Trade
Authors
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

The ROK-U.S. alliance must remain the core pillar of South Korea’s security, but “efforts to enhance autonomy and negotiating power through strategic diversification are also necessary, says APARC Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin.

Speaking at an international conference, The New Growth Paradigm in the AI ​​Era: The Evolving Role of Finance, hosted by the Institute for Global Economics and KB Financial Group on November 6, 2026, in Seoul, Shin pointed to shared pressures facing South Korea, Japan, and Europe across trade, investment, defense spending, and supply chains as reasons for closer cooperation among U.S. allies.

With AI competition increasingly centered on the United States and China, he argued that South Korea would inevitably need to align substantially with Washington, but that “passively following along is not necessarily desirable.” He stressed that cooperation among Seoul, Tokyo, and Europe should strengthen South Korea’s position within the alliance without replacing it or becoming an anti-China coalition.

For more, see the coverage of Shin’s remarks in Korean media: 

Read More

Illustration of three speech bubbles representing (from left to right) the flags of the EU, Japan, and South Korea.
Commentary

EU-Japan-South Korea Cooperation Is Indispensable Now

The trilateral is more feasible – and more important – than ever before.
EU-Japan-South Korea Cooperation Is Indispensable Now
CS Park discussing the rise of South Korea's semiconductor memory industry
News

From Rice Paddies to AI: Five Lessons from the Rise of Korea’s Semiconductor Memory Industry

How did South Korea become a global leader in semiconductor memory, and what will keep it there in the AI era? A Stanford seminar reviewed forty years of industry development and the challenges ahead.
From Rice Paddies to AI: Five Lessons from the Rise of Korea’s Semiconductor Memory Industry
Snow-capped mountains and a seascape on the shore of the Arctic town of Longyearbyen.
Blogs

The Arctic Is Rewriting Energy Geopolitics – and Testing South Korea’s Strategy

As Arctic ice melts, South Korea sees new opportunities in energy, shipping, and shipbuilding – but also growing geopolitical risks tied to US-China-Russia competition.
The Arctic Is Rewriting Energy Geopolitics – and Testing South Korea’s Strategy
Hero Image
Gi-Wook Shin speaks at the international conference of the Institute for Global Economics and KB Financial Group on November 6, 2026, Seoul, South Korea.
Gi-Wook Shin speaks at the international conference of the Institute for Global Economics and KB Financial Group, November 6, 2026, Seoul, South Korea. | 이데일리 (E Daily)
All News button
1
Subtitle

Speaking at an international conference in Seoul, Shin, director of APARC’s Korea Program, urged South Korea to strengthen its negotiating power through closer ties with Japan and Europe while keeping the U.S. alliance central to its security.

Date Label
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
Yes
-
After the Midterms: What’s Next for America’s Korea Policy?

The November 2026 midterm elections will shape the political landscape for the second half of the Trump presidency, raising important questions about the future direction of U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula. What will the future hold for the U.S.-South Korea alliance amid debates over OPCON transfer, burden-sharing, and nuclear submarines? How will Washington balance its security commitments to Seoul with the possibility of renewed diplomacy with Pyongyang? And how might the administration’s trade and economic agenda reshape bilateral relations, particularly with the ROK, and the growing importance of economic security? Experts will examine these interconnected dimensions of U.S. policy toward the two Koreas and assess their implications for regional security and economic relations. 

Co-sponsored by the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in San Francisco.
 

Speakers:
 

Michael L. Beeman is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Loyola Marymount University. He also is a Senior Associate (Non-resident), Japan Chair, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a Senior Fellow for Economic Security at The National Bureau of Asian Research.

From 2023-24, he was a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and university Lecturer and, during 2025, he was a Lecturer at UC San Diego. Prior to this, he served for over two decades in the federal government beginning at the Department of Commerce and then, for over 16 years, as a senior trade official and negotiator at the Office of the US Trade Representative (Executive Office of the President). As the Assistant US Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC, he led negotiations with Korea for the renegotiated U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (2018) and negotiations with Japan for the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement (2019).

He is the author of Walking Out: America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia Pacific and Beyond (2024, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center) and Public Policy and Economic Competition in Japan (2001, Routledge). He received his DPhil (PhD) in Politics from the University of Oxford, an MA in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Southern Methodist University. Dr. Beeman also was a Fulbright and Monbusho Scholar in Japan and an Advanced Research Fellow at Harvard University.
 

Mark Lambert joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as Visiting Scholar, China Program Fellow, for the 2026-2027 academic year, following a career in government with the U.S. Department of State. He served as China Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He oversaw the Office of China Coordination and the Office of Taiwan Coordination. Mark has extensive experience in China, cross-Strait, and Asia Pacific affairs. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary with responsibility for Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. Earlier he established the International Organizations Bureau’s office aimed at protecting UN integrity from authoritarianism and served as Special Envoy for North Korean Affairs.  Previously, he was named the State Department’s human rights officer of the year for devising a strategy to release Chinese political prisoners and promote religious freedom.
 

