This commentary first appeared in Foreign Affairs.

North Korea has long been a source of instability, but a new development over the past year threatens to make things even worse: the country is teaming up with Russia. At a meeting in Pyongyang last July, North Korea’s defense minister, Kang Sun Nam, and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, vowed to expand their countries’ military cooperation to “resolutely stand against” their “common enemy,” the United States. Then, at a September summit with President Vladimir Putin in Russia, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un toasted the Kremlin’s “sacred struggle” against “a band of evil”—a reference to Western countries—and called Putin the “Korean people’s closest friend.”

The North Korean–Russian convergence goes beyond rhetoric. Russia has been propping up the Kim regime with food aid, along with fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, and equipment for ballistic missile production. There are signs that Russia is sharing its expertise, too. In July, North Korea conducted a test launch of a technologically sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile, and in November, it managed to send its first military reconnaissance satellite into orbit after several failed attempts.

The transfer of critical supplies goes both ways. North Korea is sending Russia much-needed artillery shells to use in its war in Ukraine, with U.S. officials confirming in October that more than 1,000 containers of arms had arrived in Russia by ship and by train. Pyongyang’s equipment is hardly world-class—its shells have a 20 percent failure rate, whereas most advanced U.S. munitions have failure rates in the low single digits—but many of North Korea’s missiles are difficult for Ukraine to defend itself against because they are long-range, which allows Russian forces to fire from deep within their own territory, and low-tech, which helps them evade detection. North Korean military assistance could therefore be decisive in Russia’s campaign to halt Ukrainian troops’ progress. For Pyongyang, meanwhile, the arms transfer is an opportunity to test its wares in battle.

In addition to undermining U.S. and allied efforts to defend Ukraine, expanding North Korean–Russian cooperation threatens to destabilize the Korean Peninsula. On January 5, less than a week after reports emerged that Russia had launched its first North Korean–made ballistic missiles into Ukraine, North Korea fired hundreds of artillery rounds into the sea near its disputed border with South Korea. On January 14, North Korea conducted its first intermediate-range ballistic missile test of the year and formally announced that it no longer considered South Korea a “partner of reconciliation and reunification” but an enemy that had to be conquered—through nuclear war, if necessary.

As if this were not enough, China is playing a counterproductive role. Beijing’s security relationship with Russia has deepened: Russia has provided critical weapons and defense-industrial expertise to China, and the two countries are engaging in more frequent and sophisticated joint military exercises. Beijing, in effect, has sanctioned a larger Russian military role in Asia and provided the political cover and economic lifeline Putin needs to continue fighting in Ukraine. China has also shielded North Korea from international sanctions and pressure designed to force Kim to give up his nuclear weapons program. There is historical precedent for the three countries’ working together, too. During the Cold War, China, North Korea, and Russia were all committed to “opposing imperialism”—code for their anti-Western activities. Their cooperation facilitated conflict around the world, including in eastern Europe, on the Korean Peninsula, and across the Taiwan Strait.

The good news, however, is that this trilateral alignment turned out poorly for all three countries during the Cold War—and if the United States plays its cards right, it can fail this time around, too. Chinese and Soviet backing helped North Korea fight South Korea and its allies to a draw, leading to an armistice agreement in 1953, but subsequent decades of poverty and international pariah status can hardly be considered a victory for Pyongyang. As for Beijing and Moscow, cooperation soon gave way to the Sino-Soviet split and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Although today’s circumstances are different, familiar signs of unease are already visible among China, North Korea, and Russia—rifts the United States can exploit.

An Unstable Triangle
 

China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union’s falling out over the course of the 1950s is instructive. The decade began with the two larger powers, China and the Soviet Union, committed to each other’s security and to supporting other communist countries, including North Korea. In 1950, Beijing and Moscow signed an alliance agreement vowing mutual defense in the event of an attack and pledging to coordinate their activities against the West. Both supported Kim Il Sung, the founding father of North Korea and the grandfather of Kim Jong Un, in his bid to attack South Korea the same year. When China sent its own forces into the brutal fighting on the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union backed the Chinese effort with military aid and expertise. 

But this cooperation was not to last. After the death of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, introduced political reforms and pursued “peaceful coexistence” with the United States. The Soviet Union’s pivot threatened to undermine the Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s domestic project, which emulated Stalin’s harsh governance. Meanwhile, Chinese attacks on Taiwanese-controlled islands, China’s 1962 border war with India, and the Great Leap Forward—Beijing’s disastrous economic and social program of that period—elicited contempt in Moscow. Mao’s personal jabs at the Soviet leadership did not help matters, either. By 1960, the Soviet Union had canceled 12 aid agreements and roughly 200 science and technology projects in China.

Back then, as now, Beijing and Moscow were revisionist great powers with limited willingness to advance the other’s ambitions. Both expected more from a partnership than mere protection. Beijing sought financial assistance for its defense-industrial base and political support to lend legitimacy to the regime. Moscow wanted to lead an ever-expanding communist bloc and to secure China’s help in undermining the United States’ position in Asia. Although the two sides shared many of the same interests, their priorities differed. And they would clash over tactics, especially when it came to dealing with third parties. Beijing and Moscow disagreed, for instance, about how to respond to Polish and Hungarian resistance against Soviet control in 1956: Mao even warned that China would support Poland if the Soviet Union dispatched troops to quell the unrest. 

