FSI's research on the origins, character and consequences of government institutions spans continents and academic disciplines. The institute’s senior fellows and their colleagues across Stanford examine the principles of public administration and implementation. Their work focuses on how maternal health care is delivered in rural China, how public action can create wealth and eliminate poverty, and why U.S. immigration reform keeps stalling.
FSI’s work includes comparative studies of how institutions help resolve policy and societal issues. Scholars aim to clearly define and make sense of the rule of law, examining how it is invoked and applied around the world.
FSI researchers also investigate government services – trying to understand and measure how they work, whom they serve and how good they are. They assess energy services aimed at helping the poorest people around the world and explore public opinion on torture policies. The Children in Crisis project addresses how child health interventions interact with political reform. Specific research on governance, organizations and security capitalizes on FSI's longstanding interests and looks at how governance and organizational issues affect a nation’s ability to address security and international cooperation.
'Hell Chosun' and 'Ghost Island': Growing Voter Anger and New Nationalisms in South Korea and Taiwan
Left-center parties in South Korea and Taiwan recently defeated their conservative opponents amid a surge in turnout by younger voters. What are the underlying causes of these developments? Do they signal the beginning of a political transformation in these vibrant democracies? Booseung Chang will discuss the role of growing voter anger over socio-economic disparities and the rise of new nationalisms in potentially changing the political party systems of South Korea and Taiwan, along with the implications for the United States.
Bloomberg TV: Next steps for the Bank of Japan
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) convened in late April to discuss the future of Japanese monetary policy. An outcome of that meeting was a decision to hold interest rates steady. On Bloomberg TV, Stanford economist Takeo Hoshi said the non-move is unsurprising and offered views on what to expect next from the BOJ.
At Stanford, Fu Ying discusses prospect of building US-China consensus
China and the United States have lately been characterized as geostrategic rivals and on a path toward inevitable conflict. But, according to Fu Ying, chairperson of China’s Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress and former ambassador to the Philippines, Australia and the United Kingdom, this picture is incomplete and misrepresents a reality that is much more nuanced.
Fu discussed the current state of U.S.-China relations in a keynote speech at Stanford on Tuesday. Speaking to a full house in Encina Hall, she described different perspectives and shared challenges of China and the United States, and urged a new consensus between the world’s two largest economies.
“In the past thirty years, we’ve had friendly moments, but we were never very close. We had problems, but the relationship was strong enough to avoid derailing.
“Now we are at a higher level. If we work together now, we are capable of making big differences in the world. But if we fight, we will bring disasters – not only to the two countries, but to the world,” Fu said.
Fu’s visit was co-hosted by the China Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, two centers in the Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI). Following her remarks, Thomas Fingar, a Shorenstein APARC Distinguished Fellow and former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, offered comments and took questions from the audience.
Fu opened her speech by saying she welcomed alternative views and “a debate.”
Misunderstandings, she said, afflict the U.S.-China relationship. Confusion shared between the two countries can largely be attributed to a “perception gap,” which, she said, is aggrandized through media reporting.
Concern on the American side over China, she said, is tied to its own doubts over its “constructive engagement” strategy. An approach held during the past eight U.S. administrations, the strategy was based on an assumption that supporting market-based reforms in China would lead to political change, she said. However, this has not occurred, and some in the U.S. are now urging the construction of another “grand strategy.”
The United States, she said, also has “rising anxiety about what kind of a global role China is going to play,” and about the future direction of the Chinese economy after its growth slid to hover around seven percent in the last two years compared to its once double digit growth in the past decade.
China interprets the United States’ apprehension as misguided, Fu said. “We see it as a reflection of the United States’ fear of losing its own primary position in the world.”
On the other hand, China, she said, is “relatively more positive” about its overall engagement with the United States. The purpose of Chinese foreign policy, Fu said, is to improve the international environment and to raise the standard of living of its people without exporting its values or seeking world power. “We believe China has achieved this purpose,” she added.
The United States and others must also remember that the past can loom large in the minds of the Chinese people, Fu said.
In attempting to understand China, “one should not lose sight of the historical dimension,” she said. China at various times in the nineteenth to early twentieth century was under occupation by foreign powers, she said, and this is a reason why sovereignty is a closely held value in the Chinese ethos.
The overall “perception gap” between China and the United States has moved from misunderstanding to fear, and that, she said, is causing negative spillover effects for both countries.