Sydney Seiler was the national intelligence officer for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council from 2020 to 2023 and is one of the nation’s top experts on North Korea. Previously, he was the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) senior analyst and senior defense intelligence expert for North Korea from 2016 to 2020, serving as the principal adviser and senior expert on Korean Peninsula security issues to the USFK commander and the U.S. Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Mr. Seiler also served as the U.S. special envoy for Six Party Talks (2014–2015), where he coordinated U.S. diplomacy and policy on the DPRK and led negotiations with North Korea. Prior to that, Mr. Seiler served as the director for Korea on the National Security Council (2011–2014). A member of the Senior National Intelligence Service, Mr. Seiler has over 40 years of experience focusing on Korean Peninsula affairs in a range of executive management, intelligence, and policy positions within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Analysis, the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, the CIA’s Open Source Center, and the National Security Agency. He has four decades of experience watching North Korea and 17 years of serving in South Korea. He received his MA degree in Korean studies from Yonsei University and is a graduate of the Korean language programs of the Defense Language Institute and Yonsei University.
 

Directions and Parking > 

Philippines Conference Room (C330)
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

Michael L. Beeman, Visiting Assistant Professor, Loyola Marymount University
0
Visiting Scholar, China Program Fellow, 2026-2027
mark_lambert.jpg

Mark Lambert joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as Visiting Scholar, China Program Fellow, for the 2026-2027 academic year, following a career in government with the U.S. Department of State.  He served as China Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He oversaw the Office of China Coordination and the Office of Taiwan Coordination. Mark has extensive experience in China, cross-Strait, and Asia Pacific affairs. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary with responsibility for Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands.  Earlier he established the International Organizations Bureau’s office aimed at protecting UN integrity from authoritarianism and served as Special Envoy for North Korean Affairs.  Previously, he was named the State Department’s human rights officer of the year for devising a strategy to release Chinese political prisoners and promote religious freedom. 

Date Label
Mark Lambert, China Policy Fellow, APARC, Stanford University
Sydney Seiler, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Seminars
Date Label
Authors
Noa Ronkin
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Chinese President Xi Jinping's three-day state visit to Washington, D.C., delivered lavish pageantry and a two-month extension of the U.S.-China trade truce but few tangible breakthroughs, according to Mark Lambert, APARC's China policy fellow. He cautioned, however, against scoring the summit as a win or a loss for either side. 

"Having people talk to each other, particularly the leaders of the two strongest economies on planet Earth, is a good thing," said Lambert, a retired U.S. diplomat who served as one of the State Department’s leading China experts, most recently in the role of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for China and Taiwan and as the Department’s China Coordinator.

Lambert joined APARC Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui on the latest episode of the APARC Briefing video series to assess the outcomes of the Trump-Xi summit and analyze the issues shaping the U.S.-China relationship.



Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive expert analysis and insights from our scholars and guests >

Both leaders have bigger fish to fry right now than antagonizing one another.
Mark Lambert

A Truce Extended, Big Questions Deferred


Lambert described Xi’s state visit as “the third movement in a five-part concert,” following the two leaders’ October 2025 meeting in Busan, South Korea, on the sidelines of the APEC summit, and Trump’s May 2026 visit to Beijing. These engagements spurred talks about a framework to stabilize the tense U.S.-China relations. Looking ahead, Xi has invited Trump to the APEC summit in Shenzhen in November 2026, and Trump hopes to host Xi at the G20 in Florida in December.

Each leader has domestic reasons to keep bilateral tensions low, Lambert pointed out. In the United States, the midterm elections and soaring gas and grocery prices are front and center. In China, high youth unemployment and demographic pressures loom large, and Xi, facing a Party plenum next month, needs to show he has the American relationship in a good place from a Chinese perspective.

"Both leaders have bigger fish to fry right now than antagonizing one another," Lambert explained, noting that the White House did an effective job of keeping expectations from Xi’s state visit modest. Washington and Beijing agreed to extend their trade truce through January 2027, but announced little else beyond that and a commitment to hold further talks, and provided no specificity on the economic and trade aspects of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.

“It seems like what came out of last week's summit was: ‘Let's carve out a few areas where we can trade, recognizing that the vast majority of sensitive areas are either too delicate or too complex, not ripe right now to deal with,’” Lambert observed, predicting that the likely trend moving forward is more de-risking by both sides. 

Mark Lambert and Kiyoteru Tsutsui in conversation.

 

Skepticism on AI


The White House announced the U.S. and China have agreed to start a dialogue on AI, with a communications channel to help defuse the technology’s risks. Lambert, however, is doubtful this effort will yield much, noting that a similar commitment emerged from the Biden-Xi 2023 meeting in San Francisco but was never fleshed out.

"I am not convinced that China is all that serious about working on artificial intelligence,” he said. “Every time we've tried to have meetings on AI, they will send diplomats; they will send political-type figures. They don't send real experts on artificial intelligence. And that makes it very difficult to talk about safeguards and protecting ourselves from accidents or other things.”

The American and Chinese summit readouts also describe AI quite differently. While the White House said China had agreed to the term "superintelligence," Lambert emphasized that "not once did the Chinese use the term superintelligence in their readout."

"It's good that they're talking about it," he said, but "I will be very surprised if it leads to real, meaningful discussion about these core issues on artificial intelligence.”

