International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

-

EMERGING ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIA

A Special Seminar Series


RSVP required by March 6, 2019

VALID STANFORD ID CARD MUST BE PRESENTED UPON ARRIVAL

Oral Democracy studies citizens' voices in civic and political deliberations in India's gram sabhas (village assemblies), the largest deliberative institution in human history. The book analyses nearly three hundred transcripts of gram sabhas, sampled within the framework of a natural experiment, allowing the authors to study how state policy affects the quality of discourse, citizens' discursive performances and state enactments embodied by elected leaders and public officials. By drawing out the varieties of speech apparent in citizen and state interactions, the authors’ analysis shows that citizens' oral participation in development and governance can be improved by strengthening deliberative spaces through policy. Even in conditions of high inequality and illiteracy, gram sabhas can create discursive equality by developing the “oral competence” of citizens and establishing a space in which they can articulate their interests. The authors develop the concept of 'oral democracy' to aid the understanding of deliberative systems in non-Western and developing countries. 

Vijayendra (Biju) Rao, a Lead Economist in the Development Research Group of the World Bank, works at the intersection of scholarship and practice.  He integrates his training in economics with theories and methods from anthropology, sociology and political science to study the social, cultural, and political context of extreme poverty in developing countries. He leads the Social Observatory, an inter-disciplinary lab to improve the conversation between citizens and governments.  His research, published in leading journals in Economics, Political Science and Development Studies has spanned a variety of subjects including dowries in India, domestic violence, the economics of sex work, public celebrations, community development, and deliberative democracy.   He and Ghazala Mansuri co-authored  Localizing Development: Does Participation Work? He is speaking about his latest book (with Paromita Sanyal), Oral Democracy: Deliberation in Rural India (Cambridge University Press, 2019).  It be downloaded for free from here. He was a co-author of the 2006 World Development Report on Equity and Development, and has co-edited Culture and Public ActionHistory, Historians and Development Policy, and, Deliberation and Development.  He serves on the editorial boards of several journals and is a  member of the Successful Societies Program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR).
 

Vijayendra (Biju) Rao World Bank
Authors
Gi-Wook Shin
Joyce Lee
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
Washington and Pyongyang must agree on key concepts and eliminate ambiguities if they want a real breakthrough. 
“There is no detailed definition or shared agreement of what denuclearization entails....” These words were not from critics of ambivalence in the Trump administration’s nuclear negotiations with North Korea. Rather surprisingly, they were the words of the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea, Stephen Biegun, during his speech at Stanford University last month. He had been asked whether the United States and North Korea had consensus on the technicality of the term “denuclearization.” Yet, this is only one of the many problematic ambiguities surrounding North Korean denuclearization.
 
Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un will be shaking hands again in Hanoi, Vietnam on February 27-28. In the past year, the two adversarial countries have striven—probably the most in the history of their relations—to move away from the brink of war toward intensive communications and diplomatic endeavors. Still, amidst widespread skepticism, Trump’s diplomatic efforts with North Korea are often criticized in Washington and elsewhere for failing to produce adequate tangible deliverables on North Korean denuclearization. Even with a number of meaningful and voluntary gestures seemingly put toward denuclearization in the past year, North Korea has yet to give a clear indication of a firm decision to completely and entirely dismantle its nuclear capability. As Special Representative Biegun conveyed, progress on the nuclear front after the Singapore summit has been minimal, inviting criticism and greater skepticism regarding the upcoming summit and the Trump administration’s North Korea policy in general.
 
For this very reason, the Vietnam summit is all the more purposive. Trump and Kim must resolve the divergences and ambiguities implicit in their central questions, before they can make any meaningful progress toward denuclearization and whatever measures for the progress of denuclearization.
 
Read the full article on The National Interest.
Hero Image
South Koreans watch on a screen reporting on the U.S. President Trump meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the Seoul Railway Station on June 12, 2018 in Seoul, South Korea
Chung Sung-Jun/ Getty Images
All News button
1
-

WE HAVE REACHED VENUE CAPACITY AND ARE NO LONGER ACCEPTING RSVPS

 

Forty years after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, we are at a historic inflection point defined by more and more competition and less and less cooperation. Both countries have actively traded economic blows and we have demonstrably proven that we are most capable of hurting each other. There are voices on both sides clamoring for economic decoupling amidst a severe collapse of trust, and that trust deficit is most starkly on display in the realm of technology and innovation. In many respects, China’s technological transformation has been a boon to the United States. It is, in fact, impossible to imagine a Silicon Valley without China. But US concerns over China’s policies and practices in the high-tech sphere are very real. The US Trade Representative’s Section 301 report accurately identifies a suite of anti-competitive and unfair practices that cannot continue if cooperative innovation is to thrive. History shows that the United States and China can both choose to make progress together, or we can both choose to struggle together. There are steps China can take to right this course, steps that are in its own economic interests as well as ours.

