This essay originally appeared in Korean on June 16 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as the third in a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download.

Just as in Korea, there have been polls in the United States that show that more Americans would vote for Trump than Biden if the election were to be held today. The former president is poised to make another run for the White House in 2024, as the FBI continues its investigation into his potential mishandling of classified documents.

Biden and Yoon could not be more different in terms of ideological orientation or political experience. Nonetheless, they find themselves in a similar political predicament. How can we explain this state of affairs? Some would emphasize the effect of catastrophic events beyond any leader’s control, like the COVID-19 pandemic. Others stress the role of structural factors, including political polarization. Critics in Korea and the United States point to policy failures and shortcomings of political leadership, while both Biden and Yoon insist that their respective predecessors left behind daunting challenges. This essay examines each of these factors as it explores the path ahead for President Yoon Suk-Yeol, who recently marked his 100th day in office.

Is Yoon Korea’s Trump?

Before comparing Yoon with Biden, however, it is necessary to first address another frequently mentioned comparison—that of Yoon with Trump. In the months leading up to Korea’s presidential election this March, foreign journalists and observers often asked if Yoon could be understood as a Trump-like figure in Korean politics. To be sure, there is an overlap: a lack of political experience, strong anti-China rhetoric, and anti-feminist attitudes. Yoon’s unwillingness to foster diversity calls to mind Trump’s white supremacist rhetoric.[1] Both are perceived as “strongmen” who forcefully achieve their goals by any means, not skilled politicians who foster compromise through negotiation. Moreover, both are known for their blunt manner of speaking and their anti-pluralist rhetoric.[2]

However, the differences between the two are arguably more salient. Trump’s doctrine of “America First” rejected an international order built on multilateral cooperation. He showed no hesitation in openly pressuring longstanding allies like Japan and Korea. In contrast, Yoon has voiced support for the liberal international order and has emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Korea alliance. Furthermore, Trump has shown little regard for the rule of law. Instead of condemning those who attacked the Capitol on January 6, 2021, Trump still claims that the election was fraudulent. Yoon, who was trained as a lawyer, has consistently emphasized the rule of law.

Trump was rejected by the Republican establishment as a political maverick. Yoon, on the other hand, is the embodiment of Korea’s elite. He graduated from the Department of Law at Seoul National University, which is regarded as Korea’s most prestigious university. He then became a prosecutor and rose to the position of prosecutor general, overseeing one of Korea’s most powerful institutions. If anything, Yoon brings to mind a different Republican president: George W. Bush.

Yoon and George W. Bush: Striking Similarities

Bush and Yoon both grew up in upper-middle-class households and graduated from prestigious universities. Bush’s father served as president from 1988 to 1992, while Yoon’s father taught at Yonsei University as a professor of applied statistics.[3] Despite their affluent backgrounds, both faced troubles during their youth. Bush struggled with alcohol and was once arrested for a dui violation. He also suffered defeat in his first attempt to run for Congress in 1978. Yoon failed the state bar exam eight times and succeeded on his ninth attempt, only to be relegated to less important positions multiple times in his prosecutorial career for his uncompromising stance in politically sensitive investigations.[4] Bush and Yoon have both overcome difficulties, and they also cultivated down-to-earth, approachable personas as politicians.

The similarities do not end there. As president, Bush and Yoon both relied heavily on well-established figures in the conservative mainstream when making appointments to key positions. Bush chose Dick Cheney, who served as secretary of defense during his father’s administration, to be his running mate. Donald Rumsfeld, who led the Pentagon under President Ford, was once again appointed to the same position. Key figures from the Republican national security establishment, including Condoleezza Rice, played a significant role in shaping the Bush administration’s foreign policy.

The Bush administration followed the traditional Republican stance of emphasizing alliances in foreign policy. It pursued market-friendly policies at home and abroad, lowering taxes and entering into free trade agreements with Korea and other countries. Moreover, it pushed ahead with the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and labeled North Korea as part of the “axis of evil,” along with Iraq and Iran. In doing so, the Bush administration raised political tensions by pursuing a so-called ABC policy (“anything but Clinton”), seeking to overturn its predecessor’s legacy.

There are striking similarities in the composition and policy orientation of the Yoon administration. Consider its foreign policy team, for instance. Park Jin, a legislator with extensive foreign policy credentials, was appointed as foreign minister. Kwon Young-Se, a former National Assembly member who was the Park Geun-Hye administration’s first ambassador to Beijing, now leads the Ministry of Unification. Kim Sung-Han, a professor at Korea University who was a vice foreign minister during the conservative Lee Myung-Bak administration, is Yoon’s national security advisor. Kim Tae-Hyo, who played a key role in shaping Lee Myung-Bak’s national security policy and subsequently taught political science at Sungkyunkwan University, has returned to government as Yoon’s deputy national security advisor.

Some observers have noted that this team bears a resemblance to the neoconservatives of the Bush administration. The Yoon administration is expected to stress the U.S.-Korea alliance and adopt a hardline stance against Pyongyang. Some expect Yoon to pursue a policy of “anything but Moon,” just as Bush proceeded with “anything but Clinton.”

