This opinion piece was first published by Project Syndicate >

STANFORD/LOS ANGELES – It is tempting to frame the Sino-American economic rivalry as a clash between engineering doers and lawyerly naysayers, as the Chinese-Canadian analyst Dan Wang does in his new book Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future. But this is a false dichotomy, because law is a crucial feature of US capitalism.

We have heard the lawyers-versus-engineers argument before. Forty years ago, Japan’s economic rise induced similar anxieties, most famously articulated in the American sociologist Ezra Vogel’s book Japan as Number One: Lessons for America. Commentators fretted that America was mired in lawsuits while Japan’s best minds were solving problems and driving their country’s meteoric growth. Yet over the ensuing decades, the United States, with its mammoth legal industry, outperformed Japan by a wide margin.

Today’s panic about an Asian economic challenger is equally unwarranted and counterproductive. Invoking national security and the competition with China, Donald Trump’s administration is pursuing increasingly anti-capitalist and legally dubious interventions into private industry, with potentially high costs for American dynamism.

Continue reading at Project Syndicate >

The world stands at a critical juncture. Today, about 2.3 billion people are living with moderate or severe food insecurity worldwide (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO 2024). By 2050, our planet will be home to nearly 10 billion people, requiring at least a 50% increase in food production from 2011 levels (FAO 2017). This challenge is not simply about producing more food. It is about doing so on degraded land, with less water, under extreme weather conditions in the face of climate change. 

The traditional, resource-intensive farming that sustained the global human population for decades is no longer a viable path forward. Reliance on labor inputs and intensive use of resources cannot meet these complex, interconnected challenges. We must transform our agricultural systems into climate-smart, high-tech agriculture—driven by data and Industry 4.0 technologies, such as AI, robotics, remote sensing, and big data. These tools hold the promise of a “quantum leap” in sustainable food productivity. Yet this transformation cannot happen without investing in agricultural education and training.

From the 1950s to the 1970s, institutions such as the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, USAID and its precursors, and multilateral development banks made significant global investments in agricultural research, education, and training. These investments laid the foundation for the Green Revolution, demonstrating that human capital and agricultural research and development (R&D) are as critical as physical inputs in driving productivity growth and food security. Since then, however, global public investment in agricultural education and R&D has declined or stagnated, except in a few countries, such as China (Ruane and Ramasamy 2023). For example, in the United States, public agricultural R&D spending—adjusted for inflation—fell by nearly one-third between its 2002 peak and 2019, returning to levels last seen in the 1970s. 

Why Investing in Agricultural Education Is a Global Necessity

There is now an urgent need for a renewed commitment to build agricultural human resources that can lead the next transformation. This is not just about teaching farming. It is about cultivating a new generation of innovators, scientists, policymakers, and agro-entrepreneurs who can lead the Green Revolution 2.0. Here are seven compelling reasons why investing in agricultural education is a global necessity.

1. The times call for a quantum leap in sustainable productivity

The first Green Revolution helped avert mass famine through high-yield varieties, but at great environmental cost (see, inter alia, Tilman 1999 and Yang 2024). Now, we need a  Green Revolution 2.0 to drive a "quantum leap" in food production. This next revolution must be “smart” and sustainable. Agricultural education is the engine of this revolution. It will educate scientists, policymakers, and high-tech farmers, enabling them to develop new climate-resilient crops and adopt sustainable practices. Furthermore, the digital technologies driving the Green Revolution 2.0 can improve market access and help ensure fair prices for smallholder farmers.

2. Innovation adoption must be accelerated

Innovation is meaningless if it does not reach those who need it most. However, farmers, especially smallholders (e.g., small-scale and family farmers) and those with limited education, are often risk-averse in adopting new practices. Worse, the traditional systems supporting technology adoption have become ineffective. Government extension services struggle to keep up with the latest technologies, while farmers increasingly rely on commercial vendors for advice. Recent studies suggest that newer approaches, like social networks and farmer-to-farmer learning, have proven far more effective. Investing in education helps create "agropreneurs" who can champion innovation within farming communities, thereby accelerating the adoption of new technologies.

