The Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL) has received two grants to offer guidance for more effective U.S. foreign policy strategies in Asia and propose structural reforms that propel the region toward growth, innovation, and democratic resilience. The first grant, from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), supports SNAPL's policy engagements with stakeholders in Washington, D.C., forthcoming this September. The second grant, from Stanford Global Studies, funds a series of SNAPL-hosted research workshops throughout the 2024-25 academic year.

Both funded initiatives underscore SNAPL's commitment to generating evidence-based policy recommendations and promoting transnational collaboration with academic and policy institutions to advance the future prosperity of Asia and U.S.-Asia relations.

Housed at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), SNAPL is led by Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, a senior fellow at FSI, and the director of APARC and the Korea Program. The lab’s mission is to address emergent social, cultural, economic, and political challenges facing Asia-Pacific countries and guide effective U.S. Asia policies through interdisciplinary, comparative research and collaboration with academic and policy research institutions in Asia and the United States.  

“We are grateful to FSI and Stanford Global Studies for supporting SNAPL's interdisciplinary, policy-relevant research,” says Shin. “The two grants provide a tremendous boost as we work to contribute evidence-based recommendations to advance a more nuanced understanding of Asia's role in global affairs and informed new directions for U.S. Asia policies.”

Policy Considerations for U.S.-China and U.S.-Asia Relations

With a grant from FSI to support policy engagement, SNAPL team members will share research findings from several of the lab’s flagship projects. The SNAPL team — including Shin, Research Fellow Xinru Ma, and Postdoctoral Fellows Gidong Kim and Junki Nakahara — will travel to Washington, D.C. in September 2024 to present these findings at forums and meetings with academic and policy communities. The trip includes a joint symposium with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a presentation at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, and meetings with think tanks and Congress members.

Three core projects the team will share guide U.S. policies in Asia, particularly toward China. The first project challenges many pundits’ framing of the U.S.-China competition as a “new Cold War.” In contrast to this narrative, a recent SNAPL study reveals that contemporary U.S.-China relations are markedly different from the U.S.-Soviet Cold War dynamics. “Our analysis of over 41,000 Congressional speeches spanning 36 years suggests that current U.S. discourses on China mirror those on the past economic competition with Japan rather than the ideological or military conflicts with the USSR in the Cold War era,” says Ma. “Applying Cold War analogies to today's geopolitical landscape would thus misguide efforts to navigate current U.S.-China tensions.”

The research findings from a second SNAPL study offer a better understanding of how U.S. alliance relationships and U.S.-China tensions shape public attitudes toward China in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, another study challenges the conventional wisdom that democracy promotion gives the U.S. a competitive edge in its foreign policy over China. “Our research indicates that liberal values do not serve as a key lens through which Asia-Pacific citizens view recent geopolitical developments,” notes Kim. “The United States should therefore pivot from focusing on liberal rhetoric to emphasizing its role in promoting shared benefits with Asia-Pacific citizens in economic, trade, and military security areas.”

These studies are part of SNAPL’s U.S.-Asia Relations research track.

Racism in Global Context

At George Washington University, the SNAPL team will discuss findings from a project the lab explores as part of another research track, Nationalism and Racism. Recognizing that racism is a global problem with diverse roots and manifestations, this research track examines how nationalism and racism intertwine to create forms of exclusion and marginalization in Asia and provides policy recommendations to advance more inclusive societies in the region and beyond.

At this discussion, to be hosted by the Elliott School of International Affairs’ Sigur Center for Asian Studies, the team will present findings from a study that analyzes how 16 Northeast, Southeast, and South Asian nations discuss and justify their positions on race and racial discrimination. “Our study reveals various forms of racism ‘denial’ rooted in nationalist and religious ideologies, hindering efforts to address ongoing inequalities,” says Nakahara. “Addressing these forms of denial is crucial for promoting critical dialogue on race and racism in Asia and dismantling systems of oppression in the region and elsewhere.”

