This analysis by Oriana Skylar Mastro originally appeared in The Interpreter, by the Lowy Institute.

China’s strategy in responding to concerns about its intentions in the South China Sea is to claim that none of the activities, statements or behaviours that concern other countries are actually happening.

China claims it has not militarised the South China Sea, but that the United States “is the real pusher of militarisation” in these waters. Its leaders often argue that China is a peace-loving country only interested in defending itself. As the China’s General Wei Fenghe stated at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, “China has never provoked a war or conflict, nor has it ever invaded another country or taken an inch of land from others. In the future, no matter how strong it becomes, China shall never threaten anyone.”

China has similarly brushed off concerns of other claimants, such as Vietnam, about its intensifying military exercises in the South China Sea and largely ignored Australia’s assertion at the United Nations that China’s claims have no legal backing.

So apparently it is all one big misunderstanding.

On 24 November, former Chinese ambassador Fu Ying criticised the United States in a New York Times op-ed for raising multiple issues that in her mind do not exist. Thus, the way to resolve the growing bilateral tensions is for the two countries “to have candid talks to better understand each other’s intentions and cultivate trust”.

So, in the Chinese communist spirit of 实事求是, or “seeking truth from facts”, I have charted the military capabilities China has deployed to the South China Sea, which are displayed with references on the map below. The Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands are under dispute; Hainan Island is a recognised part of China, but I include it because the military capabilities in situ have implications for Chinese military options in the South China Sea writ large.

This op-ed by Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Charles Crabtree
was originally published in The Hill.

President-elect Joe Biden had a pleasant surprise for Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga during their first phone conversation after the U.S. presidential election. In what was expected to be a cordial congratulatory call without policy discussion, Biden explicitly stated America’s commitment to protect the Senkaku Islands, citing Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

At the time, Americans were preoccupied with the political aftermath of the still-contested election, but Japanese observers paid close attention to the first contact between the two new leaders, especially since the first encounter between their predecessors shaped U.S.-Japan relations for the past several years.

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Four years ago, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe became the first foreign leader to meet with President Trump, soon after his election victory in November 2016. This fact was never lost on Trump; throughout his presidential administration, the relationship between the two men was strong, which benefited the alliance as the two countries worked to create a united front against China’s increasing international aggression.

In 2016, policymakers on the Japanese side were concerned about the U.S. conceding much of its interest in the Pacific to China, as part of “a grand bargain” that would diminish U.S. commitment to Japan and other allies in the region. Trump’s successful campaign made this scenario less likely, but the Japanese understood that their country relies more on American support in constraining China’s expansive regional ambitions than vice versa. 

Fast-forward to 2020, and we see a new political reality in the bilateral relationship — the U.S. needs Japan as much as Japan needs the U.S. in facing the challenges of China’s rise to a global superpower. The fact that Biden mentioned his commitment to Senkakus — largely unsolicited, although the Japanese side allegedly dropped some hints — suggests an American desire to shore up support from Japan.

With China now viewed as a shared rival — if not outright enemy — how will the two leaders shape regional dynamics in coming years? On security, tensions around the Senkakus almost certainly will rise, and a credible threat of U.S. military action is likely the most effective deterrent of China’s provocations that could escalate the conflict over territorial claims there. Biden surely will work hard to rebuild the trust of other allies in the region, with the hope of containing China through multilateral alliances. South Korea is a particularly important partner in this effort, and Suga would be wise to rehabilitate Japan-ROK relations that have been marred by complicated historical issues. The U.S. can help mediate the process.

Similarly, on economy and trade, multilateral frameworks such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) will become more important, and Japan will continue to encourage the U.S. to participate in these agreements. However, this might not be realistic given the domestic political environment in the U.S. The best-case scenario in the short term is probably the U.S. valuing the World Trade Organization (WTO) again. In this vein, the U.S. regaining the trust and respect of Europe is important, because China continues to lure European countries with its attractive economic and trade packages. 