Taiwan, Japan, and U.S. Allies


On Taiwan, according to Lambert, Trump did not give Beijing the language it has long sought: that Washington "opposes," rather than "does not support," Taiwan’s independence. Having put forward the largest arms sales package to Taiwan in U.S. history, the Trump administration has postponed it to avoid jeopardizing the summit with President Xi. With two additional in-person meetings between the two leaders expected this year, Lambert predicts the arms sales deal will be postponed until the new year. 

Asked about Xi's referencing shared U.S.-China history during World War II, when the two nations fought together “against Japanese militarist aggressors,” Lambert replied, "History is history. We don't deny history, but I don't think it's wise to let ourselves become a prisoner of history." He called Japan "the keystone relationship with the United States in the Pacific," arguing the moment was "a missed opportunity for President Trump" to acknowledge the wartime relationship with China while also affirming the alliance with Japan and urging Xi to improve ties with Tokyo. He reiterated long-standing advice to new presidents: talk to allies before going to Beijing.

I haven't seen anything to suggest that China is going to lessen its support of Iran.
Mark Lambert

Iran and China’s leverage


Lambert said that China, "hands down Iran's biggest trading partner," has been reluctant to take on the responsibilities of a global power in international affairs. He pointed to Chinese banks and shipping companies that help Iran circumvent U.S. sanctions. Despite subdued rhetoric from Beijing at the United Nations, "I haven't seen anything to suggest that China is going to lessen its support of Iran." Beijing could help Washington end the unpopular war with Iran, but is unlikely to use that leverage.

Symbolism and what comes next


Lambert called President Trump’s personal welcome of Xi at Joint Base Andrews "really unprecedented" and "overdone," and said Beijing is portraying it as American recognition of China as an equal. Still, he cautioned against writing off the United States as a declining power. “Yes, we make mistakes all the time, and I personally think we're in a pretty difficult time right now. But don't count us out.”

Read More

Two people walking in Memorial Court, Main Quad, Stanford Campus. Text: "Shorenstein APARC Call for Applications: 2027-2029 Fellowships."
News

Stanford’s Asia-Pacific Research Center Invites Applications for 2027-2029 Postdoctoral and Visiting Fellowships

The center and its research programs offer multiple postdoctoral and visiting fellowships in Asian studies starting in fall quarter 2027. Opportunities are open to scholars of contemporary Asia from a wide range of disciplines, encompassing both pan-regional research and specialized tracks focused on specific regions and themes.
Stanford’s Asia-Pacific Research Center Invites Applications for 2027-2029 Postdoctoral and Visiting Fellowships
Kiyoteru Tsutsui interviews Susan Thornton.
News

The Stakes of the Trump-Xi Summit and What Next for U.S.-China Relations

Speaking on the latest episode of the APARC Briefing series, China expert and veteran diplomat Susan Thornton argues for managing expectations of the summit between the two presidents, rethinking the U.S.-China technology competition, and understanding Beijing’s long game on Taiwan.
The Stakes of the Trump-Xi Summit and What Next for U.S.-China Relations
Urban architecture of Suzhou Industrial Park. China.
News

How China’s Debt-Ridden Local Governments Are Rewriting Their Economic Development Playbook

Having lost their primary source of revenue from land finance, indebted Chinese counties and cities are pursuing new strategies to sustain development, pivoting toward industrial parks and venture capital, Stanford political scientist Jean Oi observes in her recent fieldwork.
How China’s Debt-Ridden Local Governments Are Rewriting Their Economic Development Playbook
Hero Image
All News button
1
Subtitle

President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Washington, D.C., and summitry with President Trump served both leaders’ near-term interests but left the challenges of AI threats, the Taiwan flashpoint, and the unpopular Iran war unresolved, says APARC’s China Policy Fellow Mark Lambert, speaking on the latest APARC Briefing episode.

Image
Mark Lambert and Kiyoteru Tsutsui in conversation.
Title
Trump-Xi State Visit Kept the Bilateral Truce Alive but Left Hard Questions Open
Aria Label
Read More of Trump-Xi State Visit Kept the Bilateral Truce Alive
Date Label
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
Yes
0
Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow on Contemporary Asia, 2026-2027
grace_zeng.jpg PhD

Grace Xueqing Zeng joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center as Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow on Contemporary Asia for the 2026-2027 academic year. She is a political scientist specializing in international political economy, with a focus on China's use of trade and investment to influence global regulatory governance. Her research examines how states leverage economic tools to shape international rules and institutions. Her work on China's trade practices shows how China uses seemingly technical health and safety regulations to exert pressure on other nations, systematically increasing import restrictions in response to political tensions.

At APARC, she will pursue projects that extend this research agenda by examining China's growing influence in global governance. One project investigates whether China strategically uses infrastructure investment and foreign subsidiaries to shape international environmental standards. Another examines China’s information control system through the lens of its WTO commitments and the global governance of cyberspace.

Before joining Stanford, Grace was a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. She received her Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University. She also holds an M.A. in the Social Sciences (MAPSS) from the University of Chicago and a B.S. in Mathematics from the University of Hong Kong.

Date Label
-
Flyer for the seminar "The Rise and Future of the Korean Semiconductor Memory Industry," featuring headshot of the speaker,  C.S. Park.

