In South Korea’s June 3, 2026, local election, the ruling Democratic Party won most contests, but lost the pivotal Seoul mayoral race, suggesting voters were reluctant to grant the party unchecked power. This election served as the first nationwide test of the Lee Jae Myung administration, Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC's Korea Program, told news agency AFP.

The Seoul mayoral race attracted particular attention because the office is widely viewed as a launching pad to the presidency. But while the re-elected conservative Seoul mayor, Oh Se-hoon, is a seasoned political veteran and one of the most recognizable figures in his party, "he projects a sense of political fatigue, offering no fresh image and no new agenda to anchor a national candidacy," Shin noted.

Read the two AFP reports featuring Shin's commentary:

• South Korea ruling party fails to flip Seoul in blemish on local poll results >
• South Korea's ruling party heads for local election sweep

In May 2023, Thai pro-democracy reformer and lawmaker Pita Limjaroenrat led Thailand’s Move Forward Party to a stunning victory in the general election on a platform of progressive change. The party won a clear mandate from over 14 million voters, but conservative powers and military-appointed senators blocked Pita’s path to the prime ministership. Fifteen months later, Thailand’s Constitutional Court dissolved the Move Forward Party – the same fate its predecessor, the Future Forward Party, met in 2020. The court also barred Pita from politics for a decade.

It is a story he recounts in his political memoir, The Almost Prime Minister, and one he discussed at a February 2025 fireside chat hosted by APARC’s Southeast Asia Program. In his current role as a Senior Democracy Fellow back at his alma mater, the Harvard Kennedy School, Pita continues to champion transparent and equitable governance, coaches a new generation of political leaders, and strategizes a democratic path forward for Thailand. 

On May 29, 2026, Pita returned to Stanford for a follow-up discussion with APARC Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui, who also serves as co-director of the Southeast Asia Program. Pita examined political developments in Thailand since the contentious 2023 election, the tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, the crisis in Myanmar, ASEAN’s role in the region, and how Thailand and other middle powers should hedge their bets amid the U.S.-China competition and a fragmenting world order. 

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Anatomy of a Defeat

Pita’s opening remarks focused on the outcome of Thailand’s recent general election, in which the People’s Party – the successor to the dissolved Move Forward Party – suffered a decisive defeat. Entering the February 8, 2026, election, the People’s Party had hoped to convert widespread calls for democratic reform into power. Instead, the conservative Bhumjaithai Party secured a clear victory and then joined forces with the third-place populist Pheu Thai Party to form a coalition government.

Pita, who had campaigned for the People’s Party ahead of the election – a political activity he remains eligible to undertake despite being barred from seeking office – offered a candid assessment of the party’s loss.

Lower voter turnout was a key determinant of the February 8 election results, he argued: at 65 percent, it was sharply down from 76 percent in the 2023 general election that he won. Many voters came to believe that the costs of participating in the political process outweighed the potential benefits, Pita said.

That is the calculus of autocrats when they manipulate elections, he argued. Recognizing that electoral participation is the linchpin of a representative democracy's legitimacy and power, and that voter turnout of upward of 70 percent would all but guarantee a People Party victory, "they want to make sure that the cost of going to an election is higher than the benefit."

Pita pointed to his experience as evidence. Despite winning the 2023 election, Thai supporters now see him, three years later, living in Boston rather than governing from Bangkok. The message to voters, he said, is clear: If you keep voting and nothing changes, then why bother?

Pita calls this "voter fatigue by design" – a tactic used by autocrats to make politics seem “dramatized, boring, or irrelevant.”

He labels this Thai establishment's effort to convince voters that political participation is futile as “constituency.” It is one element in a “five C’s framework” that explains the People’s Party’s recent election defeat, he says.

A second factor, which he names “competitive collusion,” was evident in the decision by conservative candidates to coordinate their efforts – whether by merging campaigns or stepping aside – to avoid splitting the vote and present a unified front against the reformist People’s Party.

Third, conflict – by which Pita refers to the recent flare-up of tensions between Thailand and Cambodia – rallied nationalistic sentiment, lending greater legitimacy to the military and thus benefiting the conservative parties associated with it.

The fourth element, according to Pita, is Thailand’s Constitution, under which the Election Commission – the country’s sole election management body – is effectively appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Senate. “So I felt the [February 2026] election was not fair,” Pita said. “There was no linkage to the people, and there were no checks and balances.”