3. The agriculture workforce needs upskilling

The nature of work in agriculture is rapidly changing—vertical farms, AI-driven analytics, automated systems, and climate-resilient practices are redefining food production. Farmers need new skills in data, systems management, digital operations, and climate-resilient methods. Without education, millions risk being left behind, especially in developing countries, resulting in worsening inequality. Investment in upskilling enables farmers to collaborate with technology, thereby avoiding a poverty trap.

4. Empowering smallholder and family farmers will create opportunities and aid their survival

Unlike past mechanization that favored large farms, today’s advances in precision and digital agriculture can empower smallholders. And it creates new opportunities for smallholder farmers to serve growing niche, diverse markets. With supportive policies and education, smallholders can become key drivers of inclusive agricultural transformation.

5. Agriculture needs new, young blood

Farmers are aging worldwide, while youth are leaving rural areas to seek careers in other fields. Traditional agricultural curricula and programs fail to spark their interest. By integrating robotics, AI, biotechnology, and data science into agricultural education, coupled with the use of app-based market-access solutions, we can redesign agricultural systems and make farming an attractive, future-oriented career. Investing in high-tech agricultural education is the key to filling the labor gap with skilled, motivated, next-generation farmers

6. Greenhouse gas reduction

Agriculture is the second-largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and consumes 70% of global fresh water. Climate-smart farming practices can reduce emissions, store carbon, and build resilience against droughts, pests, and diseases. Education is the gateway to equipping farmers with the knowledge to implement such solutions at scale.

7. Agricultural investment boosts national prosperity and global collaboration

The benefits of investing in agricultural education extend far beyond farms. Past investments in the 1950s–70s powered the Green Revolution, saving over a billion people from starvation, reducing rural poverty, and fueling industrial development. A notable example of a successful investment is the US-funded Seoul National University (SNU) Minnesota Project (1954–1962). Under the project, the University of Minnesota helped rebuild SNU’s College of Agriculture and train a generation of agricultural scientists. These scientists not only transformed Korea from a food-deficit to a food-secure nation, but are today contributing to agricultural advancements globally. Replicating such initiatives worldwide could deliver similar results in today’s food-insecure countries.

Moving Forward

Momentum for significant investments in agriculture is building. The G20 has committed to food security, emphasizing investment in sustainable productivity. The World Bank has invested $45 billion in food and nutrition security programs since 2022, exceeding its target of $30 billion. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) pledged $40 billion (2022–2030), including $26 billion in new financing. It is encouraging that more than 50 countries have launched programs to nurture young and next-generation farmers, recognizing their vital role in food security, as well as in ensuring the future sustainability and competitiveness of the agricultural sector (although the outcomes of these programs remain mixed). Countries are also stepping up their investment in agricultural education and training. For example, Bangladesh is developing a $150 million project with ADB and the Korean Eximbank to upgrade its agricultural tertiary education, while Thailand is developing a $120 million investment project in agricultural technical and vocational education.

However, to avert a coming food crisis, these efforts need to be scaled, and to achieve that, concerted global action is necessary. One such initiative, now being proposed by ADB in partnership with a consortium of agricultural universities, is the establishment of a global climate-smart, high-tech agricultural education network to mobilize public and private investments, accelerate knowledge sharing and technology adoption, and prepare the next generation of agriculture leaders and entrepreneurs globally.

The challenges are immense, but so are the opportunities. Investing in agricultural education and training is not just about farming—it is about building a sustainable, food-secure, and climate-resilient future.
 

Works Cited

FAO. 2017. The Future of Food and Agriculture—Trends and Challenges.

FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO. 2024. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024—Financing to End Hunger, Food Insecurity and Malnutrition in All Its Forms.