Chinese and Soviet leaders weighed the benefits and risks of teaming up. Great powers can use alliances to strengthen their militaries and enhance their deterrence, but forming a partnership can also provoke a potential adversary or draw one of the great powers, against its wishes, into its ally’s disputes. During the 1950s, for example, Soviet leaders grew concerned that China’s dispute with Taiwan would undermine their plans to discuss détente with the United States. 

Similar stresses could now be opening fissures between China and its partners. Closer cooperation between North Korea and Russia has highlighted a fundamental tension in Russia’s relationship with China: unlike Pyongyang, Beijing has been unwilling to aid Moscow’s war effort directly. Russia’s requests for military equipment and aid from China have gone unanswered. (Russian officials have claimed that China secretly agreed to provide lethal weapons, but U.S. assessments have found no evidence that this is true.) Beijing’s official stance on the war in Ukraine is to remain neutral. It has called for de-escalation, reiterated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, and affirmed the sovereignty of all nations. None of China’s statements have contained explicit rebukes of Russia, but they have not expressed full-throated support, either. The fact that Russia had to turn to North Korea for aid shows how little material assistance Moscow is receiving from Beijing. In the immediate term, Russia has no choice but to take what help it can get, but eventually the discovery that its “no limits” partnership with China does, in fact, have limits may force a reckoning with the risks of relying on Beijing. 

For China’s part, the North Korean–Russian relationship undermines Beijing’s influence on the Korean Peninsula. With no indication of having consulted China, Russia opted to ignore United Nations trade sanctions (which both China and Russia had signed on to) and sell North Korea the advanced military technology its leaders have long desired. Now that Russia is willing to provide benefits that China will not, Pyongyang is turning closer to Moscow, and Beijing has lost significant leverage. To be sure, China is still North Korea’s largest trading partner. And even when North Korea was almost wholly dependent on China, Kim sometimes felt free to dismiss Chinese leaders’ preferences. But Russian support gives Pyongyang a stronger hand to take action that could impede Beijing’s regional and global ambitions. For example, Beijing will not want North Korea—or Russia, for that matter—to jeopardize its attempts to unify Taiwan with mainland China. But a crisis on the Korean Peninsula could spoil China’s plans by driving the United States and its allies toward deeper defense integration, just as the North’s 1950 invasion of the South pushed the United States to rethink its security interests in the region and sign a defense pact with Taiwan in 1954.

The most damning consequence of North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia may be that it is damaging China’s broader diplomatic and security environment. An emboldened North Korea and an aggressive Russia do nothing to improve China’s image or help it compete with the United States. Nothing unites U.S. allies more than shared concerns about North Korean or Russian belligerence. And as a partner of both countries, China is expected to use its own political capital to solve the problems they cause. At a December summit with EU leaders in Beijing, for example, Chinese officials wanted to focus on long-term plans for bilateral relations and caution against a European “de-risking” strategy that threatens China’s technological ambitions and economic interests. But the European delegation instead opened the talks by urging China to leverage its economic influence over Russia “to put an end to the Russian aggression against Ukraine.” 

China has long regarded a trilateral alliance among Japan, South Korea, and the United States as a critical threat to its security, even seeking guarantees from Seoul and Tokyo that they would not enter such a pact. Part of the case Beijing is making to reassure both capitals is that China is prepared to serve as the “stabilizer” of Northeast Asia—a message it repeated in a meeting with Japanese and South Korean officials after North Korea launched its spy satellite in November. At the same meeting, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin urged Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to encourage North Korea to halt its provocations and pursue denuclearization. But China’s commitment to playing “a constructive role” could amount to little if North Korea, bolstered by Russia, does not respond to Beijing’s overtures. At a certain point, even if other countries in the region do not see China as complicit in North Korea’s bellicose actions, Japan, South Korea, and the United States are bound to make defense decisions that will be unwelcome in Beijing.

China, recognizing the danger of being grouped with North Korea and Russia, has tried to publicly distance itself from the two countries. In late January, Liu Pengyu, the spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington, told Voice of America that he was “unaware” that North Korea and Russia were cooperating on military matters. China has also denied playing any role in the two countries’ recent collaboration. In line with that claim, when Moscow suggested that North Korea join Chinese-Russian naval drills in September, Beijing did not respond. The official Chinese media has also downplayed the idea of a trilateral alliance among China, North Korea, and Russia. In China’s telling, such a partnership is “concocted” by Western media to justify closer military cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States and generate a Cold War mindset by framing regional politics in terms of two opposing blocs. Beijing still sees real, if limited, benefits from its relationships with North Korea and Russia, but it is clearly concerned that Moscow and Pyongyang’s actions will do China more harm than good.

Let the Chips Fall

The United States and its allies can encourage fissures in the emerging autocratic bloc, but they must proceed with caution. Erecting obstacles is the wrong approach. Taking a page from history, Washington should recognize that China, North Korea, and Russia will sabotage their triangular alignment all on their own. During the Korean War, for instance, Soviet air support for Chinese forces was not forthcoming despite promises from Moscow, and in the 1960s, the Soviet Union reneged on commitments to lend its nuclear expertise to China. Moscow’s continued reluctance to support Beijing, let alone extend security assistance, in times of crisis was a major contributor to the Sino-Soviet split.

