International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Encina Hall backdrop with text "A Summit Discussion with Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan and President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea"

This event is at full capacity and has closed for registration. There is no waitlist.
No walk-ins will be accepted.

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is honored to host the Prime Minister of Japan, Kishida Fumio, and the President of the Republic of Korea, Yoon Suk Yeol, for a special summit discussion. The event co-hosts are the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and Hoover Institution.

Portraits of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan and President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea.


Following remarks by Prime Minister Kishida and President Yoon on the challenges and future of science and technology, they will engage in a moderated conversation with Secretary Condoleezza Rice, the Tad and Dianne Taube Director of the Hoover Institution. Discussion topics include decarbonization and clean energy, quantum technology, and startup innovation.

Speakers will also include Professors Gi-Wook Shin and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Director and Deputy Director of APARC, respectively, and Professor Michael McFaul, Director of FSI.

This historic gathering on the Stanford campus of the leaders of the two key U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific — a convening that would have been almost unthinkable just over a year ago — follows a period in which the two leaders have made extraordinary progress in strengthening Japan-ROK bilateral relations, and is particularly significant in the aftermath of the August 2023 Camp David U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral summit, which has been touted as the beginning of a new era in trilateral cooperation among the three allies as they seek to advance peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.

This event is available to in-person attendees and will not be livestreamed.

When registering, please be sure to read carefully the terms and conditions for attendance.

Members of the press should follow the media advisory below. For press/media inquiries, please contact aparc-communications@stanford.edu.

We will keep registrants informed of any program revisions subject to Japanese, Korean, and U.S. government protocols.

1:00 p.m. 
Registration check-in opens

1:30 p.m.
Doors to the auditorium open

2:10 p.m.
Audience seated and doors to the auditorium close

2:30 p.m.
Event begins

Welcome
Michael McFaul
Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science
Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution

Remarks
The Honorable Kishida Fumio
Prime Minister of Japan

The Honorable Yoon Suk Yeol
President of the Republic of Korea

Discussion
Moderated by 
Condoleezza Rice
Tad and Dianne Taube Director, Hoover Institution
Thomas and Barbara Stephenson Senior Fellow on Public Policy, Hoover Institution
Denning Professor in Global Business and the Economy, Stanford Graduate School of Business
Senior Fellow, by courtesy, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Q&A Session
Guided by 
Kiyoteru Tsutsui
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Sociology
Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Deputy Director, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Director, Japan Program

Closing Remarks
Gi-Wook Shin
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Sociology
William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea
Director, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Director, Korea Program


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David and Joan Traitel Building
Hoover Institution
435 Lasuen Mall
Stanford, CA 94305

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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This commentary originally appeared in The New York Times.


For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

That equilibrium has been upset. China is building up and flexing its military power; hostile rhetoric emanates from both Beijing and Washington. War seems likelier each day.

It’s not too late to restore the kind of balance that helped to keep the peace for decades, but it will require taking steps to ease China’s concerns. This will be difficult because of Chinese intransigence and the overheated atmosphere prevailing in Washington. But it is worth the political risk if it prevents war.

Deterrence came in the form of the implied use of U.S. military force to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Reassurance was provided by the understanding that the United States would not intrude on decisions regarding Taiwan’s eventual political status.

The United States and its regional allies must continue to create a robust military deterrence. But U.S. leaders and politicians also need to keep in mind the power of reassurance, try to understand China’s deep sensitivities about Taiwan and should recommit — clearly and unequivocally — to the idea that only China and Taiwan can work out their political differences, a stance that remains official U.S. policy.

During the Cold War, Beijing and Washington signed a series of communiqués related to Taiwan. One of them said the United States “reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” This and other wording was deliberately ambiguous, but it was accepted by all sides as a commitment to avoid rocking the boat. China still views this arrangement as binding.

To be clear, it was China that began rocking the boat first.

Since 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected president of Taiwan (succeeding a more China-friendly administration), Xi Jinping has repeatedly brandished China’s military power with large-scale military exercises and other pressure tactics apparently meant to discourage independence sentiment on Taiwan.

U.S. political figures have rightly responded with rhetorical support for democratic Taiwan, by supplying it with weapons and by strengthening the U.S. military presence in the region. But the American reaction is also pouring fuel on the fire.

Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow

I have worked on U.S. defense strategy in various military roles for more than a decade. I recently traveled to Beijing, where I met with Chinese government and military officials, leading academics and experts from Communist Party-affiliated think tanks. During these talks it was clear that Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity and toward supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence.

They have plenty of evidence to point to.

In December 2016, Donald Trump became the first U.S. president or president-elect since the normalization of China-U.S. relations in 1979 to speak directly with a Taiwanese leader, when Ms. Tsai called to congratulate him on his election victory. President Biden has, on four occasions, contradicted the U.S. policy of ambiguity by saying we would support Taiwan militarily if China attacked. The number of U.S. Congress members visiting Taiwan — which China views as overt support for the island’s independence — reached a decade high last year, including an August 2022 trip by Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House at the time and the highest-ranking U.S. official travel to Taiwan since the 1990s. That has continued this year: In June a nine-member congressional delegation, the largest in years, arrived in Taipei.