On environmentalism, both Suga and Biden have declared that their countries will work toward zero emissions by 2050. On this issue, China’s cooperation is critical. While China also has committed to working toward zero -emissions by 2060, it likely will use this issue to gain other concessions from the U.S. Biden may face a difficult political decision at some point on whether to a) compromise on environmentalism and incur the wrath of the left wing of the Democratic party or b) sacrifice U.S. national interest in other areas for an agreement on environmentalism and risk losing support from independents and moderate Republicans. Japan would worry about the latter scenario.

Finally, Biden is expected to be more involved than Trump regarding China’s human rights issues. He’s likely to call out situations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, among others. Japan will join the chorus, and mix in the North Korean abduction issue, which largely has been silenced internationally as a consequence of Trump’s bromance with Kim Jong Un. China will counter these criticisms by pointing to racism in the U.S. as evidence of American hypocrisy. This might embarrass the U.S. but can be a net positive, if China’s naming and shaming leads to more efforts by the U.S. government to address racism. This dynamic is reminiscent of the Cold War era, when the Soviet Union countered America’s criticisms of civil and political rights violations by pointing to racism in the U.S., facilitating advancements during the civil rights movement.

Overall, on hard issues such as security and trade, a drastic change is unlikely; rehabilitating relations with allies, and revaluing multilateral frameworks, will be the most likely changes under a Biden administration. On more values-oriented issues such as environmentalism and human rights, domestic politics in the U.S. plays a significant role in shaping Biden foreign policy. Assuming that Democrats don’t win both of the Senate seats in Georgia’s runoff elections, Biden will face a Republican Senate that can block appointments for key cabinet positions and some of his foreign policy priorities.

For Japan, Biden’s remark about the Senkaku Islands was an excellent start. With such a commitment secured, Suga can play the diplomatic game from a position of strength and mediate between the U.S. and China. This is a role that Japan can thrive in, as its shrewd management of relationships with both the U.S. and China in the past few years indicates. Japan’s success in playing this role could define international relations in the Asia-Pacific for the next decade or two.

On November 10th, the APARC China Program convened an expert panel focused on the Decision of the fifth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which took place on October 26-29.  The Fifth Plenum Decision outlines not only China’s 14th Five Year Plan (2021-2025), but also Beijing’s economic blueprint through 2035 and the “goal of fully building a modern socialist country."  The CCP leadership recently articulated its “dual circulation” policy – viz., a drastic reduction in China’s dependence on U.S. technologies and increased reliance on domestic consumption while maintaining exports and attracting foreign direct investments.  At this critical juncture when the coronavirus pandemic has shrunk global trade and tensions between the U.S. and China continue to intensify, panel members were asked to examine what the Fifth Plenum Decision might signify.  Does it mark a significant shift in Beijing’s strategic economic orientation?  What are the short- and long-term implications of the Decision for China’s economic development strategy, U.S.-China relations, as well as the world’s economic and technology ecosystems?  

Guests heard from experts James Green, Damien Ma, and Xiaomeng Lu.  James Green, Senior Research Fellow at Georgeton University's Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues, has worked for over two decades on U.S.-Asia relations.  He has held several positions in government, including Minister Counselor for Trade Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and China Director of the White House’s National Security Council.  Damien Ma is the Director and co-founder of MacroPolo, the Think Tank of the Paulson Institute, which focuses on China's economics, technology, and politics.  He is also adjunct faculty at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University.  Finally, Xiaomeng Lu is a senior analyst in Eurasia Group's geo-technology practice.  She focuses on many of the most important issues related to China right now, including cybersecurity, data protection, artificial intelligence, internet governance, 5G, and trade.  The panel concluded with a discussion of audience questions. Watch:

The China Program at Shorenstein APARC had the pleasure of hosting Professor Min Ye of Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies on October 14, 2020. Her program, moderated by China Program Director Jean Oi, focused on the much-discussed but poorly-understood Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping. While it is not widely known exactly what the BRI is or what Beijing hopes it will accomplish, it has been described as something of a modern silk road, connecting China to dozens of other countries through trade and extensive infrastructure projects. Based on research conducted for her recently published book, The Belt Road and Beyond: State-Mobilized Globalization in China: 1998-2018, Professor Ye enlightened the audience on a surprisingly critical element of this global program: the domestic component.