In assembling his economic team, Yoon has drawn from well-established career civil servants. His prime minister, Han Duck-Soo, entered the civil service in 1970 and later served as minister of finance and prime minister under President Roh Moo-Hyun. Choo Kyung-Ho, who serves as deputy prime minister and the minister of economy and finance, has nearly three decades of experience in economic and financial policy. The Yoon administration has rolled out a package of market-friendly economic policies focused on eliminating red tape, stimulating innovation, and lowering corporate taxes.

There is more than a passing similarity between the composition and policy objectives of the Yoon and George W. Bush administrations. That said, the political trajectory of Yoon’s presidency seems likely to follow that of Biden, not Bush. Unlike Biden, whose approval ratings have steadily declined after entering office, Bush’s ratings soared to 90% following 9/11 and stayed relatively high during the early days of the War on Terror. Bush was re-elected in 2004, but it remains to be seen whether Biden can do the same.

Yoon faces many of the same challenges as Biden: the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, high inflation, and a society riven by ever-worsening political and economic polarization. Both leaders also have to contend with a ruling party that is far from cohesive. Examining the path that the Biden administration has taken over the past 18 months can thus yield important lessons for the political future of the Yoon administration.

An Early Loss of Support

During Trump’s presidency in the United States and Moon Jae-In’s presidency in Korea, commentators often spoke about a crisis of democracy. The conversation has now shifted to focusing on a crisis of political leadership. Those in the United States and in Korea have sought to understand why Biden and Yoon, who each entered office after a hard-won electoral victory, faced difficulties early on in their terms.

As I noted in a previous essay, both presidents won narrow victories in bruising election campaigns marked by unprecedented levels of mudslinging.[5] In both countries, the ruling parties won important victories shortly after the presidential election. Raphael Warnock won a Senate seat in Georgia for the Democratic Party in January 2021, while the PPP swept Korea’s local elections in June 2022. However, those in the United States and Korea who hoped that the new president would overcome the crisis of democracy and return the country to normalcy have so far been disappointed.

Let us first look at the United States. According to a RealClearPolitics average of multiple polls conducted in July and August, nearly 70% of respondents believe that the country is going in the wrong direction. Only 23.2% stated that the country is headed in the right direction.[6] In its own analysis, FiveThirtyEight notes that Biden had the lowest approval rating (38.6%) of any president 18 months after entering office. (By comparison, Trump recorded 42.1% at the same point in his term.) Biden’s ratings have fallen even among African Americans and Latino Americans, who traditionally make up the Democratic Party’s base. Among youth, who overwhelmingly voted for Biden in 2020 (over 60%), the level of support has fallen by half.[7]

A similar trend is now evident in Korea. In terms of the speed and magnitude of the decline, Yoon has fared much worse than Biden. According to a poll of 1,000 respondents conducted by Gallup Korea from July 26 to 28, only 28% expressed support for Yoon’s job performance. In terms of age groups, those in their 30s and 40s showed the lowest level of support at 17%. Even among respondents in the city of Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province, which are conservative strongholds, negative responses exceeded positive responses by 7 percentage points.[8] If there was a difference between Biden and Yoon in this regard, it was in the main reason for the loss in support. Economic troubles created difficulties for Biden, whereas Yoon went against prevailing public opinion by appointing controversial individuals to key posts.

How might we understand the causes of Biden’s political troubles? In the July 20 New Statesman, Adam Tooze writes that “a combination of bad luck, ineptitude, internal divisions, the structures of U.S. politics and the ruthlessness of their enemies has put not only the future of the Biden administration but the republic itself in danger.”[9] One could reasonably classify the pandemic and high inflation as “bad luck.” Beyond this, Tooze largely points to two causes. Political polarization and “the ruthlessness of. . . enemies” are structural factors. On the other hand, “ineptitude” and “internal divisions” pertain to questions of political leadership. It is debatable whether Biden has already “failed,” as Tooze concludes. However, his frame of analysis provides a useful lens for diagnosing the current political situation in Korea.

Extreme Political Polarization

Structural factors have played an important role in the United States. Trump was skilled in using “divide and conquer” to his political advantage. Political polarization in the United States reached unprecedented levels during Trump’s term in office. The 2020 election came down to the wire, with Arizona, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania playing a decisive role in the electoral college vote. Trump, along with certain segments of the Republican Party, still refuses to concede defeat.

In such a polarized environment, it is difficult for even the most skilled politician to obtain an approval rating exceeding 50%. Major initiatives that require a broad national consensus, such as FDR’s New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, have become virtually impossible. Biden initially pitched “Build Back Better” as a New Deal for the 21st century, but it encountered significant opposition in Congress. Conflicts over the so-called culture war issues, including abortion rights, have further intensified. Edward Luce, the U.S. national editor of the Financial Times, recently warned that “America is two nations barely on speaking terms.”[10]

Second, critics have raised doubts about the effectiveness of Biden’s political leadership at home. While Biden successfully led the Democratic Party to victory in its battle against Trump in 2020, voters did not necessarily see him as the most attractive candidate at the outset. Even though they did not secure the nomination, candidates such as Sanders and Warren, who openly advocated for progressive policies, drew a great deal of support during the primaries. Once Trump had been defeated, the intra-party alliance loosened. It became a daunting challenge to bring together different factions of the Democratic Party into a cohesive whole. I also raised this point in an interview with the Korean press, noting that Biden could face a lame duck period much sooner than expected. In perhaps the most well-known example, the Build Back Better initiative failed to pass Congress not only because of opposition from Republicans, but also because of pushback from Democratic senators Manchin and Sinema.