The recent Nasdaq debut of a Korean semiconductor memory producer, SK hynix—raising $26.5 billion in the largest-ever listing by a foreign company—has garnered global recognition after temporarily overtaking Samsung Electronics as South Korea’s most valuable chipmaker. Together, the two companies account for more than half of KOSPI’s total market capitalization.

This talk will explore how South Korea built a globally competitive semiconductor memory industry, navigated intense industry competition and consolidation, survived historical boom-and-bust cycles, and emerged as a crucial player in the global artificial intelligence (AI) era. Specifically, the discussion will shed light on how South Korean firms overcame initial technological, financial, and human capital constraints to ultimately transform a historically low-margin commodity memory business into the highly profitable High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) products required for AI. Finally, the presentation will consider the future trajectory of Korea’s memory industry, including Moore’s Law, the growing semiconductor ecosystem, its U.S. footprint, the rise of Chinese memory makers, engineering talent, demand cyclicality, stock volatility, socio-economic impact, and geopolitics as the global AI industry continues to evolve.

Speaker:
C.S. Park is the former Chairman and CEO of Hynix Semiconductor (now SK hynix). In 1983, he joined Hyundai Electronics as a founding member, where he held several positions, including President of U.S. operations, Head of Semiconductor Marketing & Sales, and CEO. He was instrumental in restructuring and transforming Hyundai Electronics into Hynix Semiconductor, a leading memory company. He was also Maxtor’s CEO until its merger with Seagate, where he served as Lead Independent Director. In the past, he served on a number of boards, including DLA Piper, Enphase Energy, Computer Sciences Corp., Ballard Power, Brooks Automation, Smart Modular, STATS ChipPAC, and Silicon Valley Community Foundation. Currently, he serves as a Board Advisor for ScaleFlux, a memory and storage company scaling the AI data pipeline.

Directions and Parking > 

Philippines Conference Room (C330)
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

C.S. Park, former Chairman and CEO, Hynix Semiconductor (now SK hynix)
Seminars
Image
Registration: The Rise and Future of the Korean Semiconductor Memory Industry: Perspectives and Insights from 1983 to 2026 and Beyond. Photo: C.S. Park
Date Label
Authors
Gi-Wook Shin
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

This essay first appeared in The Diplomat.



For decades, South Korean strategy rested on a stable hierarchy within the international order. The alliance with the United States provided security; Seoul then managed relations with Japan, Europe, China, and regional institutions around that anchor. The alliance remains indispensable, but Seoul can no longer assume that this foundation will stay stable.

The evidence is visible in the way Washington now deals with allies. In 2025, the United States initially announced sharply differentiated “reciprocal” tariffs on South Korea, Japan, and the European Union. Negotiations later produced a 15 percent baseline framework for all three, but the process mattered as much as the final rate. Trade access, industrial investment, defense procurement, and alliance politics were increasingly handled as one bargaining package. Allies were not exempt from economic pressure because they were allies.

At the same time, Europe and Asia have been building connections that would have seemed highly ambitious a decade ago. The European Union signed security and defense partnerships with Japan and South Korea in November 2024. This year, the EU and Japan launched a defense-industry dialogue, while the EU and South Korea signed a digital trade agreement and began implementing cooperation on maritime security, cyber and hybrid threats, information manipulation, space, and the defense industry. The strategic map is becoming more networked. 

The network, however, remains uneven. Japan already has a mature economic partnership with the EU and rapidly expanding defense-industry ties. EU-South Korea relations are deepening, but they still lack the density and regular strategic consultation found in EU-Japan ties. A trilateral format would therefore do more than add another meeting: it would reduce asymmetry among three partners whose capabilities are increasingly complementary.


Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive our scholars' commentary and analysis >


The postwar hierarchy cannot simply be preserved by demanding more reassurance from Washington. Its resilience will depend on whether allies can build connective tissue among themselves before the next crisis forces them to improvise.
Gi-Wook Shin

South Korea, Japan, and the EU now face four converging challenges and pressures.

The first is demographic. South Korea is aging faster than any other OECD society; Japan’s working-age population has been shrinking for decades; and the EU’s fertility rate reached a new low in 2024. Demography is not a social-policy sidebar. It affects defense recruitment, industrial capacity, fiscal room, technological adoption, and the ability to sustain long-term commitments. Each actor is experimenting with immigration, automation, workforce policy, and welfare reform, but the security implications remain largely compartmentalized.

The second is concentrated economic dependence. None of the three can or should decouple from China. Yet South Korea’s experience after the THAAD deployment, Europe’s debates over economic coercion, and China’s export controls on gallium, germanium, and other strategic inputs have shown that interdependence can be converted into leverage. De-risking therefore requires more than national stockpiles. It requires shared risk maps, compatible certification, co-investment in alternative suppliers, and advance consultation before export controls or industrial subsidies create collateral damage among partners.

The third challenge is U.S. volatility. The United States is still the only actor capable of providing extended nuclear deterrence to South Korea and Japan, and NATO remains central to European defense. But dependence on U.S. power now coexists with uncertainty about U.S. policy. The classic alliance dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment are no longer opposite ends of a spectrum. Today, U.S. allies fear both being left out and being drawn into bargains or contingencies they did not shape.

