Click here for a transcript of “We Need To Rethink Our Assumptions about China’s Strategic Goals”

Where China Was in the 1990s

Twenty years ago, the Chinese-Taiwan invasion plan was to take a couple of fishing vessels and paddle their way across the strait. In the 1990s, China had very limited, and often no ability to fly over water, or at night, or in weather, and their ships had no defenses.

For many, many years we knew that China was willing to fight if Taiwan declared independence. Fighting a war in any country that is big and resolved is problematic. But it was never the case that the United States was going to lose that war; it was always a matter of, “How many days?” How many days is it going to take us to win?

Where China Is Now

In the intervening years, China's military has changed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Now they have the largest navy in the world, and those ships are some of the most advanced surface ships that can be comparable to those of the United States. Same with their fighters; they have fifth generation airplanes and the largest airforce in the region. They’ve put all these capabilities online, and at the same time, they [have also] started developing capabilities to reach out and touch the United States with.

They developed the capability to hit moving ships at sea, which is something the United States doesn’t have the capability to do. They have a huge cruise and ballistic missile program that basically can take out a U.S. base like Kadena  in the region in a matter of hours, should they ever be willing to make a direct hit on the U.S.

This doesn't mean that China is more powerful than the United States; China still can’t project power outside the Indo-Pacific region, and even there it’s mostly through space, cyber, and nuclear weapons. But most of the contingencies we're talking about are really close to China, so it doesn’t really matter that they can’t project power. So, on the conventional side, I’m very concerned.

Why Taiwan Matters

The whole goal of the Communist Party, since its founding in 1949, has been to resolve this Taiwan issue.

Now they have the ships, the aircraft, and they’ve reorganized their whole military so that they can do joint operations, so that the navy and the air force can do an invasion of Taiwan. And a lot of those efforts came to a successful conclusion at the end of 2020. And that's why people like myself, not because of  the capabilities, but because when I was in Beijing and talked to the Chinese military and government officials, they said, “We could do this now, and maybe we should think about it.”

We know from behavioral economics that countries and people are much more willing to take risks to not lose something that they think is theirs, versus when they are trying to get something which they don't think is theirs. In the Chinese mindset, Taiwan, the South China Sea, East China Sea, etc. is already theirs, and the United States is trying to take it from them. That makes the situation even more problematic. 

What the United States Should Do

The Biden administration is doing a lot of political maneuvering to show that the United States is willing to defend Taiwan. And I think it’s just upsetting Beijing, because they think we’re changing the political status quo. It also does nothing to enhance our deterrence, because it doesn't signal anything about our capability to defend Taiwan.

The Chinese basically assume the United States will intervene. Their big question is, can they still win? We need to show China that they cannot win, and that’s about showing out capabilities in the region. It’s about aggressively negotiating new host arrangements, more access for the U.S. military, and new international institutions and treaties that constrain the ways China leverages power.

I'm a military person, but I'm totally on board with leading with diplomacy. But I don't see those types of efforts coming out of the Biden administration. They seem to want to double down and do the same things, just with more allies and partners.  I'm supportive of it, but I just don't think it's enough.

This interview was first published by the Stanford News Service.

When President Joe Biden meets with his Chinese counterpart President Xi Jinping next week, they will both want to show the world that the two countries have common and compatible objectives and that cooperation is possible, says Stanford scholar Thomas Fingar.

While there are real differences between the two countries, global threats exist that require joint effort to address, such as nuclear proliferation and the danger of new arms races, said Fingar in an interview with Stanford News Service.

In anticipation of the upcoming summit scheduled for Monday, Fingar discusses what to expect when the two leaders meet and what goals Biden will want to work towards as it fits with his larger objectives for the U.S.

Fingar is a Shorenstein fellow at The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), which is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is leading a multi-year study, China and the World, that seeks to better understand China’s global engagement.

Fingar returned to Stanford in 2009 after having served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94) and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held several positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Where does diplomacy between the U.S. and China now stand?

Friction between Beijing and Washington did not put an end to diplomatic exchanges, but having markedly different approaches has inhibited the two sides. Simply stated, the United States has sought to work on specific global and bilateral problems to achieve priority objectives such as limiting greenhouse gases and reducing the dangers of unconstrained nuclear, space and cyber competition. China has maintained that “building trust” and improvement of the overall bilateral relationship are prerequisites for progress on specific issues. Developments in the run-up to the summit, such as the joint climate statement in Glasgow, suggest that Beijing has relaxed its preconditions.

How does the summit symbolize a diplomatic reset?