Recently, the war in Ukraine provided a perfect opportunity for China to disappoint its partner by refusing to fully back Russia’s military campaign. But the Biden administration squandered that opportunity by threatening China with “consequences” should it assist the Russian war effort and by adding Chinese companies that it asserted were supporting the Russian military to a trade blacklist. Even without these warnings, Beijing would have been unlikely to provide significant aid. Now, however, Beijing can contain the damage to its relationship with Moscow by blaming the United States for China’s failure to help a friend. If Washington had left the issue alone or confined its threats to private channels, China and Russia’s disagreement might have snowballed into an even larger rift.

The best way for the United States to counter the Chinese-Russian alignment is by using it to rally U.S. allies and partners. Shared perceptions of a threat create a fertile environment for deepening alliances and breaking ground on new areas of defense cooperation. Such a mindset has already allowed Japan and South Korea to look past their historic animosities and work together more closely than ever before. Each country decided to reinstate the other’s preferred trade partner status last spring, and in December they resumed high-level economic talks after an eight-year hiatus. U.S. allies in Europe that were previously reluctant to push back against Beijing may also change their minds as they come to see China and Russia as a unified threat—perhaps enough to persuade them to help the United States deter Chinese aggression in Asia. China has been reluctant to support Russia’s military and political goals in Europe in part because Beijing values its economic relationships with European countries. If those countries join the United States in taking a harder line on China, Beijing may conclude that an association with Russia and its disruptive tactics comes with too high a cost.

For now, coordination between North Korea and Russia makes it harder for the United States and its allies to compel either country to leave behind its revisionist, aggressive tendencies and assume a constructive role in the international community. But if their relationship sufficiently threatens China, Beijing may choose to distance itself from both Moscow and Pyongyang. It might even go so far as to try to push North Korea and Russia apart. The United States and its allies were not the primary reason for the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War, and they will not be the cause of the next Chinese-Russian rift—but they can make the most of the regional dynamics hastening a divide.

On January 13, 2024, Taiwan elected Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as its next president. Mr. Lai received 40.05% of the vote, the lowest winning percentage since 2000. In addition to the DPP’s losing control of parliament, President-elect Lai will face a litany of practical and existential challenges during his presidency, chief among them the looming threat of Chinese military and economic coercion. As Taiwan looks to the United States for support in deterring China, the United States, in turn, must continue to shore up its alliance network in East Asia, particularly with Japan, the most consequential partner in the region.

How should we assess efforts to adapt the U.S.-Japan security and technology alliance to meet these challenges? What should we look for in 2024 given Taiwan’s election results and the political uncertainty in the United States and Japan? The Japan Program at Shorenstein APARC and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA convened a panel discussion, titled “U.S.-Japan Alliance Adaptation to Intensifying Strategic Competition with China,” to weigh in on these questions.

The speakers included Larry Diamond, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution; Matake Kamiya, professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan; Oriana Skylar Mastro, Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; and Jim Schoff, senior director of the US-Japan NEXT Alliance Initiative at Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA. APARC Deputy Director and Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui moderated the discussion.

The panelists assessed the state of the U.S.-Japan security and technology alliance, examined current initiatives aimed at bolstering military cooperation, proposed additional measures to be taken, and considered various economic security policies related to supply chains, export controls, and high-tech industries. The speakers all acknowledged that Japan is the critical swing player in the gathering geopolitical storm in the Taiwan Strait and agreed that Japan's choices in responding to the increasing security challenge will be consequential, if not decisive. While each panelist suggested some form of strategic promotion and coordination of policies to address rising threats to the economic and national security of the United States and Japan, they asserted that enhanced communication with other like-minded partners is needed to achieve this objective.

A Consequential Election

Diamond noted that domestic issues were at the forefront of Taiwan’s elections. While the island's semiconductor industry is booming, other sectors struggle to keep pace, and citizens cite rising inequality, elder care, and energy policy as major domestic policy issues.

However, for Diamond, Taiwan’s active security challenge supersedes these domestic concerns, and Taiwan faces a grim reality. The U.S., Japan, and Taiwan are not prepared militarily, economically, or psychologically for a potential blockade or military confrontation with China, he said. Diamond argued that Taiwan must have more robust defenses to withstand pressure from Beijing.

Diamond invoked 20th-century history, issuing a warning: “I cannot underscore enough that this is a dangerous situation. We need to learn from the experience of the 1930s. Russia is trying to swallow Ukraine, a country with sovereignty. China, Russia, and Iran are cooperating. North Korea is sending supplies to Russia. We need to learn from history and take threats seriously in terms of rhetoric, action, and ideology. China is preparing for war against Taiwan; it is preparing to push the U.S. out of Asia, and it will likely happen in this decade.”

Diamond argued that Chinese intervention in Taiwan would not be the terminus of their expansion and suggested that “if you want to deter war, you better prepare for it. Anyone who believes that China would stop with Taiwan is breathtakingly naïve. We are running out of time. Urgent appeals are needed to get the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and the European public to exit from their wishful thinking and slow pace of preparation.”

