This article first appeared in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. You can also download its PDF version.

With the conclusion of the Cold War, Southeast Asia entered a transformative era that spanned approximately 25 years. During this period, the geopolitics of the region underwent profound changes, reshaping the foundations of regional security. Washington’s two pivotal alliances in Southeast Asia, which had been cornerstones of stability, struggled to find purpose. In the post-Cold War era, U.S.–Philippine relations weathered a turbulent course, while the alliance between Washington and Bangkok drifted. Policymakers in Washington relegated both alliances to secondary roles in U.S. Asian foreign policy.

However, since the inauguration of the Bongbong Marcos administration, the past year has witnessed a revitalization of the U.S.–Philippine alliance. A series of proactive measures have been taken to strengthen defense ties, highlighted by Marcos’ successful visit to Washington and a continuous stream of high-level US officials visiting Manila. In stark contrast, US–Thai relations have continued to amble along, characterized by senior-level visits but a conspicuous lack of momentum, leading some to question whether the relationship qualifies any longer as an “alliance.”[1]

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How Did We Reach This Point?

Numerous factors have contributed to the erosion of the alliance, which reached its zenith during the Vietnam War, driven by mutual concerns regarding communist expansionism. Rewinding to 1975, the fall of Saigon and the broader U.S. withdrawal from the region left Thai officials bewildered, shaking their confidence in Washington. Consequently, they embarked on diversifying their international relationships, notably by establishing ties with China.

The conclusion of the Cold War severed the alliance from a shared threat or adversary, and it marked the loss of the strategic lens through which Washington had previously viewed Thailand and Southeast Asia as a whole. The United States began exerting pressure on Thailand on a wide array of issues, spanning from trade matters to democracy and human rights. Thai officials voiced discontent, asserting that they were no longer receiving the special treatment befitting an ally. Furthermore, during the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis, Washington offered minimal support and encouraged Thailand to follow the International Monetary Fund’s stringent prescriptions. In contrast, China provided more substantial support to its new partner. This period of U.S. policy remains a source of disappointment, if not anger, for many Thais.

Relations experienced a modest warming in the early 2000s. Washington embraced Thailand’s democratic progress, its cooperation in the Global War on Terror, and its role as a regional hub for security cooperation, humanitarian relief, and US diplomatic endeavors. The US military and American officials working closely with Bangkok highly valued Thailand’s collaboration on an array of issues. The George W. Bush administration even bestowed major non-NATO ally status upon Thailand and initiated negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement. However, this period of the alliance paled in comparison to its former “glory days.” This was evident in the absence of a shared threat perception, the dearth of substantial personal connections between senior Thai and US officials, and the relatively limited attention Washington—outside of the Pentagon—paid to Thailand.

The downward trajectory of the relationship gained momentum in 2006 when the Thai military ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s government in a coup. Washington denounced the coup and suspended military assistance in compliance with the law, though this reaction did not precipitate a complete breakdown in the relationship. Over the subsequent years, Thailand’s deep-seated political polarization, persistent street protests by the “yellow shirts” and “red shirts,” and occasional judicial interventions in electoral politics led to bewilderment and frustration among US officials.[2] They struggled to comprehend why the Thai establishment found it challenging to accept the outcomes of competitive elections.

The turning point came in 2014 with another military coup, which prompted a sharply critical response from the United States. This included another suspension of military aid and a deliberate distancing of the United States from the new Thai government. In response, the coup government and its conservative supporters bitterly criticized Washington, alleging double standards and a lack of understanding of the Thai situation. The government also began leaning increasingly toward China, which offered diplomatic backing, arms, and additional defense cooperation. Bangkok maintained a distinct chilliness toward the United States for several years, even initiating a brief ‘investigation’ of US Ambassador Glyn Davies for public comments related to the lèse-majesté law.[3]

The Trump administration, with a focus on the geopolitical rivalry with China rather than democracy and human rights, reengaged with Thailand in 2017-2018. It invited then–Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha to the White House and restored military-to-military relations following Thailand’s pseudo-democratic 2019 elections. These actions stabilized bilateral relations, albeit at a less enthusiastic level than what the two countries had enjoyed for decades.

Where Relations Stand Today

After a sluggish start, the Biden administration ramped up its efforts in 2022 to enhance the United States’ relationship with Thailand. This included hosting Prime Minister Prayut as part of the US–ASEAN Summit, convening the inaugural bilateral Strategic and Defense Dialogue, dispatching Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Bangkok for discussions on military modernization, and publicly lauding the signing of a communiqué by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai. The communiqué was framed as an expansion of the renowned 1962 Rusk-Thanat communiqué, which had solidified the alliance half a century earlier.[4]

Despite these advancements, the relationship has yet to approach its previous heights for several notable reasons. Foremost, the two nations lack a shared perception of common threats. Notably, the United States perceives China as a threat, while Thailand regards China as a significant partner. Consequently, Washington has no doubt felt dissatisfaction with the deepening security ties between Thailand and China, including arms sales and joint military exercises.

Secondly, the United States has voiced its discontent with Thailand’s robust support for the Myanmar junta and its neutral stance regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Thirdly, the Biden administration continues to be disappointed with the Thai conservative establishment’s employment of legal and parliamentary tactics to impede the restoration of full democracy in the kingdom. As an indication of this disappointment, the Biden administration opted not to invite Thailand to participate in its December 2021 and March 2023 Summits for Democracy. These decisions irked Thai authorities, as did President Joe Biden’s choice to skip the Thailand-hosted Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders meeting in late 2022.[5] Furthermore, Washington’s recent refusal of Thailand’s request to purchase F-35 fighter jets, possibly influenced by concerns regarding Thailand’s deepening security ties with China, undoubtedly contributed to Bangkok’s frustration.[6]

The Way Ahead

As previously highlighted, the current reality has prompted some to question the relevance of the U.S.–Thailand alliance in its current form. Some wonder if it might be more accurate to reclassify the relationship as something other than a traditional alliance, considering the glaring lack of strategic alignment and Thailand’s burgeoning closeness to China. Considering these factors, it appears that the objectives of the two nations are increasingly divergent. In fact, discreet voices in Thailand have been quietly suggesting for years that their “alliance” with the United States appears less meaningful and valuable when compared to Washington’s “partnerships” with non-allies, such as Singapore and even Vietnam.