Although the recently passed Inflation Reduction Act takes meaningful steps related to climate change, many progressive Democrats were deeply unhappy with Biden for failing to keep his promise to act on the issue. Biden’s loss of support among young voters is partly due to economic difficulties, but it is also related to his reluctance to wholeheartedly adopt key elements of the progressive agenda. On the other side, centrist and conservative-leaning figures in the Democratic establishment, including Larry Summers, are criticizing Biden’s economic policies as being too far to the left. Moreover, Biden met with Mohammed bin Salman in July, despite his strong condemnation of the Saudi prince’s human rights record. This meeting was ostensibly for the purpose of persuading Saudi Arabia to increase its oil production. Biden received criticism from both sides of the aisle after failing to achieve this goal.

The United States is experiencing its worst inflation since the 1980s, with persistent concerns about an impending recession. Furthermore, the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and the ongoing war in Ukraine have raised doubts about the effectiveness of U.S. leadership on the world stage. Biden’s response to Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan also raised doubts in some quarters. All of these events have led to growing dismay and disappointment among the American public. It is certainly too early to pronounce Biden as a failed president, as Tooze claims in the New Statesman. If anything, the Dobbs decision and the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act appear to have created momentum among core supporters of the Democratic Party ahead of this year’s midterms.

However, the Democratic Party still faces an uphill battle in its bid to retain the White House. The outcome of several ongoing criminal investigations involving the former president remains an open question, but Trump is all but certain to run again in 2024. If Biden fails, then Trump may well return—with profound consequences for America and the international community.

Tooze’s analysis of Biden’s first 18 months has significant implications for Korea. Both the United States and Korea are exposed to external shocks, including the pandemic and high inflation. The two countries also share structural problems, including political polarization and the lack of toleration and compromise among political actors.[11] Far from steering Korea’s democracy out of troubled waters, Yoon is in danger of losing political momentum altogether due to intra-party strife and incompetence.

Is There a Way Out for Yoon?

Just as Biden has to contend with Trump’s legacy, Yoon also has to deal with everything that Moon Jae-In has left behind. Missteps and complications in economic and foreign policy have surely created a challenge for Yoon, but one cannot keep blaming the Moon administration for ongoing difficulties. The people rendered their judgment when they voted the DPK out of power. Yoon will be judged on his own merits.

In several respects, Yoon finds himself in a much more difficult situation than Biden. With decades of political experience, Biden can rely on a team of trusted aides and advisors with whom he has worked since at least the Obama administration. His party also controls both houses of Congress. Yoon, however, is still a newcomer to politics, and the opposition party commands a powerful majority in the National Assembly. The PPP and the DPK only recently agreed on the division of standing committee chairs, which is required to proceed with a session of the National Assembly.[12] This delay has cost the Yoon administration, which urgently needs support for its legislative priorities.

An approval rating in the 20s only two months into office is a serious warning sign. Every country in the world is being battered by external shocks, but smaller countries like Korea sway more violently when struck by the same wave. President Yoon has rightly said that policies should not waver with every fluctuation in public opinion, but a democratically elected leader must heed the people’s warning. Popular support is a sine qua non for any president.

To find a way out of the current crisis, Yoon must demonstrate leadership as a politician, not as a lawyer or a prosecutor. He must make it a priority to defuse internal strife within the PPP. Like Biden, Yoon was elected as the best candidate to achieve a transfer of power. He was seen, first and foremost, as a leader of disparate political forces who opposed Lee Jae-Myung. There are multiple factions within the PPP that seek to protect their own interests. Yoon’s supporters were united in their opposition to Lee, but it was unclear what they stood in favor of, with no clear goal to coalesce around once the election was over.

The ongoing struggle between Lee Jun-Seok, the suspended chairman of the PPP, and pro-Yoon politicians has taken no one by surprise. President Yoon could have fostered dialogue and compromise, but instead left this conflict to fester. His actions have sometimes exacerbated the situation. One journalist wrote that “Yoon is his own worst enemy.” Yoon must honestly reflect on his role in the ruling party’s crisis and show himself to be a responsible leader with integrity.

Yoon became a politician with a vow to restore fairness and common sense to politics. He also repeatedly emphasized the importance of freedom in his inaugural address. However, it still remains unclear to the Korean people what this means in practice. How does he intend to apply fairness and common sense to his administration’s policies? What concrete steps is he taking to restore and defend liberal democracy in Korea? Even if Yoon and his aides already have something in mind, the Korean people are still waiting for the answers to these questions.

In particular, polls repeatedly indicate that controversial personnel appointments are the main reason behind unfavorable views of Yoon. Put differently, the public believes that Yoon is violating his pledge to apply fairness and common sense when choosing individuals to appoint to key government positions. In the same vein, only criticizing the failures of the Moon administration is not enough to restore and renew Korea’s damaged democracy. The Korean people still await the Yoon administration’s vision for the country, one which would be based on fairness, common sense, and freedom.