Japan’s Role and Relevance

Kamiya remarked upon recent changes in Japan’s military stance, citing the residual influence of Japan's postwar pacifism. According to Kamiya, the Japanese public has gradually accepted the reactivation of its self-defense forces and a dramatic increase in defense spending over the coming years.

For Kamiya, increased military spending is ushering in new levels of strategic alignment and unlocking new opportunities for the U.S.-Japan collaboration. He asserted that the future success of the U.S.-Japan alliance in countering China depends on whether Japan can maintain its current changes to its defense policy and whether both nations can ensure the preservation of rules-based international order. The military has a role of deterrence in establishing peace, he said.

Ensuring a Collaborative Approach

Schoff agreed that increased interdependence is necessary in an era of strategic competition but asked, “How can we compete effectively without undermining other partners? There is a consensus that national security consists of territorial and economic aspects, so maintaining an advantage means maintaining and advancing technological development and economic security.”

Schoff argued that U.S.-Japan leaders' summits would help achieve such collaboration, citing “two plus two” meetings of the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (EPCC) as particularly relevant. He highlighted semiconductor collaboration, government agency cooperation, and information sharing as some of the most helpful tools to confront this challenge.

Schoff also discussed U.S.-Japan joint security initiatives and some of the challenges to the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific, including malware targeting critical infrastructure organizations in Guam and elsewhere carried out by Volt Typhoon, a state-sponsored actor based in China that typically focuses on espionage and information gathering. He argued that the United States and Japan must collaborate on information sharing to address this and other cyberthreats.

Schoff also commented on Japan’s development of a new joint force command, the nation’s first. “As Japan builds this capability, we can more effectively leverage U.S. forces in Japan with an operational command in Japan. We can plan together, train together, and exercise together, but it depends on how much INDOPACOM wants to participate,” he said.

Deterrence and Force

Mastro, like Diamond, painted a solemn portrait of the escalating tensions in the region. She indicated that over the past 25 years, the Chinese military has rapidly modernized, stating that “this isn't the 1990s; the military balance of power used to be in Taiwan's favor.”

Mastro also ruled out any sort of diplomatic resolution to the situation, arguing that there is nothing Taiwan or the DPP can do to placate Beijing. “It looks like a very real possibility of war over the Taiwan Strait. The conditions for peace and reunification have already failed.”

Citing U.S. deterrence as the most important action to defend Taiwan, Mastro asserted that “there is nothing more important than Japan for U.S. deterrence. The southern islands of Japan are the only options close to the conflict zone, as Australia and South Korea are too far away.” Being the only country with a geographic location and potential for aggregate military, naval, and air power, Japan is the critical nation in the equation.

“If Japan and the U.S. were to join the fight, China would never attack Taiwan, but if China does not attack Japan, Japan will not join,” Mastro said. “If the Chinese attack Taiwan, they will likely tell Japan not to worry and that the Senkaku islands are safe.” She added that any guarantees of non-aggression from China are not necessarily trustworthy.

When considering "how bad it would be for Japan and the international system if we lost Taiwan,” Mastro replied that “Dealing with a forceful China that has come to accept that aggression is a good way of doing business is bad in the long term.” She argued that a Taiwan contingency would directly affect Japan and that China and Russia are building a relationship to counter the U.S.-Japan security partnership.

As for the practical details of the U.S.-Japan security partnership, Mastro suggested that the United States would not make Japan a joint command unless the nation was “all in.” Mastro also provided a timeline for preparations, stating that, “we have to be ready by 2027 if we want this war to be prevented.”

This article first appeared in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. You can also download its PDF version.

With the conclusion of the Cold War, Southeast Asia entered a transformative era that spanned approximately 25 years. During this period, the geopolitics of the region underwent profound changes, reshaping the foundations of regional security. Washington’s two pivotal alliances in Southeast Asia, which had been cornerstones of stability, struggled to find purpose. In the post-Cold War era, U.S.–Philippine relations weathered a turbulent course, while the alliance between Washington and Bangkok drifted. Policymakers in Washington relegated both alliances to secondary roles in U.S. Asian foreign policy.

However, since the inauguration of the Bongbong Marcos administration, the past year has witnessed a revitalization of the U.S.–Philippine alliance. A series of proactive measures have been taken to strengthen defense ties, highlighted by Marcos’ successful visit to Washington and a continuous stream of high-level US officials visiting Manila. In stark contrast, US–Thai relations have continued to amble along, characterized by senior-level visits but a conspicuous lack of momentum, leading some to question whether the relationship qualifies any longer as an “alliance.”[1]

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How Did We Reach This Point?

Numerous factors have contributed to the erosion of the alliance, which reached its zenith during the Vietnam War, driven by mutual concerns regarding communist expansionism. Rewinding to 1975, the fall of Saigon and the broader U.S. withdrawal from the region left Thai officials bewildered, shaking their confidence in Washington. Consequently, they embarked on diversifying their international relationships, notably by establishing ties with China.

