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The ROK-U.S. alliance must remain the core pillar of South Korea’s security, but “efforts to enhance autonomy and negotiating power through strategic diversification are also necessary, says APARC Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin.

Speaking at an international conference, The New Growth Paradigm in the AI ​​Era: The Evolving Role of Finance, hosted by the Institute for Global Economics and KB Financial Group on November 6, 2026, in Seoul, Shin pointed to shared pressures facing South Korea, Japan, and Europe across trade, investment, defense spending, and supply chains as reasons for closer cooperation among U.S. allies.

With AI competition increasingly centered on the United States and China, he argued that South Korea would inevitably need to align substantially with Washington, but that “passively following along is not necessarily desirable.” He stressed that cooperation among Seoul, Tokyo, and Europe should strengthen South Korea’s position within the alliance without replacing it or becoming an anti-China coalition.

For more, see the coverage of Shin’s remarks in Korean media: 

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As Arctic ice melts, South Korea sees new opportunities in energy, shipping, and shipbuilding – but also growing geopolitical risks tied to US-China-Russia competition.
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Gi-Wook Shin speaks at the international conference of the Institute for Global Economics and KB Financial Group on November 6, 2026, Seoul, South Korea.
Gi-Wook Shin speaks at the international conference of the Institute for Global Economics and KB Financial Group, November 6, 2026, Seoul, South Korea. | 이데일리 (E Daily)
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Speaking at an international conference in Seoul, Shin, director of APARC’s Korea Program, urged South Korea to strengthen its negotiating power through closer ties with Japan and Europe while keeping the U.S. alliance central to its security.

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After the Midterms: What’s Next for America’s Korea Policy?

The November 2026 midterm elections will shape the political landscape for the second half of the Trump presidency, raising important questions about the future direction of U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula. What will the future hold for the U.S.-South Korea alliance amid debates over OPCON transfer, burden-sharing, and nuclear submarines? How will Washington balance its security commitments to Seoul with the possibility of renewed diplomacy with Pyongyang? And how might the administration’s trade and economic agenda reshape bilateral relations, particularly with the ROK, and the growing importance of economic security? Experts will examine these interconnected dimensions of U.S. policy toward the two Koreas and assess their implications for regional security and economic relations. 

Co-sponsored by the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in San Francisco.
 

Speakers:
 

Michael L. Beeman is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Loyola Marymount University. He also is a Senior Associate (Non-resident), Japan Chair, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a Senior Fellow for Economic Security at The National Bureau of Asian Research.

From 2023-24, he was a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and university Lecturer and, during 2025, he was a Lecturer at UC San Diego. Prior to this, he served for over two decades in the federal government beginning at the Department of Commerce and then, for over 16 years, as a senior trade official and negotiator at the Office of the US Trade Representative (Executive Office of the President). As the Assistant US Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC, he led negotiations with Korea for the renegotiated U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (2018) and negotiations with Japan for the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement (2019).

He is the author of Walking Out: America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia Pacific and Beyond (2024, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center) and Public Policy and Economic Competition in Japan (2001, Routledge). He received his DPhil (PhD) in Politics from the University of Oxford, an MA in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Southern Methodist University. Dr. Beeman also was a Fulbright and Monbusho Scholar in Japan and an Advanced Research Fellow at Harvard University.
 

Mark Lambert joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as Visiting Scholar, China Program Fellow, for the 2026-2027 academic year, following a career in government with the U.S. Department of State. He served as China Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He oversaw the Office of China Coordination and the Office of Taiwan Coordination. Mark has extensive experience in China, cross-Strait, and Asia Pacific affairs. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary with responsibility for Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. Earlier he established the International Organizations Bureau’s office aimed at protecting UN integrity from authoritarianism and served as Special Envoy for North Korean Affairs.  Previously, he was named the State Department’s human rights officer of the year for devising a strategy to release Chinese political prisoners and promote religious freedom.
 

