China's ascent in the economic, technological, and military spheres and its assertive foreign policy have disrupted geopolitical paradigms, prompting intensified discussions of great power competition and rivalry. But how did China achieve great power status and build it from a weaker resource position in a U.S.-dominated international system?

Stanford political scientist Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military and security policy, sets out to answer this question in her new book, “Upstart” (Oxford University Press), which offers a novel framework for understanding how China chose to compete on the international stage. A center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and faculty at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Mastro draws on the political science and business literature to explain China’s thinking that allowed it to enter the great power club.

Mastro joined APARC Publications Manager George Krompacky to discuss her new book. Listen to the conversation on our SoundCloud or YouTube channels. A transcript is also available to download.

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The Startup Approach

In debating about China’s rise, one might fall into the trap of assuming that China would pursue its ambitions like the United States has. Mastro, however, argues that China does not act the same way as the United States or other would-be superpowers and does not have to compete everywhere and in the same manner to yield influence or dictate outcomes.

Acknowledging the highly politicized nature of China’s rise and U.S. competition with China, Mastro emphasizes a pragmatic approach in her book. “For the United States to compete effectively, we have to understand first what the situation is,” she says, ascribing her pragmatic outlook, at least partially, to her military career. Mastro continues to serve in the U.S. Air Force Reserve, currently as the deputy director of reserve global China strategy at the Pentagon.

Mastro shows that China’s buildup of power over the past three decades stems from pursuing a “startup approach,” that is, a careful mix of three strategies: emulation (mirroring U.S. activities in similar areas), exploitation (adopting U.S. strategies, but in different areas of competition, where the United States isn't strongly present), and entrepreneurship (applying innovative approaches to new and existing areas of competition). Throughout her book, she provides 22 case studies in the economic, military, and political realms to illuminate when China has used each of the three components of the startup strategy and explain why it has chosen a certain pathway at a given time.
 

Emulation, for example, is manifested in China's approach to mediation diplomacy, as it attempts to present itself as an international mediator to gain power and influence; in its pursuit of humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations; and its attempts to internationalize the renminbi.

Instances of exploitation include China’s use of arms sales to countries that can't buy them from the United States due to factors like treaty obligations or embargoes; its approach to free trade and industrial policy; and its ability to keep most U.S. forces out of Asia and disrupt those operating there (known as its anti-access/ area denial capability.

Examples of China’s entrepreneurial approach include its reliance on strategic partnerships instead of alliances; its nuclear strategy and protection of overseas interests (unlike the United States, China has no overseas bases and has not relied on a large nuclear arsenal); and its Belt and Road Initiative.  

By no means is China always successful. Mastro lists various examples indicating, she argues, that China chose the wrong strategy in its pursuit of power buildup, such as its attempts to emulate U.S. soft power or aircraft carrier capabilities. ”But I don't want us to be blind to the realities that a lot of what China does has been effective,” says Mastro. “It’s indisputable that what China has accomplished over the past 30 years is impressive.”

Emulation and Exploitation in Foreign Policy

One salient example of the United States’ misunderstanding of China's strategic approach pertains to China’s participation in international organizations. It is also a lesson in the importance of reevaluating and reinforcing the frameworks that govern international institutions.

International institutions, Mastro explains, have been a key mechanism for the United States to build and exercise power in a flexible, innovative manner. Confident in these institutions' ability to regulate state power in alignment with American interests, many in the United States believed that integrating China into the global order would push Beijing towards political and economic liberalization. This belief underpinned the U.S. support for granting China a most-favored-nation status in the 1990s and its entry into the World Trade Organization.

By the early 21st century, China had joined 50 international governmental organizations and more than a thousand international non-governmental organizations. Within these bodies, China sought to assume a leadership role comparable to that of the United States and its allies, aiming to steer agendas and influence outcomes. Not only did China turn out to be adept at working within the rules to shift institutional directions but also at exploiting loopholes, as, for example, in trade organizations, where its compliance with the established norms has been selective. The U.S. expectations about China’s economic liberalization and democratic reform, however, proved to be distorted.

