Trade
Authors
Lisa Griswold
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

As the inaugural meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank sets to convene, Stanford researcher Thomas Fingar discusses findings from his new book that seeks to study China’s objectives and methods of engagement with other countries. Much of China’s behavior is determined by its own cost-benefit analysis of the perceived effect engagement would have on its security and development.

As China has pursued modernization over the past 35 years, patterns have emerged that shed light on the government’s foreign policy decision-making, according to new research by Thomas Fingar, a Stanford distinguished fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC).

Since 1979, China’s foreign policy has been underscored by two priorities – security and development. Knowing those priorities, analysts can attempt to better study and anticipate China’s relations with other countries even in the wake of unforeseen events in the global system.

“China’s increased activity around the world has elicited both anxiety and admiration in neighboring countries eager to capitalize on opportunities but worried about Beijing’s growing capabilities. Yet as is the case with all countries, what China can do is shaped by global and regional developments beyond its control,” said Fingar, the editor of The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform.

The book, which has a total of 13 authors, is the first in a series published by Stanford University Press that examines China’s changing relationships in Asia and with other portions of the world. It is also an outcome of the research project “China and the World.” Fingar, who heads the project, draws upon his experience from five decades working on Asia and more than 25 years in U.S. government, including as chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

Framework to analyze China’s foreign policy

One dimension of the research project examines how China’s policies and priorities are shaped by China’s perceptions about how much a country threatens or addresses China’s security concerns; a second dimension examines China’s perceptions about how much a country can contribute to China’s pursuit of sustained economic growth and modernization.

To explore these relationships, Fingar developed a framework for analysis using a matrix that displays, on one axis, China’s perceptions about the threat to China’s security posed by a country or region, and on the other axis, China’s perceptions about a country or region’s capacity to contribute to China’s development.

By comparing the position of a given country or region from one period to another, the matrix both predicts the character of China’s policies and reveals a pattern over time. The figure below illustrates China’s views in 1979 and 2016.


[[{"fid":"223290","view_mode":"crop_870xauto","fields":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":false,"field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":false,"field_credit[und][0][value]":"","field_caption[und][0][value]":"","field_related_image_aspect[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto"},"type":"media","field_deltas":{"1":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":false,"field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":false,"field_credit[und][0][value]":"","field_caption[und][0][value]":"","field_related_image_aspect[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto"}},"link_text":null,"attributes":{"width":"870","class":"media-element file-crop-870xauto","data-delta":"1"}}]]


In 1979, India and countries in Central Asia figured high on the threat axis because of their relationship with the Soviet Union and low on capacity to provide the resources China needed to jumpstart its economy, Fingar said.

At that time, China sought to address both its priority security concerns and developmental goals by improving ties with Europe, Japan and the United States. South and Central Asia were afforded lower priority, he said.

In the 1990s, however, China’s perceptions shifted as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union and a decade of economic success in China, Fingar explained. Shown in the matrix, China’s policies toward Central Asia changed as the region transitioned to a more favorable security position by 2000 and as China required additional resources (energy, technology, training, etc.) to fuel its growing economy.

Fingar said China’s increased engagement with South Asia was buttressed by a need for markets and investment opportunities, and furthered along by a reduction in the threat environment as India altered its relationship with Russia and Pakistan became a less valuable security partner.

Calculating who China will engage with and how has become much clearer, yet in some ways it has also become more complicated, according to Fingar.

“The countries that can do the most for China today often pose the greatest perceived long-term threat, namely the United States and its allies,” he said. “Conversely, China’s proclaimed closest friends—North Korea and Pakistan—can do little to assist China’s development and pose increasing danger to its security.”

Current policy applications

Over the past three years, Chinese President Xi Jinping has embarked on numerous projects with neighbors and other countries around the world, such as the “new Silk Road,” a trans-continental trade route that will link countries together, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral development bank that plans to lend money to poorer parts of Asia for building infrastructure.

The objectives of both initiatives are consistent with the China’s prioritization of security and development, Fingar said. The AIIB and Silk Road initiative indicate that China assumes there are gains from economic integration, and this is largely due to the fact that China has already benefited from past projects.

In 2001, the Chinese government launched concerted efforts to improve its relationships with Central Asian countries because of China’s concern that the United States was seeking to “contain” China, he said. Outcomes have included newfound markets for China’s manufactured goods and increased stability in separatist areas near or on its borders.

“By taking such a big stake in building infrastructure, China has changed the dynamic of the region,” he said. “Anybody can use a road, railroad or bridge. China has helped stitch together the economies of different countries in ways they have never been before.”

For China, the AIIB and the Silk Road initiative are also a form of “soft power,” said Fingar. The approach by the Chinese government evokes memories of U.S. “dollar diplomacy” early in the last century and Japanese “yen diplomacy” when financial assistance was extended to developing countries.