A Platform for Interdisciplinary Research on Contemporary Asia

SNAPL’s second grant, awarded by Stanford Global Studies, will enable the lab to host throughout the 2024-25 academic year a research workshop series focused on projects from the two research tracks above. Involving scholars and students from Stanford and Asia, the six-part series will foster cross-disciplinary dialogue and share policy-relevant findings grounded in the lab’s research.

The four workshop installments in fall and winter quarters 2024 will be dedicated to the projects discussed above. The spring quarter 2025 workshops will focus on two additional projects: one that examines the discursive construction of U.S. rivals and the respective roles of the media, executive, and legislative branches in this process, and the second that investigates elite articulation of “multiculturalism” in four Asia-Pacific nations.

“These workshops will be invaluable to advancing exchange and partnerships with academics and experts from Stanford and across Asia,” says Shin. “They directly promote SNAPL’s mission to serve as a platform that facilitates trans-Pacific, network-based collaboration."

Visit SNAPL's website for information about the workshops’ schedule and discussion topics.

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to invite applications for a host of fellowships in contemporary Asia studies to begin in Autumn quarter 2025.

The Center offers postdoctoral fellowships that promote multidisciplinary research on Asia-focused health policy, contemporary Japan, and contemporary Asia broadly defined, postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions with the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, and a fellowship for experts on Southeast Asia. Learn more about each opportunity and its eligibility and specific application requirements:

Asia Health Policy Program Postdoctoral Fellowship

Hosted by the Asia Health Policy Program at APARC, the fellowship is awarded to one recent PhD undertaking original research on contemporary health or healthcare policy of high relevance to countries in the Asia-Pacific region, especially developing countries. Appointments are for one year beginning in Autumn quarter 2025. The application deadline is December 1, 2024.

Japan Program Postdoctoral Fellowship

Hosted by the Japan Program at APARC, the fellowship supports research on contemporary Japan in a broad range of disciplines including political science, economics, sociology, law, policy studies, and international relations. Appointments are for one year beginning in Autumn quarter 2025. The application deadline is December 1, 2024.  

Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Asia

APARC offers two postdoctoral fellowship positions to junior scholars for research and writing on contemporary Asia. The primary research areas focus on political, economic, or social change in the Asia-Pacific region (including Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia), or international relations and international political economy in the region. Appointments are for one year beginning in Autumn quarter 2025. The application deadline is December 1, 2024. 
 

China's ascent in the economic, technological, and military spheres and its assertive foreign policy have disrupted geopolitical paradigms, prompting intensified discussions of great power competition and rivalry. But how did China achieve great power status and build it from a weaker resource position in a U.S.-dominated international system?

Stanford political scientist Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military and security policy, sets out to answer this question in her new book, “Upstart” (Oxford University Press), which offers a novel framework for understanding how China chose to compete on the international stage. A center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and faculty at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Mastro draws on the political science and business literature to explain China’s thinking that allowed it to enter the great power club.

Mastro joined APARC Publications Manager George Krompacky to discuss her new book. Listen to the conversation on our SoundCloud or YouTube channels. A transcript is also available to download.

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The Startup Approach

In debating about China’s rise, one might fall into the trap of assuming that China would pursue its ambitions like the United States has. Mastro, however, argues that China does not act the same way as the United States or other would-be superpowers and does not have to compete everywhere and in the same manner to yield influence or dictate outcomes.

Acknowledging the highly politicized nature of China’s rise and U.S. competition with China, Mastro emphasizes a pragmatic approach in her book. “For the United States to compete effectively, we have to understand first what the situation is,” she says, ascribing her pragmatic outlook, at least partially, to her military career. Mastro continues to serve in the U.S. Air Force Reserve, currently as the deputy director of reserve global China strategy at the Pentagon.

Mastro shows that China’s buildup of power over the past three decades stems from pursuing a “startup approach,” that is, a careful mix of three strategies: emulation (mirroring U.S. activities in similar areas), exploitation (adopting U.S. strategies, but in different areas of competition, where the United States isn't strongly present), and entrepreneurship (applying innovative approaches to new and existing areas of competition). Throughout her book, she provides 22 case studies in the economic, military, and political realms to illuminate when China has used each of the three components of the startup strategy and explain why it has chosen a certain pathway at a given time.
 

