China's ascent in the economic, technological, and military spheres and its assertive foreign policy have disrupted geopolitical paradigms, prompting intensified discussions of great power competition and rivalry. But how did China achieve great power status and build it from a weaker resource position in a U.S.-dominated international system?

Stanford political scientist Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military and security policy, sets out to answer this question in her new book, “Upstart” (Oxford University Press), which offers a novel framework for understanding how China chose to compete on the international stage. A center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and faculty at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Mastro draws on the political science and business literature to explain China’s thinking that allowed it to enter the great power club.

Mastro joined APARC Publications Manager George Krompacky to discuss her new book. Listen to the conversation on our SoundCloud or YouTube channels. A transcript is also available to download.

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The Startup Approach

In debating about China’s rise, one might fall into the trap of assuming that China would pursue its ambitions like the United States has. Mastro, however, argues that China does not act the same way as the United States or other would-be superpowers and does not have to compete everywhere and in the same manner to yield influence or dictate outcomes.

Acknowledging the highly politicized nature of China’s rise and U.S. competition with China, Mastro emphasizes a pragmatic approach in her book. “For the United States to compete effectively, we have to understand first what the situation is,” she says, ascribing her pragmatic outlook, at least partially, to her military career. Mastro continues to serve in the U.S. Air Force Reserve, currently as the deputy director of reserve global China strategy at the Pentagon.

Mastro shows that China’s buildup of power over the past three decades stems from pursuing a “startup approach,” that is, a careful mix of three strategies: emulation (mirroring U.S. activities in similar areas), exploitation (adopting U.S. strategies, but in different areas of competition, where the United States isn't strongly present), and entrepreneurship (applying innovative approaches to new and existing areas of competition). Throughout her book, she provides 22 case studies in the economic, military, and political realms to illuminate when China has used each of the three components of the startup strategy and explain why it has chosen a certain pathway at a given time.
 

Emulation, for example, is manifested in China's approach to mediation diplomacy, as it attempts to present itself as an international mediator to gain power and influence; in its pursuit of humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations; and its attempts to internationalize the renminbi.

Instances of exploitation include China’s use of arms sales to countries that can't buy them from the United States due to factors like treaty obligations or embargoes; its approach to free trade and industrial policy; and its ability to keep most U.S. forces out of Asia and disrupt those operating there (known as its anti-access/ area denial capability.

Examples of China’s entrepreneurial approach include its reliance on strategic partnerships instead of alliances; its nuclear strategy and protection of overseas interests (unlike the United States, China has no overseas bases and has not relied on a large nuclear arsenal); and its Belt and Road Initiative.  

By no means is China always successful. Mastro lists various examples indicating, she argues, that China chose the wrong strategy in its pursuit of power buildup, such as its attempts to emulate U.S. soft power or aircraft carrier capabilities. ”But I don't want us to be blind to the realities that a lot of what China does has been effective,” says Mastro. “It’s indisputable that what China has accomplished over the past 30 years is impressive.”

Emulation and Exploitation in Foreign Policy

One salient example of the United States’ misunderstanding of China's strategic approach pertains to China’s participation in international organizations. It is also a lesson in the importance of reevaluating and reinforcing the frameworks that govern international institutions.

International institutions, Mastro explains, have been a key mechanism for the United States to build and exercise power in a flexible, innovative manner. Confident in these institutions' ability to regulate state power in alignment with American interests, many in the United States believed that integrating China into the global order would push Beijing towards political and economic liberalization. This belief underpinned the U.S. support for granting China a most-favored-nation status in the 1990s and its entry into the World Trade Organization.

By the early 21st century, China had joined 50 international governmental organizations and more than a thousand international non-governmental organizations. Within these bodies, China sought to assume a leadership role comparable to that of the United States and its allies, aiming to steer agendas and influence outcomes. Not only did China turn out to be adept at working within the rules to shift institutional directions but also at exploiting loopholes, as, for example, in trade organizations, where its compliance with the established norms has been selective. The U.S. expectations about China’s economic liberalization and democratic reform, however, proved to be distorted.

