China's ascent in the economic, technological, and military spheres and its assertive foreign policy have disrupted geopolitical paradigms, prompting intensified discussions of great power competition and rivalry. But how did China achieve great power status and build it from a weaker resource position in a U.S.-dominated international system?

Stanford political scientist Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military and security policy, sets out to answer this question in her new book, “Upstart” (Oxford University Press), which offers a novel framework for understanding how China chose to compete on the international stage. A center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and faculty at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Mastro draws on the political science and business literature to explain China’s thinking that allowed it to enter the great power club.

Mastro joined APARC Publications Manager George Krompacky to discuss her new book. Listen to the conversation on our SoundCloud or YouTube channels. A transcript is also available to download.

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The Startup Approach

In debating about China’s rise, one might fall into the trap of assuming that China would pursue its ambitions like the United States has. Mastro, however, argues that China does not act the same way as the United States or other would-be superpowers and does not have to compete everywhere and in the same manner to yield influence or dictate outcomes.

Acknowledging the highly politicized nature of China’s rise and U.S. competition with China, Mastro emphasizes a pragmatic approach in her book. “For the United States to compete effectively, we have to understand first what the situation is,” she says, ascribing her pragmatic outlook, at least partially, to her military career. Mastro continues to serve in the U.S. Air Force Reserve, currently as the deputy director of reserve global China strategy at the Pentagon.

Mastro shows that China’s buildup of power over the past three decades stems from pursuing a “startup approach,” that is, a careful mix of three strategies: emulation (mirroring U.S. activities in similar areas), exploitation (adopting U.S. strategies, but in different areas of competition, where the United States isn't strongly present), and entrepreneurship (applying innovative approaches to new and existing areas of competition). Throughout her book, she provides 22 case studies in the economic, military, and political realms to illuminate when China has used each of the three components of the startup strategy and explain why it has chosen a certain pathway at a given time.
 

Emulation, for example, is manifested in China's approach to mediation diplomacy, as it attempts to present itself as an international mediator to gain power and influence; in its pursuit of humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations; and its attempts to internationalize the renminbi.

Instances of exploitation include China’s use of arms sales to countries that can't buy them from the United States due to factors like treaty obligations or embargoes; its approach to free trade and industrial policy; and its ability to keep most U.S. forces out of Asia and disrupt those operating there (known as its anti-access/ area denial capability.

Examples of China’s entrepreneurial approach include its reliance on strategic partnerships instead of alliances; its nuclear strategy and protection of overseas interests (unlike the United States, China has no overseas bases and has not relied on a large nuclear arsenal); and its Belt and Road Initiative.  

By no means is China always successful. Mastro lists various examples indicating, she argues, that China chose the wrong strategy in its pursuit of power buildup, such as its attempts to emulate U.S. soft power or aircraft carrier capabilities. ”But I don't want us to be blind to the realities that a lot of what China does has been effective,” says Mastro. “It’s indisputable that what China has accomplished over the past 30 years is impressive.”

Emulation and Exploitation in Foreign Policy

One salient example of the United States’ misunderstanding of China's strategic approach pertains to China’s participation in international organizations. It is also a lesson in the importance of reevaluating and reinforcing the frameworks that govern international institutions.

International institutions, Mastro explains, have been a key mechanism for the United States to build and exercise power in a flexible, innovative manner. Confident in these institutions' ability to regulate state power in alignment with American interests, many in the United States believed that integrating China into the global order would push Beijing towards political and economic liberalization. This belief underpinned the U.S. support for granting China a most-favored-nation status in the 1990s and its entry into the World Trade Organization.

By the early 21st century, China had joined 50 international governmental organizations and more than a thousand international non-governmental organizations. Within these bodies, China sought to assume a leadership role comparable to that of the United States and its allies, aiming to steer agendas and influence outcomes. Not only did China turn out to be adept at working within the rules to shift institutional directions but also at exploiting loopholes, as, for example, in trade organizations, where its compliance with the established norms has been selective. The U.S. expectations about China’s economic liberalization and democratic reform, however, proved to be distorted.

“The underlying issue was the assumption that China would adopt a worldview similar to the U.S. upon deeper integration,” Mastro says. “Had there been a more nuanced understanding of China's strategic intentions, the U.S. might have reinforced certain norms and established new rules to limit China's influence more effectively.”

Taiwan and a Changing Military Balance of Power

Just as the United States was mistaken in believing that international institutions would limit China's actions in foreign policy, it might also be wrong in assuming that China's integration into the global economy has changed its stance on the use of force or that China will consider the cost of attacking Taiwan too high.