While Ye began her research with the assumption that many hold about the BRI—that it is primarily a global, internationally-focused initiative—as she continued her research, she found that many, if not most, BRI projects are either entirely domestic or have strong ties to domestic programs. To this end, she posed three questions during her program: Why did Chinese leadership launch the BRI in 2013? How did the Chinese state and businesses implement the BRI? and, What are the internal and external outcomes of the BRI?

To answer these questions, Ye explained the theoretical frameworks she used to understand both the BRI and China's "state-mobilized globalization." Firstly, Ye's "Chinese-State Framework" breaks the Chinese governmental system into three parts: Party Leadership, State Bureaucracy, and Subnational Actors. Each of these elements affect the others, as well as policy surrounding the BRI. However, this division also creates fragmentation in authority and ideology. Secondly, her “State-Mobilized Globalization” framework explains the process surrounding Chinese national strategy. Ye posits that national strategies are generally prompted by crises faced at lower levels of government, particularly when a lack of efficiency or communication is causing “state paralysis.” Once the strategy is announced in order to coordinate efforts and solve the crisis, it enters a feedback loop in which plans are adjusted and changed according to ground-level conditions. These frameworks informed the empirical studies used to answer Ye’s research questions.

The drivers of the BRI, argues Ye, were threefold: strategic, diplomatic, and economic. It was believed by interested parties within China that such an international initiative could ease tensions related to the United States and maritime Asia, as well as generally improve diplomatic relations for the country. China’s industries were also facing problems related to overcapacity, and economic and financial groups wished to use their excess capital to invest abroad. Actors from several different levels in China, including national agencies, local governments, and private entrepreneurs, were involved in executing BRI projects intended to alleviate these tensions. Different cities saw different sides of this implementation: Chongqing, one of China’s largest cities, is heavily dominated by state capital, with its main BRI actors being State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Wenzhou, a port city in Zhejiang province, is by contrast dominated by private entrepreneurs.

With diverse implementation comes diverse outcomes. Ye argues that some BRI projects have been helpful in reforming cities’ structural economy, while others have helped upgrade industry. The BRI has managed to alleviate some of the tensions listed above, but at the same time, it has created its own problems. While there has been a massive internal mobilization effort for BRI projects, there exists a disconnect between the domestic situation and demands for transparency from outside actors.

Ye concluded her talk by tying her research to current developments related to COVID-19. While one might imagine that a global pandemic would be a significant inhibitor to an international trade and infrastructure project, Ye finds just the opposite. Because the BRI is, in fact, quite domestically focused, many BRI projects are continuing at a rapid pace, albeit with digital adjustments. Some projects, such as the New Infrastructure Plan, were actually fast-tracked in the wake of the pandemic outbreak. Ye predicts that as COVID-19 restrictions ease and the world returns to “normal,” these domestic and digital elements will be combined with the BRI’s original projects.

An audio recording of this program is available at the link below, and a video recording is available upon request. Please contact Callista Wells, China Program Coordinator at cvwells@stanford.edu with any inquiries.

On October 28th, the APARC China Program hosted a panel of experts for the panel "Caught in the Crossfire: Strategic Competition, U.S.-China Science Collaboration, and U.S. Universities." Reports of Chinese espionage, IP theft and military-civil fusion strategy have all fueled concerns regarding U.S. universities’ open research ecosystem, especially in STEM. Many of the concerns focus not only on research integrity but also on potential adverse consequences to U.S. military and economic security. The October 28th panel discussed open access to U.S. universities, security risks involved, as well as the potential adverse consequences of limiting international access in science and technology (S&T) research.  