The conclusion of the Cold War severed the alliance from a shared threat or adversary, and it marked the loss of the strategic lens through which Washington had previously viewed Thailand and Southeast Asia as a whole. The United States began exerting pressure on Thailand on a wide array of issues, spanning from trade matters to democracy and human rights. Thai officials voiced discontent, asserting that they were no longer receiving the special treatment befitting an ally. Furthermore, during the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis, Washington offered minimal support and encouraged Thailand to follow the International Monetary Fund’s stringent prescriptions. In contrast, China provided more substantial support to its new partner. This period of U.S. policy remains a source of disappointment, if not anger, for many Thais.

Relations experienced a modest warming in the early 2000s. Washington embraced Thailand’s democratic progress, its cooperation in the Global War on Terror, and its role as a regional hub for security cooperation, humanitarian relief, and US diplomatic endeavors. The US military and American officials working closely with Bangkok highly valued Thailand’s collaboration on an array of issues. The George W. Bush administration even bestowed major non-NATO ally status upon Thailand and initiated negotiations for a bilateral free trade agreement. However, this period of the alliance paled in comparison to its former “glory days.” This was evident in the absence of a shared threat perception, the dearth of substantial personal connections between senior Thai and US officials, and the relatively limited attention Washington—outside of the Pentagon—paid to Thailand.

The downward trajectory of the relationship gained momentum in 2006 when the Thai military ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s government in a coup. Washington denounced the coup and suspended military assistance in compliance with the law, though this reaction did not precipitate a complete breakdown in the relationship. Over the subsequent years, Thailand’s deep-seated political polarization, persistent street protests by the “yellow shirts” and “red shirts,” and occasional judicial interventions in electoral politics led to bewilderment and frustration among US officials.[2] They struggled to comprehend why the Thai establishment found it challenging to accept the outcomes of competitive elections.

The turning point came in 2014 with another military coup, which prompted a sharply critical response from the United States. This included another suspension of military aid and a deliberate distancing of the United States from the new Thai government. In response, the coup government and its conservative supporters bitterly criticized Washington, alleging double standards and a lack of understanding of the Thai situation. The government also began leaning increasingly toward China, which offered diplomatic backing, arms, and additional defense cooperation. Bangkok maintained a distinct chilliness toward the United States for several years, even initiating a brief ‘investigation’ of US Ambassador Glyn Davies for public comments related to the lèse-majesté law.[3]

The Trump administration, with a focus on the geopolitical rivalry with China rather than democracy and human rights, reengaged with Thailand in 2017-2018. It invited then–Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha to the White House and restored military-to-military relations following Thailand’s pseudo-democratic 2019 elections. These actions stabilized bilateral relations, albeit at a less enthusiastic level than what the two countries had enjoyed for decades.

Where Relations Stand Today

After a sluggish start, the Biden administration ramped up its efforts in 2022 to enhance the United States’ relationship with Thailand. This included hosting Prime Minister Prayut as part of the US–ASEAN Summit, convening the inaugural bilateral Strategic and Defense Dialogue, dispatching Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to Bangkok for discussions on military modernization, and publicly lauding the signing of a communiqué by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai. The communiqué was framed as an expansion of the renowned 1962 Rusk-Thanat communiqué, which had solidified the alliance half a century earlier.[4]

Despite these advancements, the relationship has yet to approach its previous heights for several notable reasons. Foremost, the two nations lack a shared perception of common threats. Notably, the United States perceives China as a threat, while Thailand regards China as a significant partner. Consequently, Washington has no doubt felt dissatisfaction with the deepening security ties between Thailand and China, including arms sales and joint military exercises.

Secondly, the United States has voiced its discontent with Thailand’s robust support for the Myanmar junta and its neutral stance regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Thirdly, the Biden administration continues to be disappointed with the Thai conservative establishment’s employment of legal and parliamentary tactics to impede the restoration of full democracy in the kingdom. As an indication of this disappointment, the Biden administration opted not to invite Thailand to participate in its December 2021 and March 2023 Summits for Democracy. These decisions irked Thai authorities, as did President Joe Biden’s choice to skip the Thailand-hosted Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders meeting in late 2022.[5] Furthermore, Washington’s recent refusal of Thailand’s request to purchase F-35 fighter jets, possibly influenced by concerns regarding Thailand’s deepening security ties with China, undoubtedly contributed to Bangkok’s frustration.[6]

The Way Ahead

As previously highlighted, the current reality has prompted some to question the relevance of the U.S.–Thailand alliance in its current form. Some wonder if it might be more accurate to reclassify the relationship as something other than a traditional alliance, considering the glaring lack of strategic alignment and Thailand’s burgeoning closeness to China. Considering these factors, it appears that the objectives of the two nations are increasingly divergent. In fact, discreet voices in Thailand have been quietly suggesting for years that their “alliance” with the United States appears less meaningful and valuable when compared to Washington’s “partnerships” with non-allies, such as Singapore and even Vietnam.

While it is true that the current state of the relationship is more aptly described as a partnership rather than a conventional alliance, this does not necessarily imply that the governments should terminate the alliance altogether. In the realm of diplomacy, such a move would inevitably be perceived as a downgrade of the relationship, regardless of any new title applied to it. It would be more prudent for both governments to focus on enhancing the substance and tone of the relationship while accepting the inherent ambiguity of being somewhat misaligned allies.