According to Mastro, Taiwan is another case where Beijing measures costs and benefits differently from Washinton. “While we might think there are constraints on Chinese [calculus on Taiwan], those constraints are often not actually in place.”

For China, Mastro explains, Taiwan is of utmost importance and deeply connected to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. She stresses that her research indicates that, as part of China's use of economic power, there is good reason to suspect that international isolation and condemnation in response to a Chinese assault on Taiwan would be relatively mild. ”Most strategic partnerships include clauses where countries agree not to let political issues like Taiwan affect their economic relationships,” Mastro says. “This, combined with the changing military balance of power, is something I hope readers understand from my book.

Lessons for U.S. Strategy

In the last chapter of her book, Mastro discusses the implications of China’s upstart strategy for U.S. policy and offers guidance on how Wahington can address China’s rise. “The United States needs to target its approaches to build and maintain a competitive edge with its own version of an upstart strategy,” Mastro writes. Specifically, the United States should avoid emulating all of China's successes, promote emulation where it maintains competitive advantages, close the gaps China exploits to build power, and embrace its unique entrepreneurial approaches.

“The overall goal should be to move competition into areas where the United States has an advantage and reduce the impact of Chinese strategies where China enjoys advantages,” Mastro notes.

But how realistic is it for the United States to play the long game in this manner, given its four-year election cycle and current politically polarized environment?

Mastro recognizes that not only does the U.S. domestic political system make it difficult for policies to continue from one administration to another, but it also increases the cost of entrepreneurial thinking for any administration interested in implementing a new approach during its four-year term. Entrepreneurial actions require a degree of experimentation, but our politicians are averse to taking risks with actions and policies that might require course adjustment.  

Ultimately, Mastro concludes, it is a question of leadership. “I think the rise of China and the challenge of China is of such importance and urgency that you need leaders to put their political aspirations aside and think in a more calculated, strategic way. You need that kind of leadership and courage in our system for us to be able to compete with China.”

Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is delighted to share that Chris Buckley, the chief China correspondent for the New York Times, has won the 2024 Shorenstein Journalism Award for Excellence in Asia-Pacific Coverage. The award recognizes Buckley’s expertly crafted narratives unraveling the intricate tapestry of politics, social dynamics, and security issues in China and Taiwan. He will receive the award at a public ceremony at Stanford in October 2024.

Buckley’s reporting journey spans over two decades, covering Chinese politics, foreign policy, social change, and environmental issues. In recent years, he has focused on detailing the complex dynamics of the Chinese Communist Party’s governance, the transformative impact of Xi Jinping's leadership on China’s’ domestic and international affairs, and the varied responses to these developments from the Chinese populace. Since relocating to Taipei in late 2022, he has expanded his coverage to include Taiwanese society, politics, and culture, providing a comprehensive view of the region’s evolving landscape. His perceptive coverage navigates the challenges of tightened restrictions on foreign press reporting on China.

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Buckley was with colleagues a finalist for the 2020 Pulitzer Prize in international reporting for gripping accounts that revealed China's covert efforts to repress millions of Uyghurs and other ethnic groups in the Xinjiang region through a system of labor camps, harsh treatment, and extensive surveillance. He was also part of the Times team that won the 2021 Pulitzer Prize in Public Service for coverage of the Covid pandemic. One of several Times correspondents to race into Wuhan in the earliest days of the Covid outbreak, he spent 76 days in the city during the lockdown there, reporting on the Chinese government’s opacity as the Coronavirus spread and covering the public outcry following the death of whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang.

In May 2020, Buckley was forced to leave mainland China, where he had lived and worked for more than two decades, and was then barred from working in Hong Kong. Based in Taipei since 2022, he has continued to report on China and now also covers Taiwan.

“With his journalistic prowess, profound insights into China’s political system, and finely honed accounts, Chris Buckley has shined a critical light on the shifts in Chinese society and politics and broke numerous stories despite facing government backlash and personal sacrifices,” said APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin. “We are honored to recognize him with the Shorenstein Journalism Award.”

Before rejoining the New York Times in 2012, Buckley was a senior correspondent in Beijing for Reuters News Agency for 7 years, and before that worked as a researcher and reporter for the Times and International Herald Tribune in Beijing. He grew up in Sydney, Australia, earned a bachelor's degree in history from the University of Sydney, studied Chinese Communist Party history at Renmin University in Beijing, and received a doctorate in Chinese studies from Australian National University.