“The underlying issue was the assumption that China would adopt a worldview similar to the U.S. upon deeper integration,” Mastro says. “Had there been a more nuanced understanding of China's strategic intentions, the U.S. might have reinforced certain norms and established new rules to limit China's influence more effectively.”

Taiwan and a Changing Military Balance of Power

Just as the United States was mistaken in believing that international institutions would limit China's actions in foreign policy, it might also be wrong in assuming that China's integration into the global economy has changed its stance on the use of force or that China will consider the cost of attacking Taiwan too high.

According to Mastro, Taiwan is another case where Beijing measures costs and benefits differently from Washinton. “While we might think there are constraints on Chinese [calculus on Taiwan], those constraints are often not actually in place.”

For China, Mastro explains, Taiwan is of utmost importance and deeply connected to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. She stresses that her research indicates that, as part of China's use of economic power, there is good reason to suspect that international isolation and condemnation in response to a Chinese assault on Taiwan would be relatively mild. ”Most strategic partnerships include clauses where countries agree not to let political issues like Taiwan affect their economic relationships,” Mastro says. “This, combined with the changing military balance of power, is something I hope readers understand from my book.

Lessons for U.S. Strategy

In the last chapter of her book, Mastro discusses the implications of China’s upstart strategy for U.S. policy and offers guidance on how Wahington can address China’s rise. “The United States needs to target its approaches to build and maintain a competitive edge with its own version of an upstart strategy,” Mastro writes. Specifically, the United States should avoid emulating all of China's successes, promote emulation where it maintains competitive advantages, close the gaps China exploits to build power, and embrace its unique entrepreneurial approaches.

“The overall goal should be to move competition into areas where the United States has an advantage and reduce the impact of Chinese strategies where China enjoys advantages,” Mastro notes.

But how realistic is it for the United States to play the long game in this manner, given its four-year election cycle and current politically polarized environment?

Mastro recognizes that not only does the U.S. domestic political system make it difficult for policies to continue from one administration to another, but it also increases the cost of entrepreneurial thinking for any administration interested in implementing a new approach during its four-year term. Entrepreneurial actions require a degree of experimentation, but our politicians are averse to taking risks with actions and policies that might require course adjustment.  

Ultimately, Mastro concludes, it is a question of leadership. “I think the rise of China and the challenge of China is of such importance and urgency that you need leaders to put their political aspirations aside and think in a more calculated, strategic way. You need that kind of leadership and courage in our system for us to be able to compete with China.”

Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is delighted to share that Chris Buckley, the chief China correspondent for the New York Times, has won the 2024 Shorenstein Journalism Award for Excellence in Asia-Pacific Coverage. The award recognizes Buckley’s expertly crafted narratives unraveling the intricate tapestry of politics, social dynamics, and security issues in China and Taiwan. He will receive the award at a public ceremony at Stanford in October 2024.

Buckley’s reporting journey spans over two decades, covering Chinese politics, foreign policy, social change, and environmental issues. In recent years, he has focused on detailing the complex dynamics of the Chinese Communist Party’s governance, the transformative impact of Xi Jinping's leadership on China’s’ domestic and international affairs, and the varied responses to these developments from the Chinese populace. Since relocating to Taipei in late 2022, he has expanded his coverage to include Taiwanese society, politics, and culture, providing a comprehensive view of the region’s evolving landscape. His perceptive coverage navigates the challenges of tightened restrictions on foreign press reporting on China.

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Buckley was with colleagues a finalist for the 2020 Pulitzer Prize in international reporting for gripping accounts that revealed China's covert efforts to repress millions of Uyghurs and other ethnic groups in the Xinjiang region through a system of labor camps, harsh treatment, and extensive surveillance. He was also part of the Times team that won the 2021 Pulitzer Prize in Public Service for coverage of the Covid pandemic. One of several Times correspondents to race into Wuhan in the earliest days of the Covid outbreak, he spent 76 days in the city during the lockdown there, reporting on the Chinese government’s opacity as the Coronavirus spread and covering the public outcry following the death of whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang.

In May 2020, Buckley was forced to leave mainland China, where he had lived and worked for more than two decades, and was then barred from working in Hong Kong. Based in Taipei since 2022, he has continued to report on China and now also covers Taiwan.