While it is true that the current state of the relationship is more aptly described as a partnership rather than a conventional alliance, this does not necessarily imply that the governments should terminate the alliance altogether. In the realm of diplomacy, such a move would inevitably be perceived as a downgrade of the relationship, regardless of any new title applied to it. It would be more prudent for both governments to focus on enhancing the substance and tone of the relationship while accepting the inherent ambiguity of being somewhat misaligned allies.

The key to strengthening these ties lies in both countries adjusting their expectations regarding each other and the relationship itself. The United States should accept that Thailand is not currently strategically aligned with Washington nor a full-fledged democracy. Nevertheless, Thailand can still play a crucial role as an important partner. This recognition, among other factors, necessitates patience concerning Thailand’s domestic politics and faith that the kingdom will not fall excessively under China’s influence. Instead, like Indonesia and Malaysia, it can seek to maintain positive relations with both major powers as well as numerous middle powers.

On the other hand, Thailand should realize that its relationship with Washington holds significance for its own strategic autonomy, security, and economic interests. It should strive to be a more constructive partner.

Moving forward, both nations can capitalize on the numerous strengths within their broad and deep relationship. The United States remains Thailand’s leading export market and its third-largest source of foreign investment. Thailand has also aligned itself with Washington’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Health cooperation, notably the long-standing partnership in health research, continues to thrive. The security relationship, which has long been at the core of the alliance, remains robust, albeit less exclusive than in the past. The United States and Thailand jointly host the influential annual Cobra Gold exercise and engage in cooperation and training across various domains. Washington continues to be a key supplier of weaponry and equipment to the Thai military. The two countries also collaborate closely on law enforcement, including counternarcotics efforts. People-to-people connections, including the Peace Corps program, educational exchanges, scholarships, and various initiatives, help maintain a deep reservoir of goodwill between the two nations.

The recent Thai elections represented a missed opportunity. The establishment of a new government led by the victorious political party could have triggered a surge in US enthusiasm for the relationship, not because Washington endorsed a particular party, but because it would have marked a triumph for democracy. Regrettably, Thailand’s conservative establishment obstructed that party from forming a government, resulting in a less democratic outcome.

Despite the disappointing outcome, the emergence of a new Thai government and a fresh Thai foreign minister provides an opening to strengthen cooperation between the US and Thailand on regional and subregional issues. Thailand has traditionally been influential in these areas, but its diplomacy lacked vigor during the Prayut era. This potential cooperation encompasses expanded efforts to safeguard the crucial Mekong River ecosystem, increased collaboration on mitigating and addressing climate change, and the enhancement of economic ties among mainland Southeast Asian nations.

A new government could also facilitate more constructive dialogue regarding Myanmar, offering a prime opportunity to increase cross-border humanitarian assistance. On the defense and security front, both countries should reinitiate discussions on the earlier proposal to transform U-Tapao Air Base into a regional disaster relief hub. Additionally, regular dialogues on potential security concerns, such as the possibility of Chinese access to Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, are essential.

While a return to the alliance’s heyday seems unlikely, a path to a more productive and robust relationship between these long-standing allies exists through patience, persistence, and a willingness to embrace new geopolitical realities.

NOTES

[1] Several authors recently have discussed this alliance versus partnership question. See, for example, Benjamin Zawacki, “U.S.-Thai Relations Have an Alliance Problem,” Foreign Policy, 12 May 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/; and Murray Hiebert, “The United States Makes Up Critical Terrain in Thailand,” CSIS, 2 September 2022, https://www.csis.org/.

[2] See: Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “Two Thailands: Clashing Political Orders and Entrenched Polarization,” in Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia: Old Divisions, New Dangers, ed. Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020), 67–80, https://carnegieendowment.org/. The red shirts initially emerged as backers of the deposed former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who faced removal in a military coup in September 2006. Over time, this support shifted to Thailand’s ruling Pheu Thai party, led by Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra. Conversely, the yellow shirts signify those who stood in opposition to Mr. Thaksin and played a pivotal role in the street protests that precipitated the 2006 coup.

[3] Thomas Fuller, “Thai Police Investigate U.S. Ambassador on Suspicion of Insulting the King,” New York Times, 9 December 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/. This law makes it illegal to defame, insult, or threaten the monarch of Thailand.

[4] “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai Remarks to the Press” (press release, US Department of State, 10 July 2022), https://www.state.gov/.

[5] Masayuki Yuda, “Thailand Belittled Again as U.S. Ostracizes It From Democracy Summit,” Nikkei Asia, 9 December 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/; and “Thailand Shut Out of U.S. Democracy Summit Again,” Bangkok Post, 29 March 2023, https://www.bangkokpost.com/.

[6] Matthew Fulco and Chen Chuanren, “U.S.-Thai Military Alliance Is At A Crossroads,” Aviation Week, 19 July 2023, https://aviationweek.com/.

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University and the Ban Ki-moon Foundation For a Better Future are pleased to announce the second annual Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue (TPSD) in Seoul, Republic of Korea, set to take place on September 12-14, 2023. This convening, designed to accelerate progress on achieving the United Nations-adopted 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, will focus on energy security, the seventh of the Agenda’s underlying 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

APARC and the Ban Ki-moon Foundation launched the dialogue initiative to spur new research and policy collaborations between experts from the United States and Asia to expedite the implementation of the SDGs by governments and non-state actors. This year’s event builds upon the success of the inaugural Tran-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue, held in Seoul in October 2022, and the continued momentum generated through its resultant regional convening, the Trans-Altai Sustainability Dialogue, which took place earlier this summer in Mongolia.  