Provocative legislation has not helped. Last year the Taiwan Policy Act, which articulated support for Taiwan’s role in international organizations, was introduced in the Senate, and in July of this year the House passed a similar act. House Republicans introduced a motion in January to recognize Taiwan as an independent country.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow

Actions like these put great pressure on Mr. Xi, who won’t tolerate going down in history as the Chinese leader to have lost Taiwan. That would be seen in Beijing as an existential threat, potentially fueling separatist sentiment in restive regions like Tibet and Xinjiang.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. But if he concludes that the United States has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily. The United States might be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as necessary might be impossible to achieve.

Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose the island’s peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan’s fate is up to Taipei and Beijing. It would mean moving away from attempts to create international space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei’s diplomatic partners. The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.

There would doubtless be blowback in Washington and Taipei, and Mr. Xi may already have made up his mind to seize Taiwan, regardless of the U.S. stance. But a politically neutral position on Taiwan is what the United States has followed for decades. Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and George H.W. and George W. Bush advocated peaceful dialogue between Taipei and Beijing to resolve their differences.

There also are longer-term repercussions to consider: If the combination of deterrence and reassurance fails and China attacks Taiwan, it will set a precedent in which Chinese leaders kill and destroy to achieve their goals. But if a pathway remains for China to eventually convince Taiwan’s people — through inducements or pressure — that it is in their interest to peacefully unify, then that may be a China that we can live with.

In the best-case scenario, the United States and China would reach a high-level agreement, a new communiqué, in which Washington reiterates its longstanding political neutrality and China commits to dialing back its military threats. This would avert war while giving China political space to work toward peaceful unification. That might mean using its clout to isolate Taiwan and eventually convince the island’s people that it should strike a deal with Beijing. But it isn’t Washington’s place to prevent the unification of the two sides — only to ensure that doesn’t happen through military force or coercion.

A war between the United States and China over Taiwan could be the most brutal since World War II. As politically difficult as it may be, U.S. leaders have a duty to try to prevent conflict, and that means speaking more softly but carrying a big stick.

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U.S. Seaman Xi Chan stands lookout on the flight deck as the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) transits the Taiwan Strait during routine underway operations.
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For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

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Banner image for October 12, 2023 APARC event Political Economy of the Financial Crisis in Japan and the U.S. featuring headshot of speaker Hirofumi Takinami

 

This spring, we saw the collapses of Silicon Valley Bank, Credit Suisse, etc., and now we are observing collapses of Chinese real estate giants: Evergrande, and Country Garden. Would be there another financial crisis? 
Now, it is highly worthy to review the ‘lessons' of historically recent financial crises with significant seriousness, which happened in the two largest economies, the United States and Japan.

During the 1990s-2000s, Japan and the United States each experienced the same type of financial crisis, notably triggered by the collapse of major financial institutions, stemming from the real estate bubble burst. Namely, the Heisei Financial Crisis and the Lehman Brothers Collapse.

Both were under the political-economic conditions of one of the largest economies in the world, as well as of an advanced democracy. Enormous shock happened politically, economically, and historically, due to these two financial crises.

Then, as the research question, what were the ‘lessons’ of the United States and Japan's financial crises, concerning crisis response through public money injection, from the viewpoint of political economy? Where is the ‘learning’ between Japan and the United States?
Also, as the related research ‘puzzle’, why the difference in speed between these countries to respond and recover?

Based on his Ph.D. thesis, Senator Takinami, an alumnus of Stanford APARC, will elaborate on these issues by covering up and amending Hoshi & Kashyap(2010), thus establishing ‘7 lessons’ throughout the Japan and the United States financial crises on government bailout from the political economy viewpoint.

 

Speaker

Square photo portrait of Hirofumi Takinami

Hirofumi Takinami (Ph.D.) is an Upper House Member of the Japanese Parliament, corresponding to a Senator in the U.S. He is a former Vice-Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry, and also a former Vising Scholar, APARC, Stanford University. 

Dr. Takinami covers a wide range of policies, including not only energy, environment, and finance, but also innovation, infrastructure, welfare for the disabled, etc. He has been the Director of the Fisheries Division of LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) from last year.

Before starting his political career 10 years ago, he was a Director of the Ministry of Finance. During his about 20 years of service as a Japanese government official, he held management positions including Public Relations Director, and Deputy Budget Examiner at the Ministry of Finance. He also worked internationally, in charge of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) etc. 

He graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1994, earning a Bachelor of Law. He received a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the University of Chicago in 1998. While in office as an upper house member, he obtained a Ph.D. in 2021 from Waseda University for the study on financial crises, which he started when he held research positions at Stanford University as a Visiting Fellow in 2009-2011 and as a Visiting Scholar in 2016. 