Both symbolically and substantively, the summit will empower lower-level officials in both countries to work on issues within their purview. This is more significant in China, where clear signals from the top are necessary for subordinates to engage, but it will also help to mitigate paralysis on the U.S. side resulting from competing visions of how best to address China-related issues.

What issues will be top of mind for Biden and Xi?

Both will want to diminish exaggerated characterizations of bilateral friction as evidence that we have entered a new Cold War and may be on the verge of conflict, and that cooperation on any issue is impossible. We have very real disagreements, but we also have many common or compatible objectives. Helping domestic and external audiences to understand that things are not nearly as dire as many observers contend will be a priority objective. Beyond that, I think clarifying matters of greatest concern to the other side and establishing mechanisms to address them will be on the agenda.

What areas can they agree on and where can they make progress?

They are likely to find it easier to agree on issues requiring joint effort than on the best way to address issues like nuclear proliferation (Iran and North Korea), new weapons systems and the danger of new arms races (hypersonic glide vehicles, cyber and kinetic threats to nuclear surveillance and command and control systems) and transition to cleaner energy sources.

What areas will spark disagreement and will these issues come up?

I suspect that both leaders will feel compelled to raise all of the high salience concerns in their countries. For Biden, that list includes Xinjiang, Hong Kong, PRC [People’s Republic of China] actions near Taiwan and the rollback of opportunities for Americans in China. Xi will raise U.S. military operations around China’s periphery, arms sales and relations with Taiwan, restrictions on visas for Chinese citizens and Chinese investment in the U.S., among other issues.

What would signal that the meeting was productive?

The fact that it has occurred will be significant because it will open the door to other, hopefully, less contentious exchanges across a broad spectrum of issues. Easing of travel restrictions should be easy to achieve but of more than symbolic importance. I doubt that the meeting is designed to solve any of the difficult issues in our relationship.

What do you think about Biden’s approach to China?

I agree with the President’s focus on his largely domestic “Build Back Better” agenda. Spending the time, effort and political capital necessary to secure approval of measures to address infrastructure, energy, education, childcare, internet access and a host of social justice, pandemic and voter protection issues are, in my opinion, more important than trying to improve relations with China for the sake of improving the relationship. Where working with China is necessary and/or perceived to be possible for achieving other domestic and foreign policy goals, he should do so. I think the fact that this summit is taking place is a sign that he is attempting to do that, but I judge that he is unwilling to jeopardize his ability to achieve higher priority objectives by making concessions to Beijing merely to create the appearance of a better relationship.

Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro discussed America's strategic, military, and economic interests in Taiwan, as well as the potential for an outbreak of armed conflict on WBUR's "On Point" with Meghna Chakrabarti. 

Mastro first reflected on the escalation of Chinese miliary activity in the Taiwan Strait and the potential likelihood of conflict in the immediate future, stating that, "The increase in recent tensions does not tell us that there's a higher likelihood of war...we have this uptick in Chinese military activity in the vicinity of Taiwan...the number of air incursions in particular has increased exponentially."

The month of October, in particular, saw record high rates of Chinese aircraft with a record high on October 4 with 56 aircraft, and 159 aircraft total entering Taiwan's air defense identification zone.

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Mastro then suggested that the recent displays of military power are not indicative of a plan to invade Taiwan immediately. "I think this is mainly political signaling, Beijing is trying to tell Taiwan, you're on your own...as much as the United States can make statements, can make agreements like AUKUS with the Australians, when push comes to shove, they are not here," she said.

Mastro indicated that the situation with Taiwan is part of a larger great power competition in which China aims to exert global influence. "The bottom line is that China has a different vision of what it wants the world to be like. And it's not only that China wants to control what governments do, they want to control what corporations, universities, individuals can say and do," she said.

"China has demonstrated whenever it has economic power, diplomatic power, or military power, they are more than willing to use it to hurt others...if [U.S.] national security has been free from foreign dictation, being free from other countries telling the United States and the American people what to do, then it's absolutely critical that we stand up to China," said Mastro.

When asked about the prevention of armed conflict, Mastro argued that "War is very easy to prevent, you just give the other side everything they want. The difficulty is ensuring our own peace and security, stability and prosperity in the face of this challenge. And so for that reason, I think [Taiwan] is very important, and Taiwan is only the the biggest Flashpoint and the first step to ensuring that the United States maintains its position in Asia and therefore its position in the world."

Listen to the full conversation here.

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Studies of human rights in North Korea are even more important now, in light of North Korea’s response to COVID-19, said Shin at the opening of the discussion. The DPRK has kept its borders closed for nearly two years, resulting in reduced trade and worsening the economic and social situation of its population.