The Korea Environment Institute, Korea Energy Economics Institute, Korea Environmental Industry & Technology Institute, K-water, and Ewha Womans University will co-host the second annual Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue. The event’s supporters include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University, and the Asian Development Bank. Award-winning Korean actor and director Cha In-pyo has been named honorary ambassador of the TPSD. Mr. Cha will deliver remarks at the opening session of the dialogue. 

At the core of the 2023 TPSD is the pivotal theme of energy security, SDG7, which proposes to ensure access to affordable, reliable, and sustainable energy for all. The challenge of energy production, transportation, and security poses a critical barrier to a shared sustainable future. Despite ongoing progress toward sustainable energy targets on a global scale, recent data indicates that the pace of advancements is insufficient to meet the SDG7 targets by 2030 and varies significantly across different regions. The latest report from the SDG7 Indicator Custodian Agencies also finds that the policy measures required to tackle the global energy crisis, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, continue to lag and that international public financial support for clean energy in low and middle-income countries has been declining since before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

“Energy security is pivotal to the SDGs. Without securing clean energy, the climate crisis remains insurmountable. However, the clean energy future is under serious threat from the war in Ukraine sparked by Russia,” says Mr. Ban Ki-moon, the 8th Secretary-General of the United Nations. “In this regard, I expect the second annual Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue to play an important role in convening world-renowned researchers, policymakers, and students to address energy security and advance clean energy technologies,” he adds.

In pursuit of genuine progress, the second annual TPSD will convene esteemed academics, government officials, industry experts, and leading professionals from Stanford University and across Asia. Together, they will interact in dynamic discussions that bridge multiple disciplines and climate science, exploring technological and policy solutions to expedite the transition toward a future free from fossil fuels and other unsustainable energy practices.

“As we approach the 2023 TPSD, we find ourselves at a crucial juncture, crossing the mid-point of the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with mixed results,” notes Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea at Stanford and director of APARC. “By extending a platform for leading experts to combine rigorous scientific research, policy analysis, and industry insights, I am confident in our ability to advance tangible solutions and real-world action to propel us forward in pursuit of a decarbonized world.”

The first day of the dialogue, co-hosted by the Korea Environment Institute and the Korea Energy and Economics Institute, will convene at The Plaza Seoul. A World Leaders Session will kick off the event, headlined by Mr. Ban Ki-moon; Chairman of the State Great Hural (Parliament) of Mongolia Zandanshatar Gombojav; former U.S. Secretary of Energy and Nobel Prize Laureate in Physics, Stanford Professor Steven Chu; and Managing Director General of the Asian Development Bank Woochong Um. The following plenary sessions will examine the intersections of energy security, sustainability, and issues such as geopolitics, green technologies, and clean energy co-benefits.

The second day will be held at Ewha Womans University and hosted by Ewha’s Center for Climate/Environmental Change Prediction Research. The day’s discussion topics will include, among others, energy-efficient technologies and principles for energy security education. With the mission of empowering young leaders to drive the climate change and sustainable development agenda, the second day will offer opportunities for emerging scholars and young professionals to present their research and applied work in championing progress toward energy security.

The 2023 TPSD underscores APARC’s and the Ban Ki-moon Foundation's shared commitment to fostering ambitious action toward delivering the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals. APARC and our partners, co-hosts, and supporters warmly invite scholars, students, policy experts, and professionals to join us at the TPSD and get involved with our efforts to shape a sustainable and resilient future for the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

Visit the 2023 TPSD page to register to attend the event in person and access the complete program agenda and list of speakers.

About the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) is Stanford University's esteemed institute dedicated to addressing critical issues impacting Asia and its relations with the United States. Through interdisciplinary research, education, and dialogue, APARC seeks to shape innovative policy solutions and enhance collaboration among countries in the Asia-Pacific region. For more information, visit aparc.stanford.edu.

About the Ban Ki-moon Foundation For a Better Future
The Ban Ki-moon Foundation For a Better Future upholds the legacy and vision of Ban Ki-moon, the 8th Secretary-General of the United Nations. Guided by the principles of unification, communication, co-existence, and dedication, the Foundation works tirelessly towards achieving peace, security, development, and human rights. Collaborating with international organizations and stakeholders, the Foundation actively supports the UN's Sustainable Development Goals and the 2050 carbon net-zero target set by the Paris Climate Accord. For more information, visit eng.bf4bf.or.kr.

Contact

For further information on the Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue, contact Cheryll Alipio, Shorenstein APARC’s Associate Director for Program and Policy at calipio@stanford.edu.

This essay originally appeared in Korean on March 4 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as part of a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download. 

This winter, Koreans struggled with the bitter cold amidst a surge in heating costs. It has already been said many times, but climate change and the energy crisis are no longer abstract issues to be dealt with in the future. Northern California, where I live, was drenched and battered by intense storms this winter. The Midwest and the East Coast experienced brutal cold waves and heavy snow. Mount Washington in New Hampshire, close to the Canadian border, “recorded the coldest wind chill in the history of the United States” in early February at -108.4ºF.¹ Europe was spared the worst due to an unusually warm winter, but the energy crisis sparked by the Russia-Ukraine War still poses a vexing challenge.

As the world emerges from the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic, it faces a series of interrelated challenges—climate change, wars, the energy crisis, inflation, Sino-U.S. tensions, a crisis of democracy, and a crisis of political leadership. Each one of these problems is formidable on its own, but they are inextricably bound together like a Gordian knot. It is hard to know where to begin. Untangling this knot will require not only cooperation between Washington and Beijing, but also broader multilateral coordination. Simply severing the knot is not a feasible solution. Reflecting this complex state of affairs, the theme of this year’s World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland was “Cooperation in a Fragmented World.”

Korea cannot afford to remain a bystander to climate change. Energy security is a critical issue for Seoul, as Korea is highly dependent on energy imports. Climate change and energy security are also at the heart of the United Nations’ emphasis on sustainability, and addressing them will require international cooperation based on coherent, consistent policies at the national level. It is encouraging to note that the Yoon Suk-Yeol administration has proclaimed carbon neutrality as a policy goal while also emphasizing Korea’s energy security. These issues transcend ideological divides and party lines. They are a matter of national survival. The Yoon administration has put forth a vision of values-based diplomacy based on partnerships with liberal democracies, but it must also be more proactive in facilitating international cooperation on climate change and energy issues. There is no time to lose, and Korea’s international stature demands that it play a greater role.

