This interview was first published by The Diplomat magazine.

The growing strategic and economic competition between China and the United States has prompted renewed U.S. attention to the nations of Southeast Asia, a region of 11 nations that sprawls at the center of the Indian and Pacific oceans. Yet, as Ambassador Scot Marciel details at length in his new book, “Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia” (Shorenstein APARC & Rowman & Littlefield), Southeast Asia remains poorly understood by many in Washington.

That’s certainly not true of Marciel, a U.S. diplomat who has spent a large part of his 35-year career based in and working on Southeast Asia. After an initial posting to the Philippines that coincided with the 1986 People Power revolt that overthrew President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Marciel would go on to serve as the first U.S. ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and as ambassador to Indonesia (2010-2013) and Myanmar (2016-2020), the latter at a time of great turbulence. These postings were preceded by a period during which he oversaw U.S. relations with Southeast Asia as principal deputy assistant secretary for East Asia and the Pacific at the U.S. State Department.

Marciel, now a member of the Southeast Asia program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, spoke with The Diplomat’s Sebastian Strangio about the recent trajectory of U.S.-Southeast Asia relations, the “enigma” that is ASEAN, and how Washington should approach a region that desires fruitful relations with the U.S., but is congenitally leery of superpower tensions.

In the introduction to the book, you write, “My friends in the region often talk about how the United States does not truly understand Southeast Asia or how to engage effectively with it. They are not wrong.” This is something that we have seen most recently with the response of some nations in the region, Indonesia chief among them, to the formation of AUKUS, which has been accused of stoking regional tensions. What do you think U.S. policymakers most often get wrong about Southeast Asia?

The AUKUS example highlights the high degree of sensitivity that many in Southeast Asia have toward major powers either raising the geopolitical stakes in the region or establishing mechanisms that might challenge what ASEAN considers its central role in regional diplomacy and security. The advent of the Quad is another example. It’s not that these initiatives were mistakes. Rather, they reflect a tendency that U.S. policymakers sometimes do not fully appreciate just how nervous such developments make Southeast Asian partners. Although I don’t know if this was the case with the AUKUS announcement, U.S. policymakers often assume that Southeast Asian governments will view U.S. foreign policy moves in the region as being as benign or even helpful as the United States sees them. This reflects Washington’s own view of itself as being on the “right side” of most issues, and a failure to recognize that some in Southeast Asia view the United States with some wariness, just as they do China.

The main point I was making in the quote you noted, however, was broader. U.S. policymakers, including me, have struggled for years to figure out how best to work with Southeast Asia as a region. This reflects both the lack of expertise (in academia and government) about the region and the inherent difficulty of dealing with a highly diverse group of countries that has neither a powerful central institution nor a dominant member that can speak on behalf of the members. Attending ASEAN meetings tends to be underwhelming, and visiting multiple Southeast Asian countries regularly is impractical for top officials. That reality, along with the sheer size and importance of some other countries in Asia, means that U.S. policymakers tend to focus on China, Japan, Korea, and India. Absent a major crisis, policy toward Southeast Asia tends to be a corollary of policies toward those major powers, most notably China. This leads to episodic engagement and excessive U.S. emphasis in those limited engagements on broader strategic concerns (i.e., China) rather than on issues of importance to Southeast Asians.

You argue that the U.S. approach toward Southeast Asia “cannot be simply a corollary of its China strategy,” with the implication that U.S. policy toward the region remains to some extent hostage to the increasingly confrontational relationship with Beijing. How can the U.S. convince the region that it is not bolstering its engagement only because of its concerns about China? And how would you assess the Biden administration’s approach on this front over the past two years?

The Biden administration’s approach on this front has been better than that of the Trump administration, which unabashedly made many if not most of its interactions with Southeast Asia about China. Although they probably still talk too much about China when they are in Southeast Asia, senior Biden administration officials and the President himself have made a greater effort to talk about U.S. cooperation with Southeast Asia. This is critical. Southeast Asians are fully aware of the benefits and costs of their relationships with China. They don’t need the United States to “educate” them, and U.S. officials should trust that they have agency in protecting their independence and sovereignty.