How Yoon Can Rebuild Popular Support

Another way out of the current crisis would be to pursue policies that align with the political center. Due to political polarization, no president can hope for approval ratings in the 70s or 80s anymore. For simplicity, let us assume that roughly one-third of Korea’s electorate leans left, a third consists of moderates, and the remaining third is conservative. The most feasible strategy to regain popular support would be to attract around two-thirds of the moderates (22%) in addition to his conservative base (33%), which would yield an approval rating in the mid-50s.

Political polarization is a structural problem that cannot be resolved overnight. Nonetheless, certain steps can be taken to bolster support among moderates. The Yoon administration would do well to keep this in mind as it seeks to implement reforms in education, pensions, and labor policy. The experiences of past governments are instructive in this respect. Kim Dae-Jung entered office in 1998 with a legislative minority, but he joined forces with Kim Jong-Pil’s United Liberal Democrats to build political momentum.[13] Lee Myung-Bak faced a domestic political crisis early on in office, but he was able to regain support by enacting centrist policies that addressed the needs of ordinary citizens.

Yoon must resist the temptation to pursue “anything but Moon.” The Moon administration openly vowed to “eradicate deep-rooted evils,” rejecting and punishing the policies of its predecessor. Faulty policies must, of course, be corrected. Those who were involved in corrupt or illegal activities should be held to account. However, it is excessive and unnecessary to punish those who made a good faith effort to formulate reasonable policies based on the information that was available at the time. Doing so would make civil servants even more reluctant to do their jobs.

The Moon administration created a task force within every key government agency to pursue its “eradication” agenda. While using the judicial apparatus, it was a politically motivated act to punish those who were involved in the previous conservative administrations’ policy decisions. Yoon must avoid repeating this mistake. He would know better than anyone the pitfalls of going down such a path. Although Yoon was initially part of this effort as a prosecutor, he later became the target of such a political campaign during his time as prosecutor general.

Having a strong base of popular support is critical in conducting foreign policy, an area in which Korea will face formidable challenges. Yoon’s attendance at the NATO summit in Madrid in June demonstrated his resolve to strengthen the U.S.-Korea alliance and uphold the liberal international order. The overarching orientation of Yoon’s foreign policy is commendable. However, managing relations with China will be a demanding task. Yoon’s foreign policy team will soon be put to the test. Pyongyang could engage in a major provocation. Beijing will continue to pressure Seoul to uphold the “three noes” with respect to the THAAD missile defense system.[14] A military clash between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait is by no means an unlikely possibility. Popular support is critical in responding to any foreign policy crisis. A leader who is weak at home is also constrained abroad.

Finally, Yoon must refrain from turning to the rule of law as the solution to every problem. Respect for laws and principles is a necessary condition for democracy, but it is not a sufficient condition. We have seen all too clearly how the Moon administration weakened Korea’s democracy under the guise of rule of law. Without respect for democratic norms and values and the resolve to defend them, liberal democracy cannot be sustained. To defend freedom, which President Yoon emphasized during his inaugural address, it is vital to show toleration for the other side and forbearance in the exercise of power. He must engage in a sustained dialogue to persuade the people, including the opposition.

In late July, Park Soon-Ae, the education minister, faced intense public opposition after abruptly announcing that the age of entry into elementary school would be lowered from six years to five. She resigned only ten days later. Before pursuing major policy reforms, sufficient time must first be taken to gather a wide range of views through public debate and dialogue. The Yoon administration not only faces a large opposition party, but also must contend with progressive elements of Korea’s civil society. The administration must skillfully conduct negotiations, reconcile opposing views, and foster compromise. The ability to exercise political leadership will be crucial.

In doing so, the administration must acknowledge differences while pursuing shared goals and interests. It is only natural for there to be opposing views in a pluralistic, democratic society. The government must listen to a variety of voices and appoint a diverse group of individuals to key positions. As I noted in a previous essay, ensuring diversity is critical to innovation and organizational effectiveness.[15] Relying heavily on former prosecutors and career civil servants, as the Yoon administration has done, makes it much more difficult for diverse voices and experiences from the full breadth of Korean society to inform policymaking on important issues.

A Global Crisis of Leadership: The Path Ahead for Yoon

We are now experiencing a global crisis of leadership, perhaps as serious as the global crisis of democracy. Trump and Moon are no longer in office, but their respective successors are struggling to unite and lead their countries. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party experienced a prolonged leadership vacuum before choosing Liz Truss as the new prime minister. Merkel’s absence is keenly felt in Germany. Macron was re-elected after a difficult election campaign in France, but the ruling party’s approval rating is stalled in the mid-30s. Firm leadership and cohesion among democratic powers—including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan—are critical in defending the liberal international order from challenges by authoritarian powers like China or Russia. The current state of affairs is far from encouraging.

Korea is no exception. Its own crisis of leadership is unfolding much more rapidly than those in other major democracies, with serious repercussions. There are structural problems, both domestic and external, that President Yoon cannot immediately resolve. However, it is critical for him to deeply reflect on his effectiveness as a leader so far. If he honestly confronts and learns from his shortcomings and mistakes, the present political crisis could become a turning point. Amidst a global crisis of leadership, Yoon could elevate Korea as a staunch defender of democracy. The choice is his to make.

This essay originally appeared in Korean in the May 2022 issue of Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as the first in a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download.

