On September 13, 2024, the Japan Program at APARC welcomed to Stanford a delegation from the Embassy of Japan in the United States and the Consulate-General of Japan in San Francisco, including Ambassador Shigeo Yamada and Consul General Yo Osumi. The visit included a discussion of the Japanese diplomats with Stanford faculty members. Moderated by Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the discussion focused on current issues affecting U.S.-Japan relations, regional and global security, and opportunities for strengthening U.S.-Japan academic exchange.

Yamada, who assumed his post as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the United States of America in December 2023, shared his experiences serving in the Abe and Kishida administrations and reflected on Japan’s concerns regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. He emphasized that Russia's aggression is a threat to the rule of law and represents a broader threat in East Asia. He expressed his hope that bilateral efforts will continue to counter these challenges.

The September 27 Liberal Democratic Party presidential election in Japan and the forthcoming November presidential election in the United States were also a major topic of conversation. Ambassador Yamada voiced his optimism, stating that regardless of the election outcomes, the strong foundation of the U.S.-Japan alliance will remain a constant. This bilateral relationship, he noted, is essential to navigating future geopolitical shifts.

Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive our experts' analysis and commentary.

Stanford faculty members posed questions to Ambassador Yamada, touching on topics ranging from Japan-U.S.-Republic of Korea trilateral relations to the future of NATO’s role in Asia security. Ambassador Yamada underscored his belief in the growing strength of the Japan-Korea relationship, particularly among younger generations.

Ambassador Yamada and Consul General Osumi expressed a desire to deepen collaboration with academic institutions like Stanford and cultivate environments where Japanese scholars can thrive in global research ecosystems. In this context, the Ambassador addressed the decline in Japan’s global standing in science and technology research. He noted that, while Japan once led the way in innovation, there is a concern that the nation’s researchers are not sufficiently engaging with their international counterparts, including those in the United States.

A highlight of the discussion was the participation of Miku Yamada, a recent graduate of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy Program at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies now serving as Second Secretary at the Embassy of Japan in Washington, DC. Yamada described how her experience at Stanford has shaped her career path and shared her passion for inspiring other Japanese students to pursue academic and research opportunities abroad.

The visit reaffirmed the commitment of Japan and the United States to maintaining a strong bilateral relationship, with continued emphasis on academic partnerships as a means of fostering mutual understanding and addressing global challenges. Ambassador Yamada expressed his enthusiasm for continued engagement with Stanford scholars and sharing their insights to inform U.S.-Japan policy discussions.

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to invite applications for a host of fellowships in contemporary Asia studies to begin in Autumn quarter 2025.

The Center offers postdoctoral fellowships that promote multidisciplinary research on Asia-focused health policy, contemporary Japan, and contemporary Asia broadly defined, postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions with the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, and a fellowship for experts on Southeast Asia. Learn more about each opportunity and its eligibility and specific application requirements:

Asia Health Policy Program Postdoctoral Fellowship

Hosted by the Asia Health Policy Program at APARC, the fellowship is awarded to one recent PhD undertaking original research on contemporary health or healthcare policy of high relevance to countries in the Asia-Pacific region, especially developing countries. Appointments are for one year beginning in Autumn quarter 2025. The application deadline is December 1, 2024.

Japan Program Postdoctoral Fellowship

Hosted by the Japan Program at APARC, the fellowship supports research on contemporary Japan in a broad range of disciplines including political science, economics, sociology, law, policy studies, and international relations. Appointments are for one year beginning in Autumn quarter 2025. The application deadline is December 1, 2024.  

Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Asia

APARC offers two postdoctoral fellowship positions to junior scholars for research and writing on contemporary Asia. The primary research areas focus on political, economic, or social change in the Asia-Pacific region (including Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia), or international relations and international political economy in the region. Appointments are for one year beginning in Autumn quarter 2025. The application deadline is December 1, 2024. 
 

This opinion piece originally appeared in The New York Times. 