Rather than worry excessively about what China is doing in Southeast Asia, Washington should focus on building strong and durable partnerships with the region on its own merits, based on a positive agenda – trade, investment, climate change, health, education and security – and on building confidence in the region that the United States is committed to Southeast Asia long term. That means showing up consistently at all levels, implementing a substantive trade and investment agenda – whether via IPEF or other initiatives – and investing more in key issues that matter to the region. Building that strong partnership, without talking much about China, will ease regional concerns about why Washington is engaging. It also is the best way to bolster the freedom of maneuver of Southeast Asian nations, which should be a U.S. priority.

In the context of the growing strategic competition between China and the United States, the mantra that one often hears from Southeast Asian states is that they don’t want to be forced to choose between the two powers. Do you agree with this framing, and what are the implications for U.S. policy toward the region?

The framing has limited value, in the sense that no one is asking Southeast Asian states to choose between the two powers, and it is not even clear what “choosing” would mean in practical terms. That said, the broader message represented by this mantra is accurate: most if not all of the region wants to enjoy good relations with both China and the United States (as well as with other partners) and resents attempts by either power to pressure them to do otherwise.

The implication for U.S. policy is that the focus should not be on discouraging the countries from having good relations with China but rather on ensuring the United States is a good and reliable partner itself. That means not worrying too much when a Southeast Asian leader visits Beijing and celebrates close ties with China, or when a particular country seems to be leaning more toward China. That is going to happen at times. The United States should focus instead on making sure it is doing all it can to be a good partner with Southeast Asia. I’ll offer a specific example. Indonesia under President Jokowi has moved somewhat closer to China, which causes consternation in some quarters. Washington should not worry unduly about this, as Indonesia is fiercely independent and has moved closer to China in part because the Belt and Road Initiative is funding priority infrastructure projects in the archipelago. Rather, U.S. policymakers should consider what they can do to bolster their own relationship with Jakarta, without making it about China. Among other things, vigorously implementing the recently announced $20 billion Just Energy Transition Partnership would be a great way to do just that.

You served as the first U.S. ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an organization that you describe as an “enigma” and note has often been a subject of disappointment for many in Washington. What do you think U.S. officials fail to understand about ASEAN, and how can the U.S. work more constructively with it?

ASEAN has disappointed many not only in Washington but even in Southeast Asia. It is by design not a powerful, supranational organization, but rather a relatively loose association of countries that see the institution as a useful way to promote cooperation and avoid interstate tensions, amplify their collective voice, and discourage great power meddling. ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making and its practice of not interfering in member states’ domestic affairs render it largely incapable of bold action, whether on the South China Sea or during Myanmar’s current crisis. What U.S. policymakers sometimes don’t appreciate is that, for Southeast Asian governments, maintaining broad unity and relationships among member states, along with setting the agenda for the region, are essential priorities that make up for these weaknesses.

For the United States, it is important to accept ASEAN for what it is and to recognize that it still offers value. First, I don’t think it’s a coincidence that there have been no inter-state conflicts among ASEAN member states in decades. Second, ASEAN is steadily making progress in reducing trade barriers between member states, making it a more compelling investment destination. Third, its annual meetings provide an excellent opportunity for senior U.S. officials to engage not only with ten Southeast Asian counterparts but also with key leaders from the region and the world. By showing up and engaging consistently at these meetings and supporting ASEAN’s own work, U.S. leaders bolster America’s relations with all ten ASEAN member countries and increase the region’s confidence that the United States is a reliable and good partner.

You write that since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has “tended to measure countries and adjust the quality of our relationships – including with our treaty allies – based on their progress, or lack thereof, on democratic and human rights grounds.” Given the prickly response that this has garnered from some leaders – Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia is perhaps the most obvious example from your book – do you think it is possible to pursue these moral and strategic goals in tandem? How can the U.S. balance these two imperatives?