Presented annually by APARC, the Shorenstein Award carries a $10,000 cash prize and commemorates the legacy of APARC’s benefactor, Mr. Walter H. Shorenstein, and his twin passions for promoting excellence in journalism and understanding of Asia. The selection committee for the award praised Buckley’s exemplary work as embodying the award’s purpose, commenting that he is “truly unparalleled in his knowledge and understanding of China.”

The committee members are William Dobson, co-editor of the Journal of Democracy; Anna Fifield, the Washington Post's Asia-Pacific editor and recipient of the 2018 Shorenstein Journalism Award; James Hamilton, the Hearst Professor of Communication, chair of the Department of Communication, and director of the Journalism Program at Stanford University; Louisa Lim, associate professor, Audio-Visual Journalism Culture and Communication at the University of Melbourne; and Raju Narisetti, publisher of McKinsey Global Publishing at McKinsey and Company.

Twenty-two winners previously received the Shorenstein Award. Recent honorees include The Caravan, India's premier magazine of long-form journalism; Emily Feng, international correspondent for NPR covering China, Taiwan, and beyond; Swe Win, editor-in-chief of Myanmar Now; and Nobel Laureate Maria Ressa, CEO and president of the Philippines-based news organization Rappler.

Information about the 2024 Shorenstein Journalism Award ceremony and panel discussion celebrating Buckely will be forthcoming in the fall quarter.

This commentary was originally published by The Diplomat.

New United Nations Special Envoy for Myanmar Julie Bishop faces what seems to be an impossible mission. Even setting aside the long history of failed U.N. envoys to the country, the current situation is not at all welcoming to a would-be foreign peacemaker. The Myanmar military, in addition to being xenophobic, misogynistic, dishonest, and brutal, is by nature uncompromising and absolutely committed to maintaining political power. This is true even in the face of significant resistance gains, a worsening economy, and a severe humanitarian crisis.

For its part, the broad resistance – and arguably the population at large – is dead-set on removing the military from power and unlikely to accept anything short of that. In addition, despite improved inter-group communication and broad unity on the goal of ousting the military, its various elements represent a host of different interests, and there is no one person who can speak for all or even most of those interests.

There is no foolproof path to success for Bishop, but past experience and an analysis of the current Myanmar situation suggest an approach that includes the following elements.

First, recognize that – at least for now – there is virtually zero chance that any envoy will be able to (a) persuade the military to reduce violence or (b) bring the parties to the table for serious dialogue on a potential compromise deal. Myanmar now is a zero-sum situation; there is no compromise to be had and pushing one will do little more than alienate everyone involved. The best hope for an environment that would allow for genuine dialogue/negotiations would be for the military to be weakened to the point that it seriously begins to seek an exit strategy. That has not yet happened.

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Second, Bishop should use the interim period to put herself in the best possible situation to be helpful should that inflection point be reached. That would involve first talking at length with credible experts on Myanmar, most of whom should be Myanmar people. The next step would be to very carefully begin to develop relationships with key players – in the military, the resistance, and among other political and civil society players.  The emphasis here is on “very carefully” because the junta will use any visits/meetings as photo ops to confer legitimacy, which will undermine the envoy’s standing with the resistance and the broad Myanmar population.

Bishop should insist that any meetings not be photographed. If that proves impossible, any meetings/photos with the generals need to be matched in a timely way with similar events with the National Unity Government and other resistance officials. Bishop’s public appearances and media engagements should be limited and restrained, though she likely will need to “clarify” any meeting readouts from the junta.

Third, as Morten Pedersen noted in a recent article for the Lowy Institute, Bishop can use her discussions with the broad resistance to encourage further coordination and development of a shared vision, along with work toward a more detailed blueprint for any future transition. There is less to do with the generals, frankly, though encouraging them to think of a realistic exit strategy might have some limited value (mostly among officers other than the top one or two generals).

Fourth, Bishop can use her position to push the United Nations as well as Myanmar’s neighbors and other interested parties to review and rethink their approach on humanitarian assistance. To date, the U.N. and the neighbors have largely played by the junta’s rules, and in doing so have both conferred legitimacy on it and ensured that most of the assistance does not reach those who truly need it. Bishop will have the standing and the clout to insist on a more creative approach. Key will be her discussions with the Thais, who have generally backed the generals but under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin seem to be more open to new ideas than in the past.

Finally, Bishop would do well to coordinate and exchange ideas with key regional players, including current Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Special Envoy Alounkeo Kittikhoun, including before any visits to Myanmar. These players have had limited influence to date but could play important roles if and when the situation changes and there is a genuine need for regional and international support for negotiations and a potential “deal” to end the crisis. Again, such a deal is very unlikely – or if it somehow happened would not be durable – until and unless the military is desperate enough to make massive concessions, which means patience will be a necessity.