Hirofumi Takinami Upper House Member of Japanese Parliament, Ph.D. , Former Vising Scholar, APARC, Stanford University Upper House Member of Japanese Parliament
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This September, President Biden welcomed Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan and President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea for a weekend summit at Camp David. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and tensions between the U.S. and China over trade, militarization, and Taiwan, the meeting was a notable step in ongoing efforts by the U.S. to increase trilateral cooperation amongst its allies in East Asia.

To contextualize the summit and its implications for the U.S.-South Korea-Japan relationship, Gi-Wook ShinDaniel SneiderThomas Fingar, and Oriana Skylar Mastro — scholars at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) — explain the evolution of the relationship and how the summit may impact the dynamic moving forward.



A Complicated History


While South Korea and Japan are both long standing partners and allies with the United States, their bilateral relationship with each other has historically been strained.

In an interview with Asia Experts ForumGi-Wook Shin, the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) explained:

“Japanese colonialism was instrumental to the formation of Korean national identity. The Korean peninsula is surrounded by big powers such as China, Japan, and Russia. Even today, these influences are still very strong. A sense of threat is still there.”

In particular, issues stemming from the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula between 1910 and 1945 remain a political third rail in both countries. The use of Korean nationals as forced laborers and soldiers in Japanese industry and the Japanese military remains an unresolved legacy, as do demands for the recognition of and restitution for Korean women who were taken into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army in the 1930s and 40s.

The withdrawal of Japanese troops from Korea, 1945.
The withdrawal of Japanese troops from Korea, 1945. | Mainichi Newspapers Company via Wikimedia Commons

In 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court passed a series of rulings requiring Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Nippon Steel of Japan to compensate 14 Korean citizens for their unpaid labor. As of yet, neither company has agreed to comply with the ruling. The South Korean government has since announced plans to compensate survivors who were forced to work in Japanese mines and factories during the wartime period, but this remains a unilateral decision on the part of the Yoon administration, not a bilateral position between South Korea and Japan.

These tensions have ripple effects far outside of East Asia. Writing for Toyo KeizaiDaniel Sneider, an FSI Lecturer in International Policy with a focus on Asia, explains the broader geopolitical implications of these issues:

“The Americans have been urging the two countries to settle these problems in order to ease the way to the kind of security cooperation that has become visible in recent months. Joint military exercises for missile defense and other small steps to intensify trilateral coordination are taking place and a resolution of the history of problems may be key to moving ahead.”


Steps Forward


The last year has seen increased efforts to restore more functionality to the South Korea-Japan relationship. President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida met briefly on the sidelines of the September 2022 UN General Assembly meeting in New York, which was followed by respective visits of Yoon to Tokyo in March 2023 and Kishida to Seoul two months later in May, the first such visits in over 11 years.

The Camp David summit, which brought the U.S., South Korea, and Japan together as strategic partners, is the latest step on the hoped-for road to institutionalized security cooperation between the three nations.

Speaking to NBC, Shorenstein Fellow Thomas Fingar explained the significance of the weekend.

“The importance of this [summit] is that it was a genuine trilateral meeting, which means the Japanese and the Koreans are talking to one another as opposed to the U.S. dealing separately with each of them.”

In contrast to the idyllic Camp David setting, the three leaders are faced with a weighty set of issues, noted Sneider, including the crisis triggered by the Ukraine war, North Korea’s aggressive posture, as well as growing concerns about China.

The war in Ukraine has done a lot to open leaders' eyes to the dangers of having neighbors with territorial hopes and claims that also have strong militaries. It's pushed these two countries to rethink their own strategies for security.
Oriana Skylar Mastro
FSI Center Fellow

Oriana Skylar Mastro, an FSI Center Fellow and an expert on security, conflict resolution, and the Chinese military elaborated further on the mutual pressures South Korea, Japan, and the United States face:

“Since President Biden came into office, he’s really stressed strengthening alliances and partnerships as a way of protecting U.S. interests abroad. I'm sure there has been much work behind the scenes to try to get these two countries to come together. In terms of the timing [of this summit], it's of course partially because of the accumulation of these concerns over China. I think also the war in Ukraine has done a lot to really open up leaders' eyes to the dangers of having neighbors with territorial hopes and claims that also have strong militaries that could potentially be undeterred from using force. I think it's fair to say that this has also pushed these two countries to rethink their own strategies for security.”


An Uncertain Future


The official summit documents outline both a vision of partnership and offer a variety of practical agreements on everything from annual leadership summits to meetings on economic and cyber security, and a proposal for how to move forward with joint military exercises. Notably, the two-paragraph ‘commitment to consult’ on responses to ‘regional challenges, provocations, and threats affecting our collective interests and security’ — while not a fully embodied collective security agreement — is nonetheless a “stunning achievement,” says Daniel Sneider.