Yes, I think it is possible to pursue both goals in tandem. It’s a matter of how we do so. Promoting democracy and human rights is an essential part of American diplomacy, and many in Southeast Asia appreciate our support for these goals. The problem is that some of the tools the United States has come to rely on to advance these goals – critical public statements and even grading of other countries, reducing or eliminating engagement with “offending” governments, and on occasion sanctions – have become both less effective and more obligatory, in the sense of U.S. domestic constituencies demanding their use. These tools might have worked to some extent when the United States was in ascendancy after the Cold War, but countries now have other choices and are increasingly critical of what they see as U.S. double standards.

This does not mean the United States should stop promoting human rights and democracy. Rather, Washington needs to recognize that the world has changed and adjust its tactics accordingly. That means accepting that public criticism isn’t always the best option, that sanctions rarely work, and that promoting democracy and human rights requires more nuance and humility. This will be more controversial, but it also means continuing to talk with the governments in question – while avoiding “business as usual” – in the face of setbacks, except in extreme circumstances such as the appalling junta in Myanmar now. I’m not advocating a 180-degree shift in approach, just some tactical adjustments to make U.S. efforts more effective and more in line with the realities of the world today.

Of the challenges facing Southeast Asia, none carries as much moral and political urgency as the conflict in Myanmar, where you served as ambassador from 2016 to 2020. How would you assess ASEAN’s approach to the crisis, and do you think the U.S. can best help the situation, given the extreme complexity of the conflict and the limitations imposed by China’s proximity?

I give ASEAN credit for trying, via the Five-Point Consensus of April 2021 and its unprecedented decision not to invite junta representatives to key ASEAN meetings. The Five-Point Consensus, however, has failed, both because of the junta’s refusal to compromise and because the consensus itself depended on the flawed assumptions that the generals were reasonable people and that the crisis could be resolved via a dialogue leading to a political compromise. The problem now is that ASEAN is divided and so cannot reach agreement on a different or bolder approach, which is why it continues to tout the Five-Point Consensus. While I hope Indonesia as ASEAN Chair will take more initiative, such as meeting publicly with the National Unity Government (NUG) and key ethnic groups and making clear that it will not accept the junta’s sham elections, I don’t see ASEAN as a whole acting decisively. That is why I have called for Washington to take more of a leadership role in supporting the pro-democracy forces, including through greater assistance and improved coordination with like-minded countries on sanctions.

One potential constraint on U.S. action is that Beijing seems to see U.S. support for the pro-democracy forces as somehow a threat to its interests, so greater U.S. support could result in China doubling down on its backing of the junta. Already, we see China pressing the ethnic resistance organizations in Myanmar’s northeast to strike a deal with the junta, which has a remarkable track record of not honoring such deals. China’s approach is unfortunate, as this is not or should not be a U.S.-China issue. Whatever government emerges out of this crisis is inevitably going to want and need to have reasonably good relations with China. I would assume that the NUG and others within the pro-democracy coalition are making this point regularly to Chinese officials. To the extent that U.S. and Chinese officials are talking about Myanmar, it would be useful for U.S. officials to emphasize that they also would welcome good relations between any future Myanmar government and China. In the end, the United States should step up its support for pro-democracy forces despite China’s concerns because those forces are the only hope for Myanmar to enjoy stability, peace, and prosperity.

Amid escalating tensions between the United States and China and as the U.S. government is exploring how to further limit China's access to U.S. technology, discussions about the possibility of decoupling between the two countries have intensified. As businesses operating in China grapple with the potential consequences of decoupling, APARC’s China Program hosted a panel of executives across industries from tech, retail, and finance currently engaged in reshaping their China businesses to provide a view from the ground and consider the future of decoupling with China.

The event was the second installment in a special series celebrating APARC’s 40th anniversary. Titled Asia in 2030, APARC@40, the series highlights core areas of the center’s expertise, examines Asia’s transformation over the past four decades, and considers the drivers and shapers of the region’s future.

The panel featured Dan Brody, the managing director of Tencent Investments, who is responsible for the company’s overseas investments; Frits Van Paasschen, a change management expert, former CEO of Starwood Hotels and Resorts, and former president of EMEA at Nike; and Stuart Schonberger, a founding partner of CDH Investments, one of the leading China-focused alternative asset managers. China Program Director Jean Oi chaired the panel.