When It Rains on Greenland’s Glaciers

During a recent visit to a winery in Napa Valley, I asked the owner for his thoughts about the most serious threat or challenge that the winery would face in the next 20 to 30 years. I assumed he would mention fire, given the devastating fires the region has experienced in the past few years. Without any hesitation, however, he said it was climate change. Even a one-degree Celsius increase in the temperature would necessitate a substantial change in the variety of grapes he could grow. If current trends persist, he added, Oregon or Washington will become the center of wine production on the West Coast.

There are similar changes occurring in Europe. Grape-harvesting regions are gradually moving north, with one study concluding that the United Kingdom could have the best climate for grape production in 20 years.² The UK currently has lower average temperatures and shorter summers than France or southern Europe, but this could change by 2040. According to Debbie Inglis, the director of the Cool Climate Oenology and Viticulture Institute in Canada, “a 2ºC global increase in temperature could remove 55% of wine growing regions worldwide and 4ºC could remove over 70% of these regions from production.”³

Coffee—beloved by many Koreans—will also be affected by climate change. A recent study by researchers at the University of Zürich reported that the regions suitable for coffee production “could be cut in half by 2050.”⁴ A study published by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that an increase in surface-level temperatures of 2ºC or greater could reduce coffee production in Latin America by up to 88%.⁵ In addition, the International Coffee Organization found that 70% of the land suitable for coffee production in Southeast Asia will disappear by 2050. Coffee beans, the most commonly traded item after oil, are presently cultivated in over 60 countries. If coffee production falls as a result of climate change, we may soon witness coffee rationing and even international disputes over coffee.

Climate change will disrupt every aspect of our daily lives, and the pace and intensity of this disruption only continues to grow. Fort Smith in Canada is located north of the 60th parallel and usually remains cool during the summer, but it reached nearly 104ºF in 2021, breaking an 80-year record.⁶ The Summit Station, located at the highest point of Greenland’s glaciers, saw rain for the first time in recorded history in August 2021.⁷ There were 97 tropical storms last year, including typhoons and hurricanes. Headlines about record flooding, unprecedented droughts, and extreme heatwaves are becoming a regular occurrence.

An annual global climate report published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) last year noted that atmospheric carbon dioxide levels in 2021 had reached the highest level “in at least the last million years.” Global surface temperatures were 0.21–0.28ºC higher than the 1991–2020 average, making 2021 one of the six warmest years since observation began in the 19th century. Moreover, 2015 to 2021 marked “the seven warmest years on record.”⁸ The latest research, utilizing artificial intelligence, concludes that temperatures will rise 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels within the next 10 years even if action is taken to reduce emissions.⁹

In 2021, NOAA Administrator Rick Spinrad said at COP26 in Glasgow that the climate crisis “is not a challenge for future generations, but one we must confront today.”¹⁰ A few months later, he warned that “if we hope to have a prosperous society and economy tomorrow, it must begin with climate action and adaptation plans made today.”¹¹ In his opening remarks to COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh last November, UN Secretary-General António Guterres did not hold back. “We are on a highway to climate hell with our foot still on the accelerator,” he said, observing that “the deadly impacts of climate change are here and now.”¹²

A Global Energy Crisis

The energy problem is closely tied to climate change. Around 3 billion people, or 40% of the global population, still rely on wood, coal, charcoal, and animal waste for their energy needs. These materials are some of the main culprits of climate change, as they are responsible for approximately 60% of global greenhouse gas emissions. When the United Nations announced 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) in 2015, the question of energy was discussed extensively. For instance, goal 7, “Affordable and clean energy,” notes that increasing the use of renewable energy and reducing greenhouse gas emissions will help address climate change and foster inclusive and sustainable communities.

Despite such efforts, realizing this goal remains a distant prospect. International cooperation on clean and renewable energy is vital, but the Ukraine-Russia War has demonstrated how energy supplies can be weaponized for political purposes. This has exacerbated the energy crisis across the world. According to data from the European Commission, for instance, “in 2019 Europe relied on Russia for 41.1 percent of its gas imports, 46.7 percent of its solid fuels imports, and 26.9 percent of its crude oil imports.”¹³

In an October 2022 interview, Fatih Birol, the executive director of the International Energy Agency (IEA), noted that “in the 1970s, we had an oil crisis, but it was only oil. Now we have oil, natural gas, coal, [and] electricity.”¹⁴ The IEA was founded in 1974 by major energy consumers, including the United States, in response to price manipulation by oil producers in the Middle East. Its chief is now sounding the alarm about a wide-ranging energy crisis more serious than that of the 1970s.

Green Growth: The Lee Administration’s Lost Legacy

Korea experienced significant difficulties during the 1970s oil shock, even resorting to oil rationing. To this day, Korea’s economy suffers from a major vulnerability—it is completely dependent on oil and natural gas imports for its energy needs. Those in Korea should heed Birol’s warning. This summer, Koreans may have to deal with intense heat waves and a surge in electricity prices. If a conflict were to break out in East Asia, it could block the commercial sea lanes that are the lifeline of Korea’s economy. In such a scenario, Korea would be much more vulnerable than the EU is today following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is vital to think ahead about how Korea can meet its energy requirements even if there is a geopolitical crisis in the region.

The Lee Myung-Bak administration (2008–13) was perhaps the first government to pay serious attention to climate change and the importance of the energy issue. Every administration has its successes and failures, but the Lee administration has not received due credit for its “green growth” agenda and its “resource diplomacy.” Worthy policy initiatives can run into errors as they are implemented, and such mistakes should be rectified. It is a great shame that the Lee administration’s policy vision on climate change and energy issues was not upheld by its successors. The Moon Jae-in administration even regarded resource diplomacy as a political target during its campaign to eradicate “deep-rooted evils.”¹⁵ In a welcome development, the current Yoon administration seems to be receptive to restoring the green growth agenda and resource diplomacy. That said, the question remains whether Korea could have done more on these issues in the past 10 years.