Two manifestations of this fear, she cited, are the United States’ “reluctance to acknowledge China’s efforts to help improve the existing order,” such as the development of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, and the U.S.’ “growing interference” in South China Sea issues.
“Will it lead to a reckless urge to ‘throw down the gauntlet’?” Fu asked.
She acknowledged that collision is a concern. China is focused on addressing its challenges with the United States, including avoiding potential incidents and finding ways “to adapt to and participate in adjustment in international order,” Fu said.
Yet, she cautioned that the two countries be realistic in their aims and know that China is not seeking to emulate the United States. China and the United States, unlike Japan and South Korea, do not have a formal strategic or security alliance, and they need not have one, Fu said.
“China is not an ally, and it should not be an enemy either,” she said.
“Can we accept and respect each other, and build new consensus?” she asked. She then stated, “I want to end my speech with a question mark as a salute to Stanford University which is renowned for its capability of addressing difficult questions.”
Fingar gave a brief response to Fu’s address.
Calling it largely “fictional,” he challenged the notion that there is high “American anxiety” about China. Instead, he noted, “Americans do not think very much about China,” as reflected in the multitude of polls taken recently during the primary campaigns. Thus, “there isn’t a lot of public drive to do things differently with China.”
Among U.S. academics, however, there is “puzzlement,” Fingar suggested. Puzzlement, he explained, borne less from any kind of loss of confidence in U.S. policy of constructive engagement but rather from China’s seeming departure from a trajectory that it had set for itself over the last 40 years. At the moment China’s reforms appear “bogged down;" its leaders, slow to take the critical steps necessary for economic growth; and its engagement with the outside world, increasingly unpredictable. “The puzzlement about China,” therefore, and “concern about policy has at least as much to do with concern that China may be stumbling as it does about a rising China,” he added. Debunking the zero-sum notion of international relations, Fingar emphasized instead that the United States has “done very well as a nation” in part because of its active engagement with and because of China’s success. “We welcome the rise of China, the rise of others,” he stated.
Fingar concluded with his opinion that the debacle in the South China Sea does not pose a serious threat to the relationship. Instead, “the world needs more examples of joint U.S.-Chinese cooperation and leadership” as was the case with recent breakthroughs in climate change between the United States and China. Otherwise, he added, other countries will not commit their resources for fear of a veto or objection from either the United States or China.
Later that day, Fu met with faculty members of FSI and Hoover.
Related links:
China poses "most strategic challenge" for US-Japan relationship, Funabashi says
China has historically been the “most divisive element” in the U.S.-Japan relationship, Yoichi Funabashi, a former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun, told a Stanford audience last Friday at a panel discussion hosted by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC).
Funabashi said in his keynote speech that despite the past, “we are in a much, much better position now” as tensions between Japan and the United States have been contained lately. However, misperceptions between Washington and Tokyo over their approaches to China could challenge the positive trajectory we see now, Funabashi warned.
The discussion titled, “Continuity and Change in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” was part of the Shorenstein Journalism Award ceremonies at the Freeman Spogli Institute, an annual honor that recognizes an accomplished journalist who is committed to critical reporting, and who has helped unravel the complexities of Asia through his or her writing. Fourteen journalists have received the prestigious award since its founding in 2002.
Funabashi, the 2015 award recipient, was joined by a distinguished panel of Japan experts. Susan Chira, a deputy executive editor at the New York Times, and Michael Armacost, a Stanford distinguished fellow and former U.S. ambassador to Japan, provided comments to Funabashi’s remarks, and Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, moderated the discussion.
The United States views Japan’s approach to China as “too balance-oriented,” while Japan thinks the U.S. administration under Barack Obama is “more engage-oriented,” Funabashi said. This disjuncture has caused some observers to describe China’s relationship with the West as having already entered a “new Cold War,” he said.
Funabashi quickly dismissed that idea, saying, “I do not think [we’ve] entered into a new Cold War,” and recognized that Japan, the United States and others around the world must identify ways of working with China despite differences.
Funabashi said Japan “can offset the prospect or danger of China and Russia ganging up against Japan” through its strategic engagement with both countries, but that the United States would require some reassurance and understanding of how Japan views its relationship with Moscow and Beijing.
“The approach to China will remain the most crucial factor to managing the U.S.-Japan relationship,” he said.
Chira later added that the U.S.-Japan alliance has been the beneficiary of the shift in focus to a “rising China.” She said it had both “diminished American concern” over the once-heightened economic friction between Japan and the United States in the 1980s, and “underlined the importance of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.”