Fourth, the presidential transition was anything but smooth. Trump refused to concede the election and launched a legal challenge against the election results, resulting in an unprecedented, violent takeover of Congress by his most fervent supporters. In South Korea, Lee Jae-Myung, the Democratic Party’s candidate, unequivocally conceded the election before all the votes had been counted. This initially provided some hope and relief that South Korea would not follow the path taken by the United States. However, it was not long before President-elect Yoon’s transition team and the outgoing Moon administration collided over a host of major issues, including relocating the presidential office, providing COVID-19 relief to small business owners, and filling high-level government positions. There is a broad similarity between the United States and South Korea in that both presidential transitions encountered significant obstacles.

Finally, both democratic norms and the spirit of democracy were betrayed under the guise of the rule of law. Trump defied a widely held norm by nominating a Supreme Court justice during an election year, while Moon attempted to fill key government positions during the presidential transition, including seats on the Board of Audit and Inspection’s inspection panel.[3] Responding to public criticism, the Blue House stated that the sitting president has the de jure authority to make appointments to government positions. This is evidently true, but according to democratic norms and past practice, such appointments should wait until the incoming president takes office. At minimum, the incumbent should adequately consult and obtain the agreement of the president-elect before proceeding with “midnight” appointments.

Democratic Decay in South Korea

The chaos and disarray on display during these elections and presidential transitions cannot be dismissed as passing aberrations. They are the result of a democratic decay that has taken place in South Korea and the United States for the past several years, one that should be taken seriously.

The democratic recession in the United States has received serious attention among academics and intellectuals. My colleagues at Stanford University, including Larry Diamond and Francis Fukuyama, have been actively sounding the alarm about worrying trends in the United States. I have also expressed my deep concerns in previous essays about an apparent backsliding of democracy in South Korea. In an April 2020 essay in Sindonga magazine, I warned that South Korea’s democracy was gradually crumbling, in a manner captured by the Korean expression “to become soaked by a light drizzle without noticing.”[4] In an article published in the Journal of Democracy in July of the same year, I characterized the state of South Korea’s democracy as one of “democratic decay.”[5]

Since the late 1980s, Korea has served as an exemplary case of the “third wave” of democratization, but its democracy has been in retreat since the 2010s. The Park Geun-hye administration (2013–17) regressed to an authoritarian mode of governance reminiscent of the Park Chung-Hee era, and she was ousted from power with impeachment. An obsolete model of authoritarianism à la Park Chung-Hee was constantly in tension with Korea’s democratic, pluralized civil society.

These tensions erupted in the Candlelight Protests of 2016 and 2017—a watershed moment in Korea’s political history. These protests demonstrated a recurring feature of Korea’s democratization since the late 1980s: a confrontation between the state and civil society. Instead of political parties competing with each other, civil society is pitted against the “state,” which includes political parties. Through the Candlelight Protests, Korea’s civil society rejected and ousted an authoritarian state once again.

The Moon Jae-In administration built its political legitimacy on these protests by calling itself the “candlelight government,” but it failed to faithfully uphold the demands of the protestors and presided over a period of democratic decay in South Korea. The regressive tendencies on display during this past election and the presidential transition should be understood in their wider historical context. Specifically, it is vital to consider three issues that have precipitated democratic decay in South Korea.[6]

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Democracy without Liberalism

The first is illiberalism. As I note in Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (2006), Korea was imbued with an extreme version of ethnic nationalism as it experienced colonial rule and national division on its path to modernity. Ethnic nationalism elevates the collective over the individual, unity over diversity. It was thus difficult for liberalism, with its emphasis on individual rights and autonomy, to take root in Korea. The anti-communism of South Korea’s past authoritarian regimes and the chauvinistic anti-Japanese ideology of the Moon Jae-In administration both draw heavily from ethnic nationalism, which remains an incredibly powerful and attractive ideology to this day.

After the late 1980s, South Korea undoubtedly attained the status of a de jure democracy, with the requisite legal foundations. It is highly unlikely that it will regress to the authoritarianism of its past. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether liberal democracy has been firmly established in South Korea. As political scientist Yascha Mounk points out in The People vs. Democracy (2018), having the rule of law does not necessarily imply the existence of a liberal democracy.

A liberal democracy cannot be sustained merely upon the procedural legitimacy of the rule of law. Democratic norms and the spirit of democracy must also be honored. It is important to heed the warning of Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, both professors of political science at Harvard University, in their book How Democracies Die (2019): even without a revolution or a coup, democracy can gradually wither away if elected leaders violate democratic norms or the spirit of democracy.

South Korea and the United States are no exception. When the core democratic norms of mutual tolerance and forbearance are not respected, the procedural formalities of the rule of law alone cannot protect liberal democracy. Democratic decay is all but inevitable if a politics of hate and confrontation overwhelms toleration and compromise, and if the exercise of power becomes unbalanced and veers toward rampant abuse.

South Korea has unfortunately experienced democratic decay at the hands of a generation of politicians who, in their younger days, participated in pro-democracy activism. Ahn Byong-Jin, a noted progressive academic and a professor of political science at Kyunghee University, observes that the central figures of the Moon administration contributed to democratization by taking part in the struggle against authoritarianism, but they had no opportunities to learn or experience liberal values. In other words, they failed to internalize liberal democratic norms and values, such as individual freedoms and rights, mutual respect, and tolerance. They often conflated majoritarianism with democracy.