“With his journalistic prowess, profound insights into China’s political system, and finely honed accounts, Chris Buckley has shined a critical light on the shifts in Chinese society and politics and broke numerous stories despite facing government backlash and personal sacrifices,” said APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin. “We are honored to recognize him with the Shorenstein Journalism Award.”

Before rejoining the New York Times in 2012, Buckley was a senior correspondent in Beijing for Reuters News Agency for 7 years, and before that worked as a researcher and reporter for the Times and International Herald Tribune in Beijing. He grew up in Sydney, Australia, earned a bachelor's degree in history from the University of Sydney, studied Chinese Communist Party history at Renmin University in Beijing, and received a doctorate in Chinese studies from Australian National University.

Presented annually by APARC, the Shorenstein Award carries a $10,000 cash prize and commemorates the legacy of APARC’s benefactor, Mr. Walter H. Shorenstein, and his twin passions for promoting excellence in journalism and understanding of Asia. The selection committee for the award praised Buckley’s exemplary work as embodying the award’s purpose, commenting that he is “truly unparalleled in his knowledge and understanding of China.”

The committee members are William Dobson, co-editor of the Journal of Democracy; Anna Fifield, the Washington Post's Asia-Pacific editor and recipient of the 2018 Shorenstein Journalism Award; James Hamilton, the Hearst Professor of Communication, chair of the Department of Communication, and director of the Journalism Program at Stanford University; Louisa Lim, associate professor, Audio-Visual Journalism Culture and Communication at the University of Melbourne; and Raju Narisetti, publisher of McKinsey Global Publishing at McKinsey and Company.

Twenty-two winners previously received the Shorenstein Award. Recent honorees include The Caravan, India's premier magazine of long-form journalism; Emily Feng, international correspondent for NPR covering China, Taiwan, and beyond; Swe Win, editor-in-chief of Myanmar Now; and Nobel Laureate Maria Ressa, CEO and president of the Philippines-based news organization Rappler.

Information about the 2024 Shorenstein Journalism Award ceremony and panel discussion celebrating Buckely will be forthcoming in the fall quarter.

Note: this piece builds on a previous article by the authors, published by The Washington Quarterly.

No foreign policy challenge is more important, or difficult, than finding a way to simultaneously deter and engage China without provoking unwanted behaviors. Achieving this requires understanding the perceptions and priorities shaping Beijing’s actions.  

Despite China’s worsening economic problems and waning international trust, the March 2024 session of the National People’s Congress has reaffirmed Beijing’s determination to stick with policies fuelling domestic discontent and alienating foreign partners. The reasons are structural, not simply strong-man egoism. Policies in China are tightly interconnected, reflecting hard-to-change perceptions reinforced by bureaucratic and personal interests. Changing one facet requires changing the entire policy package. For now, that package prioritizes domestic stability and security over economic growth.

Beijing has fallen into an old mindset that sacrifices growth to reduce vulnerability to external and internal threats that leaders believe endanger the regime and China’s future. This is not good for China, the United States, or the world. Washington cannot achieve immediate or fundamental changes in China’s behavior but ill-considered actions can make things worse. The best we currently can achieve is wary coexistence, careful management to reduce dangers, and keeping the way open for a better day.

Read the rest of the essay online at the East Asia Forum.

The possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan has been front and center to the simmering tensions between China and the United States, but American and other world leaders are failing to take the measures necessary to deter China from taking Taiwan by force, argues Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and an expert on Chinese military and Asia-Pacific security. Mastro, who is also affiliated with APARC, joined the Center's Visiting Scholar Gita Wirjawan, host of the "Endgame" video podcast, to consider the likelihood of a war over Taiwan, Chinese military modernization, Beijing's ambitions in the South China Sea, and the future of Asia. 

Mastro believes Xi Jinping will use force to compel Taiwan to unite with the mainland once he is confident in the Chinese military’s ability to succeed in relevant joint operations, like an amphibious attack. She predicts that the flashpoint is likely to occur in 2027 — by which time, "if the pieces are on the board in a relatively similar manner" and the Chinese military is convinced it can quickly take over the island before the United States can intervene with force, then there will be nothing left "to convince Xi not to resolve this most important issue for the Communist Party."

