Countries are in a high-stakes competition to develop AI talent and respond to the technology's transformative impact on labor markets and economic growth. As the race intensifies, a critical question looms large: What talent development strategies deliver proven outcomes?

In a recent book published by Stanford University Press, The Four Talent Giants, Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, examines how countries attract, develop, and retain talent in a globalized world. Shin, who is also the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and director of the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), explores how four vastly different Asia-Pacific nations – Japan, Australia, China, and India – rose to economic prominence by pursuing distinct human resource development strategies, encompassing different approaches to education, migration, and transnational talent mobility.

The study provides a framework that extends beyond the four cases, offering policy lessons for other economies, particularly less developed nations. Below are four insights from the book on the evolution of talent strategies and why countries need to construct multiple forms of talent – domestic, foreign, and diasporic – to address new risks and capitalize on emerging opportunities.

1. Look for variation in mobilizing human resources for development

Several Asia-Pacific countries now rank among the world’s largest economies – a marked shift from the 1980s, when Japan was the only regional economy near the top. Shin cautions against interpreting this rise of Asia-Pacific nations as evidence of a single developmental regional “recipe.” Instead, his work shows that similar economic outcomes emerged from different national paths, shaped by distinct histories of colonial rule, nationalism, state-building, and higher education policy.

Rather than isolating one driver of growth, the analysis highlights how states structured education systems, migration pathways, and global connections to talent in ways that reflected domestic priorities and constraints.

2. Talent includes social capital, not just skills or credentials

Shin defines talent broadly as both human capital and social capital. In a transnational era, the value of talent lies not only in technical expertise but also in the networks, relationships, and institutional ties that connect individuals across borders.

This insight underpins a four-part framework for national talent strategies: brain train (developing domestic talent), brain gain (attracting foreign talent), brain linkage (maintaining ties with citizens and students abroad), and brain circulation (sending talent out and facilitating return). Successful countries rarely rely on a single approach; instead, they combine these strategies in different proportions over time.

3. Talent strategies must be diversified and rebalanced over time

A central contribution of Shin’s book is a framework he calls Talent Portfolio Theory, which likens national talent strategies to investment portfolios. Just as investors diversify assets and rebalance them as conditions change, states must continually adjust how they train, attract, and retain talent in response to economic shifts.

Japan’s experience illustrates both the strengths and limits of a concentrated strategy. Its post-WWII success rested on a robust domestic training system spanning universities, vocational schools, and workplace education. Nevertheless, as the global knowledge economy evolved in the 1990s, Japan struggled to adapt, facing demographic decline and hampered by institutional introspection. Only in the 2010s did Japanese policymakers begin to diversify talent development through study-abroad programs, attracting international students, and implementing limited immigration reforms.

Australia followed a contrasting path, relying heavily on foreign talent through skilled migration and international education. Its system emphasized work-migration pathways and relatively easy naturalization for international students, while more recent policies have focused on sustaining global alumni and diaspora networks. Each model carries risks, but together they demonstrate why diversification and timely rebalancing matter.

4. Political leadership and state policy shape talent outcomes

Across cases, Shin argues that talent strategies are not purely organic market outcomes. Political leadership and state capacity play decisive roles in shaping higher education systems and migration policy. China’s post-reform experience demonstrates how state-led overseas training and return programs helped address the loss of scientific expertise after the Cultural Revolution. Over time, China shifted from emphasizing the return of Chinese nationals to the country toward building broader transnational linkage and circulation mechanisms.

India offers a different model, where long-standing patterns of outward migration produced a global diaspora that functions as a form of “brain deposit.” Alumni of Indian Institutes of Technology and other elite institutions now serve as transnational bridges connecting India to Silicon Valley and other innovation hubs.

For developing countries, Shin offers a counterintuitive lesson: initial brain drain is often unavoidable and can be productive if governments invest in long-term linkage and circulation rather than restricting mobility. To the United States and other nations grappling with anti-immigration politics, Shin’s message is that erecting barriers to attracting and retaining global talent could undermine their long-term economic competitiveness.

When Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin left his home country of South Korea in 1983 to pursue graduate studies at the University of Washington, he was certain he would return to Korea upon graduation. More than 40 years later, Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, is still in the United States. 