Choi Jang-Jip, professor emeritus at Korea University and a renowned scholar of Korean democracy, harshly criticized the generation of former pro-democracy activists for adopting a confrontational and divisive approach to politics even after assuming power. These politicians did not view the opposition as a partner in governing the country, instead treating it as an enemy that must be defeated at all costs. The progressive elements of South Korea’s civil society, which played a critical role in democratization, lost sight of their duty to act as a watchdog over government power and became a pipeline to political office. Former civil society activists filled key positions in the Blue House and the Cabinet. The policies they implemented—real estate regulations, income-led growth, and the phasing out of nuclear power—resulted in abysmal failures. Even so, they were intoxicated by an outmoded sense of moral superiority and thought of themselves as the “candlelight government,” while regarding the PPP and other opponents as an “old evil.” Far from upgrading South Korea’s democracy, they degraded it. Korean politics has descended into a sordid, partisan battle between good and evil. The extreme mudslinging on display during the recent presidential election revealed the consequences of this style of politics all too clearly.

The populist turn in Korea’s politics is another important factor contributing to democratic decay. The populism that is erupting across the world in the 21st century differs from previous forms of populism, which simply sought to appeal to public sentiment. Jan-Werner Müller, a political theorist at Princeton University, characterizes 21st-century populism as consisting of anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. Anti-elitism attacks the elite, and anti-pluralism rejects coexistence with different political actors. The former fosters hatred toward party politics, and the latter leads to the demonization of opposing political forces. On top of this, advances in information technology and the development of social media platforms have enabled a culture of direct communication between populist leaders and their supporters, which is another defining characteristic of 21st-century populism. In this sense, Trumpism in the United States is the archetype of populism in the 21st century.

The Legacy of “Eradicating Deep-rooted Evils”

The Moon administration’s populist character was most clearly revealed in its campaign to “eradicate deep-rooted evils.” These “deep-rooted evils” refer to the ancien régime. Any obsolete order must, of course, be discarded. Those who engage in corruption or commit crimes must be punished. However, the boundary between the old order and the new order is ambiguous in South Korea’s politics and civil society.

The campaign to uproot the ancien régime should have been guided by what Jürgen Habermas labeled “self-limitation.” In other words, tasks that were essential to dismantling the old order should have been completed as promptly as possible, so that efforts could then be directed toward pursuing a new form of societal unity and integration. Unfortunately, the Moon administration’s all-encompassing campaign to eradicate the ancien régime lasted far too long, constraining Korea’s pluralistic liberal democracy in the process.

This year’s presidential election took place within this political and social milieu. As noted by sociologist Kim Ho-Ki of Yonsei University, a progressive academic, this election was the first presidential election since democratization in 1987 that was framed as a battle between old and new elites, no longer a struggle between pro-democratic and authoritarian political forces. Instead of the traditional archetype of a democratic leader who values compromise and cooperation, there was a clear preference for unrelenting “strongmen” from the outside who were not accustomed to the political logic of Yeouido and would forcefully battle anti-elite forces.[7]

This type of leader values decisiveness and forceful action over deliberation and the ability to foster compromise. It is not a coincidence that Lee and Yoon were chosen as the respective candidates of the ruling and leading opposition parties. They persistently attacked each other as the “old” elite or the “new” elite, rejecting toleration and coexistence.

Political Fandoms on the Left, Gender Politics on the Right

Following the global financial crisis of 2008, the issue of inequality—particularly in the form of deepening economic polarization—was widely discussed around the world. Both the IMF and the OECD stressed the importance of reducing economic polarization. However, the issue of political polarization also merits close attention. Countries across the world are suffering from this malaise, which is inextricably tied to economic polarization. South Korea is part of this global trend. The dearth of liberal values and the emergence of populism, as noted above, amplified political polarization. In 2019, there were rallies by the Moon-ppa, ardent supporters of President Moon, near the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office in Seocho-dong. At the same time, there were anti-Moon rallies by the so-called Taegukgi brigade at Gwanghwamun Plaza in the heart of Seoul, named after the national flag they wave at their rallies. The extreme confrontation exemplified by these competing rallies showed that political polarization was taking root as South Korea’s new normal.

As mutual distrust between individuals and groups deepened, a partisan, Manichean logic of good and evil took hold. The symptoms of democratic decay became noticeable in many corners of Korean society. Pluralistic norms, such as agreeing to disagree and seeking commonalities while acknowledging differences, vanished. There was only “us” and “them.” The anti-pluralism and anti-elitism inherent in illiberalism and populism transform politics into a ruthless battle for power between opposing camps, each defined by common beliefs and sentiments. Because South Korea has a powerful presidency fused with a winner-takes-all electoral system, presidential elections are inevitably framed as a contest between those seeking to retain power and those seeking to reclaim it at all costs.

This partisan war manifests as a culture war, as conceptualized by James Hunter, or identity politics, as described by Francis Fukuyama. Hunter argued that American society was split into two irreconcilable camps based on “hot-button” issues such as abortion, separation of church and state, homosexuality, and gun rights. A culture war may arise for many reasons, and its particular form can differ between countries. The form and intensity of a culture war are determined by the nature of socioeconomic policies aimed at addressing inequality, the extent of societal and cultural toleration for minorities, and whether political institutions foster majoritarian or consensus-based politics.