Note: this piece builds on a previous article by the authors, published by The Washington Quarterly.

No foreign policy challenge is more important, or difficult, than finding a way to simultaneously deter and engage China without provoking unwanted behaviors. Achieving this requires understanding the perceptions and priorities shaping Beijing’s actions.  

Despite China’s worsening economic problems and waning international trust, the March 2024 session of the National People’s Congress has reaffirmed Beijing’s determination to stick with policies fuelling domestic discontent and alienating foreign partners. The reasons are structural, not simply strong-man egoism. Policies in China are tightly interconnected, reflecting hard-to-change perceptions reinforced by bureaucratic and personal interests. Changing one facet requires changing the entire policy package. For now, that package prioritizes domestic stability and security over economic growth.

Beijing has fallen into an old mindset that sacrifices growth to reduce vulnerability to external and internal threats that leaders believe endanger the regime and China’s future. This is not good for China, the United States, or the world. Washington cannot achieve immediate or fundamental changes in China’s behavior but ill-considered actions can make things worse. The best we currently can achieve is wary coexistence, careful management to reduce dangers, and keeping the way open for a better day.

Read the rest of the essay online at the East Asia Forum.

On March 6, 2024, we lost Professor Makoto Iokibe, a giant in U.S.-Japan relations. Iokibe was 80 years old, but he could easily have passed for 60,  starring in a senior baseball league and playing active roles in Japan’s foreign policy debates until that fateful March day. His sudden passing due to acute aortic dissection has been met with tremendous sadness and surprise, particularly since he had just attended a meeting a few hours earlier.

Iokibe was a renowned diplomatic historian best known for his pioneering studies on the United States’ post–World War II occupation of Japan. But he was so much more. He wrote broadly about Japan’s modern history, focusing on its international relations, from how Meiji leaders learned from the West to how Showa leaders misdirected the Japanese Empire in the 1930s and 40s but rebuilt post-WWII Japan into an economic superpower (The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present). 

Having experienced the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake at his home in Kobe, he got involved in post-disaster policymaking and disaster management efforts, chairing the government committees for reconstruction after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake as well as after the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake. These issues became his second major focus, culminating in a recent publication, The Era of Great Disasters: Japan and Its Three Major Earthquakes. 

His influence extended beyond the scholarly world, as many leaders in recent decades sought his guidance in foreign policymaking. He was openly critical of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, but Koizumi, being a big fan of Iokibe’s works, listened to his advice on other foreign policy matters and appointed him the president of Japan’s National Defense Academy. Seeing that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was veering toward revisiting Japan’s official stance on World War II, particularly its victimization of Asia, he did everything he could to council Abe about the follies of disempowering Japan in the international community and empowering forces that sought to undermine Japan’s credibility as a global leader.

He was particularly close to Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, who, among recent prime ministers, has been most committed to managing challenging relations with the rising China. Iokibe played a leading role in Fukuda’s cabinet in mending Sino-Japanese ties and continued to attend to this increasingly important but thorny relationship. His stance about prioritizing the U.S.-Japan security alliance while maintaining China-Japan cooperation in the economic realm should continue to guide Japan’s foreign policy in the years and decades to come. 

On a personal note, Iokibe-sensei was a mentor and family friend who has helped and supported me in many important ways. Our grandparents knew each other as fellow economists. My father and Iokibe-sensei had been friends since graduate school. He and his late wife were always kind to my family, and I’ve known most of his children, most closely Kaoru Iokibe, a leading historian and political scientist of modern Japan at the University of Tokyo. 

Iokibe-sensei was always generous with his time with everyone around him, including myself, guiding me when I was not sure about my career direction and counseling me on contemporary political issues that Japan faces. Even though he was one of the most respected scholars with access to leaders of the highest echelon in Japan and in the US, he treated everyone with the same respect, humility, and infectious smile. 

I fondly remember hosting him for a talk multiple times at the University of Michigan where I was director of the Center for Japanese Studies, as well as at Stanford in 2005-06 when I was a visiting assistant professor at APARC. Always a sports fan and player, we would go out to watch a football game at a major stadium and he would also play baseball with our daughter in a neighborhood park. 

I never imagined that talking to him a few months ago at an award event in Tokyo would be the last time I’d see him, and I deeply regret that I couldn’t welcome him to Stanford again. His voice of reason will always whisper in my ears and, hopefully, in the ears of Japan’s policymakers. Thank you, Iokibe-sensei; I’m sure that you’re enjoying your time with your beloved wife up above.