Yet he does not consider himself a case of brain drain for Korea. Shin, who is also the founding director of the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and APARC director, has continuously contributed to Korea by leading transnational collaborations, researching and publishing on pressing issues in Korean affairs, and otherwise engaging in diverse intellectual exchanges with the country.

Shin’s experiences sparked his interest in the sociological patterns of mobile talent and a central question: How do countries attract, develop, and retain talent in a globalized world? His new book, The Four Talent Giants (Stanford University Press, 2025), explores that question regarding transnational talent flows from a comparative lens by examining how four strikingly different Asia-Pacific nations – Japan, Australia, China, and India – have become economic powerhouses.

We interviewed Shin about his book – watch:

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The book’s main idea, Shin explains, is that how countries manage talent is key to their strength and future success. He calls the four Asia-Pacific nations the book examines “talent giants” because each has used a distinct talent strategy that has proven critical to national development. Three of these nations – China, Japan, and India – are among the top five economies in the world in terms of GDP, and Australia, despite its relatively small population size, is third in terms of wealth per adult.

In The Four Talent Giants, Shin investigates how these four nations have become global powers and sustained momentum by responding to risks and challenges, such as demographic crises, brain drain, and geopolitical tensions, and what lessons their developmental paths hold for other countries.

A New Framework for Studying Human Resource Development 

Asia’s robust economic growth over the past forty years is nothing short of a remarkable feat. The Asia-Pacific today continues to be the world's fastest-growing region, despite global economic uncertainty. How did this phenomenal ascendance come about?

The existing literature has emphasized common “recipes” of success among Asia-Pacific powers. Endeavoring to find one-size-fits-all formulas that could be replicated in other countries seeking rapid development, it has overlooked the distinct developmental journeys of Asian nations. “We need a new lens, or framework, to explain their successes, while also accounting for cross-national variation in development and sustainability,” writes Shin. 

In his book, Shin examines talent – the skilled occupations essential to a nation’s economy – as a key driver of economic development. While all countries rely on human resources for development, their talent strategies vary based on historical, cultural, and institutional factors. Shin introduces a new framework, talent portfolio theory (TPT), inspired by financial portfolio theory, to analyze and compare these national approaches.

“TPT views a nation’s talent development, like financial investment, as constructing a ‘talent portfolio’ that mixes multiple forms of talent – domestic, foreign, and diasporic – adjusting its portfolio over time to meet new risks and challenges,” he explains. Just as an investor may select different financial products in a mix of assets, countries can create talent portfolios by picking from various strategies.

Shin identifies four main strategies by which a country can harness talent – what he calls the four B's: 

• “Brain train” signifies efforts to develop and expand a country’s domestic talent or human capital.
• “Brain gain” refers to attracting foreign talent to strengthen the domestic workforce.
• “Brain circulation” involves bringing back nationals who have gone abroad for work or study.
• “Brain linkage” means leveraging the global networks and expertise of citizens living overseas through transnational collaboration.

Shin uses TPT as an analytical framework to examine how each of the four talent giants has constructed its distinct national talent portfolio and how this portfolio has evolved. As in an investment portfolio rebalancing, a nation can maintain diversification across the four B's and within each B. TPT therefore offers a holistic framework for understanding the overall picture of a country’s talent strategy, and how and why it may “rebalance” its talent portfolio.

Throughout the book, Shin shows that, while Japan has relied on the brain train strategy, Australia, whose population was too small for such an approach, emphasized brain gain. China used brain circulation: it first sent students and professionals abroad to learn, then implemented policies to encourage them to return. India, by contrast, established linkages among its diaspora and used them to develop its economy.

New Geopolitics of Global Talent: Lessons and Policy Implications

The case studies of the four talent giants reveal that there is no single path to talent-driven development. Each of the four Asia-Pacific countries has built its unique talent portfolio, balancing human and social capital, homegrown and foreign-educated individuals, and domestic and diasporic talents. While the talent giants use all four B's to some extent, each emphasizes them differently, reflecting diverse strategies and development paths. The core findings of these studies offer valuable insights for countries aiming to design effective talent policies. 