“The underlying issue was the assumption that China would adopt a worldview similar to the U.S. upon deeper integration,” Mastro says. “Had there been a more nuanced understanding of China's strategic intentions, the U.S. might have reinforced certain norms and established new rules to limit China's influence more effectively.”

Taiwan and a Changing Military Balance of Power

Just as the United States was mistaken in believing that international institutions would limit China's actions in foreign policy, it might also be wrong in assuming that China's integration into the global economy has changed its stance on the use of force or that China will consider the cost of attacking Taiwan too high.

According to Mastro, Taiwan is another case where Beijing measures costs and benefits differently from Washinton. “While we might think there are constraints on Chinese [calculus on Taiwan], those constraints are often not actually in place.”

For China, Mastro explains, Taiwan is of utmost importance and deeply connected to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. She stresses that her research indicates that, as part of China's use of economic power, there is good reason to suspect that international isolation and condemnation in response to a Chinese assault on Taiwan would be relatively mild. ”Most strategic partnerships include clauses where countries agree not to let political issues like Taiwan affect their economic relationships,” Mastro says. “This, combined with the changing military balance of power, is something I hope readers understand from my book.

Lessons for U.S. Strategy

In the last chapter of her book, Mastro discusses the implications of China’s upstart strategy for U.S. policy and offers guidance on how Wahington can address China’s rise. “The United States needs to target its approaches to build and maintain a competitive edge with its own version of an upstart strategy,” Mastro writes. Specifically, the United States should avoid emulating all of China's successes, promote emulation where it maintains competitive advantages, close the gaps China exploits to build power, and embrace its unique entrepreneurial approaches.

“The overall goal should be to move competition into areas where the United States has an advantage and reduce the impact of Chinese strategies where China enjoys advantages,” Mastro notes.

But how realistic is it for the United States to play the long game in this manner, given its four-year election cycle and current politically polarized environment?

Mastro recognizes that not only does the U.S. domestic political system make it difficult for policies to continue from one administration to another, but it also increases the cost of entrepreneurial thinking for any administration interested in implementing a new approach during its four-year term. Entrepreneurial actions require a degree of experimentation, but our politicians are averse to taking risks with actions and policies that might require course adjustment.  

Ultimately, Mastro concludes, it is a question of leadership. “I think the rise of China and the challenge of China is of such importance and urgency that you need leaders to put their political aspirations aside and think in a more calculated, strategic way. You need that kind of leadership and courage in our system for us to be able to compete with China.”

Amidst evolving geopolitical shifts, the foundation of U.S. nuclear deterrence, forged in the crucible of the Cold War, faces a new set of challenges. The principle of mutually assured destruction (MAD), once the bedrock of deterrence, is now being tested by Russia's aggressive posturing and China's strategic advancements. In the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and signals of a willingness to employ tactical nuclear weapons, questions arise about the efficacy of traditional deterrence strategies. Concurrently, China's expanding nuclear arsenal adds complexity to the equation. Do these developments mean America needs to rethink its deterrence strategy? 

In a new paper, “China’s Nuclear Enterprise: Trends, Developments, and Implications for the United States and Its Allies,” FSI Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro focuses on the Chinese perspective of the equation and examines recent trends in Chinese military doctrine and their implications for U.S. deterrence strategy. Mastro’s contribution is part of a new report, Project Atom 2023: A Competitive Strategies Approach for U.S. Nuclear Posture through 2035, produced by the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues.

A fundamental premise underlying Mastro’s analysis is that China merits distinct scrutiny differently from Russia, and that the two countries should not be considered  “nuclear peers.” Although China is indeed engaging in nuclear force modernization, Mastro contends that the nation is still adhering to its fundamental nuclear policy: minimal retaliation capability and a no-use-first pledge.