Ruane, John, and Selvaraju Ramasamy. 2023. Global Investments in Agricultural Research: Where Are We and Where Are We Going? Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Tilman, David. 1999. “Global Environmental Impacts of Agricultural Expansion: The Need for Sustainable and Efficient Practices.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 96 (11): 5995-6000.

Yang, Yi, David Tilman, Zhenong Jin et al. 2024. “Climate Change Exacerbates the Environmental Impacts of Agriculture.” Science 385 (6713).
 

As the U.S.-China competition unfolds in areas ranging from trade to technology to the military, the rival-making discourse surrounding this great power competition was the focus of the conference Beyond a New Cold War, organized and hosted by the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL).

Held on August 14, 2025, the event showcased SNAPL research illuminating how U.S. political leaders and the media shape narratives concerning China and how citizens in young democracies perceive these narratives. Serving as discussants were experts from Columbia University, the University of California, Berkeley, the Hoover Institution (represented by a former National Security Affairs Fellow), and the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China.

The studies presented and discussed at the conference are part of SNAPL’s U.S.-Asia Relations research track, one of four research streams the lab pursues. Housed at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and founded by sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the lab aims to generate evidence-based policy recommendations and promote transnational collaboration with academic and policy institutions to advance the future prosperity of Asia and U.S.-Asia relations.

“This conference provided an excellent opportunity to engage the policy community with our research findings,” says Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and the director of APARC and the Korea Program. “The lab will continue to foster ongoing dialogue between academic and policy circles.” 

The conference builds on previous SNAPL forums and meetings with policy and academic communities in Washington, D.C., held in September 2024. These policy engagement activities are made possible thanks to a grant from FSI. 

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Dynamics of American Elite Discourse on China

At the first conference panel, Research Fellow Xinru Ma shared a study that unravels who leads elite discourse on U.S.-China relations – whether Congress, the White House, or the media. While prior research suggests that each of these actors could have distinct agenda-setting capacities, their relative influence and its directionality in foreign policy discourse remain empirically underexamined.

The study addresses this question by investigating China-focused discourse and framing by the U.S. legislative and executive branches as well as the media. Using computational and causal inference methods, the study analyzes social media data from the legislative and executive branches alongside major U.S. media outlets across two periods: the 116th Congress (January 3, 2019 – January 3, 2021) and the 118th Congress (January 3, 2023 – January 3, 2025).

The analysis reveals that, both in terms of issue attention and framing, the media tends to follow the lead of Congress and the President. The findings also indicate that Republican lawmakers exert greater influence on setting the China agenda in the media. In contrast, Democratic lawmakers are stronger predictors of how the media frames the issues at stake. Moreover, the findings suggest that presidential influence on China discourse weakened sharply in the 118th Congress, and that there is an overall shift toward party-driven, rather than institutionally mediated, communication among elites. 

Policy Implications
 

• Media Weakness: The reliance of media outlets on partisan cues from political elites on foreign policy issues increases the risk of incomplete or skewed public understanding of China and U.S.-China relations. The risk is especially disconcerting as U.S. reporters face limited access to China.
• Partisan Echo Chambers: Communication flows primarily within partisan networks rather than across institutions, with the separation of powers becoming less effective as a system of checks and balances. The splintering of political discourse into parallel echo chambers risks eroding opportunities for cross-party dialogue and democratic deliberation on complex foreign policy issues.
• Fragmented Messaging: Divergent partisan messaging on China signals inconsistency to both domestic and international audiences who might draw contradictory conclusions about U.S. intentions. This dynamic gives rise to strategic miscalculations abroad and a fragmented public understanding of China policy at home.
• Declining  Institutional Voices: The decline of institutional power over shaping U.S. discourse on China has created a growing vulnerability. As individual political figures gain sway, personalized narratives often prioritize short-term visibility over a coherent, long-term strategy.

Democracy vs. Autocracy: A View from Young Democracies

Despite their deep divisions on most issues, there is one topic Republicans and Democrats converge on: China. Both parties increasingly frame the intensifying U.S.-China tensions as a strategic competition between democracy and autocracy. But is the value diplomacy this approach begets effective in promoting liberal values in young democracies?