The four B's were instrumental in the economic rise of the four Asian nations, and they will be equally critical in addressing new challenges facing all economies, from demographic crises to emergent geopolitical tensions. For the United States, one such challenge is its sprawling competition with China, where the battle for talent is heating up in the race for technological supremacy.

Shin warns that the advantage the United States has long held in technological innovation, driven by its ability to attract skilled foreign talent, is now at risk from the Trump administration’s anti-immigration policies, pressures on universities, and cuts to research funding. “Immigrants have not just filled jobs,” he emphasizes. “They have created new industries and helped the US and their home countries. If the US makes it harder for talent to come in and stay, it risks hurting its long-term success.”

The Four Talent Giants is an outcome of Shin’s longstanding project investigating Talent Flows and Development, now one of the research tracks he leads at the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL), which he launched in 2022. Housed at APARC, the lab is an interdisciplinary research initiative addressing Asia’s social, cultural, economic, and political challenges through comparative, policy-relevant studies. SNAPL’s education mission is to cultivate the next generation of researchers and policy leaders by offering mentorships and fellowship opportunities for students and emerging scholars.

Shin notes that the SNAPL team illustrates all four B’s in his talent portfolio theory, as some members are U.S.-born and trained, some come from Asia and, after working at the lab, return to their home countries, whereas some stay here, promoting linkages with their home countries. “In many ways, this project shows what is possible when we invest in talent and encourage international collaboration.”

In the Media

Stanford Scholar Reveals How Talent Development Strategies Shape National Futures
The Korean Daily, July 13, 2025 (interview)
- English version
- Korean version

Demographic shifts worldwide have increased the number of older workers, and many economies are facing a critical question: Are their labor markets ready to support older workers?

Researchers have found that, in the United States, the surge of older workers has gone hand–in-hand with an increase in the number of “age-friendly jobs” – roles with working conditions more suitable for aging employees, such as placing fewer physical demands or offering greater scheduling flexibility. Yet it remains unclear whether comparable trends have taken hold in other aging economies.

A new study, published in the Journal of the Economics of Ageing, helps fill in this gap by examining the evolution of age-friendly jobs in South Korea (hereafter Korea), where the number of workers aged 50 and over increased by 165 percent from 2000 to 2023. Korea is now officially considered a "super-aged" society, and the government is doubling down on its efforts to bolster the workforce.

The study, co-authored by Hyeongsuk Kim and Chulhee Lee, both of Seoul National University, and Stanford health economist Karen Eggleston, the director of APARC’s Asia Health Policy Program, examines Korea’s workforce and economy to determine whether the nation significantly expanded its 50+ workforce by creating job opportunities favorable for older workers or if some other mechanism is at play. 

The co-authors examined the job characteristics experienced by older Koreans relative to their younger counterparts and U.S. older workers. Second, they analyzed data collected in 2020 about Korean workers, evaluating their jobs based on various parameters in the Age-Friendliness Index (AFI), a tool that measures the degree to which jobs are more suitable for older workers. The researchers considered AFI factors such as the requirement for heavy physical activity, the pace of the job, and the possibility of telecommuting. They also examined how the number of age-friendly jobs changed from 2000 to 2020.

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• Learn more about Dr. Eggleston's related research project, "Innovation for Healthy Aging" >

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The study finds that, while age-friendly jobs have increased in Korea, the number grew more slowly than in the United States, indicating that the U.S. market responded more quickly to changes in workforce demographics. Furthermore, the study indicates that older Koreans were not the main beneficiaries of age-friendly jobs. Instead, women and college-educated workers benefited more from these jobs, while non-college-educated men have seen fewer gains. “These results highlight the uneven adaptation of Korea’s labor market to demographic change and suggest that social norms and labor market frictions shape age-friendly job creation and who benefits from those jobs,” the researchers write.

The study also unveils that, in Korea, the working conditions of employees aged 50–61 differ significantly from those aged 62 or older. Despite the nation's high employment rates for those aged 65 and older, the researchers discovered that a third of working Koreans over the age of 62 held jobs requiring heavy physical activity and earned lower wages. Additionally, only a little over one-fifth of them had jobs that allowed for “mostly sitting.”