The key to strengthening these ties lies in both countries adjusting their expectations regarding each other and the relationship itself. The United States should accept that Thailand is not currently strategically aligned with Washington nor a full-fledged democracy. Nevertheless, Thailand can still play a crucial role as an important partner. This recognition, among other factors, necessitates patience concerning Thailand’s domestic politics and faith that the kingdom will not fall excessively under China’s influence. Instead, like Indonesia and Malaysia, it can seek to maintain positive relations with both major powers as well as numerous middle powers.

On the other hand, Thailand should realize that its relationship with Washington holds significance for its own strategic autonomy, security, and economic interests. It should strive to be a more constructive partner.

Moving forward, both nations can capitalize on the numerous strengths within their broad and deep relationship. The United States remains Thailand’s leading export market and its third-largest source of foreign investment. Thailand has also aligned itself with Washington’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Health cooperation, notably the long-standing partnership in health research, continues to thrive. The security relationship, which has long been at the core of the alliance, remains robust, albeit less exclusive than in the past. The United States and Thailand jointly host the influential annual Cobra Gold exercise and engage in cooperation and training across various domains. Washington continues to be a key supplier of weaponry and equipment to the Thai military. The two countries also collaborate closely on law enforcement, including counternarcotics efforts. People-to-people connections, including the Peace Corps program, educational exchanges, scholarships, and various initiatives, help maintain a deep reservoir of goodwill between the two nations.

The recent Thai elections represented a missed opportunity. The establishment of a new government led by the victorious political party could have triggered a surge in US enthusiasm for the relationship, not because Washington endorsed a particular party, but because it would have marked a triumph for democracy. Regrettably, Thailand’s conservative establishment obstructed that party from forming a government, resulting in a less democratic outcome.

Despite the disappointing outcome, the emergence of a new Thai government and a fresh Thai foreign minister provides an opening to strengthen cooperation between the US and Thailand on regional and subregional issues. Thailand has traditionally been influential in these areas, but its diplomacy lacked vigor during the Prayut era. This potential cooperation encompasses expanded efforts to safeguard the crucial Mekong River ecosystem, increased collaboration on mitigating and addressing climate change, and the enhancement of economic ties among mainland Southeast Asian nations.

A new government could also facilitate more constructive dialogue regarding Myanmar, offering a prime opportunity to increase cross-border humanitarian assistance. On the defense and security front, both countries should reinitiate discussions on the earlier proposal to transform U-Tapao Air Base into a regional disaster relief hub. Additionally, regular dialogues on potential security concerns, such as the possibility of Chinese access to Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, are essential.

While a return to the alliance’s heyday seems unlikely, a path to a more productive and robust relationship between these long-standing allies exists through patience, persistence, and a willingness to embrace new geopolitical realities.

NOTES

[1] Several authors recently have discussed this alliance versus partnership question. See, for example, Benjamin Zawacki, “U.S.-Thai Relations Have an Alliance Problem,” Foreign Policy, 12 May 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/; and Murray Hiebert, “The United States Makes Up Critical Terrain in Thailand,” CSIS, 2 September 2022, https://www.csis.org/.

[2] See: Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, “Two Thailands: Clashing Political Orders and Entrenched Polarization,” in Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia: Old Divisions, New Dangers, ed. Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020), 67–80, https://carnegieendowment.org/. The red shirts initially emerged as backers of the deposed former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who faced removal in a military coup in September 2006. Over time, this support shifted to Thailand’s ruling Pheu Thai party, led by Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra. Conversely, the yellow shirts signify those who stood in opposition to Mr. Thaksin and played a pivotal role in the street protests that precipitated the 2006 coup.

[3] Thomas Fuller, “Thai Police Investigate U.S. Ambassador on Suspicion of Insulting the King,” New York Times, 9 December 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/. This law makes it illegal to defame, insult, or threaten the monarch of Thailand.

[4] “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai Remarks to the Press” (press release, US Department of State, 10 July 2022), https://www.state.gov/.

[5] Masayuki Yuda, “Thailand Belittled Again as U.S. Ostracizes It From Democracy Summit,” Nikkei Asia, 9 December 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/; and “Thailand Shut Out of U.S. Democracy Summit Again,” Bangkok Post, 29 March 2023, https://www.bangkokpost.com/.

[6] Matthew Fulco and Chen Chuanren, “U.S.-Thai Military Alliance Is At A Crossroads,” Aviation Week, 19 July 2023, https://aviationweek.com/.

The 21 member economies of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum met in San Francisco from November 11-17 at the APEC Leaders’ Week to discuss trade, sustainable development, technological innovation, and other pressing issues. The occasion also provided opportunities for APEC member leaders to hold bilateral meetings, of which perhaps the most highly anticipated was a summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Shorenstein APARC experts explain the implications of the APEC convening, analyze the deliverables from the Biden-Xi meeting, and examine issues that cast a shadow on the U.S. relations with Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy and the world's fourth-most populous country. Continue reading below for a roundup of our experts’ analysis and commentary featured in U.S. and international media.