Image
craig allen

On July 26, 2018, Ambassador Craig Allen began his tenure in Washington, DC, as the sixth President of the United States-China Business Council, a private, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization representing over 200 American companies doing business with China. Ambassador Allen began his government career in 1985 at the Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration (ITA) where, from 1986 to 1988, he worked as an international economist in ITA’s China Office. In 1988, Allen transferred to the American Institute in Taiwan, where he served as Director of the American Trade Center in Taipei. He returned to the Department of Commerce for a three-year posting at the US Embassy in Beijing as Commercial Attaché in 1992. In 1995, Allen was assigned to the US Embassy in Tokyo where he was promoted to Deputy Senior Commercial Officer in 1998. Allen became a member of the Senior Foreign Service in 1999. Starting from 2000, he served a two-year tour at the National Center for APEC in Seattle where he worked on the APEC Summits in Brunei, China, and Mexico. In 2002, Allen first served as the Senior Commercial Officer in Beijing where he was later promoted to the Minister Counselor rank of the Senior Foreign Service. After a four-year tour in South Africa, Ambassador Allen became Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia at the US Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration. He later became Deputy Assistant Secretary for China. Ambassador Allen was sworn in as the United States ambassador to Brunei Darussalam on December 19, 2014 where he served until he transitioned to take up his position as President of the US-China Business Council.

The US-China Business Council is a private, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization of approximately 200 American companies that do business with China.  For more information regarding the USCBC, click here

This event is part of the China Program’s Colloquia Series entitled "A New Cold War?: Sharp Power, Strategic Competition, and the Future of U.S.-China Relations " sponsored by Shorenstein APARC's China Program.

A New Cold War?: Sharp Power, Strategic Competition, and the Future of U.S.-China Relations

Trade conflict has exploded. The media is rife with stories of China’s unfair trade practices, cyber theft, IP theft and forced technology transfers. Who will first scale the commanding heights of technological supremacy? Who will be the first mover in AI, robotics and biotechnology? What are the implications of Beijing’s ambitious infrastructure projects, including its Belt and Road Initiative? How is China’s “sharp power” deployed, and what are its implications for political and civic life in the U.S.? Can the Trump administration and Beijing’s leadership reach agreement on our trade disputes? Are these just the beginning salvos of an increasingly turbulent future? As U.S. policy towards China sharply veers away from “constructive engagement” to “strategic competition,” the Stanford China Program will host a series of talks by leading experts to explore the current state of our bilateral relations, its potential future, and their implications for the world order.

https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/china/research/new-cold-war-sharp-power-strategic-competition-and-future-us-china-relations

Philippines Conference Room Encina Hall, 3rd Floor 616 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305

 

Amb. Craig Allen <i>President of US-China Business Council</i><br><br>
Seminars
-

We are sorry that the registration is now closed. It has reached the limit of the room capacity.

Brent Christensen is the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan’s Taipei office. Mr. Christensen has been in the United States Foreign Service for more than 29 years and has extensive experience in senior positions related to Taiwan and China.  Mr. Christensen previously served as Deputy Director of the American Institute in Taiwan’s Taipei office.  Prior to that, he was Director of the State Department’s Office of Taiwan Coordination, where he had a primary role in formulating U.S. policy toward Taiwan.  He has served three assignments at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, the most recent being Environment, Science, Technology and Health Counselor.

Mr. Christensen has also served as a Senior Level Career Development Advisor in the State Department’s Human Resources Bureau.  Prior to that assignment, he served as the Foreign Policy Advisor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS).  Other overseas postings include Hong Kong and South Africa.  Mr. Christensen also served as a Congressional Fellow on the staff of Senator Olympia Snowe.  Prior to joining the Foreign Service, he was a captain in the U.S. Air Force.

Mr. Christensen is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and holds the personal rank of Minister-Counselor.  Mr. Christensen earned an M.A. in East Asian Studies from the George Washington University, a B.A. in Chinese language and literature from Brigham Young University, and a Doctor of Medical Dentistry degree from the Oregon Health and Sciences University.  Mr. Christensen is married to Brenda Barrus Christensen and has three children.  He is a native of Provo, Utah.

Oksenberg Conference Room Encina Hall, 3rd Floor 616 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305
Brent Christensen Director, American Institute in Taiwan
Seminars
-

We are sorry that the registration is now closed. It has reached the limit of the room capacity.

A conversation about Taiwan’s economic future, moderated by Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Image
eric chu chopped 2017
Eric Chu was the first Mayor of the newly-created Special Municipality of New Taipei, a position he held from 2010-2018. He has also served in several other elected offices and government posts in Taiwan during his career, including as a member of the Legislative Yuan (1999-2001), Magistrate of Taoyuan County (2001-2009), and Vice Premier of the Republic of China (2009-2010). In 2015, he became the chairman of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), and he was the party’s nominee in the January 2016 presidential election.