At the second conference panel, Visiting Scholar Gidong Kim presented a study that addresses this question. “This study challenges the effectiveness of the value-laden U.S. diplomacy in young democracies and presents a more nuanced explanation of democracy's role in forming public opinion on foreign policy,” says Kim, formerly a postdoctoral fellow with SNAPL and currently an assistant professor of political science at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS).

The study hypothesizes that in young democracies, where democratic histories are relatively short and legacies of authoritarian rule endure, citizens tend to understand democracy in terms of electoral institutions rather than liberal values. Similarly, in the context of the U.S.-China competition, citizens in these countries tend to perceive China’s threats to electoral institutions more seriously than its threats to liberal values.

To test this proposition, the study uses a country-level, cross-national analysis and an original survey experiment in South Korea. The findings support the hypothesis.

Policy Implications
 

• Context Matters: U.S. policymakers must acknowledge the limits of value-driven diplomacy. Washington should diversify its foreign policy toolkit and adapt it to regional contexts: in Western Europe, liberal values rhetoric can reinforce alliances, but in young democracies, the design and strength of electoral institutions carry greater weight.
• A Crisis of Credibility: For China, there is an equally clear lesson about the need to rethink its approach to diplomacy. Without addressing suspicions of election interference in democratic countries, Beijing will struggle to gain traction with the publics in young Asian democracies and dissipate anti-China sentiments in those countries, even if it increases its soft power through liberalization policies.

SNAPL’s studies presented at the conference underscore the crucial role that narratives and public perceptions play in international relations. They suggest that great power competition is not just about power. Rather, it is also about persuasion, which, in turn, depends on how different audiences — at home and abroad — perceive the story.

When Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin left his home country of South Korea in 1983 to pursue graduate studies at the University of Washington, he was certain he would return to Korea upon graduation. More than 40 years later, Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, is still in the United States. 

Yet he does not consider himself a case of brain drain for Korea. Shin, who is also the founding director of the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and APARC director, has continuously contributed to Korea by leading transnational collaborations, researching and publishing on pressing issues in Korean affairs, and otherwise engaging in diverse intellectual exchanges with the country.

Shin’s experiences sparked his interest in the sociological patterns of mobile talent and a central question: How do countries attract, develop, and retain talent in a globalized world? His new book, The Four Talent Giants (Stanford University Press, 2025), explores that question regarding transnational talent flows from a comparative lens by examining how four strikingly different Asia-Pacific nations – Japan, Australia, China, and India – have become economic powerhouses.

We interviewed Shin about his book – watch:

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The book’s main idea, Shin explains, is that how countries manage talent is key to their strength and future success. He calls the four Asia-Pacific nations the book examines “talent giants” because each has used a distinct talent strategy that has proven critical to national development. Three of these nations – China, Japan, and India – are among the top five economies in the world in terms of GDP, and Australia, despite its relatively small population size, is third in terms of wealth per adult.

In The Four Talent Giants, Shin investigates how these four nations have become global powers and sustained momentum by responding to risks and challenges, such as demographic crises, brain drain, and geopolitical tensions, and what lessons their developmental paths hold for other countries.

A New Framework for Studying Human Resource Development 

Asia’s robust economic growth over the past forty years is nothing short of a remarkable feat. The Asia-Pacific today continues to be the world's fastest-growing region, despite global economic uncertainty. How did this phenomenal ascendance come about?

The existing literature has emphasized common “recipes” of success among Asia-Pacific powers. Endeavoring to find one-size-fits-all formulas that could be replicated in other countries seeking rapid development, it has overlooked the distinct developmental journeys of Asian nations. “We need a new lens, or framework, to explain their successes, while also accounting for cross-national variation in development and sustainability,” writes Shin. 