Sydney Seiler was the national intelligence officer for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council from 2020 to 2023 and is one of the nation’s top experts on North Korea. Previously, he was the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) senior analyst and senior defense intelligence expert for North Korea from 2016 to 2020, serving as the principal adviser and senior expert on Korean Peninsula security issues to the USFK commander and the U.S. Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Mr. Seiler also served as the U.S. special envoy for Six Party Talks (2014–2015), where he coordinated U.S. diplomacy and policy on the DPRK and led negotiations with North Korea. Prior to that, Mr. Seiler served as the director for Korea on the National Security Council (2011–2014). A member of the Senior National Intelligence Service, Mr. Seiler has over 40 years of experience focusing on Korean Peninsula affairs in a range of executive management, intelligence, and policy positions within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Analysis, the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, the CIA’s Open Source Center, and the National Security Agency. He has four decades of experience watching North Korea and 17 years of serving in South Korea. He received his MA degree in Korean studies from Yonsei University and is a graduate of the Korean language programs of the Defense Language Institute and Yonsei University.
 

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Visiting Scholar, China Program Fellow, 2026-2027
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Mark Lambert joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as Visiting Scholar, China Program Fellow, for the 2026-2027 academic year, following a career in government with the U.S. Department of State.  He served as China Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He oversaw the Office of China Coordination and the Office of Taiwan Coordination. Mark has extensive experience in China, cross-Strait, and Asia Pacific affairs. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary with responsibility for Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands.  Earlier he established the International Organizations Bureau’s office aimed at protecting UN integrity from authoritarianism and served as Special Envoy for North Korean Affairs.  Previously, he was named the State Department’s human rights officer of the year for devising a strategy to release Chinese political prisoners and promote religious freedom. 

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Sydney Seiler, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies
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Working paper banner showing an Asian female doctor standing and listening to an older Asian male patient sitting.

Population aging has increased the importance of understanding how long-term care interacts with healthcare. This paper examines the effects of Korea’s Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) reforms on healthcare utilization by exploiting successive eligibility expansions through changes in the Grade 3 eligibility cutoff in 2008, 2012, and 2013. Using the Korea Elderly Cohort Database and a regression discontinuity difference-in-differences design with individual fixed effects, the author estimates the causal effects of LTCI eligibility on overall and disease-specific healthcare utilization.

The results show that LTCI expansions significantly reduced inpatient healthcare utilization, with the effects following the 2008 introduction of LTCI substantially larger than those of subsequent eligibility expansions. The reductions were primarily driven by hospitalizations for diabetes and pneumonia, while outpatient visits for depression and dementia increased.

The findings suggest that LTCI both substitutes for avoidable inpatient care and complements outpatient care for conditions requiring continuous management. Rather than simply reducing healthcare utilization, LTCI reallocates healthcare use toward more appropriate patterns of care, highlighting the importance of better integrating long-term care and healthcare systems in rapidly aging societies.

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Evidence from Korea’s Long-Term Care Insurance Reforms

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Eunkyeong Lee
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Professor Oh Byung Kwon joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as visiting scholar for the 2026-2027 year. He currently serves as Professor in the School of Management at Kyung Hee University. While at APARC, he will be conducting research on embedding deliberative democracy in AI systems, with a focus on democratic institutions in the Asia-Pacific including South Korea.

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Flyer for the seminar "The Rise and Future of the Korean Semiconductor Memory Industry," featuring headshot of the speaker,  C.S. Park.

The recent Nasdaq debut of a Korean semiconductor memory producer, SK hynix—raising $26.5 billion in the largest-ever listing by a foreign company—has garnered global recognition after temporarily overtaking Samsung Electronics as South Korea’s most valuable chipmaker. Together, the two companies account for more than half of KOSPI’s total market capitalization.

This talk will explore how South Korea built a globally competitive semiconductor memory industry, navigated intense industry competition and consolidation, survived historical boom-and-bust cycles, and emerged as a crucial player in the global artificial intelligence (AI) era. Specifically, the discussion will shed light on how South Korean firms overcame initial technological, financial, and human capital constraints to ultimately transform a historically low-margin commodity memory business into the highly profitable High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) products required for AI. Finally, the presentation will consider the future trajectory of Korea’s memory industry, including Moore’s Law, the growing semiconductor ecosystem, its U.S. footprint, the rise of Chinese memory makers, engineering talent, demand cyclicality, stock volatility, socio-economic impact, and geopolitics as the global AI industry continues to evolve.