The fourth pressure is the collapse of the old geographic separation between European and Asian security. North Korean munitions, missiles, and troops have supported Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow, in turn, has provided Pyongyang with political cover, economic support, and the prospect of military know-how. What happens on a European battlefield is changing the military balance on the Korean Peninsula. A regional response to a cross-regional threat is structurally inadequate.

This is the case for an EU-Japan-South Korea strategic dialogue. This framework should not be described as strategic autonomy, equidistance, or a hedge against the United States. A better term would be institutionalized hedging: risk diversification through standing, rule-based consultation among allies and partners that remain anchored in the broader U.S.-led system.

The proposal is more feasible than ever before. Japan-South Korea relations have improved significantly in recent years. The January 2026 summit in Nara and the reciprocal summit in South Korea in May demonstrated continuity across leadership changes in both countries since June 2025. The EU already has free-trade, digital, green, and security frameworks with both countries. The task is not to invent three new bilateral relationships; it is to connect existing ones.

The dialogue should begin modestly, through a Track 1.5 process involving officials, experts, and industry. Its early agenda must be concrete and specific: a joint critical minerals and supply chain risk assessment; consultation on export controls and investment screening; cooperation on AI, cyber resilience, and digital standards; exchanges on demographic and defense workforce adaptation; and shared monitoring of North Korea-Russia military cooperation. Successful projects could then be elevated to ministerial working groups.

Two design choices are essential. First, the initiative must remain function-driven. It is not NATO, not the Quad, and not an anti-China coalition. Its purpose is to reduce vulnerability without demanding economic separation. Second, it should be complementary to relations with Washington and transparent about that purpose. Horizontal networks strengthen alliances when they help allies absorb shocks, coordinate positions, and arrive at consultations with greater capacity.

For South Korea, the need is particularly acute. Japan already has the G7, a mature economic partnership with the EU, and expanding European defense ties. Seoul’s international weight has grown faster than its institutional depth. An EU-Japan-South Korea dialogue would help close that gap.

Horizontalizing alliances is not a vote of no confidence in the United States. It is insurance for the moments when the United States wavers, overreaches, or changes course. The postwar hierarchy cannot simply be preserved by demanding more reassurance from Washington. Its resilience will depend on whether allies can build connective tissue among themselves before the next crisis forces them to improvise.

Read More

Panelists gather for a group photo at the 2026 Oksenberg Conference.
News

Indo-Pacific Powers Diversify and De-Risk as Multipolar World Takes Shape

At the 2026 Oksenberg Conference, scholars and foreign policy experts assessed how Indo-Pacific powers are coping with a less predictable United States as China pursues selective leadership and Russia exploits Western divisions.
Indo-Pacific Powers Diversify and De-Risk as Multipolar World Takes Shape
Portrait photo of Gi-Wook Shin and a logo of the magazine Barron's with text "In the Media."
Commentary

Barron's Quotes Gi-Wook Shin on How Korea’s Semiconductor Boom Is Creating Social Instability

Record profits led to significant employee bonuses, sparking turmoil, including internal union disputes.
Barron's Quotes Gi-Wook Shin on How Korea’s Semiconductor Boom Is Creating Social Instability
People cross a road in the Akihabara district in Tokyo, Japan.
News

Japanese Public Sets High Bar for Immigrants

The latest findings of the Stanford Japan Barometer show that the Japanese public’s opinion on immigration depends heavily on applicants' skills, language ability, and country of origin, and on whether politicians emphasize economic benefits or stoke security and cultural anti-immigration rhetoric.
Japanese Public Sets High Bar for Immigrants
Hero Image
Illustration of three speech bubbles representing (from left to right) the flags of the EU, Japan, and South Korea.
Illustration made with Canva AI.
All News button
1
Subtitle

The trilateral is more feasible – and more important – than ever before.

Date Label
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
Yes
Authors
Noa Ronkin
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

As U.S. President Donald Trump prepares to visit Beijing on May 14-15, 2026, for a highly anticipated summit with President Xi Jinping, the world is watching to see if the two leaders can stabilize a U.S.-China relationship strained by disputes over trade, technological race, the future of Taiwan, and the rippling effects of the conflict with Iran.

Trump’s trip to Beijing – already rescheduled once due to the conflict in the Middle East – has been described as having tremendous symbolic significance. Yet, expectations for a breakthrough on specific deliverables should remain low, according to Susan Thornton, a China expert and former U.S. diplomat. Thornton joined APARC Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui on the latest episode of the APARC Briefing video series to analyze the potential outcomes of the Trump-Xi summit and the high-stakes dynamics shaping U.S.-China relations.
 

Image
Kiyoteru Tsutsui interviews Susan Thornton.


Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive expert analysis and insights from our scholars and guests >



Symbols Over Deliverables


Thornton’s nearly three-decade career with the U.S. State Department in Eurasia and East Asia culminated in her role as Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the first Trump administration. She offered a pragmatic forecast for the Trump-Xi summit, arguing that its primary value lies in the act of meeting itself.