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Meeting face-to-face for the first time in a year on the sidelines of the APEC Summit, Biden and Xi discussed issues spanning military and trade relations, signaling a willingness to bring a degree of stability to the rocky U.S.-China bilateral relations. Ties between the two countries have deteriorated amid tensions like those in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, disputes about technology competition, and the February 2023 Chinese spy balloon incident. APARC fellows consider the significance of the Biden-Xi meeting in numerous articles and interviews in the press.

The United States and China each have reasons to meet now and reduce hostilities. For President Biden, the upcoming 2024 presidential election is ample impetus to work for a better relationship with the Chinese. For Beijing, as Center Fellow Thomas Fingar tells the Japan Times, the country’s “economic difficulties and their implications for social stability and regime legitimacy have made Beijing more eager to improve relations with countries important to its economy than was the case six to 12 months ago.” And Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro notes in the Christian Science Monitor that “both sides are trying to present to the rest of the world that they have things under control,” something that requires “predictable, high-level engagement.”

Most analysts, however, held low expectations for substantive outcomes from the meeting between the two leaders. According to Mastro, there is no indication of improvement in the tension between the two sides because neither the United States nor China is ready to make “any significant concession,” she argues on NBC News.

One reason for that is an aversion to political risk. As Mastro tells KCRW’s Madeleine Brand on Press Play: “There’s no political appetite for [thinking outside the box]. Political leaders want to make sure any policy will 100% work before they're willing to embark on it. But in the world of geopolitics, it's really hard to know that before you try things and experiment and assess and reassess.”

That said, just the very fact of the meeting taking place could represent an essential signal to Chinese officials, as Fingar points out to NBC News: “For there really to be a movement for lower levels of the [Chinese] system to engage in specifics, it needs a refreshed endorsement from Xi.” 

One outcome many were looking for was a resumption of U.S.-China military communications, what defense analysts call “mil-to-mil exchanges.” The Chinese severed these in 2022 when then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. With close encounters between American and Chinese forces in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea becoming almost commonplace, communications at the military senior level are critical to prevent escalation. But restoring these ties would have limited value because, as Mastro tells NPR, “You can expect that, the next time [the Chinese] get unhappy about something, maybe after the Taiwan election, they cut them off again. So, unless we have some sort of commitment to sustained engagement, the mil-to-mil exchanges are unlikely to be sufficient to stabilize the relationship.”
 

The Biden-Xi meeting took place on the backdrop of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza. The United States is concerned that China — as a good friend of Iran and one of the largest importers of its gas and oil — could complicate diplomatic efforts to end the conflict and potentially exacerbate tensions. However, Mastro argues that bringing up the Middle East in the context of the U.S.-China bilateral meeting only serves to aid Beijing in its propaganda efforts. As she says on KTVU Fox 2 News, “China does not really care what happens [in the Middle East]. But they are leveraging the support, especially in the developing world, in the Global South, for Hamas to push back against the United States and basically use Israel as a proxy for discontent about what they call ‘American unilateralism,’ ‘American hegemony.’” 

The conflict in the Middle East came up in another high-level meeting when Indonesian President Joko Widodo visited Biden in Washinton before heading to the APEC forum. Although U.S.-Indonesian security cooperation is good and trade has grown, Jakarta is unhappy with the White House for several reasons. Among these, the war in Gaza was probably foremost in Widodo’s mind, writes Ambassador Scot Marciel, the Oksenberg-Rholen Fellow at APARC, in an essay for The Diplomat magazine. “Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population, has long supported the Palestinian cause and has vigorously pursued diplomatic efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire.” Thus, Indonesian public opinion has put Jakarta and Washington at odds over the Israel-Hamas crisis, explains Marciel.

Indonesians also remain upset by the snub of Biden skipping the recent East Asia Summit and by “what they see as Washington’s failure to deliver on the high-profile Just Energy Transition Partnership, under which the U.S. committed to lead G-7-plus efforts to mobilize $20 billion to support Indonesia’s accelerated transition from coal to cleaner energy,” Marciel writes, urging Washington to engage Jakarta seriously on these issues before Indonesia is heading into crucial presidential elections in early 2024.

More Media Coverage

For more coverage of the APEC forum and Biden-Xi meeting with analysis by APARC scholars, visit the links below:

Kishida and Xi Aim for Trade Progress Despite Lingering Tensions
The Japan Times, November 17, 2023

Biden, Xi Set to Pledge Ban on AI in Autonomous Weapons Like Drones, Nuclear Warhead Control
South China Morning Post, November 17, 2023

Oriana Skylar Mastro on the Xi-Biden Meeting on the Sidelines of APEC 
BBC Sounds, November 15, 2023

Biden, Xi Eye Economic, Military Thaw in High-Stakes Meeting
Bloomberg Technology, November 15, 2023

US Grants Chinese Journalists Hundreds of Visas to Cover APEC
Bloomberg News, November 14, 2023

Xi’s Arrival in US Brings Protesters and Fans Onto Streets
Bloomberg News, November 14, 2023

U.S.-China: One Summit, Two Different Goals for Biden and Xi
Nikkei Asia, November 14, 2023

Presidents Xi and Biden Seek to Turn Back the Clock in San Francisco
Time Magazine, November 14, 2023