Dr. Chu holds a bachelor’s degree in management from National Taiwan University, and a master’s degree in finance and a Ph.D. in accounting from New York University. He taught as an assistant professor at City University of New York before returning to Taiwan and joining the faculty of National Taiwan University, where he was promoted with tenure in 1997.

Philippines Conference Room Encina Hall, 3rd Floor 616 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305
Mayor Eric Chu
-

Since its establishment, DNX Ventures (formerly Draper Nexus Ventures) has acted as a bridge between growing Silicon Valley businesses and large Japanese firms. Since 2011, DNX Ventures has created more than 100 partnerships between its portfolio companies and its over 25 large Japanese corporate LPs. During this seminar, Managing Director of DNX Ventures Hiro Rio Maeda will extrapolate from his over 15 years of experience in both corporate venture capital and venture capital and extensive experience working with both startups and large Japanese corporations to discuss the basics of venture capital, and how Japanese corporations leverage venture capital to push forward open innovation initiatives. From a VC perspective: how are decisions about strategic investments made? How does money flow? What ratio of successful investments to non-successful investments do VCs aim for? From a large Japanese corporate perspective: how do large Japanese firms use VC to achieve open innovation goals? What are some of the obstacles to Japanese large firm-startup partnerships, and what are some of the ways to overcome these challenges? Maeda will answer these questions and more, as well as share examples of successful partnerships and large Japanese firms that are successfully harnessing Silicon Valley to further open innovation efforts.  

SPEAKER:

Hiro Rio Maeda, Managing Director, DNX Ventures (formerly Draper Nexus)

BIO:

Hiro Rio Maeda is a Managing Director at venture capital firm DNX Ventures (formerly Draper Nexus). Rio focuses on investing in innovative companies in Cyber Security, mobile, storage, and retail tech area that could work on a global scale. His portfolio companies include Cylance, SafeBreach, JASK, vArmour, AppDome, Ayasdi, Remotium, Klout, Fyde, JoyMode, and Hom.ma. 

Prior to joining DNX Ventures (formerly Draper Nexus), Rio spent six years at Globespan Capital Partners where he had put his resource on both investment and business development of Japan/US portfolio companies. Palo Alto Networks(NYSE: PANW) was a good example portfolio company that he took a lead on taking them to the Japanese market.

Prior to Globespan, Rio spent seven years at Sumitomo Corporation, a Japanese conglomerate trading company in which he had built expertise his international business skill in IT technologies and consumer web services in Tokyo and his capitalist career at Presidio Ventures (Sumitomo’s corporate venture capital arm) in Santa Clara.Japanese conglomerate trading company in which he had built expertise his international business skill in IT technologies and consumer web services in Tokyo and his capitalist career at Presidio Ventures (Sumitomo’s corporate venture capital arm) in Santa Clara.

AGENDA:

4:15pm: Doors open
4:30pm-5:30pm: Talk and Discussion
5:30pm-6:00pm: Networking

RSVP REQUIRED:

Register to attend at http://www.stanford-svnj.org/22819-public-forum

For more information about the Silicon Valley-New Japan Project please visit: http://www.stanford-svnj.org/

 

Hiro Rio Maeda, Managing Director, DNX Ventures (formerly Draper Nexus)
Seminars
-

The event is jointly sponsored by the Japan Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership.

The Heisei era started in 1989, with high hopes for Japan to contribute to the international order. As the Heisei era draws to an end, Japan is once again expected to “step up” with increased urgency, given the current US administration’s withdrawal from, and challenge to the international order.  In this talk, I will first look back at the thirty years of Heisei, and discuss why Japan did not take the “internationalist” path in a way that some had expected. Looking forward, I discuss how the domestic institutional changes, together with the geopolitical challenges in Asia, have prompted Japan to seek active leadership in the region and beyond. I will elaborate on the evolution of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision,” with focus on how exactly Japan seeks to achieve “free and open” in the region, and challenges and limitations going forward.

Image
hikotaniphoto2017
Takako Hikotani is Gerald L. Curtis Associate Professor of Modern Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy. She previously taught at the National Defense Academy of Japan, where she was Associate Professor, and lectured at the Ground Self Defense Force and Air Self Defense Force Staff Colleges, and the National Institute for Defense Studies. Her research focus on civil-military relations and Japanese domestic politics, Japanese foreign policy, and comparative civil-military relations. Her publications (in English) include, “The Japanese Diet and defense policy-making.” International Affairs, 94:1, July, 2018; “Trump’s Gift to Japan: Time for Tokyo to Invest in the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2017; and “Japan’s New Executive Leadership: How Electoral Rules "Japan’s New Executive Leadership: How Electoral Rules Make Japanese Security Policy" (with Margarita Estevez-Abe and Toshio Nagahisa), in Frances Rosenbluth and Masaru Kohno eds, Japan in the World (Yale University Press, 2009). She was a Visiting Professional Specialist at Princeton University as Social Science Research Council/Abe Fellow (2010-2011) and Fellow of the US-Japan Leadership Program, US-Japan Foundation (2000- ). Professor Hikotani received her BA from Keio University, MAs from Keio University and Stanford University, and PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, where she was a President’s Fellow.