Despite agreeing on a hefty laundry list of shared concerns and security goals, the way forward for additional trilateralization between the United States, Japan, and South Korea is not necessarily clear. Oriana Mastro explained: 

“Even though they might have shared threat perceptions, there is still a lot of trust that has to happen between nations for them to take coordinated military approaches. If two countries, for example, exercise together — and that's one of the things that the Biden administration is hoping to get out of this summit: more routine trilateral exercises — you get to learn a lot about another country's military, and that only really happens between friends. That’s also true of intel sharing. When you share intelligence, you’re not only sharing information, you're sharing how you get intelligence, which can also be sensitive. So while they've shared these threats for a while, it hasn't really gotten to the level in which they were willing to take risks in terms of the relationship between South Korea and Japan to become closer in the security space in a way that would help them combat these issues together.”

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio arrive for a joint news conference following three-way talks at Camp David.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio arrive for a news conference following three-way talks at Camp David. | Getty

Besides the challenges of international diplomacy, Yoon, Kishida, and Biden also face domestic hurdles that could hinder further cooperation.

In a comment to the Wall Street Journal, Gi-Wook Shin noted that, “Yoon only entered politics a few years ago. If his party loses the election, I don’t know who will stay with him.” Improving South Korea-Japan relations was a major platform of the Yoon campaign, and backlash against his administration could yield disinterest or even renewed hostility toward continuing his efforts. 

Daniel Sneider sees similar challenges for Biden and Kishida. Writing in East Asia Forum, he cautioned:

“President Joe Biden is already embroiled in an election campaign that threatens to bring Donald Trump and his isolationist views back to power. The Camp David summit was barely noticed amid the constant flow of domestic political news, though it mostly received welcome praise in the media. . . Imprisoned by domestic politics, the White House will likely be unable to give substance to this emergent partnership.”

In the case of Kishida, the decision to release wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear site, which came just days after the conclusion of the summit, has been particularly counterproductive. Sneider continued:

“Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been waiting for a bump from the Camp David summit. But he is experiencing a deepening slide in opinion polls. The Fukushima release faces opposition within Japan, including from fishermen and others worried about boycotts of Japanese products in China and South Korea. Talk of an early parliamentary election in Japan, intended to consolidate Kishida’s claim to long-term leadership, is now on hold.”

Where is the trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea relationship headed next? Follow FSI scholars to stay informed about the latest developments. Register to receive alerts to your inbox either weekly or monthly.   

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South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio hold a joint news conference following three-way talks at Camp David on August 18, 2023.
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The trilateral summit between the United States, South Korea, and Japan was an important marker in deepening coordination among the allies, but work still remains to create a solid security partnership.

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E301
Stanford,  CA  94305-6055

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Global Affiliate Visiting Scholar, 2023-24
Japan Patent Office
takumi_koganei.jpeg

Takumi Koganei is a global affiliate visiting scholar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) for 2023-24. Koganei joined the Japan Patent Office (JPO) in 2014 and has worked as a patent examiner, handling patent applications mainly in the field of mechanics, including chip mounters, conveyors, and drone delivery systems. In 2019, he held the role of Chief of the supporting startup section in the Policy Planning and Research Division, where he supported startups in developing their intellectual property strategy with the help of IP experts. In 2020, he transitioned to the Patent Examination Department. In this role, he conducted patent examinations related to therapeutic devices like stents, surgical drills, and ablation devices. Furthermore, he was a member of the team that designed the patent classification for surgical support robots. After that, he transferred to the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) as an Assistant Manager. In this capacity,  he served in the development of startup support measures for Japan's medical device industry from 2021 to 2023. 

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This announcement was updated on October 6, 2023, to reflect the addition of two new fellowship offerings focused on contemporary Taiwan.


The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to invite applications for a suite of fellowships in contemporary Asia studies to begin fall quarter 2024.

The Center offers postdoctoral fellowships that promote multidisciplinary research on Asia-focused health policy; contemporary Japan; contemporary Asia broadly defined; postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions as part of the new Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab; and a fellowship for experts on Southeast Asia. Learn more about each opportunity and its eligibility and specific application requirements:

Asia Health Policy Postdoctoral Fellowship

Hosted by the Asia Health Policy Program at APARC, the fellowship is awarded annually to one recent PhD undertaking original research on contemporary health or healthcare policy of high relevance to countries in the Asia-Pacific region, especially developing countries. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2024. The application deadline is December 1, 2023.

Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Japan

Hosted by the Japan Program at APARC, the fellowship supports research on contemporary Japan in a broad range of disciplines including political science, economics, sociology, law, policy studies, and international relations. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2024. The application deadline is December 1, 2023.  
 

Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Asia

APARC offers two postdoctoral fellowship positions to junior scholars for research and writing on contemporary Asia. The primary research areas focus on political, economic, or social change in the Asia-Pacific region (including Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia), or international relations and international political economy in the region. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2024. The application deadline is December 1, 2023.  
 

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The Center offers a suite of fellowships for Asia researchers to begin in fall quarter 2024. These include postdoctoral fellowships on Asia-focused health policy, contemporary Japan, and the Asia-Pacific region, postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions with the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, and fellowships for experts on Southeast Asia.