A culture war gains explosive power when it is channeled into identity politics. Identity refers to the thoughts, emotions, and ideologies that provide an individual with a sense of self. Traditional forms of institutionalized politics are being replaced by identity politics, which expresses resentment and resistance toward a status quo that disregards or rejects elements of one’s identity, be it religion, race, nation, or gender. This trend has been especially pronounced in the 21st century.

The appearance of political fandoms, in which supporters only pay attention to information that reinforces their existing attitudes, cannot be adequately understood in isolation from the emergence of identity politics. In today’s post-truth era, subjective beliefs matter more than objective facts. The subjective beliefs that underlie political and cultural identities influence the thoughts and actions of individual citizens at least as much as economic and material interests.

As South Korea’s culture war grows ever more intense, identity politics is also becoming increasingly prominent. In this vein, the appearance of political fandoms among progressives and the deployment of gender politics among conservatives is far from surprising. On the left, an online community called Nosamo (“People Who Love Roh Moo-Hyun”) in the early 2000s gave way to the Moon-ppa. This year’s election has given rise to the so-called gae-ddal (“daughters for reform”), referring to women in their 20s and 30s who have thrown their support behind the Democratic Party. There is a parallel genealogy on the right. An association called the Parksamo (“People Who Love Park Geun-Hye”) was followed by the Taegukgi brigade. Most recently, yidaenam (“men in their 20s”) coalesced as a political force during this year’s election. As political “tribes” on both ends of the political spectrum continue to surface in new forms, the space for tolerance, coexistence, and compromise grows narrower. The tantalizing 0.73 percent margin of victory in the presidential election is a stark reflection of South Korea’s polarized society. It was as if the country were split into two different nations, one seeking to safeguard KDP rule and the other intent on stopping it. The deepening of political polarization does not bode well for South Korea’s democracy.

When it came to power five years ago, the Moon administration declared that “opportunities will be equal, the process will be fair, and the result will be just,” vowing to “create a country that no one has ever experienced before.” They were wrong about the first part, but tragically correct about the latter. South Korea has never experienced anything like this before. Its democracy, which was becoming gradually soaked by a light drizzle, has been drenched in a heavy downpour over the course of this year’s presidential election. A devastating typhoon may lie ahead.

Yoon Must Break the Mold of a Strongman

Biden entered office with the Democratic Party in control of the House and the Senate, but Yoon faces strong political headwinds from the outset. The KDP commands an overwhelming majority of 171 among 300 seats in the National Assembly.[8] Yoon will also have to contend with the “street politics” of progressive civil society organizations and labor unions. Biden has decades of political experience, but Yoon’s political ability remains unproven. At the very least, foreign perceptions of Yoon as a political leader do not seem to be especially favorable. He is seen as a hard-headed prosecutor who opposes feminism and holds anti-China attitudes. This is a far cry from the mold of a traditional liberal democratic leader, typified by politicians such as Biden. The image of a strongman may have helped Yoon become the conservative party’s candidate, but it would be unwise to stay on this path as a leader who must govern a democratic society. Yoon must cultivate a different image if he is to play an active role on the international stage, and there must be corresponding policy measures to support this effort.

Yoon does not yet have a firm base of political support, and he is still a largely unknown figure outside of South Korea. He has undergone a whirlwind transformation into a politician after entering politics last summer, but he still seems better suited to play the role of a prosecutor general.

Yoon gained popularity as a man of integrity, a prosecutor unrelenting in his efforts to root out corruption and unyielding to political pressures. It was this reputation that propelled him to the presidency. In a pluralized, democratic society, however, there are bound to be repercussions if the highest elected leader decides to simply cut the Gordian knot every time. For example, consider the issue of relocating the presidential office. Yoon and his transition team could arguably have made greater efforts to garner public support and obtain adequate assistance from the current administration, even if they were displeased with the uncooperative attitude of President Moon’s Blue House. Governing the country in the face of powerful resistance from a super-majority opposition party and a dense network of progressive civil society organizations will require deft political leadership. It will be necessary to carefully consider the full range of public opinion, lead political negotiations, mediate and compromise between different views, and exercise restraint in wielding power. Prosecutors are appointed as public servants, but presidents are elected by the people. They each have different roles and responsibilities.

To avoid repeating the errors of its predecessor, the Yoon administration must go beyond emphasizing a principled approach and abiding by the law. The rule of law is necessary for democracy, but it is not sufficient. While building a firm foundation on the rule of law, there must also be a conscientious effort to reflect on and staunchly defend democratic norms, such as tolerance for the other side and forbearance in the exercise of power. Yoon and his administration must resist the temptation to label the opposition as evil and launch yet another campaign to eradicate deep-rooted evils. They must show patience in persuading the opposition party and the people, aiming to pursue commonalities while acknowledging differences. There are already concerns in some quarters that the Yoon administration will create “a republic of prosecutors,” just as the Moon administration formed “a republic of former pro-democracy activists.” If these fears are realized, South Korea’s democracy will regress even further. Yoon’s administration must learn from the failures of the Moon presidency.