Speaker:
C.S. Park is the former Chairman and CEO of Hynix Semiconductor (now SK hynix). In 1983, he joined Hyundai Electronics as a founding member, where he held several positions, including President of U.S. operations, Head of Semiconductor Marketing & Sales, and CEO. He was instrumental in restructuring and transforming Hyundai Electronics into Hynix Semiconductor, a leading memory company. He was also Maxtor’s CEO until its merger with Seagate, where he served as Lead Independent Director. In the past, he served on a number of boards, including DLA Piper, Enphase Energy, Computer Sciences Corp., Ballard Power, Brooks Automation, Smart Modular, STATS ChipPAC, and Silicon Valley Community Foundation. Currently, he serves as a Board Advisor for ScaleFlux, a memory and storage company scaling the AI data pipeline.

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C.S. Park, former Chairman and CEO, Hynix Semiconductor (now SK hynix)
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Registration: The Rise and Future of the Korean Semiconductor Memory Industry: Perspectives and Insights from 1983 to 2026 and Beyond. Photo: C.S. Park
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Korea's Nuclear Odyssey -October 29 at 12 p.m. PT with Eunjung Lim

Every odyssey begins with a departure, but the Odyssey is also a story of return—not just to where one began, but to lessons learned along the way.

South Korea’s nuclear journey beyond its borders spans three landmark projects: KEDO in North Korea, Barakah in the United Arab Emirates, and Dukovany in the Czech Republic. Each unfolded in a different international environment, from nonproliferation and energy cooperation to commercial competition and today’s renewed concerns over geopolitics and energy security. Dr. Lim compares these projects to trace the evolution of Korea’s nuclear export capabilities. As AI and data centers add new momentum to nuclear energy, she asks whether Korea’s path forward may ultimately lead back to an earlier lesson: the importance of international cooperation.

Speaker:
Eunjung Lim is a visiting scholar at APARC and professor in International Studies at Kongju National University in Korea. Her research focuses on international cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, comparative and global governance, and energy, nuclear, and climate change policies in East Asia. She previously served as a board member of the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (May 2018–July 2024) and as a member of the Subcommittee on Energy and Just Transition of the Presidential Commission on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth. She currently serves as a member of the Policy Advisory Committee for the Ministry of Unification and as a member of the governing board of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

Dr. Lim received a BA from the University of Tokyo, an MIA from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, and a PhD from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

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Eunjung Lim, Visiting Scholar, APARC; Professor, Division of International Studies, Kongju National University
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Yulia Yun

As long-term care (LTC) services and public coverage expand, concerns about improper billing and fraudulent claims have also grown. These practices can divert public resources and place vulnerable beneficiaries at risk across LTC systems. In response, countries have developed approaches to identifying suspicious activities, investigating potential fraud, recovering improper payments, and imposing administrative, civil, or criminal consequences, reflecting the structure of their LTC systems and the types of misconduct they encounter. Although these systems differ across countries, cross-national comparison can reveal reciprocal policy and practice lessons regarding case triage, evidence development, interorganizational coordination, payment recovery, and enforcement. This study compares LTC fraud oversight and investigation practices in the United States, Japan, and South Korea to identify transferable lessons for developing effective and sustainable fraud-control systems that preserve continuity of care for residents.

Speaker: Hyunkyung "Yulia" Yun, PhD, MS, MSW, is an Assistant Professor at the Herbert Wertheim School of Public Health and Human Longevity Science, UC San Diego. She earned her PhD in Health Services Research, specializing in health economics, at the Brown University School of Public Health. Her research evaluates health policies and care delivery systems affecting older adults, focusing on long-term care, managed care, and quality of care, using causal inference methods with claims, assessment, and EMR data. Previously, she worked at South Korea's National Health Insurance Service as a fraud investigator and researcher supporting the country's long-term care insurance system.