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Risks and Opportunities

Van Paasschen described his extensive experience developing strategies for expanding licensing and retail in China, which involved navigating the country's infrastructure and legal framework and, as CEO of Starwood Hotels, overseeing the construction of over 100 hotels. He ascribed his success in the country to his recognition of China’s strengths and weaknesses and his finding ways to interact positively with Chinese stakeholders.

The term decoupling is an oversimplification of the relationship between the complex Chinese and U.S. economies, said Van Paasschen. He noted that retailers in many cases are looking to sources from alternative markets to China, but that he believes there are still opportunities for investment in and co-development with China that remain unaffected by current frictions. He highlighted in this context the interplay between the U.S. and Chinese travel and tourism industries before the COVID-19 pandemic.

Schonberger, who also challenged the notion of decoupling as a misleading shorthand, emphasized the need for cognitive empathy between the world’s two great powers and understanding the motivation behind China's actions. He noted that the challenges facing China today are complex, including debt problems, real estate slowdown, and productivity stagnation, but said these are "known knowns" that the Chinese government is actively working to correct.

Schonberger sees two distinct issues facing institutional equity investors worried about China: government policies that negatively affect growth and corporate prospects, and longer-term risks arising from China's geopolitical position. For private investors who are focused on total return and can tolerate overt political pressures, China remains investable, as Chinese stocks have been some of the best performers on the public markets recently, said Schonberger. The challenges are greater, however, for public entities and bond investors who are more affected by political risk in their decisions. While the risks are higher, Schonberger's firm continues to invest in Chinese companies in multiple sectors.

Changes Underway

Brody said that China remains a key player in the global economy. As a personal anecdote, he noted that, while he makes fewer trips to the United States, he is traveling more frequently to Europe, India, Japan, and Southeast Asia. According to Brody, the extent to which the Chinese economy would be affected by international fluctuations is unclear, but he expects the country to continue its economic growth and attract foreign investors. He stated that a huge amount of value in the tech sector is still being created in America, so economically driven foreign investors in the tech sector still pay close attention to developments in Silicon Valley.

Van Paasschen, by contrast, pointed out that by decoupling with China, the United States would miss out on a generational opportunity for development and could potentially lose out to other countries. China still presents an enormous opportunity for businesses, he said, particularly in the hotel industry, given the country’s rate of urbanization. He reminded the audience that every country and region presents its own set of challenges and risks for investors. The imperative is to ensure Beijing and Washington maintain a dialogue and businesses are willing to take risks to invest in China.

Van Paasschen went on to describe how the U.S.-China political tensions are affecting business operations in various sectors. For instance, in the biotechnology sector, companies might consider protecting intellectual property and ensuring sustainability in their supply chain. In the apparel business, there is a growing concern about human rights and the opacity of the cotton supply chain. Overall, Van Paasschen sees a transition underway from a bilateral and straightforward approach to trade to a much more nuanced and complicated approach.

When asked if political tensions would affect some sectors more than others, Van Paasschen responded affirmatively. He gave the example of a sovereign wealth fund that refused to support investments in Chinese hotels because of the uncertainty zero-COVID policies had created. He also said that further uncertainty could arise from countries' reactions to China’s foreign policy stance, such as China's support of Russia in Ukraine.

What advice would the three business experts give Washington?

Van Paasschen expressed his hope the United States finds ways to avoid being reactive. Schonberger, urging policymakers to keep working towards peaceful coexistence, emphasized it would be counter-productive to frame China as an enemy. He also highlighted the importance of redundancy and efficiency in trade relationships and cautioned against overlooking the cost of decoupling, reminding the audience that engagement with China has boosted global trade, lifted millions out of poverty, and created a vibrant society.