Finally, Pita pointed to the People Party's own missteps, which he categorizes as “candidacy.” He described a “Brahmin left versus merchant right” dynamic, arguing that the party became overly focused on technocratic, urban-centered policies and lost touch with the rural grassroots base that had been crucial to the Move Forward Party’s 2023 electoral success.

Regional Flashpoints: Cambodia and Myanmar

On the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute, Pita called for a renewed commitment to diplomacy, arguing that lasting peace can only be achieved through dialogue. He pointed to the Joint Boundary Commission, the bilateral body the two countries established in 1997 to oversee the demarcation of their border, as the most viable mechanism for resolving the dispute.

“If we return to the table and try to negotiate that out, I think that could be a path toward durable peace between Thailand and Cambodia.”

Turning to Myanmar, Pita stressed the need for Thailand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to take a more active role in addressing the civil war that has devastated the country since the military coup of February 2021. The conflict’s spillover effects, he noted, extend well beyond Myanmar’s borders, fueling cyber scam operations, human trafficking, and illicit financial activity that directly affect Thailand.

“If the ASEAN core, especially Thailand, with its geographic proximity, doesn't do anything, it's going to keep going in a dangerous drift like that.” 

Pita noted, however, that the crisis in Myanmar has grown more complex in recent years. Beyond the struggle among ethnic armed groups and between the military and pro-democracy forces, it now encompasses resource politics as part of a broader competition over rare earths and China’s expanding strategic interests linked to trade corridors and energy infrastructure.

As China’s involvement in the region deepens through its trade routes and gas pipeline interests, the conflict in Myanmar has become much harder to resolve, he said.

As a way forward, Pita proposed a minilateral coalition comprising key ASEAN states, along with India, China, and possibly Japan and South Korea. The goal, he said, would be to work with Myanmar’s opposition forces to “turn resistance into governance” and lay the groundwork for a viable political transition toward a post-conflict Myanmar.

The Middle Power Moment and U.S.-China Rivalry

Zooming out to the global stage, Pita spoke of his interest in the prospects of a "middle power moment" taking shape, citing Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s recent diplomatic tour of the Indo-Pacific region to urge middle power nations, including India, Australia, and Japan, to unite in response to the U.S.-China great power rivalry and the transformation of U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration.

“Thailand is still the second-largest country in ASEAN,” Pita said. “So we have agency and autonomy. Whether we use it or not, that is something that remains to be seen.”

“You realize that if you rely on the Americans for security and the Chinese for the economy, you are going to be forced to choose sides. And once you choose sides, that's the end of everything that you have.” He argued that, if nations are to avoid being forced to choose sides, they must redefine neutrality as an active capability rather than a passive position.

Here, too, he suggested, flexible, issue-based minilaterals could be beneficial. “So I think we'll see a rise of multilaterals on various issues, whether it's AI governance, semiconductors, maritime management, cybersecurity, or critical minerals.”

From Player to Coach

Forced to the sidelines of Thai politics, Pita has embraced a new role. "My calling now is to groom next-gen leaders. I used to be a player, and I did a good job. And then they stopped me. They forced me to sit down. So I decided to become a coach instead.” At Harvard Kennedy School, he now co-teaches a class on running for public office in developing countries, turning his recent, raw experiences into a textbook for the next generation.

Despite the setbacks, Pita’s message remains one of resilience and determination. When asked if he could still win, he was unequivocal. "I think I can," he stated. “I think about it every single night, to return to the arena and become a player. But I can wait. I could strategize, I could accumulate small victories until I'm strong, vigorous, and capable. And when I return, I will change Thailand for good.”.

In His Own Words: Pita's Column in Matichon Weekly

Pita contributes a regular column to the Thai-language news magazine Matichon Weekly (มติชนสุดสัปดาห์), providing analysis on topics ranging from global economic shifts and international politics to urban development and his experiences engaging with leaders in politics, technology, business, and social activism. In his column of June 12, 2026, he reflects on his May 29 visit to Stanford and APARC.

Below is an English version of the column, generated by Google Translate. It has been mildly edited for accuracy and style.

Palo Alto Annual Event

I'm back at Stanford University and Palo Alto again, after visiting last year. I was so impressed that I've decided I'd like to visit every year if I can, not just because of the good weather and pleasant atmosphere, but because this place is a hub of knowledge, conversation, and unique perspectives on the world that are hard to find elsewhere.