China's Xi Jinping to meet with Biden in San Francisco
NPR, November 11, 2023

Biden, Xi Set to Pledge Ban on AI in Autonomous Weapons Like Drones, Nuclear Warhead Control
South China Morning Post, November 11, 2023

Biden and Xi to Seek to Stabilize Relations in California Meeting
New York Times, November 10, 2023

APEC Offers Important Chance to Stabilize Tense U.S.-China Relations
San Francisco Examiner, November 10, 2023

Joe Biden, Xi Jinping Set to Steal APEC Spotlight with Talks to Steady Ties
Reuters, November 8, 2023
 

Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is hiring research assistants for the U.S. Rivals Project at the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL) for the 2024 winter quarter. The selected candidate(s) will play a crucial role in using computational methods to advance our understanding of U.S. threat perception and construction. We are committed to fostering long-term collaborations among dedicated lab members. Successful candidates may have the opportunity for renewal across multiple quarters based on performance.

Project Overview: The U.S. Rivals Project is the keystone project of SNAPL that debunks the notion of a “new Cold War,” by comparing American rhetoric on China’s rise today with past rhetoric on Japan's ascent. As an RA on this project, you will contribute to groundbreaking research at the intersection of computer science and international relations, advancing methodological rigor in the conceptualization and measurement of threat perceptions, and facilitating informed policy-making on great power relations.

Responsibilities: 

The primary responsibilities of the research assistant will include:

1. Assisting in the scraping, preprocessing, and annotating textual data such as congressional debates and presidential speeches. 
2. Developing and fine-tuning multilabel classification models for analyzing political discourse.
3. Contributing to the visualization of project outcomes on our website to showcase research results to a broader audience.
4. Collaborating with a multidisciplinary team of researchers to contribute to research publications of the lab.
5. Staying abreast of the latest developments in NLP and related fields to contribute innovative research design to the project.
   

Qualifications: We are seeking candidates with the following qualifications:

1. Proficiency in programming languages such as Python and/or R and experience with relevant libraries.
2. Solid understanding of word embedding techniques and multilabel classification algorithms.
3. Experience in utilizing Shiny to create dynamic and interactive visualizations.
4. Robust problem-solving skills with a proactive and self-motivated approach to handling research tasks.
5. Effective communication and teamwork abilities.
   

This position is open to Stanford students only and will be in-person on campus for the winter 2024 quarter. 

The hourly pay rate is $17.25 for undergraduate students, $25 for graduate students. 

We require a weekly time commitment of 15-20 hours.

Application Process: Interested candidates should submit the following documents here by December 15, 2023, at 5:00 pm PT. We will consider only applications that include all supporting documents.

1. A current CV;
2. A cover letter (up to 1 page);
3. A link to a sample project showcasing relevant skills;
4. A Completed Student Information Sheet (please enter "SNAPL" for "Supervisor Name" field);
5. Arrange for a letter of recommendation from a faculty member to be sent directly to Irene Kyoung at SNAPLcontact@stanford.edu;

If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Irene Kyoung at SNAPLcontact@stanford.edu.

Today’s geopolitical climate has created new and dangerous challenges for America’s defense and the support of democracy and freedom worldwide. These challenges demand a reexamination of the U.S. defense budget to ensure that America’s forces retain the capabilities to defend the nation and deter aggression abroad. The expert authors of the new volume Defense Budgeting for a Safer World (Hoover Institution Press) review the significant areas of debate in the U.S. defense budget and provide recommendations for aligning it with new global realities. Chief among these new realities are China’s modernized military and the nation’s objectives in the South China Sea and for reunification with Taiwan, testing U.S. dominance in the world order and raising questions about allies’ security and the U.S. ability to counter threats from the People’s Liberation Army.

In her contribution to the new volume, in a chapter titled “The Military Challenge of the People’s Republic of China,” Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro reviews the last quarter-century of developments in China’s strategy for reunification with Taiwan. Mastro explains that the original shape of that strategy, strengthening ties with Taiwan to persuade the population, “has failed” and now takes the form of belligerent air and sea incursions, increasingly sophisticated military exercises, and official Chinese rhetoric about the inevitability of reunification and the impossibility of Taiwan’s independence has intensified.

Mastro notes that “China’s military modernization has focused on the ability to prevent a decisive U.S. response, referred to as its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy." The United States, as a non-resident power in the Asia-Pacific, depends on its aircraft carriers to project power in the South China Sea, but these carriers are vulnerable to Chinese ballistic systems. Because it will likely have to operate outside the first island chain — that is, the “barrier” extending from Japan, past Taiwan and the Philippines, to maritime and peninsular Southeast Asia — the U.S. military depends on “enablers” to accomplish its missions, like aerial refueling and satellites for cyber capabilities. These assets are likewise vulnerable to Chinese disruption/attack, as are U.S. forward bases in Asia, such as Okinawa.

Mastro’s recommendations to mitigate current U.S. weaknesses to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan include "more access, basing, and overflight," "more mass on targets," and "leveraging partners." While Chinese military power has not surpassed that of the United States, Mastro warns that if U.S. deterrence is not maintained and improved, Chinese leadership may become confident enough to move against Taiwan, resulting in a war with the United States. On the other hand, she assesses that the needed deterrence is possible if the proper steps are taken now.