From Brody’s perspective, predictability is crucial for business, regardless of the country one is conducting business in. He also stressed that, from a personal perspective and regardless of one’s political stance on China, the reduction in people-to-people ties between China and the United States due to recent travel restrictions is unfortunate. Ultimately, these ties have always been a net positive, and it is important to recognize their value even in the midst of tensions between the two nations. While political leaders may grapple with complex geopolitical issues, the connections between ordinary citizens remain a vital foundation for maintaining a constructive relationship. By fostering personal exchanges, the United States and China can build bridges and promote mutual understanding, even in the face of challenging circumstances.

On April 26, 2023, in recognition of the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-Korea alliance, President Joe Biden will host President Yoon Suk Yeol for a State Visit to the United States. According to Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin, the fact that Yoon received the second such invitation of the Biden administration is a testimony to the centrality of the Korea-U.S. alliance to the peace and stability of the East Asian regions, especially at a time when the frayed U.S.-China relationship continues to degrade into a new Cold War, with a potential Taiwan contingency looming on the horizon. 

Shin, former South Korea's ambassador to China and former director general of the Asia Pacific Affairs Bureau at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, is the Winter 2023 Payne Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a visiting scholar at APARC. He headlined this quarter’s Payne Lecture, speaking to an audience that gathered on March 1 for a timely discussion titled Sino-U.S. Relations and South Korea, co-hosted by APARC and FSI.

The Payne Lectureship at FSI, named for Frank E. Payne and Arthur W. Payne, aims to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community and advance international cooperation. The lectureship brings to Stanford internationally esteemed leaders from academia and the policy world who combine visionary thinking and a broad, practical grasp of their fields with the capacity to provide insights into pressing challenges of global concern. Throughout the 2022-23 academic year, the Payne Lectureship hosts experts from Asia who examine crucial questions in U.S.-China relations.

Ambassador Shin is uniquely qualified to offer insight into South Korea's response to the pressures created by the U.S.-China rivalry, said APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin, who chaired the event that included a discussion with Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military and Asia security.

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China’s Dreams

Painting a picture of Chinese ambitions, Ambassador Shin enumerated China’s goals and the steps it has taken to achieve them. “The Chinese dream,” he said, “is to regain the colonial behavior of the Qing Dynasty, when China was a great power with about one-third of the global GDP.” To achieve this dream, China's leaders have pushed for its continued economic development while arousing patriotism and nationalism domestically. Through its military modernization campaign, China has rapidly shown its ambition to become the top-rated global military power by 2049, the centennial of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, he noted.

Ambassador Shin indicated that China has prepared for a long-term competition with the U.S. in the economic arena, as Xi Jinping introduced the dual circulation economic policy, which aims to reorient the country's economy by prioritizing domestic consumption while remaining open to international trade and investment. This policy, Shin argues, “is designed, in part, to make the [Chinese] economy less affected by external factors including the supply chain reset of the U.S.” As such, China has stressed the importance of innovation and has made massive investments in science and technology to reduce its reliance on Western economies. Moreover, China has promoted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its political and economic influence.

“China became the second largest economic power and began to show assertiveness in its foreign policy, particularly by emphasizing the safeguarding of Chinese interests, namely, sovereignty and territorial integrity, state security and development interest,” stated Shin. To achieve these goals, “Chinese diplomats have voiced their arguments in an abrasive style, ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’ as it is called by Westerners.” This form of proactive engagement with the rest of the world has resulted in an intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China, which has made it increasingly difficult for South Korea to maintain simultaneous ties with both great powers.

No Longer on the Fence

Shin noted that “The strategic distrust and intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China have put substantial pressure on South Korea…and South Korea's long-term policy to make a Korea-U.S. alliance compatible with its partnership with China is becoming more difficult.” In recent years, South Korea has moved even closer to the U.S.

The joint communique issued when President Moon Jae-in visited Washington two years ago, already showed South Korea’s tilt toward the U.S. At the time, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula by the North Korean nuclear and missile provocation necessitated the alliance. Now, an ascendant China, “together with the lessons of Ukraine, have made South Korean people pay close attention to the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance,” stated Shin, noting that both nations openly stress the importance of freedom, democracy, and rule-based order. South Korea has become enthusiastic about tripartite cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, in tune with American policies. 