While both President Trump and President Xi are committed to keeping their dialogue, the expectations for concrete outcomes on pivotal issues in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship should be tempered, argued Thornton, who is currently a senior fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, the director of the Forum on Asia-Pacific Security at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. 

Whether on Taiwan or other pressing matters, China has made it clear it is not interested in a “G2 or a grand bargain” and has relatively low expectations for the list of substantive disputes between the two powers.

The Shadow of the Iran War


The ongoing conflict with Iran has added a new layer of complexity to the tense bilateral relationship. President Trump heads to Beijing after unsuccessful efforts to pressure China into helping reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while Beijing continues backing Tehran politically and potentially militarily. 

Thornton assessed that China will not allow the conflict to derail its high-level engagement with Washington, even as it officially disapproves of the U.S. intervention in the Middle East. “Keeping the U.S.-China relationship on track is much more important than having some kind of a protest signal like that,” she stated.

She suggested that Beijing may see a strategic advantage in America’s renewed focus on the Middle East. While China has made nominal peace proposals, it has not stepped up as a mediator. “It seems like they are kind of hanging back and waiting to see what will happen,” Thornton observed. She posited that, from Beijing’s perspective, a U.S. entanglement in the Middle East may serve as a useful distraction, diverting Washington’s attention and pressure away from China.

At the same time, China is hedging its bets by securing alternative energy supplies and gaining influence in regions where the conflict in the Middle East has damaged U.S. credibility.

The biggest problem for U.S. negotiators is focusing on two or three enduring and major asks of the Chinese in the trade and economic market-opening space. We've really had a hard time deciding what it is that we want from China.
Susan Thornton

Trade and Tech: A Call for a Paradigm Shift


On the economic front, Thornton drew on her deep experience in trade negotiations to critique the lack of focus in U.S. policy.

"The biggest problem for U.S. negotiators is deciding what it is that we want from China," she said. "We tend to give them a long list of revolving priorities, which [makes it easy for the] other side of the negotiating table to just fob them off and not actually commit to anything over years of negotiations.”

On the technology rivalry between the two powers, Thornton urged a shift in strategy. Rather than pursuing sweeping export controls that are often unilateral and incomplete, she advocated for a narrower, multilateral approach focused on the most sensitive technologies, combined with a greater emphasis on American innovation. AI governance is one of the areas Thornton believes could be a common ground for Washington and Beijing to align their policies.

“It's going to be very hard for the United States to contain China's technological ambitions and growth,” she said. “I don't think that we're exactly competing on the same metrics. I question how it is that we're going to be able to keep China from getting technologies that are dual-use but might be useful in some military application when these things are basically economy-wide products.”

When it comes to technological competition, "We need to try to run faster than China, not be constantly trying to trip China up and looking in the rearview mirror," Thornton urged. "I don't think that's going to bode well for the long-term development of the U.S. tech sector."

The Taiwan Flashpoint: A Longer-Term Challenge


While Taiwan remains the most dangerous flashpoint that could trigger a kinetic warfare between the United States and China, Thornton believes that the immediate risk of conflict has receded, in accordance with recent U.S. threat assessments that no longer see 2027 as a likely target date for a potential Chinese takeover of the island.

Beijing, she argued, is closely watching the domestic political situation in Taiwan and how the leadership in Taipei views U.S. reliability and support. “I think the Chinese have determined, based on both of those things they've been watching, that they can afford to wait a bit longer, see what happens.”

Thornton cautioned, however, that, even as a conflict over Taiwan may no longer pose an immediate-term threat, “it is a problem that is going to develop over the coming decade.”

Diplomacy in a Multipolar World Order 


When asked about the future of the global order, Thornton described a trend toward fragmentation. If the United States steps back from its global leadership role, it is difficult to see who else would be willing or able to shoulder the cost of providing global public goods, she said. A “thinner world order,” with the United Nations at its center, may eventually find favor with countries that can afford to pay for some of those goods, she reflected.

In a closing advice for aspiring foreign service officers, Thornton argued that the emergence of a multipolar world reinforces the need for skilled diplomacy. “As the global order changes and more countries come into the mix of the councils of politics in the world, the United States will have to lean back toward diplomacy more,” she predicted.

“We're going to need very good diplomats,” she concluded, because it will be significantly harder to be an American diplomat in a fragmented world order in which the United States is no longer the single overwhelmingly dominant power.

Read More

Kimberly Hoang and Kiyoteru Tsutsui seated in an office during a recorded podcast conversation.
News

Weaponized Corruption, Extreme Wealth, and Democratic Reordering: Insights from Asia

Speaking on the APARC Briefing video series, University of Chicago sociologist Kimberly Kay Hoang examines the architecture of global capital and how corruption discourse is transforming governance and political order in Asia and the United States.
Weaponized Corruption, Extreme Wealth, and Democratic Reordering: Insights from Asia
Panelists gather for a group photo at the 2026 Oksenberg Conference.
News

Indo-Pacific Powers Diversify and De-Risk as Multipolar World Takes Shape

At the 2026 Oksenberg Conference, scholars and foreign policy experts assessed how Indo-Pacific powers are coping with a less predictable United States as China pursues selective leadership and Russia exploits Western divisions.
Indo-Pacific Powers Diversify and De-Risk as Multipolar World Takes Shape
Portrait photo of Shibani Mahtan, winner of the 2026 Shorenstein Journalism Award.
News