I spent three days as a guest of APARC, or the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University's Asia-Pacific research center, which is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), one of the world's most influential institutions in international relations and public policy, as well as the Hoover Institution, a public policy institute that brings together thinkers, historians, economists, and former policymakers from around the globe.

These three institutions set Stanford apart from typical universities, creating a space where the academic and policy worlds converge tangibly. The people you pass each day might be Larry Diamond, who has studied democratic transitions and declines for decades; Francis Fukuyama, author of The End of History and the Last Man; Gi-Wook Shin, an expert on East Asia; or Kiyoteru Tsutsui, who studies human rights issues. On the other side of the university is a collection of former top U.S. policymakers, from Condoleezza Rice to Michael McFaul, making conversations here both academic and practical. Importantly, the questions I'm asked at Stanford are always more difficult than anywhere else.

Many conversations this year have revolved around the same question: Is the world entering an era where geopolitics and technology are increasingly intertwined? While in the past, technology companies competed to create superior products, today they face geopolitical questions similar to those governments do. From restrictions on chip exports and access to rare earth minerals to energy security and the restructuring of international supply chains, the names Nvidia, TSMC, and ASML are frequently mentioned alongside those of major powers, as the ability to design, manufacture, and control advanced technology has become an integral part of state power.

In the world of AI, the question has changed significantly this year. At Stanford and Silicon Valley, I hear less talk about frontier models than I expected, but more and more talk about inference, compute, and energy. The excitement isn't about how well the next model will perform, but about who can get these models out of the lab and into real-world economic applications first.

On the other hand, competition is shifting from the digital world to the physical world. Waymo's self-driving cars are becoming commonplace on San Francisco streets, while Amazon's Zoox is beginning to enter the fray as a major player. The development of humanoid robots is also being discussed more seriously than ever before. Many believe that the next decade will be the time when AI begins to develop its own "arms and legs," no longer confined to computer screens.

As technology has advanced to this point, the conversation has once again turned to geopolitics. This includes issues such as controls on the export of advanced chips, competition to attract leading researchers, access to energy for hyperscale data centers, and concerns about the concentration of computing power in the hands of a few companies and countries. If in the 20th century, oil was the strategic resource of superpowers, many are beginning to see that in the 21st century, computing may be heading towards a similar status. The world is therefore not just witnessing a technological competition, but a new restructuring of power through technology.

Another thing I always try to do whenever I come to Stanford and Silicon Valley is to meet Thai students, researchers, entrepreneurs, and Thais working in the technology industry. Because, if you look closely, Thais are already a part of the global competitiveness we talk about.

Over the past two years, since being disqualified from politics, I have dedicated part of my time to traveling, meeting, and systematically building a database of Thai talent abroad. This includes scientists, engineers, economists, artificial intelligence researchers, and executives in global technology companies. This trip was no exception. I had the opportunity to meet Thais working at Google, Meta, Apple, Salesforce, Nvidia, OpenAI, and many other leading technology companies. Some work in semiconductors, some develop AI models, and some manage products with hundreds of millions of users worldwide. Many may not be well-known in Thailand, but they are part of the workforce driving the world's future economy today.

Every time I speak with this group of Thais, I leave feeling hopeful. Hopeful to see that Thais can stand at the forefront of industries that are shaping the future of the world, on par with anyone else. And hopeful that their knowledge, experience, and networks can connect and create even more value for Thailand in the future. I can only hope that one day I will have the opportunity to work with them for the future of our nation.

As people increasingly turn to large language models for political tasks, including voting guidance, the political neutrality of AI chatbots has emerged as a major policy concern. American AI chatbots are used globally, yet little is known about their behavior as tools for political decision-making and potential political bias in non-U.S. contexts.

To address this gap, researchers ran an experiment during the final week of Japan’s February 8, 2026, general election. The experiment reveals a striking pattern: when asked which party to support in the election, five major AI models from three companies overwhelmingly directed voter profiles with left-leaning policy positions toward the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). The reason, according to the researchers, has to do with the information environment AI systems can access.