In his book, Shin examines talent – the skilled occupations essential to a nation’s economy – as a key driver of economic development. While all countries rely on human resources for development, their talent strategies vary based on historical, cultural, and institutional factors. Shin introduces a new framework, talent portfolio theory (TPT), inspired by financial portfolio theory, to analyze and compare these national approaches.

“TPT views a nation’s talent development, like financial investment, as constructing a ‘talent portfolio’ that mixes multiple forms of talent – domestic, foreign, and diasporic – adjusting its portfolio over time to meet new risks and challenges,” he explains. Just as an investor may select different financial products in a mix of assets, countries can create talent portfolios by picking from various strategies.

Shin identifies four main strategies by which a country can harness talent – what he calls the four B's: 

• “Brain train” signifies efforts to develop and expand a country’s domestic talent or human capital.
• “Brain gain” refers to attracting foreign talent to strengthen the domestic workforce.
• “Brain circulation” involves bringing back nationals who have gone abroad for work or study.
• “Brain linkage” means leveraging the global networks and expertise of citizens living overseas through transnational collaboration.

Shin uses TPT as an analytical framework to examine how each of the four talent giants has constructed its distinct national talent portfolio and how this portfolio has evolved. As in an investment portfolio rebalancing, a nation can maintain diversification across the four B's and within each B. TPT therefore offers a holistic framework for understanding the overall picture of a country’s talent strategy, and how and why it may “rebalance” its talent portfolio.

Throughout the book, Shin shows that, while Japan has relied on the brain train strategy, Australia, whose population was too small for such an approach, emphasized brain gain. China used brain circulation: it first sent students and professionals abroad to learn, then implemented policies to encourage them to return. India, by contrast, established linkages among its diaspora and used them to develop its economy.

New Geopolitics of Global Talent: Lessons and Policy Implications

The case studies of the four talent giants reveal that there is no single path to talent-driven development. Each of the four Asia-Pacific countries has built its unique talent portfolio, balancing human and social capital, homegrown and foreign-educated individuals, and domestic and diasporic talents. While the talent giants use all four B's to some extent, each emphasizes them differently, reflecting diverse strategies and development paths. The core findings of these studies offer valuable insights for countries aiming to design effective talent policies. 

The four B's were instrumental in the economic rise of the four Asian nations, and they will be equally critical in addressing new challenges facing all economies, from demographic crises to emergent geopolitical tensions. For the United States, one such challenge is its sprawling competition with China, where the battle for talent is heating up in the race for technological supremacy.

Shin warns that the advantage the United States has long held in technological innovation, driven by its ability to attract skilled foreign talent, is now at risk from the Trump administration’s anti-immigration policies, pressures on universities, and cuts to research funding. “Immigrants have not just filled jobs,” he emphasizes. “They have created new industries and helped the US and their home countries. If the US makes it harder for talent to come in and stay, it risks hurting its long-term success.”

The Four Talent Giants is an outcome of Shin’s longstanding project investigating Talent Flows and Development, now one of the research tracks he leads at the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL), which he launched in 2022. Housed at APARC, the lab is an interdisciplinary research initiative addressing Asia’s social, cultural, economic, and political challenges through comparative, policy-relevant studies. SNAPL’s education mission is to cultivate the next generation of researchers and policy leaders by offering mentorships and fellowship opportunities for students and emerging scholars.

Shin notes that the SNAPL team illustrates all four B’s in his talent portfolio theory, as some members are U.S.-born and trained, some come from Asia and, after working at the lab, return to their home countries, whereas some stay here, promoting linkages with their home countries. “In many ways, this project shows what is possible when we invest in talent and encourage international collaboration.”

In the Media

Stanford Scholar Reveals How Talent Development Strategies Shape National Futures
The Korean Daily, July 13, 2025 (interview)
- English version
- Korean version

Demographic shifts worldwide have increased the number of older workers, and many economies are facing a critical question: Are their labor markets ready to support older workers?