Emulation, for example, is manifested in China's approach to mediation diplomacy, as it attempts to present itself as an international mediator to gain power and influence; in its pursuit of humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations; and its attempts to internationalize the renminbi.

Instances of exploitation include China’s use of arms sales to countries that can't buy them from the United States due to factors like treaty obligations or embargoes; its approach to free trade and industrial policy; and its ability to keep most U.S. forces out of Asia and disrupt those operating there (known as its anti-access/ area denial capability.

Examples of China’s entrepreneurial approach include its reliance on strategic partnerships instead of alliances; its nuclear strategy and protection of overseas interests (unlike the United States, China has no overseas bases and has not relied on a large nuclear arsenal); and its Belt and Road Initiative.  

By no means is China always successful. Mastro lists various examples indicating, she argues, that China chose the wrong strategy in its pursuit of power buildup, such as its attempts to emulate U.S. soft power or aircraft carrier capabilities. ”But I don't want us to be blind to the realities that a lot of what China does has been effective,” says Mastro. “It’s indisputable that what China has accomplished over the past 30 years is impressive.”

Emulation and Exploitation in Foreign Policy

One salient example of the United States’ misunderstanding of China's strategic approach pertains to China’s participation in international organizations. It is also a lesson in the importance of reevaluating and reinforcing the frameworks that govern international institutions.

International institutions, Mastro explains, have been a key mechanism for the United States to build and exercise power in a flexible, innovative manner. Confident in these institutions' ability to regulate state power in alignment with American interests, many in the United States believed that integrating China into the global order would push Beijing towards political and economic liberalization. This belief underpinned the U.S. support for granting China a most-favored-nation status in the 1990s and its entry into the World Trade Organization.

By the early 21st century, China had joined 50 international governmental organizations and more than a thousand international non-governmental organizations. Within these bodies, China sought to assume a leadership role comparable to that of the United States and its allies, aiming to steer agendas and influence outcomes. Not only did China turn out to be adept at working within the rules to shift institutional directions but also at exploiting loopholes, as, for example, in trade organizations, where its compliance with the established norms has been selective. The U.S. expectations about China’s economic liberalization and democratic reform, however, proved to be distorted.

“The underlying issue was the assumption that China would adopt a worldview similar to the U.S. upon deeper integration,” Mastro says. “Had there been a more nuanced understanding of China's strategic intentions, the U.S. might have reinforced certain norms and established new rules to limit China's influence more effectively.”

Taiwan and a Changing Military Balance of Power

Just as the United States was mistaken in believing that international institutions would limit China's actions in foreign policy, it might also be wrong in assuming that China's integration into the global economy has changed its stance on the use of force or that China will consider the cost of attacking Taiwan too high.

According to Mastro, Taiwan is another case where Beijing measures costs and benefits differently from Washinton. “While we might think there are constraints on Chinese [calculus on Taiwan], those constraints are often not actually in place.”

For China, Mastro explains, Taiwan is of utmost importance and deeply connected to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. She stresses that her research indicates that, as part of China's use of economic power, there is good reason to suspect that international isolation and condemnation in response to a Chinese assault on Taiwan would be relatively mild. ”Most strategic partnerships include clauses where countries agree not to let political issues like Taiwan affect their economic relationships,” Mastro says. “This, combined with the changing military balance of power, is something I hope readers understand from my book.

Lessons for U.S. Strategy

In the last chapter of her book, Mastro discusses the implications of China’s upstart strategy for U.S. policy and offers guidance on how Wahington can address China’s rise. “The United States needs to target its approaches to build and maintain a competitive edge with its own version of an upstart strategy,” Mastro writes. Specifically, the United States should avoid emulating all of China's successes, promote emulation where it maintains competitive advantages, close the gaps China exploits to build power, and embrace its unique entrepreneurial approaches.

“The overall goal should be to move competition into areas where the United States has an advantage and reduce the impact of Chinese strategies where China enjoys advantages,” Mastro notes.