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The Myanmar resistance’s urgent task is to push the hated, brutal military out of political power once and for all. Just as importantly, however, it simultaneously needs to create the best possible conditions for any future democratic government to succeed. This goal will require addressing a wide range of difficult issues that either have lingered unresolved for many years or that have grown out of the post-2021 coup and subsequent conflict. These include restructuring the security forces, developing and implementing a system of federalism, building rule of law, tackling long-standing identity issues, and rebuilding and reinvigorating the economy. It will also need to establish an interim governance structure and decide how to maintain security and basic governance during the inevitable transition period. The international community should step up efforts to help the resistance achieve both of these goals, including by increasing aid, training and scholarships and establishing a “Friends of Myanmar Democracy Group” to coordinate approaches.

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Scot Marciel
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This essay was first published by Foreign Affairs magazine.


Over the last two decades, successive U.S. administrations have sought to cultivate a strong relationship with India. As the world’s most populous country, with the second-largest military and the fifth-largest economy, India is uniquely positioned to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. Yet as Ashley Tellis argued in Foreign Affairs earlier this month (”America’s Bad Bet on India,” May 1, 2023), there are limits to what the United States can expect from this partnership. New Delhi will not rush to Washington’s side in the event of a security crisis with Beijing unless its interests are directly threatened. India is not a sheriff of the international order or a treaty-bound defender of U.S. interests. In Tellis’s view, this makes the U.S. policy of cultivating India as a strategic partner a bad bet.

But India has never pretended it would behave like a treaty ally of the United States, and the occasional divergences between New Delhi’s and Washington’s interests do not mean the U.S. investment in the bilateral relationship is misguided. Still, the United States can make an even better bet when it comes to its partnership with India—one that is more realistic than a security pact and that still contributes meaningfully to advancing shared interests in a free and open Indo-Pacific.


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 Imperfect Alignment

India has a long history of conflict and competition with China. After a shocking and bruising war in 1962, the two countries waited until the 1980s to restore diplomatic relations, gingerly constructing a modus vivendi through a series of confidence-building agreements. Their border remains unsettled and the scene of sporadic local crises; a major Chinese incursion in 2020 into territory claimed by India led to a deadly skirmish and another rupture in bilateral relations. India also remains anxious about China’s creeping influence across the Indian Ocean region, where China plans to maintain a permanent military presence supported by a growing network of bases.

But India’s competition with China does not mean it is perfectly aligned with the United States. Although India accelerated military cooperation with the United States after the 2020 crisis, the two countries remain divided over key regional and global issues. On Afghanistan, for instance, India was dismayed by the precipitous U.S. withdrawal, while in Myanmar it continues to engage the military junta that Washington has shunned. The differences between New Delhi and Washington have been displayed most prominently during the war in Ukraine, where India has been reluctant to alienate Russia, on which it depends for military equipment and cheap energy.

Even when it comes to their shared interest in preventing Chinese hegemony in Asia, India and the United States sometimes have differing policy priorities and use different tactics to achieve similar goals. For New Delhi, Chinese moves on the Himalayan land border naturally matter more than a potential attack on Taiwan. And as India’s foreign minister has conceded, the country’s options against its much stronger rival are limited.

These differences do not make India an outlier among Washington’s global partners. Even formal U.S. allies—those with written security guarantees—do not see eye to eye with Washington when it comes to China. Japan’s vaunted new security strategy, including its bold plan for a long-range missile arsenal, is designed for self-defense, not as a playbook for assisting the United States in the event of a conflict over Taiwan or some other crisis. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has gone further and preemptively ruled out acting in support of the “U.S. agenda” in a Taiwan crisis. The United States would be churlish to expect India to unreservedly take its side during a global crisis when it cannot expect the same from long-standing allies bound to it by formal treaties.

If Washington cannot expect India to contribute military forces in a crisis, then what is the point of the U.S.-Indian partnership? The answer involves accepting that partnerships are about more than planning for emergencies. U.S. policymakers recognize that a stronger India, one that is more capable of resisting Chinese coercion, serves U.S. interests. But in the absence of clearly defined policy goals, India’s cheerleaders in Washington may conjure up unrealistic expectations—and then sour on the partnership when they learn India will not fight for Taiwan. In addition to bolstering economic and interpersonal ties between the two countries, Washington should focus on deepening cooperation in three specific arenas in which India is willing and potentially able to assist it in constraining Beijing’s expansive regional ambitions.

Sea Change

India has a formidable geographic advantage in the Indo-Pacific region. It dominates trans–Indian Ocean trade and energy routes, which Chinese strategists recognize as a vexing vulnerability. As the Chinese navy quickly builds its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean, India and the United States risk finding their interests routinely contested in the region. Greater Chinese influence over regional countries’ security policies would give it greater leverage to coerce them, predatorily extract resources, or limit others’ freedom of navigation. In times of crisis, a larger Chinese naval presence, supplemented with more port access, would give Beijing greater capacity to strike or intimidate Indian forces.