But Fingar doubts that “buying friends by building infrastructure” will be a major contributor to China’s quest for security and development. Going forward, the Chinese government must face the growing paradox between its foreign infrastructure projects and its principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, he said.

“When working in other countries, China cannot afford to dismiss internal stability, governance, rule of law,” he said. “Those facets are the baseline for building infrastructure.”

Related links:

The Diplomat - Q&A on Chinese diplomacy in the 21st century

Hero Image
chinese worker sri lanka port
A Chinese laborer works at a construction site in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Oct. 2015. | Getty Images / Buddhika Weerasinghe
All News button
1
Authors
Lisa Griswold
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

China has historically been the “most divisive element” in the U.S.-Japan relationship, Yoichi Funabashi, a former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun, told a Stanford audience last Friday at a panel discussion hosted by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC).

Funabashi said in his keynote speech that despite the past, “we are in a much, much better position now” as tensions between Japan and the United States have been contained lately. However, misperceptions between Washington and Tokyo over their approaches to China could challenge the positive trajectory we see now, Funabashi warned.

The discussion titled, “Continuity and Change in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” was part of the Shorenstein Journalism Award ceremonies at the Freeman Spogli Institute, an annual honor that recognizes an accomplished journalist who is committed to critical reporting, and who has helped unravel the complexities of Asia through his or her writing. Fourteen journalists have received the prestigious award since its founding in 2002.

Funabashi, the 2015 award recipient, was joined by a distinguished panel of Japan experts. Susan Chira, a deputy executive editor at the New York Times, and Michael Armacost, a Stanford distinguished fellow and former U.S. ambassador to Japan, provided comments to Funabashi’s remarks, and Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, moderated the discussion.

The United States views Japan’s approach to China as “too balance-oriented,” while Japan thinks the U.S. administration under Barack Obama is “more engage-oriented,” Funabashi said. This disjuncture has caused some observers to describe China’s relationship with the West as having already entered a “new Cold War,” he said.

Funabashi quickly dismissed that idea, saying, “I do not think [we’ve] entered into a new Cold War,” and recognized that Japan, the United States and others around the world must identify ways of working with China despite differences.

Funabashi said Japan “can offset the prospect or danger of China and Russia ganging up against Japan” through its strategic engagement with both countries, but that the United States would require some reassurance and understanding of how Japan views its relationship with Moscow and Beijing.

“The approach to China will remain the most crucial factor to managing the U.S.-Japan relationship,” he said.

Chira later added that the U.S.-Japan alliance has been the beneficiary of the shift in focus to a “rising China.” She said it had both “diminished American concern” over the once-heightened economic friction between Japan and the United States in the 1980s, and “underlined the importance of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.”


Image
funabashi yoichi journalism headline


Funabashi also predicted that the U.S.-Japan alliance “could be very much affected by the U.S. presidential election.” Tendering another warning, he said that the 2016 presidential election cycle “may not be political business as usual.”

Candidates have adopted strong positions on foreign policy early on and have been coupling it with harsh rhetoric. “It will have ramifications beyond their actions” and could have a “long-term impact on the U.S. relationship with the Asia-Pacific,” he said.

Over the past eight years, the Obama administration has been leading its “rebalance” policy in Asia that has both symbolized a pulling-away from Europe and the Middle East, and carried a layer of economic and strategic reassurance for the region. Funabashi said Asian leaders are now “deeply concerned” about what will happen to America’s staying power under the next U.S. president.

Part of the success of the rebalance strategy hangs on the outcome of the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s passage through the U.S. Congress. Funabashi said it “will make or break issues,” and yet, each candidate currently running does not support the 12-nation trade pact. Funabashi characterized trade politics during campaign season as challenging. Armacost later said he agreed.

“The chance of ratifying something between now and the election is somewhere between negligible and nil,” said Armacost, who held a 24-year career in the U.S. government. Attempting approval during the lame duck session is very problematic, he said.

Funabashi also addressed whether President Obama should make a trip to the atomic bombing site at Hiroshima on the periphery of the G7 summit later this month.

He said he hoped that such a trip would not “backfire” on the U.S.-Japan relationship, and relations with China and Korea. A visit by Obama could create an expectation for a Japanese prime minister to visit Pearl Harbor, and for Japanese political leaders to make a trip to the site of the Nanjing Massacre in China.

Funabashi also emphasized that a reconciliation process between Japan and the United States already exists and harkened back to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Ratified in 1952, the treaty reset Allied powers and Japan on a path toward friendly relations and to settle questions of war.

“We have proved [our ability] to reconcile on a working level, on a day-to-day level, so we don’t necessarily have to convince the public on both sides.

“Nonetheless, I think that this visit could be seen as a furthering of the reconciliation process,” Funabashi said.