This conversation with Mastro is part of an "Endgame" interview series Wirjawan is recording with Stanford experts during his residency at APARC.

As Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine reaches the two-year mark, the geopolitical reverberations of the assault have changed the dynamics of Western alliance systems, taxed the "no-limits" China-Russia partnership, and created an unexpected U.S.-E.U. alignment on China policy, tells Stanford historian and Russia expert Stephen Kotkin, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, to APARC Visiting Scholar Gita Wirjawan, host of the popular 'Endgame" video podcast.

Kotkin, who is also APARC faculty and the Kleinheinz Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, posits that the war in Ukraine has shocked Western European nations out of a dependence on Russian energy and increased scrutiny on partnerships with autocratic states that flaunt the rules-based international order. He calls this new dynamic a revival of Transatlanticism, arguing that a Transatlantic alliance could be deemed as a "pivot to Asia" and that the strengthening of institutional ties between the U.S. and the E.U. is vital to counter an ascendant China. 

In contrast with the popular portrayal of the U.S.-China competition as purely bilateral, Kotkin argues that, to compete with China, the United States must incorporate allies and other like-minded "institutional Western" nations (as opposed to geographically Western nations) in multilateral engagement.

"We have to share the planet with China," says Kotkin, but what are the terms of such coexistence, he asks, "and how do we negotiate those terms so that we preserve the free and open societies, the rule of law, the institutional West that accounts for our peace and prosperity?"

Throughout the conversation, Kotkin also addresses the perception of the increasing hegemony of China with respect to Southeast Asia, shares his intellectual influences, and talks about the importance of history in navigating the future.

This conversation with Kotkin is part of an "Endgame" interview series Wirjawan is recording with Stanford experts during his residency at APARC.

This commentary first appeared in Foreign Affairs.

North Korea has long been a source of instability, but a new development over the past year threatens to make things even worse: the country is teaming up with Russia. At a meeting in Pyongyang last July, North Korea’s defense minister, Kang Sun Nam, and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, vowed to expand their countries’ military cooperation to “resolutely stand against” their “common enemy,” the United States. Then, at a September summit with President Vladimir Putin in Russia, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un toasted the Kremlin’s “sacred struggle” against “a band of evil”—a reference to Western countries—and called Putin the “Korean people’s closest friend.”

The North Korean–Russian convergence goes beyond rhetoric. Russia has been propping up the Kim regime with food aid, along with fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, and equipment for ballistic missile production. There are signs that Russia is sharing its expertise, too. In July, North Korea conducted a test launch of a technologically sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile, and in November, it managed to send its first military reconnaissance satellite into orbit after several failed attempts.

The transfer of critical supplies goes both ways. North Korea is sending Russia much-needed artillery shells to use in its war in Ukraine, with U.S. officials confirming in October that more than 1,000 containers of arms had arrived in Russia by ship and by train. Pyongyang’s equipment is hardly world-class—its shells have a 20 percent failure rate, whereas most advanced U.S. munitions have failure rates in the low single digits—but many of North Korea’s missiles are difficult for Ukraine to defend itself against because they are long-range, which allows Russian forces to fire from deep within their own territory, and low-tech, which helps them evade detection. North Korean military assistance could therefore be decisive in Russia’s campaign to halt Ukrainian troops’ progress. For Pyongyang, meanwhile, the arms transfer is an opportunity to test its wares in battle.

In addition to undermining U.S. and allied efforts to defend Ukraine, expanding North Korean–Russian cooperation threatens to destabilize the Korean Peninsula. On January 5, less than a week after reports emerged that Russia had launched its first North Korean–made ballistic missiles into Ukraine, North Korea fired hundreds of artillery rounds into the sea near its disputed border with South Korea. On January 14, North Korea conducted its first intermediate-range ballistic missile test of the year and formally announced that it no longer considered South Korea a “partner of reconciliation and reunification” but an enemy that had to be conquered—through nuclear war, if necessary.