Labor Market Frictions

The study’s authors propose several explanations for why Korea’s economy, despite a significant increase in older workers, has not adapted as quickly as the United States in placing these workers in age-friendly occupations. One reason is Korea's comparatively low level of pension support, which forces workers to fill a disproportionate number of low-skilled, temporary, and day jobs. It may be that many older workers are forced to work, regardless of whether the jobs are friendly to their needs. Another reason may be the rigidities of the labor market, including strong protections against employees being laid off. Such protections are beneficial for workers, but they restrict companies' ability to restructure their workforce. Moreover, the role of chaebol, or large corporations, may also be significant. Although chaebol are producing and selling more, they have also increased automation and resorted to outsourcing instead of hiring additional workers.

Older workers in Korea are also facing competition from women for age-friendly jobs. The researchers noted significant gender-related changes in the country's education and employment levels. In 2009, the percentage of women enrolling in college surpassed that of men, and the percentage of women in the workforce increased by 2.5% from 2000 to 2023. Korean women are likely to have an even stronger preference for the flexibility of age-friendly jobs than American women because of gendered responsibilities for household production.

The study’s results, researchers said, reinforce key findings from previous studies: "that 'age-friendly' jobs appeal to many kinds of workers, not just older adults; and that labor market frictions shape who benefits from age-friendly jobs."

As governments grapple with rising life expectancies and shrinking traditional working-age populations, ensuring that older adults can continue working safely and with dignity is key to sustaining economic growth and social stability. According to the study, South Korea has made impressive strides in keeping older people in the workforce, but the next challenge is ensuring work itself evolves to meet their needs.

Mounting hidden local government debt is one of China’s pressing challenges. Held by local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and estimated between US$8-10 trillion, this off-the-books debt originates from a long-running tug-of-war over tax revenue between China’s central government and the localities. In the years before COVID-19, LGFVs controlled their debt by drawing on steady non-tax revenues. In summer 2020, however, approximately six months after the pandemic broke out in Wuhan, the hidden debt held by LGFVs began rising dramatically. Today, many of them are nearing default, and local governments are increasingly going broke.

​​Why did hidden LGFV debt rise so much during COVID?

A recent study, published in The China Journal, sheds light on this question. The study’s co-authors – including Jean Oi, the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and director of the China Program at APARC – use quantitative data to show how China’s central government’s regulatory crackdowns on income tied to the real estate sector during the pandemic disrupted the revenue sources LGFVs and their local governments relied on to service their debts. These policy changes “interacted with the zero-COVID policy to create a perfect storm, pushing hidden local government debt to new highs,” they write. 

Their study draws on a wide array of quantitative data, tracking information on factors ranging from COVID shocks (including confirmed cases and deaths) to, among others, government medical responses, special treasury bonds and their allocation, local debt, land purchases, and business activities. Using these sources, the co-authors built a province-level dataset covering all 31 of China’s provincial units from 2018 to 2022, allowing comparative analyses before and after China’s COVID shocks. They organized the data into three categories: (1) the impact of COVID on small and medium enterprises; (2) government fiscal responses and COVID expenditures during the pandemic; and (3) local government finances and debts.

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The Pre-COVID Era: The Grand Bargain That Failed

China’s local debt problem traces back to the 1994 fiscal reforms, which recentralized tax revenues in Beijing and left local governments with chronic budget shortfalls. To bridge the gap, the central government struck a “grand bargain”: while claiming a larger share of tax income, localities could generate new non-tax revenues through special-purpose vehicles, namely, local government financing vehicles. These LGFVs were set up as state-owned enterprises to incur and hold debt off-the-books, yet not illegally, on behalf of local governments.

The workaround fueled rapid development for years but laid the groundwork for today’s mounting hidden debt crisis.

“The success of LGFVs hinged largely on revenue generated through land finance,” explain Oi and her co-authors. “Local governments provided LGFVs with cheap land as collateral for bank loans and bonds. Further revenue was generated from preparing and selling land to real estate developers.”

Thus, LGFVs powered over a decade of rapid growth in China, driving infrastructure booms and urbanization that made the real estate sector a cornerstone of the economy. The model appeared mutually beneficial: the central government gained more tax revenue as the economy grew, while local governments used land sales and debt to fund development. But this growth depended on a continuous flow of non-tax income, making the system increasingly fragile.