Green growth was at the heart of the Lee administration’s climate change policy. This is a concept that links and encompasses two issues: the green transition and economic growth. If a country seeks to achieve economic growth in a more environmentally friendly manner, this will give rise to new industries and technologies that are related to the environment and to the energy sector. To create jobs and find new sources of economic growth, the Lee administration sought to identify new industries and technologies with great economic potential and fuse them with existing industries. The Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth was enacted in January 2010 as part of this effort.¹⁶ This law, commonly referred to as the “Green Growth Act,” was the first Korean law to address climate change. It provided the legal basis for setting emission reduction targets, and it catalyzed the Korean government’s response to climate change.

Furthermore, the Lee administration spurred international cooperation on these issues. For example, the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) was formed as a non-profit organization in Korea in June 2010. GGGI was then officially recognized as an international organization two years later, at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. This institute, which has its headquarters in Seoul, is the first international organization that was created under Korea’s leadership. At COP21 in 2015, GGGI announced “the launch of the Inclusive Green Growth Partnership, a new collaboration with top multilateral development banks and United Nations regional economic and social commissions.”¹⁷ This partnership aimed to achieve “shared prosperity and equitable growth that creates employment and raises the income of the world’s poorest,” and “assist multilateral development banks and funds in identifying green growth opportunities and investments.”¹⁸ Major development banks, including the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the African Development Bank, participated in this initiative.

Korea as a Resource-Poor Country

The Lee administration also expended great time and effort toward resource diplomacy. Korea is a resource-poor country, and its dependence on resource imports is the highest among OECD countries. Although it is a manufacturing powerhouse, Korea’s economy takes a hit whenever there is a spike in commodity prices. This is why the Lee administration—and its predecessors—sought to secure foreign resources. The Kim Dae-Jung administration (1998–2003) established a basic plan for developing overseas resources, and the Roh Moo-Hyun administration (2003–08) sought to grow Korea’s stake in mines in Mongolia and across Africa.¹⁹ However, the Lee administration was by far the most proactive on these issues. It worked through public sector companies to invest in and develop resources overseas. Recall, for example, that China has waged an aggressive campaign of its own to secure resources in Africa and Southern America.

Korea’s resource diplomacy fell behind in the 10 years following the Lee administration. According to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), there were 219 projects related to developing overseas mines in 2012. This number shrank to 94 in 2021.²⁰ In many cases, the government’s stake in overseas mines was sold at a giveaway price. As mentioned above, these projects became the target of a political campaign under the Moon administration. By its very nature, resource diplomacy is a high-risk endeavor that seeks to achieve long-term strategic goals. As a resource-poor country, Korea has no choice but to assume this risk.

To date, only the negative elements of the Lee administration’s resource diplomacy have been highlighted by the press. However, there have been major successes. The Prelude floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) platform off the Australian coast is a good example. In 2012, the Korea Gas Corporation acquired a 10% stake in this project with an investment of $1.5 billion. It began production in 2019 and was in the red until 2020, but it began to turn a profit in 2021. LNG prices have skyrocketed due to Russia’s weaponization of fossil fuels, and Korea stands to benefit greatly from this investment.²¹

Resource nationalism is emerging once again around the globe. Korea must remember its position as a resource-poor country. Although investment in overseas resources should be spearheaded by the private sector, the government should do what it can to support these initiatives with an eye toward achieving energy security. It is vital to maintain a long-term perspective, assuming appropriate risks when necessary. Once again, this is not a political nor an ideological issue.

Why Nuclear Energy Matters

“Sustainable development” and “ESG” (Environmental, Social, and Governance) are now widely known among the general public. The 70th Session of the UN General Assembly in 2015 adopted a resolution to achieve the SDGs by 2030. The SDGs articulate common goals for humanity as it seeks to achieve sustainable development for all. Under the slogan of “leave no one behind” and its five overarching themes of people, planet, prosperity, peace, and partnerships, the SDGs put forth 17 goals and 169 specific targets.²² Although the SDGs address broad issues, including poverty, food security, education, gender equality, socioeconomic inequality, and housing, they also propose specific goals for addressing these issues.

While stressing the need for highly developed countries, developing countries, and low-income countries to promote prosperity for all, the SDGs also call upon countries to protect the environment. To strengthen international cooperation on climate change, UN member states adopted the Paris Agreement at COP21 in December 2015. This agreement went into effect in November 2016. Under this accord, countries agreed to “substantially reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to limit the global temperature increase in this century to 2 degrees Celsius.”²³ The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the agreement represented a setback. However, by April 2018, 175 countries had signed the agreement and ten developing countries had submitted their national adaptation plans for responding to climate change. COP27, held at Sharm El-Sheikh in 2022, added the question of “loss and damage” to its official agenda. There was also an agreement to “establish new funding arrangements, as well as a dedicated fund, to assist developing countries in responding to” damages resulting from climate disasters.²⁴

Korea has been taking steps to align itself with these international developments. Though it was already far too late, Korea announced in October 2020 that it would achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. On September 24, 2021, it enacted the Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth for Coping with Climate Crisis.²⁵ This act codified the goal of carbon neutrality by 2050 into law. Furthermore, it established the legal procedures for setting forth a national strategy, specifying medium- to long-term emission reduction targets, and formulating and monitoring the implementation of basic plans on addressing climate change. Specifically, the law codifies Korea’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) for greenhouse gas emission reduction as 35 percent relative to 2018 levels. This law went into effect on March 25, 2022, making Korea the 14th country to codify the goal of carbon neutrality by 2050 and establish a legal framework for relevant policy implementation. It took Korea 12 years to enact an enhanced version of the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth, which went into effect in April 2010.

There is an important consideration on Korea’s journey toward carbon neutrality: nuclear energy. Although Korea should eventually phase out its nuclear power plants, carbon neutrality is virtually impossible without reliance on nuclear energy. Due to geographic factors, Korea cannot generate enough energy from renewable energy sources. Instead of phasing out nuclear power, Korea has to substantially increase its use of nuclear energy if it hopes to attain carbon neutrality.