As if this were not enough, China is playing a counterproductive role. Beijing’s security relationship with Russia has deepened: Russia has provided critical weapons and defense-industrial expertise to China, and the two countries are engaging in more frequent and sophisticated joint military exercises. Beijing, in effect, has sanctioned a larger Russian military role in Asia and provided the political cover and economic lifeline Putin needs to continue fighting in Ukraine. China has also shielded North Korea from international sanctions and pressure designed to force Kim to give up his nuclear weapons program. There is historical precedent for the three countries’ working together, too. During the Cold War, China, North Korea, and Russia were all committed to “opposing imperialism”—code for their anti-Western activities. Their cooperation facilitated conflict around the world, including in eastern Europe, on the Korean Peninsula, and across the Taiwan Strait.

The good news, however, is that this trilateral alignment turned out poorly for all three countries during the Cold War—and if the United States plays its cards right, it can fail this time around, too. Chinese and Soviet backing helped North Korea fight South Korea and its allies to a draw, leading to an armistice agreement in 1953, but subsequent decades of poverty and international pariah status can hardly be considered a victory for Pyongyang. As for Beijing and Moscow, cooperation soon gave way to the Sino-Soviet split and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Although today’s circumstances are different, familiar signs of unease are already visible among China, North Korea, and Russia—rifts the United States can exploit.

An Unstable Triangle
 

China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union’s falling out over the course of the 1950s is instructive. The decade began with the two larger powers, China and the Soviet Union, committed to each other’s security and to supporting other communist countries, including North Korea. In 1950, Beijing and Moscow signed an alliance agreement vowing mutual defense in the event of an attack and pledging to coordinate their activities against the West. Both supported Kim Il Sung, the founding father of North Korea and the grandfather of Kim Jong Un, in his bid to attack South Korea the same year. When China sent its own forces into the brutal fighting on the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union backed the Chinese effort with military aid and expertise. 

But this cooperation was not to last. After the death of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, introduced political reforms and pursued “peaceful coexistence” with the United States. The Soviet Union’s pivot threatened to undermine the Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s domestic project, which emulated Stalin’s harsh governance. Meanwhile, Chinese attacks on Taiwanese-controlled islands, China’s 1962 border war with India, and the Great Leap Forward—Beijing’s disastrous economic and social program of that period—elicited contempt in Moscow. Mao’s personal jabs at the Soviet leadership did not help matters, either. By 1960, the Soviet Union had canceled 12 aid agreements and roughly 200 science and technology projects in China.

Back then, as now, Beijing and Moscow were revisionist great powers with limited willingness to advance the other’s ambitions. Both expected more from a partnership than mere protection. Beijing sought financial assistance for its defense-industrial base and political support to lend legitimacy to the regime. Moscow wanted to lead an ever-expanding communist bloc and to secure China’s help in undermining the United States’ position in Asia. Although the two sides shared many of the same interests, their priorities differed. And they would clash over tactics, especially when it came to dealing with third parties. Beijing and Moscow disagreed, for instance, about how to respond to Polish and Hungarian resistance against Soviet control in 1956: Mao even warned that China would support Poland if the Soviet Union dispatched troops to quell the unrest. 

Chinese and Soviet leaders weighed the benefits and risks of teaming up. Great powers can use alliances to strengthen their militaries and enhance their deterrence, but forming a partnership can also provoke a potential adversary or draw one of the great powers, against its wishes, into its ally’s disputes. During the 1950s, for example, Soviet leaders grew concerned that China’s dispute with Taiwan would undermine their plans to discuss détente with the United States. 

Similar stresses could now be opening fissures between China and its partners. Closer cooperation between North Korea and Russia has highlighted a fundamental tension in Russia’s relationship with China: unlike Pyongyang, Beijing has been unwilling to aid Moscow’s war effort directly. Russia’s requests for military equipment and aid from China have gone unanswered. (Russian officials have claimed that China secretly agreed to provide lethal weapons, but U.S. assessments have found no evidence that this is true.) Beijing’s official stance on the war in Ukraine is to remain neutral. It has called for de-escalation, reiterated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, and affirmed the sovereignty of all nations. None of China’s statements have contained explicit rebukes of Russia, but they have not expressed full-throated support, either. The fact that Russia had to turn to North Korea for aid shows how little material assistance Moscow is receiving from Beijing. In the immediate term, Russia has no choice but to take what help it can get, but eventually the discovery that its “no limits” partnership with China does, in fact, have limits may force a reckoning with the risks of relying on Beijing. 