On the other hand, China warned South Korea to respect China's core interests while expressing its concerns on several strategic issues. Shin stated that “China began to demand the Yoon government to continue the three policy positions of the previous government, namely, no more deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), no participation in the American missile defense system, and no military alliance among Korea, Japan, and the U.S.” However, the current Foreign Minister Park Jin made it clear to the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang that the policy positions of the previous government do not bind the new government, Shin indicated.
 

The Taiwan Contingency

Shin indicated the precarious nature of the contingency, stating, “South Korea has no intention of challenging the One China claim. However, the peace and stability of Taiwan Strait are also very important for South Korea, as the security situation of the Taiwan Strait is connected to the Korean peninsula.” Indeed, a military collision in the Taiwan Strait would be impossible to contain locally. “The U.S. and Japan are supposed to immediately help Taiwan to repel China’s military attack, and American bases are located in South Korea and Japan, including Okinawa,” he said.

Therefore, military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is likely to escalate to Northeast Asia, and a certain portion of American forces in South Korea could move to the Taiwan Strait in the contingency according to the strategic flexibility of forces, “which might induce North Korea's misjudgment to invade South Korea,” Shin predicted.
 

Looking to National Identity

The Cost of Deterrence

Preventing Overextension

Overextension represents one of the largest limits on U.S. power projection. According to Mastro, one of the primary reasons that the Biden administration has not been talking about North Korea significantly, is the fact that the U.S. cannot fight a war on the Korean Peninsula and compete effectively with China.

Thus, Mastro proposes that the South Koreans play a greater role in their defense, a topic that comes up with NATO partners and allies in Europe as well. More specifically, Mastro suggests that the U.S. transfer operational command to South Korean forces, and that the South Korean military should allow the U.S. to practice greater strategic flexibility, to use its forces on the Korean Peninsula for operations or contingencies that are off the peninsula. Up until this point, that permission has been denied, but Mastro contends that it would be useful and could enhance deterrence. 

“If the South Koreans, along with their statements about wanting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, also explicitly allowed for that strategic flexibility to take place to say that they understand that the role of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula is primarily to deter and defend South Korea against North Korea, that could also play a potential role in wider contingencies,” she said.

Furthermore, Mastro believes that South Korea must play a greater role in the production and provision of certain types of munitions. “This is an area where the U.S. has struggled with its own manufacturing base that is considering licensing production and potentially doing it elsewhere. So the question is whether the U.S. could count on South Korea for some critical supplies during a conflict that could reduce the U.S. logistical burden,” she speculated.

South Korea is a small country, and it has limited resources, but it also has the second-largest reserve force and paramilitary force in the world, and the eighth-largest active duty force in the world. According to Mastro, “The South Korean military is technically 20 times larger than that of Japan's…it has punched above its own weight, like the Australian military has.”

It remains to be seen whether the U.S.-South Korea alliance will need to be tested in the coming years, but tensions with China will likely continue to define the two nation’s foreign policies. A potential Taiwan contingency remains one of the largest looming threats to the status quo and the most probable pathway to regional escalation, which, in Shin’s view, could draw North Korea and its nuclear arsenal into the fold.

The Payne Lectureship will return in the spring quarter, continuing with the theme of Asian perspectives on the U.S.-China relationship. We will be joined by Kokubun Ryosei, professor emeritus at Keio University and adjunct adviser at the Fujitsu Future Studies Center.

The United States can do much more to build closer partnerships with Southeast Asian countries, according to Scot Marciel, the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at APARC, whose previous long career in the U.S. foreign service focused on Southeast Asia and included the roles of U.S. ambassador to Myanmar and Indonesia. He notes, however, that a deeper, more consistent engagement with Southeast Asian nations requires the United States to adopt a more systematic strategic approach to the region, one that draws on a positive agenda that transcends the U.S.-China great power competition.