The United States, therefore, should support India’s efforts to extend its military posture in the Indian Ocean region, including by upgrading its base infrastructure and military equipment. It should also support new training procedures among partners—especially among U.S., Indian, and Australian forces—that make use of each other’s facilities. India’s military already dominates the northeastern Indian Ocean and the western approaches to the Strait of Malacca, a vital shipping lane that links the Indian and Pacific Oceans. With upgraded basing in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands archipelago and bases on Australia’s northern coast and Cocos (Keeling) Islands, the three partners would be better able to host reciprocal visits and, eventually, rotational deployments.

The United States should invest in further combined military activities with India in the eastern Indian Ocean, bolstering both countries’ capacities to track and, if necessary, target Chinese forces. This would not only be a boon for Indian security, but it would also change the strategic geometry of the Indo-Pacific. A more potent force within striking distance of Chinese facilities and assets in the South China Sea would severely complicate Beijing’s military planning for any invasion of Taiwan. All aspects of the Indo-Pacific theater are ultimately linked: by taking prudent steps to improve their military posture in the Indian Ocean, India and the United States can also create a ripple of added deterrence in the western Pacific. In this way, India can shape Beijing’s decision-making even without engaging directly in a Taiwan conflict.

Finding a Niche

The United States should also support India’s development of high-value niche military capabilities. The wholesale recapitalization of India’s ponderously large military is overdue, but replacing legacy Russian-origin kit with U.S. equipment would be slow and prohibitively expensive. The Indian military, however, does not need to replace its entire order of battle with new planes, tanks, and ships. Indeed, India’s recent acquisition of a relatively small numbers of U.S.-made transport aircraft has given it a new and valuable ability to execute high-profile humanitarian relief and evacuation operations in Turkey and Sudan.

As the war in Ukraine has shown, excellence in a niche military capability can have a disproportionate effect on the battlefield. Military modernization need not produce a standardized, wholly modern military, especially when resources are scarce. Instead, it could produce pockets of highly effective capabilities, using high technology in highly specialized roles. Rather than trying to match China’s comprehensive and resource-intensive modernization, India should tailor its capabilities to repel specific types of enemy aggression in specific theaters—and Washington should help it do so.

India faces threats from China’s incremental encroachment on its land border and gradually expanding presence in the Indian Ocean. To deter a fait accompli land grab in the Himalayas, India needs high-quality intelligence and surveillance capabilities to detect incursions early and highly mobile reaction teams to deny them. To deter a roving group of maritime militia vessels or submarines, India would benefit from long-range and long-endurance undersea drones and more air-launched antiship missiles. These are just two examples of how the United States can bolster India’s military capabilities without selling it a large fleet of F-35 fighter jets. Selective projects for weapons co-development or transfers can have outsize deterrent or combat effect. And over time, they can become a key pillar of the U.S. and Indian militaries’ ability to operate together.

A Diplomatic Offensive

Finally, the United States should enhance its diplomatic coordination with India. Washington and New Delhi exert diplomatic influence over different groups of countries. In some cases, this has been a source of frustration or friction—most acutely, when India’s relationship with Russia prompted it to take a more neutral position on the Ukraine war. But in the context of strategic competition with China, such links may prove to be an asset that Washington lacks.

India brings well-developed connections to countries of the global South, mostly in Africa and Asia. Washington has traditionally neglected such states, in part because policies tailored to win influence in the developing world are not vote-winners in the United States. In today’s Washington, bellicosity on China is a much surer way to win and remain in office than investing in renewable-energy infrastructure in Africa. In contrast, India’s influence is based on a historical legacy of diplomatic leadership, diaspora links, and a perceived affinity of interests. And it is devoid of Washington’s alien-sounding appeals to a global contest between democracy and autocracy.

Whereas China has built global influence through its investment largesse, India retains a reservoir of goodwill based on its legacy as a champion of the globe’s marginalized countries. Last week, Papua New Guinea’s prime minister, James Marape, welcomed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a visit by declaring, in an echo of the Cold War’s Non-Aligned Movement, “We need a third big voice” on the global stage. In return, he pledged, the island nations of the Pacific “will rally behind your leadership.” This is far from a zero-sum contest for favor; the United States signed a new security agreement with Papua New Guinea at the same time. But India can often serve as an indispensable bridge—a “South Western power”—to build consensus when U.S. demands may be polarizing. At the G-20 summit in Bali last November, Indian diplomats cobbled together a joint communiqué mildly rebuking Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, declaring that this is “not an era of war.” The term, which was coined by Modi months earlier, certainly does not represent a full-throated denunciation of Moscow’s actions—but it was better than nothing.

In times of crisis, U.S. and Indian diplomatic messaging may not be identical—but it can be complementary. A coordinated diplomatic campaign that includes India would extend a political consensus against Chinese coercion far beyond what Washington could achieve alone.