For China’s part, the North Korean–Russian relationship undermines Beijing’s influence on the Korean Peninsula. With no indication of having consulted China, Russia opted to ignore United Nations trade sanctions (which both China and Russia had signed on to) and sell North Korea the advanced military technology its leaders have long desired. Now that Russia is willing to provide benefits that China will not, Pyongyang is turning closer to Moscow, and Beijing has lost significant leverage. To be sure, China is still North Korea’s largest trading partner. And even when North Korea was almost wholly dependent on China, Kim sometimes felt free to dismiss Chinese leaders’ preferences. But Russian support gives Pyongyang a stronger hand to take action that could impede Beijing’s regional and global ambitions. For example, Beijing will not want North Korea—or Russia, for that matter—to jeopardize its attempts to unify Taiwan with mainland China. But a crisis on the Korean Peninsula could spoil China’s plans by driving the United States and its allies toward deeper defense integration, just as the North’s 1950 invasion of the South pushed the United States to rethink its security interests in the region and sign a defense pact with Taiwan in 1954.

The most damning consequence of North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia may be that it is damaging China’s broader diplomatic and security environment. An emboldened North Korea and an aggressive Russia do nothing to improve China’s image or help it compete with the United States. Nothing unites U.S. allies more than shared concerns about North Korean or Russian belligerence. And as a partner of both countries, China is expected to use its own political capital to solve the problems they cause. At a December summit with EU leaders in Beijing, for example, Chinese officials wanted to focus on long-term plans for bilateral relations and caution against a European “de-risking” strategy that threatens China’s technological ambitions and economic interests. But the European delegation instead opened the talks by urging China to leverage its economic influence over Russia “to put an end to the Russian aggression against Ukraine.” 

China has long regarded a trilateral alliance among Japan, South Korea, and the United States as a critical threat to its security, even seeking guarantees from Seoul and Tokyo that they would not enter such a pact. Part of the case Beijing is making to reassure both capitals is that China is prepared to serve as the “stabilizer” of Northeast Asia—a message it repeated in a meeting with Japanese and South Korean officials after North Korea launched its spy satellite in November. At the same meeting, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin urged Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to encourage North Korea to halt its provocations and pursue denuclearization. But China’s commitment to playing “a constructive role” could amount to little if North Korea, bolstered by Russia, does not respond to Beijing’s overtures. At a certain point, even if other countries in the region do not see China as complicit in North Korea’s bellicose actions, Japan, South Korea, and the United States are bound to make defense decisions that will be unwelcome in Beijing.

China, recognizing the danger of being grouped with North Korea and Russia, has tried to publicly distance itself from the two countries. In late January, Liu Pengyu, the spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington, told Voice of America that he was “unaware” that North Korea and Russia were cooperating on military matters. China has also denied playing any role in the two countries’ recent collaboration. In line with that claim, when Moscow suggested that North Korea join Chinese-Russian naval drills in September, Beijing did not respond. The official Chinese media has also downplayed the idea of a trilateral alliance among China, North Korea, and Russia. In China’s telling, such a partnership is “concocted” by Western media to justify closer military cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States and generate a Cold War mindset by framing regional politics in terms of two opposing blocs. Beijing still sees real, if limited, benefits from its relationships with North Korea and Russia, but it is clearly concerned that Moscow and Pyongyang’s actions will do China more harm than good.

Let the Chips Fall

The United States and its allies can encourage fissures in the emerging autocratic bloc, but they must proceed with caution. Erecting obstacles is the wrong approach. Taking a page from history, Washington should recognize that China, North Korea, and Russia will sabotage their triangular alignment all on their own. During the Korean War, for instance, Soviet air support for Chinese forces was not forthcoming despite promises from Moscow, and in the 1960s, the Soviet Union reneged on commitments to lend its nuclear expertise to China. Moscow’s continued reluctance to support Beijing, let alone extend security assistance, in times of crisis was a major contributor to the Sino-Soviet split.