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Hyunkyung (Yulia) Yun, Assistant Professor, University of California San Diego
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Lessons from the United States, Japan, and South Korea

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Natalia holds a Master of Arts in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), with concentrations in General International Relations and International Economics and a minor in Korea Studies. She also earned a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, majoring in Anthropology, Asian Studies, and International Studies, and studied abroad at Yonsei University in Seoul.

Natalia brings more than eight years of experience in international affairs, policy research, and program management, most recently serving as a Research Analyst and Assistant Editor with the Henry L. Stimson Center's 38 North and Korea Program.

Throughout her career, she has led complex research initiatives, managed grant-funded policy programs, engaged with U.S. and international government stakeholders, and contributed extensively to research and publications focused on the Korean Peninsula, Indo-Pacific security, and human rights.

In addition to her professional expertise, Natalia is multilingual, speaking native English as well as intermediate Korean and Spanish, enabling her to collaborate effectively with a diverse range of international partners.

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This essay first appeared in The Diplomat.



For decades, South Korean strategy rested on a stable hierarchy within the international order. The alliance with the United States provided security; Seoul then managed relations with Japan, Europe, China, and regional institutions around that anchor. The alliance remains indispensable, but Seoul can no longer assume that this foundation will stay stable.

The evidence is visible in the way Washington now deals with allies. In 2025, the United States initially announced sharply differentiated “reciprocal” tariffs on South Korea, Japan, and the European Union. Negotiations later produced a 15 percent baseline framework for all three, but the process mattered as much as the final rate. Trade access, industrial investment, defense procurement, and alliance politics were increasingly handled as one bargaining package. Allies were not exempt from economic pressure because they were allies.

At the same time, Europe and Asia have been building connections that would have seemed highly ambitious a decade ago. The European Union signed security and defense partnerships with Japan and South Korea in November 2024. This year, the EU and Japan launched a defense-industry dialogue, while the EU and South Korea signed a digital trade agreement and began implementing cooperation on maritime security, cyber and hybrid threats, information manipulation, space, and the defense industry. The strategic map is becoming more networked. 

The network, however, remains uneven. Japan already has a mature economic partnership with the EU and rapidly expanding defense-industry ties. EU-South Korea relations are deepening, but they still lack the density and regular strategic consultation found in EU-Japan ties. A trilateral format would therefore do more than add another meeting: it would reduce asymmetry among three partners whose capabilities are increasingly complementary.


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The postwar hierarchy cannot simply be preserved by demanding more reassurance from Washington. Its resilience will depend on whether allies can build connective tissue among themselves before the next crisis forces them to improvise.
Gi-Wook Shin

South Korea, Japan, and the EU now face four converging challenges and pressures.

The first is demographic. South Korea is aging faster than any other OECD society; Japan’s working-age population has been shrinking for decades; and the EU’s fertility rate reached a new low in 2024. Demography is not a social-policy sidebar. It affects defense recruitment, industrial capacity, fiscal room, technological adoption, and the ability to sustain long-term commitments. Each actor is experimenting with immigration, automation, workforce policy, and welfare reform, but the security implications remain largely compartmentalized.

The second is concentrated economic dependence. None of the three can or should decouple from China. Yet South Korea’s experience after the THAAD deployment, Europe’s debates over economic coercion, and China’s export controls on gallium, germanium, and other strategic inputs have shown that interdependence can be converted into leverage. De-risking therefore requires more than national stockpiles. It requires shared risk maps, compatible certification, co-investment in alternative suppliers, and advance consultation before export controls or industrial subsidies create collateral damage among partners.

The third challenge is U.S. volatility. The United States is still the only actor capable of providing extended nuclear deterrence to South Korea and Japan, and NATO remains central to European defense. But dependence on U.S. power now coexists with uncertainty about U.S. policy. The classic alliance dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment are no longer opposite ends of a spectrum. Today, U.S. allies fear both being left out and being drawn into bargains or contingencies they did not shape.

The fourth pressure is the collapse of the old geographic separation between European and Asian security. North Korean munitions, missiles, and troops have supported Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow, in turn, has provided Pyongyang with political cover, economic support, and the prospect of military know-how. What happens on a European battlefield is changing the military balance on the Korean Peninsula. A regional response to a cross-regional threat is structurally inadequate.