Researchers have found that, in the United States, the surge of older workers has gone hand–in-hand with an increase in the number of “age-friendly jobs” – roles with working conditions more suitable for aging employees, such as placing fewer physical demands or offering greater scheduling flexibility. Yet it remains unclear whether comparable trends have taken hold in other aging economies.

A new study, published in the Journal of the Economics of Ageing, helps fill in this gap by examining the evolution of age-friendly jobs in South Korea (hereafter Korea), where the number of workers aged 50 and over increased by 165 percent from 2000 to 2023. Korea is now officially considered a "super-aged" society, and the government is doubling down on its efforts to bolster the workforce.

The study, co-authored by Hyeongsuk Kim and Chulhee Lee, both of Seoul National University, and Stanford health economist Karen Eggleston, the director of APARC’s Asia Health Policy Program, examines Korea’s workforce and economy to determine whether the nation significantly expanded its 50+ workforce by creating job opportunities favorable for older workers or if some other mechanism is at play. 

The co-authors examined the job characteristics experienced by older Koreans relative to their younger counterparts and U.S. older workers. Second, they analyzed data collected in 2020 about Korean workers, evaluating their jobs based on various parameters in the Age-Friendliness Index (AFI), a tool that measures the degree to which jobs are more suitable for older workers. The researchers considered AFI factors such as the requirement for heavy physical activity, the pace of the job, and the possibility of telecommuting. They also examined how the number of age-friendly jobs changed from 2000 to 2020.

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• Learn more about Dr. Eggleston's related research project, "Innovation for Healthy Aging" >

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The study finds that, while age-friendly jobs have increased in Korea, the number grew more slowly than in the United States, indicating that the U.S. market responded more quickly to changes in workforce demographics. Furthermore, the study indicates that older Koreans were not the main beneficiaries of age-friendly jobs. Instead, women and college-educated workers benefited more from these jobs, while non-college-educated men have seen fewer gains. “These results highlight the uneven adaptation of Korea’s labor market to demographic change and suggest that social norms and labor market frictions shape age-friendly job creation and who benefits from those jobs,” the researchers write.

The study also unveils that, in Korea, the working conditions of employees aged 50–61 differ significantly from those aged 62 or older. Despite the nation's high employment rates for those aged 65 and older, the researchers discovered that a third of working Koreans over the age of 62 held jobs requiring heavy physical activity and earned lower wages. Additionally, only a little over one-fifth of them had jobs that allowed for “mostly sitting.”

Labor Market Frictions

The study’s authors propose several explanations for why Korea’s economy, despite a significant increase in older workers, has not adapted as quickly as the United States in placing these workers in age-friendly occupations. One reason is Korea's comparatively low level of pension support, which forces workers to fill a disproportionate number of low-skilled, temporary, and day jobs. It may be that many older workers are forced to work, regardless of whether the jobs are friendly to their needs. Another reason may be the rigidities of the labor market, including strong protections against employees being laid off. Such protections are beneficial for workers, but they restrict companies' ability to restructure their workforce. Moreover, the role of chaebol, or large corporations, may also be significant. Although chaebol are producing and selling more, they have also increased automation and resorted to outsourcing instead of hiring additional workers.

Older workers in Korea are also facing competition from women for age-friendly jobs. The researchers noted significant gender-related changes in the country's education and employment levels. In 2009, the percentage of women enrolling in college surpassed that of men, and the percentage of women in the workforce increased by 2.5% from 2000 to 2023. Korean women are likely to have an even stronger preference for the flexibility of age-friendly jobs than American women because of gendered responsibilities for household production.

The study’s results, researchers said, reinforce key findings from previous studies: "that 'age-friendly' jobs appeal to many kinds of workers, not just older adults; and that labor market frictions shape who benefits from age-friendly jobs."

As governments grapple with rising life expectancies and shrinking traditional working-age populations, ensuring that older adults can continue working safely and with dignity is key to sustaining economic growth and social stability. According to the study, South Korea has made impressive strides in keeping older people in the workforce, but the next challenge is ensuring work itself evolves to meet their needs.