Singapore-Based Investigative Journalist Shibani Mahtani Wins 2026 Shorenstein Journalism Award for Excellence in Asia-Pacific Coverage

Sponsored by Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the 25th annual Shorenstein Journalism Award honors Mahtani for her exemplary investigations into the erosion of democracy in Hong Kong and China's growing global influence.
Singapore-Based Investigative Journalist Shibani Mahtani Wins 2026 Shorenstein Journalism Award for Excellence in Asia-Pacific Coverage
Hero Image
All News button
1
Subtitle

Speaking on the latest episode of the APARC Briefing series, China expert and veteran diplomat Susan Thornton argues for managing expectations of the summit between the two presidents, rethinking the U.S.-China technology competition, and understanding Beijing’s long game on Taiwan.

Date Label
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
Yes
Paragraphs

 

Banner showing a semiconductor with the Japanese flag superimposed on top.

 

Japan’s semiconductor industry, once globally dominant in DRAM during the 1980s, declined through the 1990s and 2000s due to trade friction with the United States, the rise of Korean competitors, and a failure to adapt to the fabless/foundry model. Today, Japan’s logic IC process technology lags at the 40nm node. 

The 2020 global semiconductor shortage prompted Japan to launch two major revitalization projects under the banner of economic security: TSMC Kumamoto, a joint venture producing 12–28nm logic ICs for Japan’s automotive, industrial, and consumer electronics sectors; and Rapidus, an ambitious startup targeting 2nm logic IC manufacturing by 2027. 

The paper argues that while TSMC Kumamoto meaningfully strengthens Japan’s domestic supply chain — connecting Japanese equipment and materials suppliers with downstream industries — Rapidus tells a different story. Because Japan has virtually no domestic industrial base currently using 2nm chips, Rapidus’s primary market will likely be the United States. Rather than enhancing Japan’s supply chain resilience, Rapidus effectively inserts Japan into a global advanced logic IC supply chain running from the Netherlands through Japan to the United States. Unless Japan develops industries using these chips, the Rapidus project will not directly address Japan’s economic security strategy.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Publication Date
Subtitle

The Validity of the Revitalization Strategy

Authors
Jun Akabane
0
Visiting Scholar at APARC, 2026
taro_hamada.jpg

Taro Hamada joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as visiting scholar beginning spring 2026. He currently serves as Professor in the Faculty of Law at Senshu University. While at APARC, he will be conducting research on labor and trade policy, focusing on the U.S. and Japan as well as the Asia-Pacific region.

Date Label
Authors
George Krompacky
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

David Meale, former U.S. diplomat and current consultant, offered a cautiously optimistic perspective on U.S.-China relations at an APARC China Program seminar, arguing that despite significant tensions, there remains substantial room for what he calls “managed rivalry”—a relationship that is neither warm nor easy, but constructive enough for both countries to serve their populations and address global challenges. Drawing on his 33 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, he traced the evolution of U.S.-China relations over the past three decades and assessed current trajectories, bringing both diplomatic experience and fresh insights from private sector concerns to his analysis.

Three Decades of Evolving Relations
 

His entry into China-focused diplomacy came in 1995 when he was assigned to Hong Kong during the handover. During that era and through the early 2000s, U.S. policy operated under the assumption that China would gradually embrace the post-war rules-based international order shaped largely by the United States. The thinking was that China would develop a self-interest in preserving this order, becoming a constructive, if not easy, partner. This belief undergirded the strong U.S. effort to bring China into the World Trade Organization in 2001.

During his service as an Economic Officer in Taiwan in the 2000s, Meale witnessed the merging of talent from Asia and the United States that built China’s electronics manufacturing industry. Five percent of Taiwan’s workforce had moved to the mainland; there were even Shanghainese dialect programs on Taiwanese television at night for those dreaming of seeking their fortunes through cross-strait opportunities. Although there was tension with the Chen Shui-bian administration, there was a surprising amount of positivity in Taiwan about the mainland. That, of course, has now changed.

The Obama administration continued to work within the framework of bringing China into the existing international order, even as concerns grew. The approach aimed to convince China to preserve and, if necessary, shape this order, while using it to constrain China when necessary, as demonstrated by the attempt to resolve the South China Sea dispute involving the Philippines through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Trump administration marked a decisive shift. Meale noted that Trump openly discarded the goal of integrating China into the existing order, instead pursuing aggressive trade policies, technology restrictions, and explicit framing of China as a threat. The Chinese hoped the Biden administration would turn this around, but it instead maintained this posture, pursuing an “invest, align, compete” strategy—investing in the United States, aligning with allies, and defining the relationship as a competition.

Trump 2.0 brought “Liberation Day,” which Meale sees as the belief that the U.S. place in the world needs to be corrected; the United States is economically overextended, the trade imbalances and the associated debt cannot continue, and the supply chain vulnerability from COVID must be addressed. Tariffs were ratcheted up, and both sides imposed export controls. 

The Chinese hit back hard; Chinese officials are very proud of China’s pushback against an unchecked Trump. China’s economic growth is forecast at 5 percent this year, and the feeling from China is that it has shown the world the United States cannot push it around.