A Better Bet

In the coming years, India will play a bigger role in containing China’s growing power—but on its own terms. As Tellis rightly notes, New Delhi’s limited power and its strategic priorities mean that it will refuse to be an appendage of the United States. But it will remain a potent competitor to China as it seeks to safeguard its interests and reduce its vulnerabilities. If Washington works with New Delhi to reinforce their combined posture in the Indian Ocean, helps it develop niche military capabilities, and collaborates with it in rallying international support for a free and open Indo-Pacific, the U.S.-Indian partnership can play a pivotal role in regional security.

Together, these efforts represent a better bet on India. They would make a meaningful contribution to preserving the status quo without requiring far-fetched obligations from India to support the United States in a crisis. They are also politically and practically feasible because they would not represent an offensive threat to China or require India to dramatically increase the resources it devotes to defense. But they do require that Washington and New Delhi share in-depth assessments on Chinese intent and capability, and periodically review how they could collectively meet new strategic challenges. U.S. defense policy toward India should focus on jump-starting these tasks, rather than preparing for coalition warfare.

India is an intrinsically important country that is rapidly strengthening its ties to the United States. The growing flows of trade, investment, and people between the two countries has obvious mutual benefits. But the defense relationship often suffers wild oscillations of expectations. As Washington feverishly convinces itself that it is hurtling toward war with China, some will be tempted to judge allies and partners based on their willingness to sacrifice blood and treasure in a potential conflict over Taiwan. But Washington will find itself very lonely if it imposes such an unreasonable litmus test. It has a chance, instead, to build a more realistic and resilient strategic partnership with India that will outlast a Taiwan crisis—and may even help to deter one.

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Subtitle

How Washington and New Delhi Can Balance a Rising China

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Flyer for Asia in 2030, APARC@40 Conference and Celebration with an image of Encina Hall facade

The culmination of a special event series celebrating Shorenstein APARC's 40th Anniversary, "Asia in 2030, APARC@40"

Join us in celebrating APARC's 40 years of research, education, and engagement. Recognizing the accomplishments of the past four decades and looking forward to the future, the two-day program will highlight multiple aspects of APARC’s core areas of expertise and examine key forces affecting Asia’s present and shaping its future.

1-1:30 p.m.

Opening Session

Opening Remarks

Gi-Wook Shin
Director of Shorenstein APARC and the Korea Program
William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea
Professor of Sociology
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Congratulatory Remarks

Kathryn Ann “Kam” Moler
Vice Provost and Dean of Research
Marvin Chodorow Professor
Professor of Applied Physics, Physics, and Energy Science Engineering
Stanford University

Condoleezza Rice
Tad and Dianne Taube Director of the Hoover Institution
Senior Fellow on Public Policy at the Hoover Institution
Denning Professor of Global Business and the Economy at the Stanford Graduate School of Business
Professor of Political Science
Senior Fellow at Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Scott D. Sagan
Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University


1:30-2:45 p.m. 

The Future of Diplomacy

John Everard
Former Ambassador to Belarus, Uruguay, and North Korea for the United Kingdom
Coordinator of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts on North Korea
Former Pantech Fellow at Shorenstein APARC

Laura Stone
Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Maldives
Former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for China and Mongolia;
Former Director of the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
Former Director of Economic Policy Office in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Visiting Scholar and Inaugural China Policy Fellow at Shorenstein APARC at Stanford University

Moderator

Michael Beeman
Former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
Visiting Scholar at Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University


2:45-3 p.m. ~ Coffee and Tea Break


3-4:15 p.m.

The Future of Asian Studies

Panelists

Donald K. Emmerson
Director of the Southeast Asia Program at Shorenstein APARC
Affiliated Faculty with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Affiliated Scholar with the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies
Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Thomas B. Gold
Professor of Sociology
University of California, Berkeley

Jisoo Kim
Korea Foundation Associate Professor of History, International Affairs, and East Asian Languages and Literatures
Director of the Institute for Korean Studies
Co-Director of the East Asia National Resource Center
The George Washington University

Moderator

Kiyoteru Tsutsui
Deputy Director of Shorenstein APARC
Director of the Japan Program
Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies
Professor of Sociology
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University


4:15-4:30 p.m. ~ Coffee and Tea Break


4:30-6 p.m.

Oksenberg Panel: The Future of U.S.-China Relations

Introduction

Jean C. Oi
Director of the China Program at Shorenstein APARC
Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University
William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Panelists

M. Taylor Fravel
Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director, Security Studies Program
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

David Michael Lampton
Professor Emeritus and former Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies, School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University
Former Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Shorenstein APARC

Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Moderator

Thomas Fingar
Former U.S. Department of State Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis, Director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, and Chief of the China Division
Former Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council
Fellow at Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
 

Conferences
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U.S. and India flags with event title "U.S.-India Relations in 2030: The Future of Strategic Technologies”

This event has reached capacity. Registration is now closed.