Marciel recently joined APARC Visiting Scholar Gita Wirjawan, host of the popular Endgame video podcast, to discuss the geopolitical evolution of the Southeast Asian countries and how their relationships with the United States have been unfolding

Marciel is the author of the forthcoming book Imperfect Partners, which provides his on-the-ground witness account of the ups and downs of critical U.S. relationships in Southeast Asia. In his conversation with Wirjawan, he urges U.S. policymakers to design a positive agenda for engaging Southeast Asian countries in areas like health, climate change, and economic development.

The wide-ranging discussion addresses multiple other issues, including the unlucky history of Myanmar and how the international community can help Myanmar’s resistance prevail; the relevance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); the dynamics between ASEAN and the Quad, the minilateral grouping comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States; and more.

This conversation with Marciel is part of an Endgame interview series Wirjawan is recording with Stanford experts during his residency at APARC.

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to announce a suite of training, fellowship, and funding opportunities to support Stanford students interested in the area of contemporary Asia. APARC invites highly motivated and dedicated undergraduate- and graduate-level students to apply for these offerings:

APARC Summer 2023 Research Assistant Internships

APARC seeks current Stanford students to join our team as paid research assistant interns for the duration of the summer 2023 quarter. Research assistants work with assigned APARC faculty members on varied issues related to the politics, economies, populations, security, foreign policies, and international relations of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. This summer's projects include:

• The Biopolitics of Cigarette Smoking and Production
• The Bureaucratic State: A Personnel Management Lens
• China’s Largest Corporations
• Healthy Aging in Asia
• Hiding in Plain Sight: How China Became A Great Power
• Nationalism and Racism in Asia
• U.S. Rivals: Construct or Reality?
   

All summer research assistant positions will be on campus for eight weeks. The hourly pay rate is $17.25 for undergraduate students, $25 for graduate students.

The deadline for submitting applications and letters of recommendation is March 1, 2023.

Please follow these application guidelines:

I. Prepare the following materials:

• A current CV;
• A cover letter (up to 1 page);
• Completed Student Information Sheet

II. Fill out the online application form for summer 2023, including the above two attachments, and submit the complete form.

III. Arrange for a letter of recommendation from a faculty to be sent directly to Shorenstein APARC. Please note: the faculty members should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu. We will consider only applications that include all supporting documents.

For more information and details about each summer research project, visit the Summer Research Assistant Internships Page >

APARC 2023-24 Predoctoral Fellowship

APARC supports Stanford Ph.D. candidates who specialize in contemporary Asia topics. The Center offers a stipend of $37,230 for the 2023-24 academic year, plus Stanford's Terminal Graduate Registration (TGR) fee for three quarters. We expect fellows to remain in residence at the Center throughout the year and to participate in Center activities.

Applications for the 2023-24 fellowship cycle of the APARC Predoctoral Fellowship are due March 1, 2023.

Please follow these application guidelines:

I. Prepare the following materials:

• A current CV;
• A cover letter including a brief description of your dissertation (up to 5 double-spaced pages);
• A copy of your transcripts. Transcripts should cover all graduate work and include evidence of recently-completed work.

II. Fill out the following online application form, including the above three attachments, and submit the complete application form.

III. Arrange for two (2) letters of recommendation from members of your dissertation committee to be sent directly to Shorenstein APARC.
Please note: the faculty/advisors should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu.

We will consider only applications that include all supporting documents. The Center will give priority to candidates who are prepared to finish their degree by the end of the 2023-24 academic year.

For more information, visit the APARC Predoctoral Fellowship Page >

APARC Diversity Grant

APARC's diversity grant supports Stanford undergraduate and graduate students from underrepresented minorities who are interested in contemporary Asia. The Center will award a maximum of $10,000 per grant to support a wide range of research expenses.

The Center is reviewing grant applications on a rolling basis.
To be considered for the grant, please follow these application guidelines:

I. Prepare the following materials:

• A statement describing the proposed research activity or project (no more than three pages);
• A current CV;
• An itemized budget request explaining research expense needs.

II. Fill out the following online application form, including the above three attachments, and submit the complete application form.

III. Arrange for a letter of recommendation from a faculty to be sent directly to APARC.

Please note: the faculty members should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu.

For more information, visit the APARC Diversity Grant page >