Takako Hikotani Associate Professor, Modern Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy, Columbia University
Seminars
Authors
Noa Ronkin
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs
In her acclaimed book The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State, Chinese domestic and foreign policy expert Elizabeth Economy argues that Xi Jinping’s dual-reform trajectories—a more authoritarian system at home and a more ambitious foreign policy abroad—provide Beijing with new levers of influence that the United States must learn to use to protect its own interests.
 
Economy, the C. V. Starr senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a distinguished visiting fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, kicked off the China Program’s 2019 winter colloquia with a discussion of the transformations underway in China today and the future of U.S.-China relations.
 
Speaking to a packed audience, Economy described how, in the process of pursuing his vision of the rejuvenation of the Chinese dream, Xi Jinping has upended much of Deng Xiaoping’s "second revolution" and has put in motion four significant strategic shifts in Chinese domestic and foreign policy.
 
The first shift is a move away from Deng’s consensus- and collective-based decision-making process back toward a more single-man, authoritarian role. The second is a reassertion of the Chinese Communist Party more deeply into the everyday political and economic lives of the Chinese people. The third is a creation of a virtual wall of restrictions and regulations that allows Xi and the rest of the Chinese leadership to control more closely what comes into the country and what goes out. The fourth shift, the most visible one to people outside China, is the move from Deng’s low-profile foreign policy to a far more ambitious foreign policy.
 
This foreign policy shift, said Economy, is especially noteworthy in three areas: first, in Xi’s move from staking claims around Chinese sovereignty to realizing them; second, in his Belt and Road Initiative; and third, in his effort to reform institutions of global governance so that they reflect Chinese values and norms.
 
How should the United States address these changes in China’s domestic and foreign policy? Economy listed four ways of response: first, cooperation, namely, collaborating with China on global problems such as those concerning public health or the environment; second, coordination with U.S. allies; third, countering China by pushing back on, for example, its South China Sea claims and incidents of intellectual property infringement; and finally, competing with China by investing domestically in areas including education and research and technological development.
 
Hero Image
Elizabeth Economy speaking at a podium
Thom Holme
All News button
1
Date Label
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
No
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

As tension grows between China and the United States, its effects are felt across Asia. APARC's Southeast Asia Program Director Donald K. Emmerson sat down with Michael McFaul, FSI's Director and host of FSI's podcast World Class, to talk about why Southeast Asia in particular is caught in that rising tension between China and the United States and what can be done to prevent it from becoming a battle ground for a new Cold War between the two superpowers.

Listen to the conversation:

 

All News button
1
-

The event is sponsored by the Japan Society for Promotion of Science and
the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership.

 

abe 6364 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe speaks at Stanford about innovation in Japan and Silicon Valley. He was also joined on stage by Stanford President John Hennessy and George Shultz, the former U.S. Secretary of State and a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution (below).
When the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan regained the power led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in December 2012, Japan’s government embarked on a set of economic policies dubbed “Abenomics.” Abenomics aimed at bringing Japan back from stagnation and restoring its growth potential.  The Abe administration entered its 7th year and Prime Minister Abe looks most likely to become the prime minister with the longest reign in the post war era.  Abenomics looks seemingly successful as well.  Japan’s economy has been in the longest expansion phase in the post war era.  The unemployment rate is so low that many employers claim they cannot find workers.  Yet, the major goals of Abenomics set at the beginning, such as 2% inflation rate and 2% real economic growth, have not been achieved.  Has Abenomics really succeeded?

This panel features four experts who have been closely watching Abenomics’s impacts on the Japanese economy.  They evaluate what Abenomics has accomplished so far in various areas.

 

Panelists:

Joshua Hausman, Assistant Professor of Public Policy; Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Michigan

Takatoshi Ito, Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

Nobuko Nagase, Professor of Labor Economics and Social Policy, Ochanomizu University, Japan

Steven Vogel, Professor of Asian Studies; Professor of Political Science; Chair of the Political Economy Program, University of California, Berkeley

Takeo Hoshi (moderator), Director of the Japan Program at the Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University

 

Koret-Taube Conference Center
Gunn-SIEPR Building
366 Galvez Street, Stanford University

Panel Discussions
Subscribe to International Relations