While some have been troubled by China’s turn to regional nuclear options like the DF-26, an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads, Mastro asserts that this is because “they are regional weapons lower on the escalation ladder.” Rather than trying to achieve parity with the United States, she contends that Beijing’s objective is to preserve a credible second-strike capability, which is essential to the concept of deterrence.

Instead of prescribing specific alterations to U.S. force posture or nuclear modernization, Mastro suggests that any changes in U.S. defense strategies carefully consider the impact on Chinese nuclear strategy. The key is to preserve China’s minimal retaliation capability and its pledge to refrain from initiating nuclear warfare: “the most important goal for U.S. deterrence policy should be to ensure it does not encourage a change in China’s nuclear policy and in posture.”

Other steps the United States should take, according to Castro, include preventing the “co-mingling” of nuclear and conventional weapons on vessels apart from ballistic missile submarines. This precaution aims to eliminate ambiguity and mitigate the risk of possible conflict escalation. She also believes that there may be “more costs than benefits” in the proliferation of nuclear weapons among Asian allies — South Korea, Japan, and Australia. These threaten the non-proliferation regime and increase the possibility of accidents. The answer, Mastro holds, is not deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on foreign soil, but rather increased consultations and joint planning with allies. Such collaborative efforts could reassure allies and partners of U.S. intentions even as they have minimal impact on Chinese contingency planning. 
 

In 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court passed a series of rulings requiring Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Nippon Steel of Japan to compensate 14 Korean citizens for their unpaid labor. As of yet, neither company has agreed to comply with the ruling. The South Korean government has since announced plans to compensate survivors who were forced to work in Japanese mines and factories during the wartime period, but this remains a unilateral decision on the part of the Yoon administration, not a bilateral position between South Korea and Japan.

These tensions have ripple effects far outside of East Asia. Writing for Toyo Keizai, Daniel Sneider, an FSI Lecturer in International Policy with a focus on Asia, explains the broader geopolitical implications of these issues:

“The Americans have been urging the two countries to settle these problems in order to ease the way to the kind of security cooperation that has become visible in recent months. Joint military exercises for missile defense and other small steps to intensify trilateral coordination are taking place and a resolution of the history of problems may be key to moving ahead.”

Steps Forward

The last year has seen increased efforts to restore more functionality to the South Korea-Japan relationship. President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida met briefly on the sidelines of the September 2022 UN General Assembly meeting in New York, which was followed by respective visits of Yoon to Tokyo in March 2023 and Kishida to Seoul two months later in May, the first such visits in over 11 years.

The Camp David summit, which brought the U.S., South Korea, and Japan together as strategic partners, is the latest step on the hoped-for road to institutionalized security cooperation between the three nations.

Speaking to NBC, Shorenstein Fellow Thomas Fingar explained the significance of the weekend.

“The importance of this [summit] is that it was a genuine trilateral meeting, which means the Japanese and the Koreans are talking to one another as opposed to the U.S. dealing separately with each of them.”

In contrast to the idyllic Camp David setting, the three leaders are faced with a weighty set of issues, noted Sneider, including the crisis triggered by the Ukraine war, North Korea’s aggressive posture, as well as growing concerns about China.

Oriana Skylar Mastro, an FSI Center Fellow and an expert on security, conflict resolution, and the Chinese military elaborated further on the mutual pressures South Korea, Japan, and the United States face:

“Since President Biden came into office, he’s really stressed strengthening alliances and partnerships as a way of protecting U.S. interests abroad. I'm sure there has been much work behind the scenes to try to get these two countries to come together. In terms of the timing [of this summit], it's of course partially because of the accumulation of these concerns over China. I think also the war in Ukraine has done a lot to really open up leaders' eyes to the dangers of having neighbors with territorial hopes and claims that also have strong militaries that could potentially be undeterred from using force. I think it's fair to say that this has also pushed these two countries to rethink their own strategies for security.”