After the 2008 global financial crisis, Beijing launched a sustained push to rein in local government hidden debt, focusing heavily on LGFVs. By 2017, officials labeled the risk a “gray rhino.” Yet this drive for fiscal discipline ground to a halt with the onset of COVID.

A Perfect Storm of Policy and Pandemic

The pandemic’s impact was swift and severe. Small and medium-sized businesses, especially in the hardest-hit regions like Hubei Province, saw their incomes collapse by up to 90%. In response, Beijing provided a massive fiscal support package to localities, including one trillion yuan in special COVID bonds to offset the costs from the initial onslaught of the pandemic. Crucial for LGFVs, these bonds cushioned the impact of the pandemic on land sales.

By summer 2020, however, as China was still locked away from the rest of the world and COVID was under control, Beijing resumed its policy agenda to enforce fiscal discipline and curb local government debt. The central government’s most consequential measure was the “three red lines” policy, which dealt a major blow to China’s real estate sector by sharply restricting developers’ ability to borrow once debt thresholds were crossed. The policy, expanded from 12 pilot firms in 2020 to cover the entire sector by 2021, disrupted the “borrow-to-grow” model and triggered a liquidity crisis. Evergrande, China’s second-biggest property developer, was among the first groups affected.

As borrowing dried up, firms struggled to repay debt, halted construction, and stopped buying land, slashing local government revenues. Land sales plummeted across provinces, with national revenue growth from land transfers plunging into negative territory by 2022. The crisis deepened when unfinished housing projects led to mortgage boycotts by frustrated home buyers, prompting more state intervention.

For local governments, the shift came at a steep cost. They were ordered to step in, using LGFVs to purchase land and inject cash into public budgets. As a result, even wealthier provinces like Shanghai and Guangdong saw sharp increases in LGFV debt.

“The call for LGFVs to buy land to create revenue for local governments made matters worse, turning land from a key source of revenue into a source of new debt and forcing LGFVs further to increase borrowing, all of which caused soaring increases in LGFV debt, without any alternative revenue source to service or pay that debt,” explain Oi and her co-authors.

A Fiscal Reform Imperative

The study shows how China’s shifts in central government policies during the pandemic – especially the three red lines and the directive for LGFVs to buy up unwanted land — exacerbated long-standing vulnerabilities in local public finance. What had been a delicate balancing act quickly became unsustainable.

“At the root of China’s continuing crisis of LGFVs' debt is China’s flawed fiscal system,” the co-authors emphasize. Before the pandemic, the system masked deficits by relying on LGFVs to generate off-the-books revenues, primarily through land sales fueled by a booming real estate market. This arrangement allowed Beijing to capture the bulk of tax revenue while localities chased growth. But when COVID struck and the property sector collapsed, the facade crumbled.

The fallout exposed how deeply local governments had come to depend on land finance – an unstable, non-institutionalized revenue stream. With the real estate sector once accounting for over 20 percent of GDP, its collapse left localities and their financing vehicles adrift. “In the context of a crisis such as COVID, the weakness of the fiscal system and LGFVs was exposed as policy instability added to the volatility of the economic situation,” Oi and her co-authors note.

The local government debt problem might not trigger a financial crisis in China, “but LGFVs and their local governments remain in dire straits,” they write. More worrying, the economy has not rebounded in the post-COVID years as hoped, and “as long as the real estate sector remains depressed, land finance will not be able to make local government budgets whole as it once did. The grand bargain can’t work.”

Rather than assume the debt, Beijing is extending lifelines: urging banks to offer LGFVs 25-year loans with temporary interest relief, approving debt swaps into longer maturity municipal bonds, and allowing new issuances of special-purpose bonds. But these are stopgaps, not solutions.

Hidden debt will keep resurfacing unless China overhauls the fiscal system born out of the 1994 reforms, Oi and her co-authors conclude. Institutionalized, dependable, alternative revenue streams for local governments are needed, or the crisis will persist. “It may be time for Chinese leadership to stop kicking the can down the road and undertake institutional reforms of the fiscal system. This may be painful, but there is no other sustainable solution.”