But how realistic is it for the United States to play the long game in this manner, given its four-year election cycle and current politically polarized environment?

Mastro recognizes that not only does the U.S. domestic political system make it difficult for policies to continue from one administration to another, but it also increases the cost of entrepreneurial thinking for any administration interested in implementing a new approach during its four-year term. Entrepreneurial actions require a degree of experimentation, but our politicians are averse to taking risks with actions and policies that might require course adjustment.  

Ultimately, Mastro concludes, it is a question of leadership. “I think the rise of China and the challenge of China is of such importance and urgency that you need leaders to put their political aspirations aside and think in a more calculated, strategic way. You need that kind of leadership and courage in our system for us to be able to compete with China.”

Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is delighted to share that Chris Buckley, the chief China correspondent for the New York Times, has won the 2024 Shorenstein Journalism Award for Excellence in Asia-Pacific Coverage. The award recognizes Buckley’s expertly crafted narratives unraveling the intricate tapestry of politics, social dynamics, and security issues in China and Taiwan. He will receive the award at a public ceremony at Stanford in October 2024.

Buckley’s reporting journey spans over two decades, covering Chinese politics, foreign policy, social change, and environmental issues. In recent years, he has focused on detailing the complex dynamics of the Chinese Communist Party’s governance, the transformative impact of Xi Jinping's leadership on China’s’ domestic and international affairs, and the varied responses to these developments from the Chinese populace. Since relocating to Taipei in late 2022, he has expanded his coverage to include Taiwanese society, politics, and culture, providing a comprehensive view of the region’s evolving landscape. His perceptive coverage navigates the challenges of tightened restrictions on foreign press reporting on China.

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Buckley was with colleagues a finalist for the 2020 Pulitzer Prize in international reporting for gripping accounts that revealed China's covert efforts to repress millions of Uyghurs and other ethnic groups in the Xinjiang region through a system of labor camps, harsh treatment, and extensive surveillance. He was also part of the Times team that won the 2021 Pulitzer Prize in Public Service for coverage of the Covid pandemic. One of several Times correspondents to race into Wuhan in the earliest days of the Covid outbreak, he spent 76 days in the city during the lockdown there, reporting on the Chinese government’s opacity as the Coronavirus spread and covering the public outcry following the death of whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang.

In May 2020, Buckley was forced to leave mainland China, where he had lived and worked for more than two decades, and was then barred from working in Hong Kong. Based in Taipei since 2022, he has continued to report on China and now also covers Taiwan.

“With his journalistic prowess, profound insights into China’s political system, and finely honed accounts, Chris Buckley has shined a critical light on the shifts in Chinese society and politics and broke numerous stories despite facing government backlash and personal sacrifices,” said APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin. “We are honored to recognize him with the Shorenstein Journalism Award.”

Before rejoining the New York Times in 2012, Buckley was a senior correspondent in Beijing for Reuters News Agency for 7 years, and before that worked as a researcher and reporter for the Times and International Herald Tribune in Beijing. He grew up in Sydney, Australia, earned a bachelor's degree in history from the University of Sydney, studied Chinese Communist Party history at Renmin University in Beijing, and received a doctorate in Chinese studies from Australian National University.

Presented annually by APARC, the Shorenstein Award carries a $10,000 cash prize and commemorates the legacy of APARC’s benefactor, Mr. Walter H. Shorenstein, and his twin passions for promoting excellence in journalism and understanding of Asia. The selection committee for the award praised Buckley’s exemplary work as embodying the award’s purpose, commenting that he is “truly unparalleled in his knowledge and understanding of China.”

The committee members are William Dobson, co-editor of the Journal of Democracy; Anna Fifield, the Washington Post's Asia-Pacific editor and recipient of the 2018 Shorenstein Journalism Award; James Hamilton, the Hearst Professor of Communication, chair of the Department of Communication, and director of the Journalism Program at Stanford University; Louisa Lim, associate professor, Audio-Visual Journalism Culture and Communication at the University of Melbourne; and Raju Narisetti, publisher of McKinsey Global Publishing at McKinsey and Company.