Recently, the war in Ukraine provided a perfect opportunity for China to disappoint its partner by refusing to fully back Russia’s military campaign. But the Biden administration squandered that opportunity by threatening China with “consequences” should it assist the Russian war effort and by adding Chinese companies that it asserted were supporting the Russian military to a trade blacklist. Even without these warnings, Beijing would have been unlikely to provide significant aid. Now, however, Beijing can contain the damage to its relationship with Moscow by blaming the United States for China’s failure to help a friend. If Washington had left the issue alone or confined its threats to private channels, China and Russia’s disagreement might have snowballed into an even larger rift.

The best way for the United States to counter the Chinese-Russian alignment is by using it to rally U.S. allies and partners. Shared perceptions of a threat create a fertile environment for deepening alliances and breaking ground on new areas of defense cooperation. Such a mindset has already allowed Japan and South Korea to look past their historic animosities and work together more closely than ever before. Each country decided to reinstate the other’s preferred trade partner status last spring, and in December they resumed high-level economic talks after an eight-year hiatus. U.S. allies in Europe that were previously reluctant to push back against Beijing may also change their minds as they come to see China and Russia as a unified threat—perhaps enough to persuade them to help the United States deter Chinese aggression in Asia. China has been reluctant to support Russia’s military and political goals in Europe in part because Beijing values its economic relationships with European countries. If those countries join the United States in taking a harder line on China, Beijing may conclude that an association with Russia and its disruptive tactics comes with too high a cost.

For now, coordination between North Korea and Russia makes it harder for the United States and its allies to compel either country to leave behind its revisionist, aggressive tendencies and assume a constructive role in the international community. But if their relationship sufficiently threatens China, Beijing may choose to distance itself from both Moscow and Pyongyang. It might even go so far as to try to push North Korea and Russia apart. The United States and its allies were not the primary reason for the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War, and they will not be the cause of the next Chinese-Russian rift—but they can make the most of the regional dynamics hastening a divide.

On January 13, 2024, Taiwan elected Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as its next president. Mr. Lai received 40.05% of the vote, the lowest winning percentage since 2000. In addition to the DPP’s losing control of parliament, President-elect Lai will face a litany of practical and existential challenges during his presidency, chief among them the looming threat of Chinese military and economic coercion. As Taiwan looks to the United States for support in deterring China, the United States, in turn, must continue to shore up its alliance network in East Asia, particularly with Japan, the most consequential partner in the region.

How should we assess efforts to adapt the U.S.-Japan security and technology alliance to meet these challenges? What should we look for in 2024 given Taiwan’s election results and the political uncertainty in the United States and Japan? The Japan Program at Shorenstein APARC and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA convened a panel discussion, titled “U.S.-Japan Alliance Adaptation to Intensifying Strategic Competition with China,” to weigh in on these questions.

The speakers included Larry Diamond, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution; Matake Kamiya, professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan; Oriana Skylar Mastro, Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; and Jim Schoff, senior director of the US-Japan NEXT Alliance Initiative at Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA. APARC Deputy Director and Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui moderated the discussion.

The panelists assessed the state of the U.S.-Japan security and technology alliance, examined current initiatives aimed at bolstering military cooperation, proposed additional measures to be taken, and considered various economic security policies related to supply chains, export controls, and high-tech industries. The speakers all acknowledged that Japan is the critical swing player in the gathering geopolitical storm in the Taiwan Strait and agreed that Japan's choices in responding to the increasing security challenge will be consequential, if not decisive. While each panelist suggested some form of strategic promotion and coordination of policies to address rising threats to the economic and national security of the United States and Japan, they asserted that enhanced communication with other like-minded partners is needed to achieve this objective.

A Consequential Election

Diamond noted that domestic issues were at the forefront of Taiwan’s elections. While the island's semiconductor industry is booming, other sectors struggle to keep pace, and citizens cite rising inequality, elder care, and energy policy as major domestic policy issues.

However, for Diamond, Taiwan’s active security challenge supersedes these domestic concerns, and Taiwan faces a grim reality. The U.S., Japan, and Taiwan are not prepared militarily, economically, or psychologically for a potential blockade or military confrontation with China, he said. Diamond argued that Taiwan must have more robust defenses to withstand pressure from Beijing.