Nonetheless, the Moon Jae-In administration abruptly pursued a nuclear phase-out policy for most of its term. It halted construction on nuclear power plants and prematurely shut down an operational power plant that had passed safety inspections. At the same time, it provided substantial subsidies for solar power installations. Shortly before leaving office, however, Moon stated on February 25, 2022, that Korea must “sufficiently utilize nuclear power plants as a major source of energy for the next 60 years.” He also urged relevant agencies to “take all necessary steps to hasten the operation” of four nuclear power plants whose construction had been delayed.²⁶ In the end, Korea lost precious time due to incoherent and ill-advised policies.

The Yoon administration is right to proclaim carbon neutrality as a policy objective and emphasize the importance of energy security. It appears that the Russia-Ukraine War and global supply chain disruptions have influenced the administration’s thinking. At a June 2022 public hearing on the new administration’s energy policies, Director-General Cheon Yeong-Gil, the MOTIE official responsible for energy transition policy, stated that “it is becoming increasingly important to pursue both carbon neutrality and energy security, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is becoming protracted.”²⁷ The United States, the United Kingdom, and other advanced economies are reconsidering the specifics of their energy policy, while maintaining the overarching goal of carbon neutrality. Korea must formulate a comprehensive policy that accounts for environmental concerns and energy security.

Fostering Scholarship and Leadership

Climate change and the energy crisis cannot and should not be addressed by governments alone. Academia and the private sector have important roles to play in convening groups of experts, calling upon citizens to act, and fostering international cooperation. Universities in the United States, Japan, and China are beginning to establish institutions that address climate change and energy issues. Prominent examples include Stanford’s Doerr School of Sustainability, which opened its doors last September; Tokyo University’s Center for Climate Solutions; and Tsinghua University’s Institute for Sustainable Development Goals. Several Korean universities, including Ewha Womans University and KAIST, have also taken steps in this direction. The government and the private sector should do everything they can to support these initiatives. Such institutions will prepare today’s youth to respond to the challenges posed by climate change and the energy crisis.

Korea’s companies must take a farsighted view in supporting institutions that discuss and address issues of global importance. Think tanks such as the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and the Chey Institute, both established with private support, are playing an active role in policy discussions. However, their budgets are relatively small, and they do not comprehensively engage with fundamental issues of global importance. It is hard to find Korean equivalents of the Gates Foundation or the Zuckerberg Initiative, in which a company’s founder donates a large part of their wealth toward addressing global issues—poverty, public health, education, climate change, and energy. While Samsung operates Samsung Global Research, it must do more to support research on long-term global issues in a way befitting of its status as a global company.

Moreover, Korea has Ban Ki-Moon, who oversaw the establishment of the SDGs during his tenure as UN secretary-general. He continues to actively engage with a variety of global issues abroad, but his experience and expertise are underappreciated at home. Korea can do more to play a leadership role on international issues, and climate change and energy issues present a valuable opportunity. Ban could play a meaningful role in advising, facilitating, or overseeing such efforts.

Last October, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center partnered with the Ban Ki-Moon Foundation to launch the Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue. This forum seeks to convene scientists, experts, and policy practitioners from across the Asia-Pacific for an annual discussion to identify avenues for cooperation and foster a new generation of leaders. The inaugural dialogue addressed climate change, and this year’s dialogue will be held in Seoul on the topic of energy security. It is my hope that Korea will host many such international conferences in the years to come, as a way for Korea to exercise leadership on the international stage.

Just Look Up!

A comet several miles wide is hurtling toward Earth. If nothing is done, humanity will go extinct. However, most people question or deny the existence of this comet. As the comet finally becomes visible in the sky, some begin to cry “just look up!” Anyone can look up and see the truth for themselves. Even so, others refuse to recognize this reality. They claim that this object is not a comet, and they shout “don’t look up” instead. This is the plot of the movie "Don’t Look Up," released in 2021.

The Earth will be destroyed in less than six months, but the wealthy collude with the powerful to profit from the impending extinction of humanity. They claim that the comet is full of valuable raw materials. Later on, they detonate the moon in an unsuccessful attempt to block the comet. As a means of last resort, they escape Earth to reach a faraway planet, where they die at the hands of the alien population. The vast majority of people on Earth have no choice but to hold each other’s hands and pray as they await their fate.

It cannot be emphasized enough: climate change and the energy crisis are beginning to disrupt our everyday lives in tangible ways. The truth is in front of our eyes, but we should question if we are telling ourselves to not look up. In addition, the movie reminds us of the dire consequences when politicians and the wealthy collude to pursue their narrow self-interest. There is not much time left to confront and respond to the crises that are unfolding in plain sight. Perhaps no one can undo the Gordian knot overnight, but we should—at the very least—just look up.

¹ Amanda Pitts and Michael Bartiromo, “Mt. Washington Records Coldest Wind Chill in US History,” The Hill, February 6, 2023. ↩

² Alistair Nesbitt et al., “Climate Change Projections for UK Viticulture to 2040: A Focus on Improving Suitability for Pinot Noir,” OENO One 56, no. 3 (2022). ↩

³ Clarissa Wei, “The Arctic Circle: A New Frontier for Sustainable Wine,” BBC Travel, September 1, 2022. ↩

⁴ Roman Grüter, Tim Trachsel, Patrick Laube, and Isabel Jaisli, “Expected Global Suitability of Coffee, Cashew and Avocado Due to Climate Change,” PLOS ONE, January 26, 2022. ↩

⁵ Justin Worland, “Your Morning Cup of Coffee Is in Danger. Can the Industry Adapt in Time?,” TIME, June 21, 2018. ↩

⁶ Walter Strong, “Fort Smith Had Its Hottest Day in 80 Years: Preliminary Data,” CBC News, June 30, 2021.↩

⁷ Kasha Patel, “Rain Falls at the Summit of Greenland Ice Sheet for First Time on Record,” Washington Post, August 19, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2021/08/19/greenland-melt-august….↩