Twenty-two winners previously received the Shorenstein Award. Recent honorees include The Caravan, India's premier magazine of long-form journalism; Emily Feng, international correspondent for NPR covering China, Taiwan, and beyond; Swe Win, editor-in-chief of Myanmar Now; and Nobel Laureate Maria Ressa, CEO and president of the Philippines-based news organization Rappler.

Information about the 2024 Shorenstein Journalism Award ceremony and panel discussion celebrating Buckely will be forthcoming in the fall quarter.

This commentary was originally published by The Diplomat.

New United Nations Special Envoy for Myanmar Julie Bishop faces what seems to be an impossible mission. Even setting aside the long history of failed U.N. envoys to the country, the current situation is not at all welcoming to a would-be foreign peacemaker. The Myanmar military, in addition to being xenophobic, misogynistic, dishonest, and brutal, is by nature uncompromising and absolutely committed to maintaining political power. This is true even in the face of significant resistance gains, a worsening economy, and a severe humanitarian crisis.

For its part, the broad resistance – and arguably the population at large – is dead-set on removing the military from power and unlikely to accept anything short of that. In addition, despite improved inter-group communication and broad unity on the goal of ousting the military, its various elements represent a host of different interests, and there is no one person who can speak for all or even most of those interests.

There is no foolproof path to success for Bishop, but past experience and an analysis of the current Myanmar situation suggest an approach that includes the following elements.

First, recognize that – at least for now – there is virtually zero chance that any envoy will be able to (a) persuade the military to reduce violence or (b) bring the parties to the table for serious dialogue on a potential compromise deal. Myanmar now is a zero-sum situation; there is no compromise to be had and pushing one will do little more than alienate everyone involved. The best hope for an environment that would allow for genuine dialogue/negotiations would be for the military to be weakened to the point that it seriously begins to seek an exit strategy. That has not yet happened.

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Second, Bishop should use the interim period to put herself in the best possible situation to be helpful should that inflection point be reached. That would involve first talking at length with credible experts on Myanmar, most of whom should be Myanmar people. The next step would be to very carefully begin to develop relationships with key players – in the military, the resistance, and among other political and civil society players.  The emphasis here is on “very carefully” because the junta will use any visits/meetings as photo ops to confer legitimacy, which will undermine the envoy’s standing with the resistance and the broad Myanmar population.

Bishop should insist that any meetings not be photographed. If that proves impossible, any meetings/photos with the generals need to be matched in a timely way with similar events with the National Unity Government and other resistance officials. Bishop’s public appearances and media engagements should be limited and restrained, though she likely will need to “clarify” any meeting readouts from the junta.

Third, as Morten Pedersen noted in a recent article for the Lowy Institute, Bishop can use her discussions with the broad resistance to encourage further coordination and development of a shared vision, along with work toward a more detailed blueprint for any future transition. There is less to do with the generals, frankly, though encouraging them to think of a realistic exit strategy might have some limited value (mostly among officers other than the top one or two generals).

Fourth, Bishop can use her position to push the United Nations as well as Myanmar’s neighbors and other interested parties to review and rethink their approach on humanitarian assistance. To date, the U.N. and the neighbors have largely played by the junta’s rules, and in doing so have both conferred legitimacy on it and ensured that most of the assistance does not reach those who truly need it. Bishop will have the standing and the clout to insist on a more creative approach. Key will be her discussions with the Thais, who have generally backed the generals but under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin seem to be more open to new ideas than in the past.

Finally, Bishop would do well to coordinate and exchange ideas with key regional players, including current Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Special Envoy Alounkeo Kittikhoun, including before any visits to Myanmar. These players have had limited influence to date but could play important roles if and when the situation changes and there is a genuine need for regional and international support for negotiations and a potential “deal” to end the crisis. Again, such a deal is very unlikely – or if it somehow happened would not be durable – until and unless the military is desperate enough to make massive concessions, which means patience will be a necessity.