It is also critical for Yoon to shed the perception of being anti-feminist as soon as possible. During the campaign, Yoon’s campaign devised a gender-based electoral strategy aimed at earning the votes of young men, promising to abolish the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in one of its high-profile campaign pledges. This strategy backfired. Yoon lost support among female voters, and it only reinforced his image as an anti-feminist. Although Yoon and his advisors may insist that this image was created entirely by the KDP and the left-wing press, foreign observers would disagree. In its first article following the presidential election, Agence France-Presse labeled President-elect Yoon as “anti-feminist political novice.” Many other foreign news agencies took a similar view in their coverage. Feminism and gender identity are highly sensitive issues on the global stage. If his image as an anti-feminist becomes further solidified, this will impose significant constraints on Yoon’s ability to act as a global leader.

Finally, Yoon must abandon his previous appeals to chauvinistic anti-China sentiment. It was not prudent to appeal to anti-China sentiment following the hanbok controversy at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympics[9] or to take the hardline stance of vowing to deploy more THAAD anti-missile batteries if elected. Such remarks are reminiscent of Roh Moo-Hyun’s appeals to anti-U.S. sentiment ahead of the 2002 presidential election. As a result, the Roh administration faced difficulties in managing the relationship with the United States early on in its term. The Yoon administration must resist the temptation to exploit anti-China sentiment for political gain in the same way that the Moon administration used the anti-Japan rhetoric of “traitors in our midst.” The relationship between Seoul and Tokyo reached a nadir during the Moon presidency. Yoon must learn from these mistakes. Even though public opinion is important and Beijing may engage in wrongful actions, his administration must maintain a calm, far-sighted approach in support of South Korea’s national interests. Yoon’s emphasis on pragmatism must also extend to foreign policy and national security issues.

Keeping a Close Eye on South Korea

In 2020, President-elect Biden was faced with the task of healing a fragmented society and bridging political divides. The same is true of President-elect Yoon in South Korea today, but serious conflicts with the Moon administration during the presidential transition have already dashed hopes for a honeymoon period. Previous South Korean presidents typically entered office with around a 70 percent approval rating, but Yoon is failing to reach 50 percent even before he begins his term.

This brings to mind the challenging situation that Biden is currently mired in. He succeeded in preventing Trump’s re-election, but he has struggled in the face of formidable political obstacles and policy challenges. Biden’s approval ratings hover at 40 percent, which is the lowest of any president two years into the term except Trump. Unless the situation improves, the Democratic Party is likely to suffer a defeat in the November midterm elections. There are growing concerns that Biden’s failures could enable Trump to return to the White House for a second term. Meanwhile, the election of Yoon Suk-Yeol has resulted in a transfer of power, but it does not necessarily represent a victory for South Korea’s conservatives. The failure of the Yoon administration could lead to a progressive resurgence. In many ways, Yoon is faced with a task of historic proportions.

This year’s presidential election in South Korea was closely watched by the foreign press. In addition to U.S. news media, I conducted interviews about the election with prominent centrist and progressive media outlets in Europe, including Der Spiegel in Germany, the New Statesman and The Guardian in the UK, and a Swedish public broadcasting channel, all of which published special reports about South Korea’s election. These outlets, which have a powerful influence on shaping public discourse in the West, were keen on understanding how the victory of a prosecutor general–turned-opposition candidate would affect the future of South Korea’s democracy. As the West grapples with its own crisis of democracy, there is heightened interest in whether South Korea—once an exemplar of democracy in East Asia—will be able to repair its democracy.

South Korea’s democracy was being gradually soaked by a light drizzle, which turned into a heavy downpour over the course of the election and the presidential transition. Foreign media outlets and intellectuals will keep a close eye to see whether Yoon Suk-Yeol will be able to save South Korea’s democracy from the impending thunderstorm and undo the damage that has already been inflicted.

This essay is the first in a series of forthcoming monthly commentaries in Sindonga magazine that will be translated into English, so as to reach a wider audience. It is my sincere hope that these essays will contribute to a constructive discussion and debate among intellectuals, both at home and abroad, about the issues that lie ahead for South Korea’s democracy.

This article first appeared in the online magazine American Purpose.  

On March 9, South Koreans head to the voting booths to elect their new president. Although conventional wisdom posits that foreign affairs have little effect on voting preferences, South Koreans have defied this prediction in the past—and now, they may once again. Indeed, the atmosphere in this year’s election recalls that of 2002, when anti-American sentiments swept the South Korean presidential election. This time, it may be anti-Chinese sentiments that make an impact.

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According to our survey of over one thousand South Koreans, conducted this past January, a large majority of respondents—78 percent—indicated that Republic of Korea (ROK)-China relations will be an important consideration when deciding which presidential candidate to vote for. Given that younger South Koreans are expected to be the deciding factor in this election, it is particularly significant that the figure rises to 82 percent for respondents in their twenties. Twenty years ago, anti-American sentiments tipped the vote in favor of Roh Moo-hyun, the liberal candidate, who pledged not to kowtow to the United States. This time, how will anti-Chinese sentiment play out in Seoul? Will it work in favor of the conservatives, who tend to be tougher on China and emphasize the U.S.-ROK alliance? And what does this mean for Washington?