immigrants and their descendants often face discrimination and become targets of political scapegoating. Yet, the question of which groups of immigrants are targeted by anti-immigrant rhetoric is dependent on a host of factors, and there remains a lack of clear evidence on the reasons underlying xenophobic behavior and the othering of immigrant populations.

A new study, published in the American Political Science Review, introduces a novel international relations perspective, particularly the concept of geopolitical rivalry, into the literature on anti-immigrant sentiment. The study indicates citizens strongly prefer immigrants from non-rival countries over those from rival countries.

The study’s co-authors — including Kiyoteru Tsutsui, APARC deputy director and director of APARC’s Japan Program and Dartmouth College’s Charles Crabtree, a former visiting professor with the Japan Program, shift the research focus of anti-immigrant sentiment to the political dynamics between the immigrants' countries of origin and the destination countries. In doing so, the authors emphasize the importance of going beyond the existing preoccupation with the individual background characteristics of migrants and integrating the study of xenophobia within the global context of political competition and alliances.

Geopolitical Relations and Public Perceptions 

Traditionally, research on anti-immigrant attitudes has concentrated on factors such as race, culture, and labor market impacts. By contrast, Tsutsui and his co-authors build on the view that the political relations between immigrants’ origin and host countries shape citizen attitudes toward them. The researchers draw on this international relations perspective to argue that immigrants (as opposed to refugees) from countries with contentious or conflictual relationships with the host country are generally less welcomed than those from allied nations.

To test this argument, the researchers used a method known as a forced-choice conjoint experiment, a technique whereby social scientists present survey participants with a series of hypothetical scenarios in which they must choose between two or more options — in this case, potential immigrants — each described by a set of varying attributes. Tsutsui and his co-authors had survey participants choose between two candidates for permanent residency, differentiated by their country of origin and various other attributes typically used in experiments to determine if labor market concerns outweigh preferences for specific immigrants.

The researchers fielded the experiment with nationally representative samples in 22 democracies, mostly in Europe and the Americas but also Asia and South Africa. They assigned four countries of origin to the immigrant profiles: two countries of origin with a similar racial and cultural make-up as the majority of the survey respondents, a rival country and an ally; and two countries with a different racial and cultural make-up.

The results strongly support the geopolitical rivalry argument: “In each of the survey countries, immigrants from non-rival countries are strongly preferred over those from rival countries,” the co-authors write. “The effect is so large that it results in a net preference for immigrants from countries with a dissimilar racial and cultural makeup than the majority of the host country.”

The researchers also show that the greater the respondents’ sense of their own country’s superiority, the stronger the international relations of their governments are mirrored in their preferences for immigrants. Furthermore, they find that members of ethno-racial majorities are more prone to the rivalry effect because they are more strongly identified with their nation compared to minority members.

The authors demonstrate that, for instance, in Western Europe, immigrants from Russia are less favored, while in East Asia, Chinese immigrants face similar hostility. This animosity towards immigrants from rival nations leads to a net preference for those with different racial or cultural backgrounds compared to the more favorable reception of immigrants from allied countries.

“The mechanisms we document in this article play an important part in the overall dynamic leading to the selective rejection or acceptance of immigrants,” Tsutsui and his colleagues summarize.

Addressing Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

In their empirical analysis, the researchers found minimal evidence of broad anti-Asian sentiment or “Sinophobia” beyond the effects of political rivalry. This conclusion holds consistently across various survey countries, continents, and immigrant origin countries. The detailed examination by survey country indicates that generalized racial or cultural biases did not significantly influence the observed preference for immigrants from politically aligned countries. The authors propose that future research expand the sample of survey countries, update and refine measures of political rivalry, and include a broader range of immigrant origins.

The study offers a new lens connecting geopolitical rivalries with xenophobia, providing a more nuanced understanding of public attitudes toward immigrants. Policymakers and researchers can use this framework to better anticipate and address potential backlash against immigrants from countries with politically contentious relations. Informed immigration policies that promote multiculturalism and social inclusion start with a deeper grasp of the forces shaping public perceptions and attitudes toward immigrants.

In recent years, China's military modernization and assertive actions have led to more frequent and dangerous encounters between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the militaries of key regional players in the Indo-Pacific. Each encounter heightens the chance of a military conflict in the region. A new report published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) assesses the PLA’s strategic thinking on escalation control, analyzing the potential for conflict in the region and exploring regional responses and implications for deterrence.

Edited by Chinese military expert Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at APARC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the report, "Encounters and Escalation in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives on China’s Military and Implications for Regional Security," comprises six essays, each detailing an encounter with the PLA. These case studies include China’s maritime disputes with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam and its increasingly aggressive military activities vis-à-vis Australia, India, and Taiwan.

The authors of the essays are current and former practitioners with insight into their government’s experiences and thinking. Their assessments emphasize the need for Asia-Pacific countries to reevaluate their defense capabilities and adopt clear and consistent policy approaches to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape in the region.

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Tactics, Intentions, and Shared Threat Perceptions

As the PLA adopts a more assertive approach beyond its maritime boundaries, nations across the Indo-Pacific region have increasingly experienced perilous encounters with the Chinese military. For example, the PLA's intensifying aggression around Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea led to several incidents of maritime tension with the Philippines. Likewise, a Chinese fighter aircraft intercepted an Australian surveillance aircraft during its routine activity in international airspace over the South China Sea, posing a safety risk to the Australian aircraft and its crew.