Funabashi also predicted that the U.S.-Japan alliance “could be very much affected by the U.S. presidential election.” Tendering another warning, he said that the 2016 presidential election cycle “may not be political business as usual.”
Candidates have adopted strong positions on foreign policy early on and have been coupling it with harsh rhetoric. “It will have ramifications beyond their actions” and could have a “long-term impact on the U.S. relationship with the Asia-Pacific,” he said.
Over the past eight years, the Obama administration has been leading its “rebalance” policy in Asia that has both symbolized a pulling-away from Europe and the Middle East, and carried a layer of economic and strategic reassurance for the region. Funabashi said Asian leaders are now “deeply concerned” about what will happen to America’s staying power under the next U.S. president.
Part of the success of the rebalance strategy hangs on the outcome of the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s passage through the U.S. Congress. Funabashi said it “will make or break issues,” and yet, each candidate currently running does not support the 12-nation trade pact. Funabashi characterized trade politics during campaign season as challenging. Armacost later said he agreed.
“The chance of ratifying something between now and the election is somewhere between negligible and nil,” said Armacost, who held a 24-year career in the U.S. government. Attempting approval during the lame duck session is very problematic, he said.
Funabashi also addressed whether President Obama should make a trip to the atomic bombing site at Hiroshima on the periphery of the G7 summit later this month.
He said he hoped that such a trip would not “backfire” on the U.S.-Japan relationship, and relations with China and Korea. A visit by Obama could create an expectation for a Japanese prime minister to visit Pearl Harbor, and for Japanese political leaders to make a trip to the site of the Nanjing Massacre in China.
Funabashi also emphasized that a reconciliation process between Japan and the United States already exists and harkened back to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Ratified in 1952, the treaty reset Allied powers and Japan on a path toward friendly relations and to settle questions of war.
“We have proved [our ability] to reconcile on a working level, on a day-to-day level, so we don’t necessarily have to convince the public on both sides.
“Nonetheless, I think that this visit could be seen as a furthering of the reconciliation process,” Funabashi said.
“I hope the president does visit,” Sneider added. Acknowledgement of the bombing by the United States is “long overdue” and could set “a certain moral example,” he said.
Following the panel discussion, later that evening, Funabashi received the journalism award among many colleagues and friends.
Orville Schell, a director at the Asia Society New York and a member of the jury that selects the award recipient, described Funabashi as a leading “exemplar” of someone who “thinks clearly and writes extremely well.”
Related links:
Shorenstein Journalism Award 2015 Acceptance Speech: Yoichi Funabashi
Former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun to receive 2015 Shorenstein Journalism Award
Stanford scholar explores how the US election system shapes foreign policy
Experimental Studies and Japanese Politics
Japanese political science community has generally been slow in adopting an experimental approach in the study of Japanese politics. In the areas of public opinion research, however, there have been some new attempts that take advantages of the methodological merits of experiments in investigating the Japanese political attitudes and behaviors. In this presentation, Professor Kohno will introduce three studies that he and his colleagues have embarked on, which relate to three major issues that Japan faces: constitutional revision, national security policy, and people's attitudes under natural disasters.
Overcoming Economic Malaise: Strategic, Educational and Social Innovation for South Korea
South Korea has relied on its export-oriented development model to become an economic powerhouse, but has now reached the limits of this model. Indeed, Korea’s phenomenal growth has incubated the seeds of its own destruction. Learning from the Korean developmental experience, China has adopted key elements of the Korean development model and has become a potent competitor in electronics and the heavy industries. Meanwhile, the organizational and institutional legacies of late industrialization have constrained Korean efforts to move into technology entrepreneurship and the service sector. These strategic challenges are compounded by a demographic bomb, as social development has led to collapsing birthrates in Korea, much like other developed countries in Europe and Asia. Within the next few years, the Korean workforce will start diminishing in size and aging rapidly, straining the country’s resources and curtailing its growth. In this seminar, Joon Nak Choi, 2015-16 Koret Fellow at Stanford's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Reserach Center, will discuss innovations in business strategy, educational policy and social structure that are directly relevant to these problems, and that would alleviate or perhaps even reverse Korea’s economic malaise.
This public event is made possible through the generous support of the Koret Foundation.
Joon Nak Choi
Shorenstein APARC
Encina Hall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Joon Nak Choi is the 2015-2016 Koret Fellow in the Korea Program at Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC). A sociologist by training, Choi is an assistant professor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. His research and teaching areas include economic development, social networks, organizational theory, and global and transnational sociology, within the Korean context.