This is the case for an EU-Japan-South Korea strategic dialogue. This framework should not be described as strategic autonomy, equidistance, or a hedge against the United States. A better term would be institutionalized hedging: risk diversification through standing, rule-based consultation among allies and partners that remain anchored in the broader U.S.-led system.

The proposal is more feasible than ever before. Japan-South Korea relations have improved significantly in recent years. The January 2026 summit in Nara and the reciprocal summit in South Korea in May demonstrated continuity across leadership changes in both countries since June 2025. The EU already has free-trade, digital, green, and security frameworks with both countries. The task is not to invent three new bilateral relationships; it is to connect existing ones.

The dialogue should begin modestly, through a Track 1.5 process involving officials, experts, and industry. Its early agenda must be concrete and specific: a joint critical minerals and supply chain risk assessment; consultation on export controls and investment screening; cooperation on AI, cyber resilience, and digital standards; exchanges on demographic and defense workforce adaptation; and shared monitoring of North Korea-Russia military cooperation. Successful projects could then be elevated to ministerial working groups.

Two design choices are essential. First, the initiative must remain function-driven. It is not NATO, not the Quad, and not an anti-China coalition. Its purpose is to reduce vulnerability without demanding economic separation. Second, it should be complementary to relations with Washington and transparent about that purpose. Horizontal networks strengthen alliances when they help allies absorb shocks, coordinate positions, and arrive at consultations with greater capacity.

For South Korea, the need is particularly acute. Japan already has the G7, a mature economic partnership with the EU, and expanding European defense ties. Seoul’s international weight has grown faster than its institutional depth. An EU-Japan-South Korea dialogue would help close that gap.

Horizontalizing alliances is not a vote of no confidence in the United States. It is insurance for the moments when the United States wavers, overreaches, or changes course. The postwar hierarchy cannot simply be preserved by demanding more reassurance from Washington. Its resilience will depend on whether allies can build connective tissue among themselves before the next crisis forces them to improvise.

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The trilateral is more feasible – and more important – than ever before.

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Across the world, populations are aging rapidly as people live longer and fertility rates continue to decline. Asia is at the vanguard of this demographic shift. The number of older adults (aged 60 and above) in the region is projected to triple between 2010 and 2050, reaching nearly 1.3 billion people. As Asian economies face this “silver wave,” helping older adults live safely and independently at home – a concept known as aging in place – has become a policy imperative.

At a recent webinar held during Stanford Health AI Week, the Asia Health Policy Program (AHPP) at Shorenstein APARC brought together experts from China, Singapore, and South Korea to share insights into the potential of health AI to allow older adults to enjoy healthy aging and avoid or postpone institutionalization. 

Moderated by Stanford health economist Karen Eggleston, the director of AHPP, the webinar featured Hongsoo Kim, a professor of health policy and aging at Seoul National University’s Graduate School of Public Health and director of its Artificial Intelligence Institute’s Center for AI in Health and Care; Xiaochen Ma, an assistant professor of health economics at Peking University’s China Center for Health Development Studies; and Tien Yin Wong, a physician-scientist-innovator and the senior vice-chancellor of Tsinghua Medicine and vice-provost of Tsinghua University, who has also worked and held senior leadership roles in Singapore and Australia as a practicing retinal specialist with a research portfolio on retinal diseases, ocular imaging, AI, and digital technology.

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Here are six lessons from the front lines of Asia’s efforts to integrate AI into elderly health care and advance aging in place:

1. Adopt a Whole Systems Approach


In South Korea, the world's fastest-ageing society, automated systems like "CLOVA CareCall" – an AI-powered well-being dialer – conduct natural-sounding check-ins with solo-dwelling seniors, boasting a 96% response rate. Yet, Professor Kim emphasizes that checking in with people in need of health care is only half the battle.

If an AI flags an isolated senior at risk of depression, cognitive decline, or a physical abnormality, but the local community lacks the social workers or clinical pathways to intervene, then the health care system has failed.

“The question is not only whether AI can detect something, but how a health and care system acts on it,” she says. “Detection by itself changes nothing. A warning that no one follows up on helps no one. So the gap I care about is not the model’s cleverness itself. It is whether the system delivers.”