The authors of the six case studies in the NBR report agree "that China harbors problematic intentions and is using increasingly aggressive and risk-acceptant tactics to accomplish its goals." While they show that China uses different tactics in different situations and differ in their evaluations of the most troublesome tactics for their respective countries, their analyses share several common themes, which Mastro reviews in her introduction to the report, titled "Close Encounters with the PLA: Regional Experiences and Implications for Deterrence."

First, “China doctrinally does not take any responsibility for the deterioration in the strategic environment,” writes Mastro. “All six case studies mention China’s tendency to publicly blame the other country for whatever crisis unfolded.”

China also sees crises as opportunities, Mastro explains, and most case studies indicate that the crises at stake were deliberate acts of PLA escalation. All case studies also reflect Chinese strategic thinking on deterrence as serving dual purposes: firstly, to discourage adversaries from certain actions, and secondly, to influence their behavior in line with the deterrer's intentions, ultimately requiring them to comply with the deterrer's preferences.

Another common theme is that the PLA's assertive actions have prompted all six nations studied in the report to boost security cooperation with the United States and other regional powers, albeit to varying extents. For example, in addition to enhancing its strategic partnership with the United States, India has enhanced its defense ties with the two other Quad members (Japan and Australia) and regional partners such as Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines.

Moreover, based on their encounters with the PLA, almost all regional players have concluded that strengthening their military capabilities will discourage Chinese aggressive behavior in the future, Mastro says, noting that “changes in defense posture have perhaps been the most drastic in Japan.”

Policy Implications

The report's case studies offer policy recommendations for deterring China, emphasizing the importance of a consistent approach that includes strengthening deterrence capabilities through military modernization, firm stances on border disputes, and close security cooperation with the United States, its allies, and other like-minded nations. While there is consensus that military deterrence needs to be balanced with diplomatic engagements to reduce tensions, each regional player views the effectiveness of diplomacy and cooperation with China differently.

“Ultimately,” Mastro concludes, “the path forward for maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region requires a cohesive strategy that prioritizes long-term security interests, demonstrating the essential role of international cooperation and the strategic interplay between military readiness and diplomatic efforts in navigating China’s aggression.”

Learn more about the report and download Mastro’s introductory essay > 

Click the link for a full transcript of “What We Need To Talk About When We Talk About Taiwan.“

The Likelihood of Invasion

In stark terms, Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, believes there’s a 100% chance China will use some sort of force against Taiwan in the next five years. For the last twenty years, China has been making concerted efforts to modernize its military and increase its capabilities not only to assert force against Taiwan, but to deter intervention from the United States.

In the majority of scenarios, the United States wins in a conflict with China over Taiwan. But the United States also carries a distinct geographic disadvantage. The distance across the Taiwan Strait between the island and mainland China is approximately 100 miles, which is roughly the distance between Richmond, Virginia and Washington D.C. If China moves quickly, PRC forces could take Taiwan before U.S. forces have time to move into position.

When considering possible outcomes in Taiwan, it is equally important to consider the motivations driving Beijing’s ambitions. The leadership on the mainland has been planning and thinking about how to retake Taiwan since 1949. With the modernized capabilities coming online, the balance of power has shifted in China’s military favor, and the cost-benefit calculus favors Beijing’s ambitions. The long-term planning stage is now reaching its end, and the prospects of direct action are increasing.

The View from Taipei

Political leaders in Taiwan recognize the growing danger they face across the Strait. In Larry Diamond’s assessment, the end of Hong Kong's autonomy and the suppression of the “one country, two systems” model, the rising military incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone and coastal waters, and the whole rising pace of Chinese military intimidation has sobered Taiwan and visibly impacted Taiwanese public opinion.

Concerningly though, while the political elite recognize the real and present danger of the situation, polling of the general Taiwan public suggests that the vast majority of citizens still feel like an attack or an invasion by China is unlikely. Similar majorities suggest that they would be willing to fight in Taiwan’s defense, but volunteering for military service remains at a minimum.

To maximize safety, Taiwan needs to find ways to strengthen itself in its ability to defend, resist, and deter China, while still avoiding any appearance of moving toward permanent independence or any other action that could be deemed by Beijing as a provocation, says Diamond.

What the United States Can Do

When it comes to the defense of Taiwan, the strategic crutch hobbling the United States is geography. Most of the U.S. Pacific forces are not in Asia. The majority are in Hawaii and California, as well as a few bases and airfields in Japan. To be able to effectively deter China, the U.S. needs far greater forward deployed military capability in order to be able to either stop or stall the movement of Chinese troops into Taiwan, says Mastro.

Taiwan needs greater onshore military deterrence capabilities as well. One such strategy is the “porcupine approach,” which increases the number of smaller mobile lethal weapons. By Larry Diamond’s assessment, increased citizen participation in military training is also crucial, with an emphasis on weapons training and urban defense tactics. The U.S. could support these aims by overhauling the current system for weapons procurement to speed up the production and delivery of weapons systems not just for Taiwan, but to the benefit of U.S. defense and other contingencies as well. Working with leadership to create strategic stockpiles of food, and energy should also be a priority, says Diamond.

The U.S. also needs to put much more effort into its diplomatic efforts on behalf of Taiwan. Many U.S. allies and partners are reluctant to ostracize China because of economic ties and concerns over sparking their own conflict with China in the future. A key ally in all of this is Japan. If Japan fights with the United States on behalf of Taiwan, it is a guaranteed win and enough to effectively deter China. But much more needs to be done much more quickly in order to secure those guarantees and present them in a convincing way to Beijing.

“The clock is ticking,” Larry Diamond says. “And the problem is we don’t know how fast it’s ticking. “Taiwan is moving in the right direction. But we need to move faster than we're moving.”