“I hope the president does visit,” Sneider added. Acknowledgement of the bombing by the United States is “long overdue” and could set “a certain moral example,” he said.

Following the panel discussion, later that evening, Funabashi received the journalism award among many colleagues and friends.

Orville Schell, a director at the Asia Society New York and a member of the jury that selects the award recipient, described Funabashi as a leading “exemplar” of someone who “thinks clearly and writes extremely well.”

Related links:

Shorenstein Journalism Award 2015 Acceptance Speech: Yoichi Funabashi

Former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun to receive 2015 Shorenstein Journalism Award

Stanford scholar explores how the US election system shapes foreign policy

Should President Obama visit Hiroshima?

Divided Memories and Reconciliation research project

Hero Image
funabashi yoichi journalism headline top
Yoichi Funabashi speaks on the U.S.-Japan alliance at a panel discussion in conjunction with the Shorenstein Journalism Award ceremonies, May 6. | Rod Searcey
All News button
1
Date Label
-

Abstract

Taiwan’s domestic politics, particularly presidential elections, has been the main driver of the island’s relations with China for two decades. The 2016 elections, in which the Democratic Progressive Party, led by Dr. Tsai Ing-wen, won both the presidency and majority control of the Legislative elections, promises to be no exception. Although PRC intentions under President Xi Jinping are far from certain, some change from the state of play under the current Ma Ying-jeou administration seems fairly certain, with implications for U.S. policy.

 

Bio

Richard Bush is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Director of its Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. He came to Brookings in July 2002 after nineteen years working in the US government, including five years as the Chairman and Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan. He is the author of a number of articles on U.S. relations with China and Taiwan, and of At Cross Purposes, a book of essays on the history of America’s relations with Taiwan, published in March 2004 by M. E. Sharpe. In the spring of 2005, Brookings published his study on cross-Strait relations, entitled Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. In 2013, Brookings published his Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations.

 

This talk is co-sponsored by the Taiwan Democracy Project in the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law and the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative in the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Image
richard bush taiwan talk flyer

 

Richard C. Bush Senior Fellow and Director, Center for East Asian Policy Studies Brookings Institution
Seminars
Paragraphs

Writing for the National Bureau of Asian Research, Daniel Sneider examines Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent attempts to revise Japan’s defense guidelines. He considers how these attempts may affect the Japanese domestic political landscape and the implications that Abe’s actions may have for key issues in the U.S.-Japan alliance, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership and U.S. military interests in Okinawa.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Policy Briefs
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
The National Bureau of Asian Research
Authors
Encina Hall E301616 Serra StreetStanford, CA94305-6055
(650) 723-6530
0
shuichiro_nishioka_headshot_crop.jpg Ph.D.

Shuichiro Nishioka joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) during the 2015-16 academic year from the West Virginia University’s Department of Economics where he serves as an Associate Professor.

His research covers the broad issues on International Trade, Economic Development, and East Asian Economies. During his time at Shorenstein APARC, Nishioka will conduct research projects on the expanding inequality in China and Japan.

Nishioka previously affiliated for research and teaching at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, the University of Pittsburgh and Hitotsubashi University. He contributes to articles to publications including the Journal of International Economics, the Journal of Development Economics, and European Economic Review.

Nishioka holds a PhD and an MA in Economics from the University of Colorado at Boulder, and a BA in Economics from Yokohama National University. 

Visiting Scholar
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Japan must transform its economy in a way that mirrors the innovation ethos in places like Silicon Valley and Stanford University, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said Thursday during a speech on campus.

As an example of how to encourage such creativity, Abe hailed a new partnership starting this fall with Stanford that will train the next generation of biomedical experts. In doing so, he urged a "fundamental change" in how Japanese society views the process of innovation, from how ideas originate to competition in the marketplace.

Japan Biodesign will be launched in collaboration with the Stanford Biodesign program and five higher education and research institutions in Japan. Faculty members will work together to create new interdisciplinary systems based on Stanford Biodesign. Stanford leaders will train and mentor their Japanese colleagues.

Abe, who is the first Japanese prime minister to visit Stanford, marveled at how the tech sector in the United States has "consistently evolved at top speed."

He said, "I want the best and brightest Japanese talent" to learn about Silicon Valley.

Image
The Japanese leader also announced more plans to connect Japanese companies, employees and networking events with Silicon Valley and places like Stanford. He said it was important for the participants to emerge "reborn" with a well-honed sense of how to succeed in a highly competitive global marketplace.

Abe shared the Bing Concert Hall stage with Stanford President John Hennessy and George Shultz, the former U.S. Secretary of State and distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution. Abe's talk, titled "Innovation, Japan and Silicon Valley Symposium," included an introduction and remarks by Hennessy and Shultz. The event drew a full house of invited guests and members of the Stanford community.