Looking ahead to 2026, Meale is optimistic. There will undoubtedly be crises that pop up: the Chinese will overreach on rare earth elements, and the United States will take an economic action that the Chinese did not plan on. Meale sees this as the “sine curve” of the U.S.-China relationship. There’s a crisis, tensions rise, there’s a response, and things eventually cool down. The curve goes up and down, but very little gets resolved.


Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive our event invitations and guest speakers' insights >


 

China's Current Challenges
 

China, Meale noted, effectively contains two economies: one serving approximately 400 million people who are producing world-class products with perhaps the world's best industrial ecosystem and impressive infrastructure, and another economy serving the rest of China's population, which has improved significantly over recent decades but relies heavily on informal work and the gig economy.
China faces deep structural problems, including a property sector crisis that has destroyed significant household wealth, an economy structured excessively around investment rather than consumption, youth unemployment reflecting a mismatch between graduating students and available jobs, and "involution" (neijuan, 内卷)—a race to the bottom in sectors where government incentives have driven overcapacity. China's reliance on export-led growth comes at a time when its overcapacity is increasingly unwelcome not just in developed countries but across the global South.

These challenges, Meale argues, will not result in a financial crisis or recession, but rather chronic headaches that will affect its foreign relations. Growth will continue, albeit at a slower pace, and the country will have significant work ahead to address inequality and structural imbalances.

On the question of Taiwan, Meale pushed back against predictions of imminent Chinese military action, particularly speculation about 2027 as a critical year tied to the 100th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army. He argued that, right now, one of China’s top goals is to avoid being drawn into a Taiwan conflict. China has recently purged nine senior military officials and is dealing with serious problems in its military. Five years from now, however, the situation could look quite different.

Defining End States and Finding Common Ground
 

Meale concluded by outlining what he believes each side seeks as an end state, arguing that these visions, while different, are not irreconcilable. Rather than global domination, he argued China seeks a world that works for what it calls "grand rejuvenation." This means overcoming the century of humiliation, reunifying with Taiwan, and living safely and securely on its own terms. China wants recognition as a global power, dominance in its near seas, freedom from technology containment, elimination of shipping chokepoints, access to markets, and the ability to pursue relationships with ideologically aligned countries.

The United States, meanwhile, accepts that competition with China is permanent but seeks a predictable China. U.S. goals include protecting advanced technology where it has an advantage, avoiding supply chain vulnerabilities, shaping Beijing's choices without attempting to control them, maintaining the Taiwan status quo until it evolves in a mutually and naturally agreed way, and ensuring fair trade to address what it sees as a stacked deck in current trade relationships. The United States also wants to prevent China from enabling adversaries, as seen in Chinese firms rebuilding Russia's military-industrial complex while maintaining nominal neutrality on Ukraine.

These end states, Meale acknowledged, collide in many ways but not in absolute ways. He sees substantial room for leader-driven, managed rivalry that can function constructively. This rivalry will not be easy or warm, but it can allow both countries to serve their populations while cooperating where global interests align.
 

Key Takeaways  
 

  • The “integrated China” assumption is over. U.S. policy no longer aims to bring China into the existing international order, marking a fundamental shift from decades of engagement strategy.
  • China's economy faces structural challenges, not a crisis. China will continue to grow, but must address inequality, overcapacity, and wealth destruction from the property crisis.
  • Taiwan timing matters more to Beijing than deadlines. China seeks to control when and how the Taiwan issue is resolved, preferring not to be forced into premature action.
  • Managed rivalry is possible. Despite significant tensions and incompatible elements of each side's goals, there remains space for constructive competition. While the relationship between the world's two largest economies will stay competitive and often contentious, it need not become catastrophic.
     

Read More

Lawmakers and members of the South Korea's main opposition Democratic Party (DP) demonstrate against the country's president at the National Assembly on December 04, 2024 in Seoul, South Korea.
Commentary

South Korea’s Fractured Democracy: One Year After Martial Law

The country’s political polarization has metastasized. What can be done?
South Korea’s Fractured Democracy: One Year After Martial Law
Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi delivers remarks while seated in front of the Japanese flag.
Commentary

Japan's Prime Minister Takaichi: A First-Month Report Card

Stanford sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui, director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Japan Program, evaluates Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's first month in office.
Japan's Prime Minister Takaichi: A First-Month Report Card
On an auditorium stage, panelists discuss the documentary 'A Chip Odyssey.'
News

‘A Chip Odyssey’ Illuminates the Human Stories Behind Taiwan’s Semiconductor Dominance

A screening and discussion of the documentary 'A Chip Odyssey' underscored how Taiwan's semiconductor ascent was shaped by a collective mission, collaboration, and shared purpose, and why this matters for a world increasingly reliant on chips.
‘A Chip Odyssey’ Illuminates the Human Stories Behind Taiwan’s Semiconductor Dominance
Hero Image
CP_David_Meale
All News button
1
Subtitle

Eurasia Group’s David Meale, a former Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, reflects on the last 30 years and describes how the two economic superpowers can maintain an uneasy coexistence.

Date Label
Subscribe to Trade