⁸ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “BAMS Report: Record-High Greenhouse Gases, Sea Levels in 2021,” August 31, 2022. ↩

⁹ Josie Garthwaite, “Earth Likely to Cross Critical Climate Thresholds Even if Emissions Decline, Stanford Study Finds,” Stanford University, January 30, 2023. ↩

¹⁰ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Dr. Rick Spinrad on COP26: Climate Crisis Not a Challenge for Future, but ‘One We Must Confront Today’,” November 1, 2021. ↩

¹¹ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Statement from NOAA Administrator Dr. Rick Spinrad on the IPCC Climate Change 2022 Impacts Report,” February 28, 2022. ↩

¹² United Nations, “Secretary-General’s Remarks to High-Level Opening of COP27,” November 7, 2022. ↩

¹³ Giulia Carbonaro, “EU has Paid Russia $16 Billion for Fossil Fuels Since Ukraine War Started,” Newsweek, March 18, 2022. ↩

¹⁴ Sandor Zsiros and Jorge Liboreiro, “‘Russia Will Lose the Energy Battle,’ Says IEA Chief Fatih Birol,” Euronews, October 29, 2022. ↩

¹⁵ Gi-Wook Shin, “In Troubled Waters: South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis,” Shorenstein APARC, May 3, 2022. ↩

¹⁶ An English translation of the law by the Korea Legislation Research Institute is available at “Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth,” Korea Law Translation Center. ↩

¹⁷ Global Green Growth Institute, “New Global Initiative Launches at COP21 to Boost Green Growth Financing,” December 7, 2015. ↩

¹⁸ Global Green Growth Institute, “New Global Initiative Launches.” ↩

¹⁹ Kim Boo-Mi, “As the Global Resource Wars Resume, Will Korea Resume Resource Diplomacy?” [in Korean], Elec Times, February 19, 2022. ↩

²⁰ Jeong Ui-Jin, “The Government is Selling Overseas Mines” [in Korean], Korea Economic Daily, January 17, 2022. ↩

²¹ Jeon Joon-Beom, “The Lee Administration’s Investment Pays Off Amidst LNG Crisis” [in Korean], Chosun BIZ, August 24, 2022. ↩

²² A detailed overview of the SDGs can be found at “The 17 Goals,” United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Sustainable Development. ↩

²³ United Nations, “The Paris Agreement.” ↩

²⁴ United Nations Climate Change, “COP27 Reaches Breakthrough Agreement on New ‘Loss and Damage’ Fund for Vulnerable Countries,” November 20, 2022. ↩

²⁵ For an English translation of the law by the Korea Legislation Research Institute, see “Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth for Coping With Climate Crisis,” Korea Law Translation Center. ↩

²⁶ Im Hyung-Seop, “President Moon Convenes Meeting on Energy Supply” [in Korean], Yonhap News, February 25, 2022.↩

²⁷ Jeong Sang-Pil, “New Administration’s Energy Policy to Focus on Security and Carbon Neutrality” [in Korean], Energy Platform News, June 21, 2022. ↩

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University and the Ban Ki-moon Foundation For a Better Future announced today the launch of an annual Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue in Asia to accelerate progress on achieving the United Nations-adopted 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The joint project will spur new research and policy partnerships between experts from the United States and Asia to expedite the implementation of the Agenda’s underlying 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by governments and non-state actors. The two-day inaugural Dialogue will be held in Seoul, Republic of Korea, on October 27 and 28, 2022, and will be free and open to the public.

The Dialogue’s co-organizers include the Natural Capital Project (NatCap) of Stanford University, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Korea Environmental Industry and Technology Institute (KEITI), Korea Environment Corporation (K-eco), and Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-water). 

The first day will take place at The Plaza Seoul and will be co-hosted by the Korea Environment Institute. It will include a series of public sessions headlined by Ban Ki-moon, the eighth secretary-general of the UN, who will join a lineup of world leaders including Kevin Rudd, former prime minister of Australia and chief executive officer and president of the Asia Society; Iván Duque, former president of the Republic of Colombia; and Gombojav Zandanshatar, chairman of the State Great Hural (Parliament) of Mongolia.

“This Dialogue is very timely and relevant as the climate crisis is deepening in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Sustainable Development Goals are becoming more difficult to achieve in the midst of the Coronavirus pandemic,” says Mr. Ban Ki-moon. “Asia-Pacific countries should be more aggressive in the fight against climate change and more audacious in the role they play toward achieving the SDGs,” he noted.

In this spirit, expert discussions on the second day will bring together social science researchers and scientists from across the Asia-Pacific region, alongside policymakers and practitioners, to share local and global nature-positive solutions and new pathways of meaningful SDG acceleration actions. Co-hosted by and held at Ewha Womans University, the panel discussions will explore the making of livable, sustainable cities, such as Busan Metropolitan City, and the threats to them by climate change, disasters, and human security issues. To achieve systems transformation and sustainable development, discussions will turn to the need to value and invest in nature.

“Climate and sustainability solutions span disciplines and sectors and require collaboration with partners worldwide,” says Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea at Stanford and director of APARC. “The launch of the Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability marks an opportune moment to scale up SDGs implementation by leveraging knowledge and expertise from across Stanford and the Asia-Pacific and engaging the next generation of scholars and experts,” Shin adds. “We are honored to join in this effort with Mr. Ban and his team, with whom APARC has an established relationship.”

Highlighting the role of youth in achieving the SDGs, the Dialogue includes student panels that feature young leaders from Stanford University, Ewha Womans University, Osaka University, and De La Salle University, among other Asian universities. Students’ research, applied work, and entrepreneurial endeavors across the region showcase innovations and transformations in green financing and sustainable investments, gender mainstreaming and climate governance, development cooperation for sustainable governance, and scaling environmental solutions through a business and social justice lens.

The Seoul Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue is the inaugural event in APARC and the Ban Ki-moon Foundation’s joint effort to stimulate ambitious action to deliver the 2030 Agenda and SDGs. The annual Dialogue may rotate among different host cities in Asia to address different themes selected from the SDGs framework spearheaded by Mr. Ban Ki-moon during his term as the UN Secretary-General. 