"It is a great honor" to be at Stanford, Abe said in beginning his remarks.

He noted that Japan is revisiting its regulatory and tax systems in order to encourage more economic dynamism and competition. "The Japanese people will benefit from innovation," he said.

The challenge, he acknowledged, has been the slow pace of innovation in Japan. Today, however, the Internet economy and big data are creating "enormous changes" in his country's economic approach, he said. "We have to catch up, or otherwise Japan will lose vitality," Abe added.

Cultural connections

In his introduction of Abe, Hennessy chronicled Stanford's long history and friendship with Japan and its people.

Japan, he said, is home to more Stanford alumni than any other Asian country, and when the university's doors first opened in 1891, the pioneer class included a Japanese student. Currently, 139 students from Japan are enrolled at Stanford.

Hennessey described Abe as focused on revitalizing Japan's economy and stewarding it toward a greater global role.

Shultz, who knew Abe's parents, shared recollections of poignant moments between Abe's politically prominent family and his own.

Abe joined a roundtable discussion after his speech with Michael McFaul, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; Stanford Board of Trustees Chair Steve Denning; Stanford School of Medicine Dean Lloyd Minor; Stanford political science Professor Emeritus Daniel Okimoto; Yahoo co-founder Jerry Yang; and Twitter co-founder Jack Dorsey, among other scholars and dignitaries. He also met with Stanford students before leaving campus.

Afterward, McFaul wrote in an email, "I think it is fantastic that Prime Minister Abe came to Stanford and Silicon Valley after his very successful visit to Washington. He demonstrated that deepening U.S.-Japanese relations requires not only strong government-to-government ties, but also deepening ties between our societies, including educational institutions like Stanford."

Abe's state visit to the United States this week included the first address by a Japanese leader to a joint session of Congress. Abe served as prime minister of Japan in 2006-07 and returned to the position in 2012.

'Working together'

On Tuesday, U.S. President Barack Obama said after a meeting with Abe that the two countries had made progress in trade talks on a massive 12-nation trade deal that would open markets around the Pacific Rim to U.S. exports. Both nations face domestic political obstacles to concluding the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement.

"This agreement would expand the coverage of the free trade agreements for both Japan and the U.S. substantially," said Stanford economist Takeo Hoshi, director of the Japan Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, in an interview. "The U.S. and Japan have been working together to maintain peace and sustain economic growth in the Pacific Asia."

Hoshi said that Abe's visit to the Silicon Valley confirms that Japan is serious about transforming its economy from one based on exports to one focused on innovations.

"Going forward, we can learn a lot from Japanese experience and their reform attempts," said Hoshi, who is also a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute.

Hoshi spoke with The Associated Press just before Abe’s arrival to California, citing Silicon Valley as the ideal place for Japan to learn about innovation. He also joined KQED’s Forum to discuss the current state of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Later, he was interviewed by BBC Business about Abe's visit to Stanford.

Stanford Biodesign

Founded in 2001, Stanford Biodesign has pioneered a new training methodology in which interdisciplinary teams of engineers and physicians go through a rigorous process of carefully characterizing unsolved clinical needs before jumping to technology solutions.

For the Japan Biodesign program, the bulk of the educational activities will take place at the campuses of the partner Japanese universities.

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

Hero Image
abe 6364
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe speaks at Stanford about innovation in Japan and Silicon Valley. He was also joined on stage by Stanford President John Hennessy and George Shultz, the former U.S. Secretary of State and a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution (below). | L.A. Cicero
All News button
1
Paragraphs

The global Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) industry has experienced a rapid, radical reorganization of industry leaders and business models—most recently in mobile. New players Apple and Google abruptly redefined the industry, bringing a wave of commoditization to carriers and equipment manufacturers. Technologies, corporate strategies, and industry structures are usually the first places to look when explaining these industry disruptions, but this paper argues that it was actually a set of political bargains during initial phases of telecommunications liberalization, which differed across countries, that set the trajectories of development in motion. This paper shows how different sets of winners and losers of domestic and regional commoditization battles emerged in various ICT industries around the world. Carriers won in Japan, equipment manufacturers in Europe, and eventually, computer services industry actors rather than communications firms emerged as winners in the United States. These differences in industry winner outcomes was shaped by the relative political strength of incumbent communications monopolies and their will to remain industry leaders, given the political system and political dynamics they faced during initial liberalization. The U.S. computer services industry, which developed independently of its telecommunications sector due to antitrust and government policy, eventually commoditized all others, both domestically and abroad. This paper contends that a political economy approach, tracing how politics and regulatory processes shaped industry structures, allows for a better understanding of the underlying path dependent processes that shape rapidly changing global technological and industry outcomes, with implications beyond ICT.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
Authors
Kenji E. Kushida
Subscribe to Trade