Over the past 15 years, China has expanded its once-minimal military presence in the South China Sea into a significant one. Beijing has laid claim to nearly all of the strategic waterway, a vital shipping lifeline for the global economy that is rich in energy and fishery resources. China has used nonmilitary assets such as its Coast Guard, fishing vessels and maritime militia to bully its neighbors, blockade their ships and build Chinese military bases on disputed islands.

America is partly to blame. It has condemned China’s behavior, but, eager to avoid escalation, has consistently refrained from standing up militarily, which has only further emboldened Beijing. A new approach is needed. The United States must take real action to strengthen alliances and confront China before it eventually takes control of this hugely important body of water without firing a shot. 

Like any unchallenged bully, China has become increasingly aggressive. Last month, Chinese Coast Guard personnel attacked a Philippine supply vessel with axes and other crude weapons — Manila says a Filipino sailor and several others were injured — in one of the worst acts of violence between China and its rivals in the South China Sea in years. The incident took place near the Sierra Madre, a rusting World War II-era ship that the Philippines had beached 25 years ago at Second Thomas Shoal to assert its territorial claim. The shoal lies about 120 miles off the Philippine island of Palawan and is well within the nation’s exclusive economic zone.

China also had past territorial confrontations in the South China Sea or other waters on its periphery with Vietnam, the United States, Australia, Japan and Taiwan. In 2012, China took control of the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, and run-ins between China and the Philippines have grown in number and intensity in recent years. In late May, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines warned that any Filipino deaths caused by a “willful act” by a foreign force in the South China Sea would be “very close to what we define as an act of war.”

Concern has grown in Manila, Beijing and Washington that tensions in the South China Sea — perhaps even more than Taiwan — could trigger a conflict with China. These fears are overblown. I study Chinese military strength and strategy, and I’m convinced that if the United States were to take a more assertive stance in the South China Sea, Beijing would be likely to back down to avoid a war it knows it would lose.

China may enjoy military advantages in a potential conflict with Taiwan, which is just off the mainland. But its position is less secure in the South China Sea. Over the past 15 years China has built more than two dozen military outposts on disputed islands. Among the largest — at Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef — there are air strips, fighter jets, radar systems, and laser and jamming equipment. But so far China lacks sufficient antiaircraft and anti-ship missile systems in the region to deny U.S. forces the ability to operate, which leaves the Chinese bases vulnerable to air and naval bombardment.

And the South China Sea is vast — about half the size of the continental United States. The Sierra Madre is around 800 miles from the Chinese mainland. A conflict there would require the People’s Liberation Army to mount joint air and naval resupply operations and to refuel its fighters across great distances — something it has never done and is not equipped for.

If the Philippines is in the fight, treaty obligations would trigger the participation of the United States, which would have access to nine Philippine air and naval bases, greatly enhancing its already considerable ability to project military power in the region. China does have “carrier-killer” ballistic missiles based on its mainland. But U.S. carriers could still send fighters into parts of the South China Sea from outside the range of those missiles. In conjunction with land-based fighters operating from the Philippines, the United States could gain crucial air superiority over a Chinese surface fleet.

China has spent huge sums on its aircraft carrier program and has two in operation, with two more in development. But those still cannot rival the number or capabilities of nuclear-powered U.S. carriers, which are larger, support more aircraft and need to refuel only about every 20 years. China’s carriers need to be refueled about every six days. And learning how to effectively conduct carrier operations takes time; the Chinese have only just begun.

It’s telling that China has been careful to use Coast Guard and civilian vessels in its encounters with neighbors rather than hard military assets — the latter would signal an escalation that Beijing is not yet willing to embark on.

But there is another very good reason China is unlikely to risk war with the United States: It doesn’t need to. Its brinkmanship and use of nonmilitary assets to intimidate its Asian neighbors has been more than enough to take China from almost no military presence in the South China Sea in the late 2000s to a significant force today.