Ambassador King, who was also a 2019-20 Koret Fellow and Visiting Scholar at APARC, identified the guiding questions of the volume, indicating that “This conundrum that we talk about in the title is an interaction between security and human rights. Is there a tradeoff? If we focus on human rights, does that make it more difficult for us to deal with security issues? If we focus on security issues do we have to ignore human rights?” 

An Error of Zero-Sum Thinking

While North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the security threat it poses have occupied the center stage and eclipsed other issues in recent years, the book’s contributors posit that human rights promotion remains an integral part of U.S. policy on the Korean peninsula. In his chapter, Victor Cha, Senior Vice President and Korea Chair at CSIS and former Koret Fellow and Visiting Scholar at APARC, analyzes the error in the zero-sum logic of North Korean human rights. "The United States sees a zero-sum relationship between pressing for human rights and denuclearization negotiations, while South Korea sees a zero-sum relationship between pressing for human rights and inter-Korean engagement," explains Cha. But the denuclearization and human rights agendas are inextricably intertwined.

The lost ground on addressing the North Korean human rights crisis is still recoverable, the contributors to The North Korean Conundrum believe. How could North Korea engage on human rights? The chapters in the volume lay out a number of ways. One opportunity to address human rights issues is through health and humanitarian assistance. Another way is to promote the economic and consumer rights of North Korean citizens to improve their quality of life and help foster a nascent civil society. And yet another way is to support information flow to the North. 

Interwoven Challenges

Nat Kretchun, Vice President for Programs at the Open Technology Fund, examines in his chapter the changing information environment in North Korea, observing how the information control system North Korean authorities are constructing is broadly characterized by an effort to move communications and media consumption onto state-controlled networks via state-sanctioned devices. The central aim is to create a “clean” information environment in which North Korean citizens use approved networked devices that technologically prevent the consumption and spread of unsanctioned content. At the same time, North Korean authorities have come to terms with a more marketized economic future. "Mobile phones have the ability to facilitate market-based economic transactions, the primary driver of much of what (limited) internal economic growth the country is seeing," notes Kretchun.

The contributors all agree that the challenge of human rights in North Korea is a complex one. It is intertwined with a host of issues, including life in the North Korean police state, inter-Korean relations, denuclearization, access to information, and international cooperation—all topics the volume addresses. We frequently separate these issues for analytical purposes or because they are dealt with in different ways or by different entities. But in fact, they are inseparable. Recognizing this interrelationship is the first step toward moving forward in a way that addresses the very serious North Korean security concerns while at the same time bringing human rights and humanitarian concerns into the equation.

Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro discussed America's Taiwan policy with CNN's Fareed Zakaria and Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass. 

After President Biden affirmed that the United States would protect Taiwan from a Chinese attack, the White House clarified that the President was not announcing a shift in U.S. policy, which is purposefully left ambiguous.

When asked why Taiwan was such a pressing issue for China, Mastro indicated that "there's political, social, and emotional components...the emotional component has to do with the fact that the Communist Party won the Civil War in 1949, the nationalists fled to Taiwan, and that war is not over until Taiwan becomes part of China." They believe that their "national rejuvenation cannot be complete until the seven decades-long civil war comes to an end."

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"If you had asked me four years ago what is the likelihood that China would attack Taiwan I would have put it at zero percent, and now I put it at 60 percent, and that is largely because Deng Xiaoping had to kick the can down the road because he didn't have a lot of options, and then they decided to build their economy so they had the economic power base, and then under Xi Jinping they really accelerated the military modernization," said Mastro.

In the intervew, Mastro, Haass, and Zakaria also discuss the economic and diplomatic risks that China would face should the nation attempt to invade Taiwan. 

Watch the full intervew here.

China's hypersonic missile test signals that it "no longer feels deterred by the presence of the U.S. military in Asia and therefore we can expect a much more aggressive and difficult China in future years," said Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro in conversation with Bloomberg's David Westin.

"This is hugely significant, from the very specifics of the ability of the United States to protect the homeland against nuclear attack, to the broader great power competition in tech. China now has the ability not only to deliver a nuclear weapon to the United States, but because this vehicle flies lower and is more maneuverable it can evade any missile defenses that the United States has," she said.

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Mastro describes Chinese military technology advancements, and their implications for the United States and the broader arena of technological development. "The Chinese have been far more advanced in some technologies, like this hypersonic boost vehicle that they tested, and other areas like artificial intelligence and quantum computing. These are areas where the Chinese government has invested a lot of resources," said Mastro. 

In the intervew, Mastro and Westin also discuss the shifting threat perception of NATO, and the potential impact that a broadening of its strategic mission might entail for Chinese military ambitions.

Listen to the full interview here.