Diamond invoked 20th-century history, issuing a warning: “I cannot underscore enough that this is a dangerous situation. We need to learn from the experience of the 1930s. Russia is trying to swallow Ukraine, a country with sovereignty. China, Russia, and Iran are cooperating. North Korea is sending supplies to Russia. We need to learn from history and take threats seriously in terms of rhetoric, action, and ideology. China is preparing for war against Taiwan; it is preparing to push the U.S. out of Asia, and it will likely happen in this decade.”

Diamond argued that Chinese intervention in Taiwan would not be the terminus of their expansion and suggested that “if you want to deter war, you better prepare for it. Anyone who believes that China would stop with Taiwan is breathtakingly naïve. We are running out of time. Urgent appeals are needed to get the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and the European public to exit from their wishful thinking and slow pace of preparation.”

Japan’s Role and Relevance

Kamiya remarked upon recent changes in Japan’s military stance, citing the residual influence of Japan's postwar pacifism. According to Kamiya, the Japanese public has gradually accepted the reactivation of its self-defense forces and a dramatic increase in defense spending over the coming years.

For Kamiya, increased military spending is ushering in new levels of strategic alignment and unlocking new opportunities for the U.S.-Japan collaboration. He asserted that the future success of the U.S.-Japan alliance in countering China depends on whether Japan can maintain its current changes to its defense policy and whether both nations can ensure the preservation of rules-based international order. The military has a role of deterrence in establishing peace, he said.

Ensuring a Collaborative Approach

Schoff agreed that increased interdependence is necessary in an era of strategic competition but asked, “How can we compete effectively without undermining other partners? There is a consensus that national security consists of territorial and economic aspects, so maintaining an advantage means maintaining and advancing technological development and economic security.”

Schoff argued that U.S.-Japan leaders' summits would help achieve such collaboration, citing “two plus two” meetings of the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (EPCC) as particularly relevant. He highlighted semiconductor collaboration, government agency cooperation, and information sharing as some of the most helpful tools to confront this challenge.

Schoff also discussed U.S.-Japan joint security initiatives and some of the challenges to the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific, including malware targeting critical infrastructure organizations in Guam and elsewhere carried out by Volt Typhoon, a state-sponsored actor based in China that typically focuses on espionage and information gathering. He argued that the United States and Japan must collaborate on information sharing to address this and other cyberthreats.

Schoff also commented on Japan’s development of a new joint force command, the nation’s first. “As Japan builds this capability, we can more effectively leverage U.S. forces in Japan with an operational command in Japan. We can plan together, train together, and exercise together, but it depends on how much INDOPACOM wants to participate,” he said.

Deterrence and Force

Mastro, like Diamond, painted a solemn portrait of the escalating tensions in the region. She indicated that over the past 25 years, the Chinese military has rapidly modernized, stating that “this isn't the 1990s; the military balance of power used to be in Taiwan's favor.”

Mastro also ruled out any sort of diplomatic resolution to the situation, arguing that there is nothing Taiwan or the DPP can do to placate Beijing. “It looks like a very real possibility of war over the Taiwan Strait. The conditions for peace and reunification have already failed.”

Citing U.S. deterrence as the most important action to defend Taiwan, Mastro asserted that “there is nothing more important than Japan for U.S. deterrence. The southern islands of Japan are the only options close to the conflict zone, as Australia and South Korea are too far away.” Being the only country with a geographic location and potential for aggregate military, naval, and air power, Japan is the critical nation in the equation.

“If Japan and the U.S. were to join the fight, China would never attack Taiwan, but if China does not attack Japan, Japan will not join,” Mastro said. “If the Chinese attack Taiwan, they will likely tell Japan not to worry and that the Senkaku islands are safe.” She added that any guarantees of non-aggression from China are not necessarily trustworthy.

When considering "how bad it would be for Japan and the international system if we lost Taiwan,” Mastro replied that “Dealing with a forceful China that has come to accept that aggression is a good way of doing business is bad in the long term.” She argued that a Taiwan contingency would directly affect Japan and that China and Russia are building a relationship to counter the U.S.-Japan security partnership.

As for the practical details of the U.S.-Japan security partnership, Mastro suggested that the United States would not make Japan a joint command unless the nation was “all in.” Mastro also provided a timeline for preparations, stating that, “we have to be ready by 2027 if we want this war to be prevented.”