America should call China’s bluff and press its military advantage. This could include escorting Philippine resupply vessels headed to Second Thomas Shoal or even conducting some supply missions itself or with allies like Australia and Japan. This would send China the powerful message that its intimidation will no longer go unchallenged, while allowing Manila to remain visibly in the lead but part of a more enduring coalition. To save face for China, Washington could present operations like these as exercises or training to minimize pressure on Beijing to respond.

Manila is a strategically vital player in America’s regional competition with China. The United States and the Philippines should strengthen their alliance to allow for more U.S. bases in the Philippines and a stronger U.S. commitment to help defend against Chinese incursions into Philippine waters. Closer relations could also make it easier for the United States to resupply Taiwan from Philippine bases during a conflict with China and open the door for enhanced military cooperation with other South China Sea nations, whose fear of an unrestrained Beijing may be deterring them from taking that step. If China determines that its provocations are likely to draw in the United States, it might begin to moderate its behavior .

Of course, anything is possible — Beijing may respond with a full-on military escalation, a daunting prospect that should not be taken lightly. But that risk is low for a Chinese military whose own doctrine is to avoid any war in which victory is not ensured.

Neither U.S. option — standing up to China or backing down — is attractive. But unless the United States asserts itself, China will continue chipping away with its tactics of bluster and intimidation until its military presence in the South China Sea becomes so dominant that it no longer fears war.

The United States can re-establish a favorable balance of power, but it must act now.

The Indo-Pacific, the world’s fastest-growing region in the global economy, faces complex geopolitical and geo-economic risks. Amid Russia’s unrelenting war in Ukraine and its strengthening ties with a bellicose North Korea, China continues to exert its power through economic coercion and diplomatic pressures. Meanwhile, Asia's established and aspiring democracies must rise to the challenge of preventing further democratic decline and revitalizing their institutions. These trends dominated the agenda at the recent Nikkei Forum, The Liberal International Order in the Indo-Pacific.

Cohosted by Shorenstein APARC, the Keio Center for Strategy at the Keio University Global Research Institute, and Nikkei Inc., the forum was held on June 24, 2024, at Keio University and featured Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) and Keio experts. Its first session, moderated by Akio Fujii, executive chair of the editorial board at Nikkei Inc., included panelists Oriana Skylar Mastro, FSI center fellow at APARC, and Michael McFaul, the director of FSI. They examined the geopolitical effects of the war in Ukraine, deterrence and provocation in Taiwan, and their implications for security in the Indo-Pacific. The second session, moderated by Nikkei commentator Hiroyuki Akita, included Gi-Wook Shin, the director of APARC and director of the Korea Program, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the deputy director of APARC and director of the Japan Program. Panelists considered the connectivity of European and Indo-Pacific security, the rise of authoritarianism and global populism, international partnerships, and various ongoing efforts to protect the liberal international order in the Indo-Pacific. The session recordings in English and Japanese are available on the Nikkei Global Events YouTube channel. 

Conflict, Deterrence, and Provocation

Opening the first session, McFaul underscored the broader geopolitical implications of the invasion of Ukraine. Emphasizing the significance of Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent visit to North Korea, he highlighted the intertwined nature of European and Asian security. McFaul argued against the notion that global security should solely focus on China, stressing that Putin's actions demonstrate a critical link between European security concerns and global stability.

McFaul offered a mixed assessment of the war in Ukraine. He praised the international community's response in providing military support and economic aid to Ukraine, stating, “I have been mostly impressed with how the liberal free world, including Japan, came together to provide weapons first and foremost, to provide economic assistance secondarily, and to put in place sanctions [agsint Russia].” Yet he also criticized delays in Western responses, attributing them partly to internal political dynamics, including actions taken during the Trump administration.

McFaul expressed concern that Russian defensive positions now hinder prospects for a breakthrough on the Ukrainian side, with future developments tied to the outcome of the next U.S. presidential election. He underscored the importance of democratic nations organizing against autocratic regimes, framing the conflict in Ukraine as a critical battleground for liberal democratic values amidst global power struggles. McFaul described that “what I see, tragically, is the breakdown of the liberal International order. We're going back to an earlier period where there was not one order, but two, and maybe many orders, and one of those divisions is between autocrats and democrats.”

Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro addressed the moderator's query about Ukraine’s implications for East Asia by delving into the complexities of deterrence and provocation in relations with China. She highlighted three main concerns: the blurred distinction between actions that deter China versus those that provoke it, the conflicting priorities of reassuring allies versus deterring adversaries post-Ukraine, and the delicate balance between showcasing military capabilities and demonstrating resolve. Mastro argued that while military build-up might deter China, political gestures, such as enhancing Taiwan's international stature, could provoke tensions.

She emphasized the challenges in aligning U.S. and Japanese strategies, especially regarding Taiwan, where differing interpretations of deterrence and provocation persist. “Attempts to signal resolve can be much more provocative than attempts to demonstrate capabilities [...] It seems that the United States and Japan at least have to be on the same page about what is reassuring versus what deters China, what deters China versus what provokes China, and what is more important, capabilities or resolve,” she explained

Mastro stressed the importance of nuanced policy decisions considering how actions perceived as deterrence in one context might provoke, in another, thus impacting regional stability. “I prefer for the United States to speak softly and carry a big stick, meaning we have a lot of capability but we should stop talking about it so much,” she said. She underscored the U.S. and Japan must coordinate closely on strategic messaging to ensure a cohesive approach to managing China's responses and maintaining regional security.

FSI and APARC scholars meet with Yoshimasa Hayashi.

During their visit to Tokyo, the Stanford delegation met with Japanese government officials, including Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi.

Michael McFaul gave an interview to the Japan Broadcasting Corporation's (NHK) prime-time news show News 7, which you can view here >

Manifold Pressures on Liberal Democracy

During the second panel, Gi-Wook Shin discussed the contemporary challenges facing liberal democracy, citing instances of foreign influence from authoritarian states like Russia and China. He began with a personal anecdote from Mongolia, where a friend running for parliament reported intimidation by authorities allegedly supported by Russia. Shin drew parallels to previous instances of interference, such as Russia's involvement in the 2016 U.S. election and China's actions in Taiwan and Korea.

In contrast to the American and British leadership against fascism and communism in the 1930s and 1940s, Shin described the current crisis in global leadership to safeguard liberal values. He questioned whether any country could now step up to combat rising authoritarianism, citing Modi’s India and alliances forming between leaders like Putin, Kim Jong-Un, and Xi Jinping. “I don't think I can say with confidence that the U.S. can defend liberal democracy, I don't see any leader in Europe either, and I don't see anyone in Asia,” he lamented.

He called for strategies to restore and strengthen global leadership in promoting and defending liberal democracy against mounting authoritarian challenges from China, Russia, and others.

In his remarks, Kiyoteru Tsutsui addressed these global challenges to democracy and emphasized Japan's role in safeguarding it. Tsutsui noted Japan's relatively stable democratic environment compared to nations experiencing greater political divisions. Despite recent economic fluctuations in the country,, “Japanese democracy is functioning quite well,” he argued. “Apart from that, Japanese society is peaceful, safe, and stable. Although the economic growth rate is low, people's discontent is not gushing out and they can live quite a good life.”

Tsutsui emphasized Japan's economic and diplomatic contributions to promoting democracy, citing its trusted role in assisting Asian countries through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JAICA). He suggested Japan could assert its influence not only through traditional democracy promotion but also by establishing standards in areas like infrastructure and public health. “If we look at the global rankings, Japan has quite a big influence.” He underscored the importance of Japan's discreet but impactful diplomacy in upholding democratic values globally, including its involvement in initiatives like the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, The Quad, and CPTPP. Through practical actions and international cooperation, he said, Japan  demonstrates its commitment to democratic values and counters global trends of democratic decline. Throughout the forum, the panelists agreed that the Indo-Pacific remains at the center of the global struggle between democracy and autocracy. They emphasized the need for collaborative action to bolster democratic institutions worldwide and urged nations to unite quickly to prevent further escalation of tensions in the region and beyond.