An Uncertain Future

The official summit documents outline both a vision of partnership and offer a variety of practical agreements on everything from annual leadership summits to meetings on economic and cyber security, and a proposal for how to move forward with joint military exercises. Notably, the two-paragraph ‘commitment to consult’ on responses to ‘regional challenges, provocations, and threats affecting our collective interests and security’ — while not a fully embodied collective security agreement — is nonetheless a “stunning achievement,” says Daniel Sneider.

Despite agreeing on a hefty laundry list of shared concerns and security goals, the way forward for additional trilateralization between the United States, Japan, and South Korea is not necessarily clear. Oriana Mastro explained: 

“Even though they might have shared threat perceptions, there is still a lot of trust that has to happen between nations for them to take coordinated military approaches. If two countries, for example, exercise together — and that's one of the things that the Biden administration is hoping to get out of this summit: more routine trilateral exercises — you get to learn a lot about another country's military, and that only really happens between friends. That’s also true of intel sharing. When you share intelligence, you’re not only sharing information, you're sharing how you get intelligence, which can also be sensitive. So while they've shared these threats for a while, it hasn't really gotten to the level in which they were willing to take risks in terms of the relationship between South Korea and Japan to become closer in the security space in a way that would help them combat these issues together.”

Besides the challenges of international diplomacy, Yoon, Kishida, and Biden also face domestic hurdles that could hinder further cooperation.

In a comment to the Wall Street Journal, Gi-Wook Shin noted that, “Yoon only entered politics a few years ago. If his party loses the election, I don’t know who will stay with him.” Improving South Korea-Japan relations was a major platform of the Yoon campaign, and backlash against his administration could yield disinterest or even renewed hostility toward continuing his efforts. 

Daniel Sneider sees similar challenges for Biden and Kishida. Writing in East Asia Forum, he cautioned:

“President Joe Biden is already embroiled in an election campaign that threatens to bring Donald Trump and his isolationist views back to power. The Camp David summit was barely noticed amid the constant flow of domestic political news, though it mostly received welcome praise in the media. . . Imprisoned by domestic politics, the White House will likely be unable to give substance to this emergent partnership.”

In the case of Kishida, the decision to release wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear site, which came just days after the conclusion of the summit, has been particularly counterproductive. Sneider continued:

“Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been waiting for a bump from the Camp David summit. But he is experiencing a deepening slide in opinion polls. The Fukushima release faces opposition within Japan, including from fishermen and others worried about boycotts of Japanese products in China and South Korea. Talk of an early parliamentary election in Japan, intended to consolidate Kishida’s claim to long-term leadership, is now on hold.”

Where is the trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea relationship headed next? Follow FSI scholars to stay informed about the latest developments. Register to receive alerts to your inbox either weekly or monthly.   

The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is delighted to share that Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro has been named an Air Force Individual Reservist of the Year 2022 in recognition of her outstanding scholarship and defense analysis in the Field Grade Officer (FGO) category. Mastro, whose career combines academic research and military service, is also a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and continues to serve in the United States Air Force Reserve, for which she works as a strategic planner at INDOPACOM.

Awarded by the Air Force Headquarters Readiness and Integration Organization (HQ RIO), the nomination recognizes Mastro’s exemplary performance and contributions to operational imperatives across the Department of Air Force by applying her globally recognized expertise as a China scholar and foreign defense analyst to bolster US national defense. Her analysis and advocacy impacted operational changes, updated national strategic policy relevant to the Indo-Pacific region, and increased strategic and combat readiness at the Wing, Major Command, Combatant Command, Service, and Department of Defense levels.

HQ RIO notes that “Mastro also led the national discussion on the U.S.-China relationship by publishing six peer-reviewed articles and book chapters; 14 commentaries in publications like The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal; recorded 40 radio spots and podcasts; conducted nearly 40 government, academic, and private sector speaking engagements and was quoted in more than 40 news pieces.”