The discussion began with Professor Susan Shirk, Chair of the 21st Century China Center at UC San Diego, who gave the audience an overview of current China science and technology policy and its relationship with US-China competition and universities. Shirk was followed by Arthur Bienenstock, co-chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Scientific Partnerships and Professor of Photon Science, Emeritus at Stanford. Bienenstock provided important perspective from the STEM side of this debate, arguing that collaboration with China--and other foreign countries--is vital and should be encouraged. Elsa B. Kania, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security's Technology and National Security Program, gave a different perspective, explaining China's "civil-military fusion" and why many in the United States consider it a threat. Finally, Tim Stearns, the Frank Lee and Carol Hall Professor in the Department of Biology, brought things back home to Stanford. As the Senior Associate Vice Provost of Research, Stearns was able to give a unique insight into university administration and how Stanford is approaching these challenges. The panel concluded with a discussion between the panelists of audience questions. Watch:

Southeast Asia is geographically and economically dwarfed by China. But that does not mean the region must inevitably bend to the will and ambitions of the PRC. Like the small but nimble mousedeer of local mythology, Southeast Asia may outwit the larger dragon through careful navigation and shrewd negotiation. Can this diverse region rally together, or will differences in culture, history, and society continue to hobble efforts to create a coordinated response to China's influence? The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century, a new edited volume by Donald K. Emmerson, seeks to understand this dynamic and give context on the complexities of Southeast Asian geopolitics both within the region and in a global context.

On October 22, 2020, Emmerson virtually joined the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the New York Southeast Asia Network, along with Ann Marie Murphy of Seton Hall, to discuss The Deer and the Dragon and further explore the region's standing in relation to current international affairs. Watch below:

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An audio recording of the event is also available for listening below:

FSI Center Fellow at APARC Oriana Skylar Mastro joins NPR's Weekend Edition host Scott Simon to discuss the rising tensions between China and Taiwan and how the United States should respond.

Listen to the complete interview below. This conversation originally appeared on NPR's website.

On September 29, the APARC China Program hosted Thomas Fingar and Stephen Stedman for the program “Rebuilding International Institutions.” The program, which was moderated by China Program Director Jean Oi, examined the future of international institutions such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Health Organization (WHO) in our evolving global political landscape. While Fingar and Stedman acknowledged that such institutions facilitated attainment of unprecedented peace and prosperity after WWII, they also asked difficult questions: Are these institutions still adequate? And if not, how will we change them?

Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar kicked off the session by asking whether or not US-China tensions would impede cooperation on major global challenges, or if those challenges were so serious as to render such rivalries immaterial. Perhaps the most obvious example of such a crisis is the current COVID-19 pandemic. The efforts to curb the virus’ spread not only by individual countries, but also by international organizations like the WHO, have proven largely inadequate. According to Fingar, our existing institutions need to be reformed or supplemented to deal with these types of threats. However, such an overhaul of our international systems will be difficult, he says.

How, then, will we go about such a massive project? Stephen Stedman, Deputy Director at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), responded by explaining that the current failure of international cooperation makes such undertakings tough. Globalization has been a double-edged sword: On one hand, more contact, perhaps inherently, leads to increased tension. The resurgence of traditional notions of sovereignty in 2010, kickstarted by the opposition of countries like Russia and China to what was seen as UN overreaching, has led to a reduction of international cooperation overall. On the other hand, Fingar posits that our interconnectedness may force us toward cooperation despite rivalries as we face more and more transnational threats. International institutions create rules to organize and manage our many interconnected relationships so that we can deal with our problems effectively and reduce friction.

Stedman also pointed to the upcoming US elections and the major impact their outcome will have on how these problems are addressed—or not. In the last four year, the United States has pulled back significantly from international institutions and agreements, leaving a gap that China has started to fill. Furthermore, despite the US’s retreat from international responsibility, the country still remains a critical actor in global initiatives. China’s embrace of a global leadership role is not inherently negative, but its future relationship with the US will need to be “managed in a way that you get greater cooperation and not just paralysis.” Stedman says that it is likely that progress will need to be made on a bilateral front in order to have productive conversations about international issues with China.

Concluding on an optimistic note, Fingar voiced his hope that the current tensions and negative perceptions between rivals might ultimately “be mitigated by success in dealing with a common problem,” because “experience does shape perceptions.”

A video recording of this program is available upon request. Please contact Callista Wells, China Program Coordinator at cvwells@stanford.edu with any inquiries.