2. Solve the Entire "Care Cascade"


In rural China, traditional diabetic screening rates hover below 33%, leaving millions at risk of Diabetic Retinopathy (DR), a leading cause of blindness. Professor Ma shared how deploying an AI screening model successfully pushed screening rates past 85%.

The research team, however, discovered a glaring bottleneck: only 21% of high-risk patients actually followed up to receive sight-saving treatments. To fill this gap, Ma’s team designed an "AI Plus” model (v2.0) that integrates immediate, local-language counseling at the point of screening. To keep seniors healthy at home, AI solutions must address the entire clinical journey, from initial scan to final treatment.

“Many of the AI tools have been focused on diagnosis accuracy or validation rather than going downstream to the entire cascade of whether improved screening will translate into improved referral and the ultimate health outcomes,” says Ma.

3. Align with Local Workflows and Incentives


AI and other technology solutions for health often fail because they expect overworked care workers to adopt entirely new habits. Professor Ma noted that digital health interventions in rural China succeeded only when they integrated seamlessly into existing daily routines.

Instead of forcing clinicians to use complex new software, successful pilots utilized WeChat, the ubiquitous messaging app already open on every phone. Furthermore, the technology must align with the financial and professional incentives of frontline health workers. If an AI tool increases their administrative burden without simplifying their day or boosting their clinical efficiency, then it will remain unused.

4. Design Human-Centered AI for Health Equity


Professor Wong highlighted the ethical risk that AI tools will worsen, rather than reduce, health care disparities. This challenge is driven by the dynamics of “Inverse Care Law,” where AI disproportionately benefits the already advantaged, and the “Recursive Care Law,” where this inequality becomes a self-reinforcing cycle embedded in the system.

Because younger, more tech-savvy individuals generate more health data, AI models become better at serving them than the intended users of aging-in-place technologies. This creates a vicious cycle where the very tools designed to support aging populations end up marginalizing them. Governments must devise policies to mandate fair data coverage and usability, ensuring that AI serves society's most vulnerable members equitably, Wong stated.

Professor Kim noted that her team found that only about 38% of community care agencies in Korea have adopted AI and that the adoption rate varied sharply by region. In fact, districts with the greatest need may have the least access to these powerful tools. This challenge is a fundamental design gap rather than a technology gap, Professor Kim argues. To be genuinely equitable, a system must be built from the start to actively track who is missing and automatically route support back to them. This requires two  human-centered design key principles:

I. Universal by Default: The hardest-to-reach should not have to be the most persistent in navigating the technology.

II. Connected Across Sectors: Long-term care, social care, and health care must act as one integrated system rather than disconnected silos, each of which sees only part of the person’s needs.

5. Augment, Do Not Replace, the Human Touch


The panelists rejected the trope of robots replacing human caregivers. Instead, they view AI as an essential force multiplier for an overstretched workforce.

Whether it is South Korea’s deployment of 12,000 AI companion robots to combat senior isolation, or automated triage tools in clinics, the goal should be to offload administrative and routine tasks. This frees up human social workers and clinicians to do what they do best: deliver hands-on, empathetic care.

6. Value Real-World Outcomes Over Technical Novelty


Healthcare systems should prioritize rigorous, real-world case studies that prove actual clinical value, such as reduced mortality, lower rates of blindness, or fewer nursing home admissions, rather than celebrating high validation benchmarks in a laboratory.

To build robust future health AI systems, the experts concluded, the academic and tech sectors must also courageously publish and analyze their failed trials to understand what truly works in the chaotic reality of home-based care.

While AI holds immense promise for helping people grow old at home, “age tech” alone cannot solve the elder care crisis, the panelists agreed.


 

In the Media


Dr. Eggleston joined Jeffrey Snyder, host of the Broadcast Retirement Network, to discuss highlights and takeaways from the webinar discussion. Watch below:

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Top aging and healthy policy experts from China, Singapore, and South Korea agree that helping older adults age at home requires addressing systemic health care bottlenecks rather than racing to build smarter AI models.

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