Choi, a Stanford graduate, has worked jointly with professor Gi-Wook Shin to analyze the transnational bridges linking Asia and the United States. The research project explores how economic development links to foreign skilled workers and diaspora communities.
Most recently, Choi coauthored Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea with Shin, who is also the director of the Korea Program. From 2010-11, Choi developed the manuscript while he was a William Perry postdoctoral fellow at Shorenstein APARC.
How Asia Works: Two Kinds of Economics and the Rise of a Divided Continent
Can Northeast Asia’s developmental sequence help explain – and even prescribe – economic development worldwide? Joe Studwell, former journalist for The Economist, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Financial Times, argues that the East Asian story holds the key to development for other countries. The sequential implementation of household farming to maximize agricultural yields; an acute focus on export-manufacturing; and financial repression and controlled capital accounts is key to promoting accelerated economic development. Emphasizing the role of politics to shape markets, Mr. Studwell notes that there are at least two kinds of economics: the “economics of development” and the “economics of efficiency,” which countries, after achieving a certain level of development, must pursue.
Joe Studwell has worked as a freelance writer and journalist in East Asia for over twenty years. He has written for the Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist, the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Observer Magazine and Asia Inc. From 1997 to 2007, Mr. Studwell was the founding editor of the China Economic Quarterly and also founder and director of the Asian research and advisory firm Dragonomics, now GaveKal Dragonomics. Joe Studwell’s previous books include Asian Godfathers: Money and Power in Hong Kong and South-East Asia (2007) named one of the year’s ten best books on Asia by the Wall Street Journal. His latest book is How Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic Region, which was placed by both the Financial Times and The Economist on their “books of the year” lists. Mr. Studwell is currently completing his mid-career Ph.D. at Cambridge University, U.K.
Rebuilding Trust: China-U.S. Relations
Please note the venue is now the Bechtel Conference Center at Encina Hall.
This event is jointly sponsored by the China Program at at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL).
Geostrategic rivalry and economic interdependence coexist in uneasy balance between the U.S. and China. Ambassador Fu will identify key strands in U.S. perceptions of China, frequently marked by confusion and anxiety, and China’s perceptions of the U.S., riddled by the desire for closer cooperation and suspicions over U.S.’s exclusion of China. The speech will highlight the South China Sea issue and emphasize the harmful effects of negative perceptions and the importance of cooperation. Commentary will be provided by Dr. Thomas Fingar, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, after the speech.
Ambassador Fu Ying has been the Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress of China since March 2013. She is also the Chairperson of the Academic Committee for China’s Institute of International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. From 1993 to 2000, she served successively as the Director, Counselor of the Foreign Ministry’s Asian Department and the Minister Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia (1997). While serving as the head of the Asian Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2000, she was instrumental in crafting China’s comprehensive strategic partnership with ASEAN and for launching the Six Party Talks with North Korea. She has served as China’s Ambassador to the Philippines (1998), Australia (2004) and to the United Kingdom (2007). From 2009 to 2013, she served as the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs for the P.R.C.
Dr. Thomas Fingar is the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. From 2005 to 2008, he served concurrently as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2004–2005), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001–2003), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994–2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989–1994), and chief of the China Division (1986–1989).
America’s Pacific Future Is Happening Now
The United States has transformed its relationships across the Asia-Pacific region under President Obama’s “rebalance” policy. America’s top diplomat for the region will speak about the strategy the administration has pursued and what lies ahead.
Prior to joining the NSC in January of 2009, he served as Director of the Office of Japanese Affairs and had assignments as U.S. Consul General in Osaka-Kobe, Japan (2005-2008); Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in The Hague, Netherlands (2002-2005); Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus (1999-2002); Chief of Staff to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering (1997-99); Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1995-96); Political Section Unit Chief at U.S. Embassy Seoul, Republic of Korea (1992-95); Political Advisor to the Permanent Representative to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Pickering (1989-92); Vice Consul in Osaka and Branch Office Manager in Nagoya, Japan (1987-89); and Assistant to the Ambassador to Japan, former Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (1985-87).
In 1996, Mr. Russel was awarded the State Department's Una Chapman Cox Fellowship sabbatical and authored America’s Place in the World, (Georgetown University Press). Before joining the Foreign Service, he was manager for an international firm in New York City.
Mr. Russel was educated at Sarah Lawrence College, University College, UK and University of London, UK.
Sponsored by the U.S.-Asia Security Iniatitive