The sixth installment in a special event series on the occasion of Shorenstein APARC's 40th Anniversary, "Asia in 2030, APARC@40"


How will key technologies shape India’s strategic capacity, and its relationship with the United States, in the years ahead? The Indian and U.S. governments both recognize that critical and emerging technologies, from artificial intelligence to synthetic biology, are increasingly vital for national security and global influence. Effectively harnessing those technologies requires the right mix of state policy, academic research, and private-sector-led innovation. The South Asia Initiative will bring together leading researchers and practitioners to better understand India’s approach to applying technologies in its defense industrial base, and the evolution of US-India cooperation on strategic technologies. 

An initial keynote session will provide an overview of key trends and policy priorities for India and the bilateral relationship. Two research presentations will then examine how India has sought to develop its defense industrial sector, with new partnerships and private sector involvement, and an aspirational goal of indigenization; and how the major powers including the US and India have traditionally managed the expectations, conditions, and anticipated returns of high technology transfers. The research will be critically evaluated by dedicated discussants who draw from both academic scholarship and personal experience as technology-sector practitioners. By the end of the workshop, we anticipate setting a rigorous baseline appreciation of how India and the US-India relationship approach the strategic applications of key technologies, and generating important new cues for future research and public-private collaboration. 

 

Agenda

8:30-9 a.m. ~ Coffee and Tea Served


9-9:30 a.m. 

Welcome Remarks

Gi-Wook Shin
Director of Shorenstein APARC and the Korea Program
William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea
Professor of Sociology
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Arzan Tarapore
South Asia Research Scholar at Shorenstein APARC 
Stanford University


9:30-10:30 a.m.

Keynote Conversation: "The Future of U.S.-India Tech Cooperation" (virtual)

Rudra Chaudhuri
Director of Carnegie India
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Helena Fu
Director for Technology Alliances
National Security Council


10:30-10:45 a.m. ~ Coffee and Tea Break


10:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m. 

Panel: "The Evolution of India's Defense Industrial Base: Trends, Trade-offs, and Technologies"

Speaker

Joshua T. White
Professor of the Practice of International Affairs
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Discussants

S. Paul Kapur
Professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School 
Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution 
Stanford University

Sarah Hess
West Coast Director
Silicon Valley Defense Group


12:15-1 p.m. ~ Lunch Break


1-2:30 p.m. 

Panel: Transactionalism Revisited? Unpacking the Logic of Major Power Technology Transfers"

Speaker

Sameer Lalwani
Senior Expert of South Asia Programs
U.S. Institute of Peace

Discussants

Julie George
Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford University

Akhil Iyer
Vice President
Shield Capital


2:30-3 p.m. 

Concluding Discussion


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Headshot for Rudra Chaudhuri

Rudra Chaudhuri is the director of Carnegie India. His research focuses on the increasingly important role of emerging technologies in diplomacy and statecraft. He works on comparative models of cross-border data flows and how data is treated by national capitals in inter-state and multilateral negotiations. He is the author of Forged in Crisis: India and the United States Since 1947, and the editor of War and Peace in Contemporary India. He is also a visiting professor of international relations at Ashoka University, New Delhi. From 2009 to 2022 (on leave since 2018), Rudra was  a lecturer and a senior lecturer at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, and in 2012, he established the U.K. Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office's (FCDO) Diplomatic Academy for South Asia at King’s College London. He holds a PhD in War Studies from King’s College London.

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Headshot for Helena Fu

Helena Fu, Director for Technology Alliances, National Security Council

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Headshot for Joshua White

Joshua T. White is Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, and serves as the inaugural director of the U.S.-ASEAN and U.S.-Pacific Institutes for Rising Leaders. He is also a Nonresident Fellow in the Foreign Policy program at The Brookings Institution. He previously served at the White House as Senior Advisor & Director for South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, where he staffed the President and National Security Advisor on the full range of South Asia policy issues pertaining to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Indian subcontinent, and led efforts to integrate U.S. government policy planning across South and East Asia. Prior to joining the White House, White was a Senior Associate and Co-Director of the South Asia program at The Stimson Center and, previously, Senior Advisor for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a position he held in conjunction with an International Affairs Fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. White has written on a wide range of issues including defense policy, electoral politics, Islamic movements, and nuclear deterrence.

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Headshot for Sameer Lalwani

Sameer Lalwani is a senior expert on South Asia at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He is also a non-resident senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Lalwani’s research interests include nuclear deterrence, interstate rivalry, alliances, crisis behavior, counterinsurgency and Indo-Pacific security. He has conducted field research in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Lalwani is a term member with the Council on Foreign Relations, and a contributing editor to War on the Rocks. He earned his doctorate in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was an affiliate of the MIT Security Studies Program. From 2015 to 2022, Lalwani was a senior fellow for Asia strategy and the director of the South Asia program at the Stimson Center. He was also as an adjunct professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs and a Stanton nuclear security postdoctoral fellow at the RAND Corporation.

Rudra Chaudhuri
Helena Fu
Joshua White
Sameer Lalwani
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