Mastro has received numerous awards for her military service and contributions to U.S. strategy in Asia, including the 2020 and 2018 Meritorious Service Medal, the 2017 Air Force recognition Ribbon, and the 2016 Individual Reservist of the Year Award.

Her current research projects focus on the U.S.-China great power competition, deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, China’s maritime ambitions, and the China-Russia military relationship. She holds a B.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University.

This essay was first published by Foreign Affairs magazine.

Click the link for a full transcript of “What We Need To Talk About When We Talk About Taiwan.“

The Likelihood of Invasion

In stark terms, Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, believes there’s a 100% chance China will use some sort of force against Taiwan in the next five years. For the last twenty years, China has been making concerted efforts to modernize its military and increase its capabilities not only to assert force against Taiwan, but to deter intervention from the United States.

In the majority of scenarios, the United States wins in a conflict with China over Taiwan. But the United States also carries a distinct geographic disadvantage. The distance across the Taiwan Strait between the island and mainland China is approximately 100 miles, which is roughly the distance between Richmond, Virginia and Washington D.C. If China moves quickly, PRC forces could take Taiwan before U.S. forces have time to move into position.

When considering possible outcomes in Taiwan, it is equally important to consider the motivations driving Beijing’s ambitions. The leadership on the mainland has been planning and thinking about how to retake Taiwan since 1949. With the modernized capabilities coming online, the balance of power has shifted in China’s military favor, and the cost-benefit calculus favors Beijing’s ambitions. The long-term planning stage is now reaching its end, and the prospects of direct action are increasing.

The View from Taipei

Political leaders in Taiwan recognize the growing danger they face across the Strait. In Larry Diamond’s assessment, the end of Hong Kong's autonomy and the suppression of the “one country, two systems” model, the rising military incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone and coastal waters, and the whole rising pace of Chinese military intimidation has sobered Taiwan and visibly impacted Taiwanese public opinion.

Concerningly though, while the political elite recognize the real and present danger of the situation, polling of the general Taiwan public suggests that the vast majority of citizens still feel like an attack or an invasion by China is unlikely. Similar majorities suggest that they would be willing to fight in Taiwan’s defense, but volunteering for military service remains at a minimum.

To maximize safety, Taiwan needs to find ways to strengthen itself in its ability to defend, resist, and deter China, while still avoiding any appearance of moving toward permanent independence or any other action that could be deemed by Beijing as a provocation, says Diamond.

What the United States Can Do

When it comes to the defense of Taiwan, the strategic crutch hobbling the United States is geography. Most of the U.S. Pacific forces are not in Asia. The majority are in Hawaii and California, as well as a few bases and airfields in Japan. To be able to effectively deter China, the U.S. needs far greater forward deployed military capability in order to be able to either stop or stall the movement of Chinese troops into Taiwan, says Mastro.

Taiwan needs greater onshore military deterrence capabilities as well. One such strategy is the “porcupine approach,” which increases the number of smaller mobile lethal weapons. By Larry Diamond’s assessment, increased citizen participation in military training is also crucial, with an emphasis on weapons training and urban defense tactics. The U.S. could support these aims by overhauling the current system for weapons procurement to speed up the production and delivery of weapons systems not just for Taiwan, but to the benefit of U.S. defense and other contingencies as well. Working with leadership to create strategic stockpiles of food, and energy should also be a priority, says Diamond.

The U.S. also needs to put much more effort into its diplomatic efforts on behalf of Taiwan. Many U.S. allies and partners are reluctant to ostracize China because of economic ties and concerns over sparking their own conflict with China in the future. A key ally in all of this is Japan. If Japan fights with the United States on behalf of Taiwan, it is a guaranteed win and enough to effectively deter China. But much more needs to be done much more quickly in order to secure those guarantees and present them in a convincing way to Beijing.

“The clock is ticking,” Larry Diamond says. “And the problem is we don’t know how fast it’s ticking. “Taiwan is moving in the right direction. But we need to move faster than we're moving.”