Visit the event page to register to attend the Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue in person in Seoul, as well as for the full program agenda and speaker list.

The event is also offered online via a live webcast: watch the live-streamed sessions on the event page or via the Ban Ki-moon Foundation’s YouTube channel.

About the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) addresses critical issues affecting the countries of Asia, their regional and global affairs, and U.S.-Asia relations. As Stanford University’s hub for the interdisciplinary study of contemporary Asia, APARC produces policy-relevant research, provides education and training to students, scholars, and practitioners, and strengthens dialogue and cooperation between counterparts in the Asia-Pacific and the United States. Founded in 1983, APARC today is home to a scholar community of distinguished academics and practitioners in government, business, and civil society, who specialize in trends that cut across the entire Asia-Pacific region. For more, visit aparc.stanford.edu.

About the Ban Ki-moon Foundation For a Better Future

The Ban Ki-moon Foundation For a Better Future follows and further develops the achievement and philosophy of Ban Ki-moon, the 8th Secretary General of the United Nations through upholding the values of unification, communication and co-existence, and dedication. It promotes three pillars of the UN including peace and security, development, and human rights and contributes to making a better future devoid of conflict and deficiency. In particular, the Ban Ki-moon Foundation actively collaborates with the UN, international organizations, and stakeholders toward achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and realizing the 2050 carbon net-zero of all state parties of the Paris Climate Accord of 2015. For more, visit http://eng.bf4bf.or.kr/. 

Media Contact

Journalists interested in covering the event should contact Shorenstein APARC’s Communications Manager, Michael Breger at mbreger@stanford.edu. For further information on the Trans-Pacific Sustainability Dialogue, please contact Cheryll Alipio, Shorenstein APARC’s Associate Director for Program and Policy at calipio@stanford.edu.

This commentary was first published in The Hill.

The future sustainability of the Earth cannot do without the coordinated actions of its two largest carbon polluters — the United States and China.

The most recent highlight in that realm is the U.S.-China Joint Glasgow Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s at the UN climate change conference COP26 in November 2021. The joint statement, which came during a turbulent time in U.S.-China relations, was both surprising and valued. The declaration reaffirms both nations’ commitment to “tackling [climate change] through their respective accelerated actions in the critical decade of the 2020s, as well as through cooperation in multilateral processes.”

The declaration also calls for “concrete actions in the 2020s to reduce emissions aimed at keeping the Paris Agreement-aligned temperature limit within reach,” including in the areas of methane reduction, decarbonization and forest protection. 

While the declaration represents a promising step forward and offers reassurances about new momentum for sustained future cooperation, it offers few details regarding concrete plans, nor the opportunities and challenges to enact and implement those plans.

Last fall, we at Stanford University partnered with Peking University to convene a series of discussions on a broad range of themes around U.S.-China collaboration on climate change, such as global sustainable finance, corporate climate pledges, as well as opportunities and challenges for the acceleration of decarbonization in both countries in general — both nationally and by sector — with particular emphasis on power, transportation and industry. The outcomes and insights were synthesized in a report on how to accelerate decarbonization in China and the United States, in which we highlight two urgent recommendations to facilitate constructive cooperation between both nations as they tackle growing environmental challenges.

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First, we need open-science research and development (R&D) collaboration.

Second, we need to be explicitly cognizant of political and institutional constraints.

This is necessary in order to translate promises into progress while protecting social benefits and their equitable distribution amid the green energy transition. As noted in both the joint declaration and our report, bilateral dialogues so far remain very high-level. We need future discussions and workshops at the sectoral and local levels to develop concrete plans. In enacting and implementing concrete plans, political and institutional constraints can pose real obstacles, as demonstrated by China’s past and ongoing efforts to control air pollution.

Hence, strong support from both national and local governments will be critical. As a first step, we need to gain a good understanding of who the relevant actors are in both policymaking and implementation and the incentives they face.

In this period of transition when there are still regional mismatches between energy supply and demand, it is too easy to let short-term needs push climate mitigation goals to the bottom of the barrel to address regional energy shortages. In both countries policymakers and those charged with implementation face multiple and sometimes conflicting goals. The prioritization of goals is shaped by incentive structures. Fostering incentive structures conducive to decarbonization is particularly important during the transitional period when consensus around goals and priorities is less clear. 

Furthermore, it is time to standardize standards. A recurring theme across our discussions is the need for shared, clearly specified regulatory frameworks and standards across both nations. Harmonizing standards will expedite trade, validation, accounting, climate pledges and environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) evaluation.

Only if there is standardization can organizations be required to follow unified disclosure practices for making available important information like the amount of carbon emitted. We need to make and implement more legislation to encourage a faster pace of decarbonization, and having unified terminology and standards is conducive to both effective carbon legislation and policy implementation. Common terminology and standards will provide a basis for carbon legislation. Having clearly stipulated standards and procedures can also make implementation easier and more straightforward. 

Last but not least, we are hopeful about the future of U.S.-China cooperation on climate change and believe that universities can play a significant role in the global energy transition. Universities are often the birthplaces of innovative technology, training grounds for talent from across the globe, as well as conveners of bilateral and multilateral dialogues. We hope the governments on both sides of the Pacific will work together to hammer out the needed details to build the momentum and make a real impact in the fight against global climate change. 

Shiran Victoria Shen is the W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell national fellow at Stanford University’s  Hoover Institution, as well as an assistant professor of environmental politics at the University of Virginia. 

Jean C. Oi is the William Haas professor of Chinese politics, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies, as well as the director of Stanford University’s China Program. She is also the Lee Shau Kee director of the Stanford Center at Peking University. 

Yi Cui is the director of Stanford University’s Precourt Institute for Energy, as well as professor of materials science and engineering. He is a senior fellow at the Woods Institute for the Environment, and professor, by courtesy, of Chemistry, Stanford University. 

Liang Min is managing director of the Bits & Watts Initiative of the Precourt Institute for Energy at Stanford University.