These findings, published in a working paper titled Why Do AI Models Tell Left-Wing Voters to Support the Communist Party?, “suggest that AI voting advice may be shaped as much by the information-retrieval environment as by model training, with implications for governance frameworks that rely on U.S.-centric assumptions,” write the researchers, Andrew Hall, the Davies Family Professor of Political Economy at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Sho Miyazaki, a visiting researcher at Waseda Institute of Political Economy, an incoming Ph.D. student in public policy at Harvard University, and a former predoctoral research fellow at Stanford University. Miyazaki is also a core member of the Stanford Japan Barometer, a project of the Japan Program at Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

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How AI Models Deliver Political Advice in Japan: A Systematic Experiment

To understand how AI models provide political recommendations in the Japanese context, Hall and Miyazaki created 36,300 synthetic voter profiles with varying gender, region, and stated political views on 12 policy issues spanning security (constitutional amendment, defense spending, espionage law), diplomacy and immigration (China relations, foreign workers, permanent residency), energy (nuclear power), economic (consumption tax, social insurance), and social domains (dual surnames, restrictions on corporate donations, Diet seat reduction).

They then queried five models from three AI companies (OpenAI, Google, and xAI) during Japan’s February 8, 2026, Lower House election, asking each model to recommend a political party based on the voter profiles. All five models were queried with web search enabled and could access current information.

The researchers found that policy positions overwhelmingly dominated the models' party recommendations, producing swings of 50 to 98 percentage points in party choice, compared to just 0.5 to 7 percentage points for demographic factors. Thus, demographic effects are an order of magnitude smaller than policy effects.

Furthermore, left-leaning policy views in voter profiles caused all five AI models to converge overwhelmingly on recommending the Japan Communist Party, even though other parties hold broadly similar positions on the issues tested. The concentration on recommending JCP under left-leaning policy stances is therefore not explained by ideological distinctiveness.

In the control condition without policy input, models showed no uniform left-wing bias: three of the five models recommended the Liberal Democratic Party at high rates, and JCP shares were low for four of the five models.

“The key finding is that JCP recommendation rates rise sharply when policy positions are provided, which is the typical scenario when voters use these tools in practice,” write Hall and Miyazaki.

Information Environment Asymmetry

Why the JCP? The researchers traced the pattern to the sources AI models cite when making recommendations.

The JCP operates Akahata, a self-described daily newspaper published on a fully open website that AI web-search tools can freely access. In contrast, Japan's major news outlets have implemented technical barriers (known as robots.txt restrictions) that block AI crawlers from accessing their content, a move driven by copyright concerns.

The researchers found that the JCP's open website and party newspaper were among the most-cited sources in the AI models’ recommendations. Unable to distinguish between editorially independent journalism and partisan content, the models treated the JCP content as a credible news source. Thus, the information environment available to AI is systematically skewed toward the JCP's partisan sources that are designed to persuade rather than to scrutinize and inform.

“A model that retrieves information from jcp.or.jp/akahata and simultaneously classifies that site as news media is not simply making a labeling error: it is operating in an information environment where the boundary between party communication and journalism is genuinely blurred, and where the consequences of that blurring flow directly into its recommendations,” Hall and Miyazaki write.

The researchers also found that incorporating X search amplified left-leaning recommendations in Japan, the opposite of expectations based on the U.S. discourse environment.

Implications for Democratic Systems in the AI Age

The study's findings carry significant implications:

• AI governance frameworks should treat content access policy and AI political neutrality as deeply intertwined domains.
• Election commissions should create nonpartisan platforms that compile structured data about party positions so that the information is comparable, party-independent, and machine-readable.
• News organizations should recognize that by imposing copyright-motivated content access restrictions, they may inadvertently cede influence over AI-mediated information to partisan actors. They may wish to consider forms of negotiated access.
• Political actors will likely begin to optimize their communication for AI.
• Users should exercise caution in using AI as a voting advisor and be conscious of its potential biases and blind spots.

“If AI systems are going to act as political intermediaries more broadly, two problems need to be addressed,” writes Hall in an article about the research via his Substack. “The first is informational: ensuring that what the sources models read reflects the same balance of scrutiny and debate that voters encounter in a healthy media ecosystem. The second is advisory: deciding how an AI system should even translate a voter’s values into political guidance in the first place.”

Learn more about the Stanford Japan Barometer and its work  >

On October 21, 2025, Ms. Sanae Takaichi, a hardline conservative, became the first female Prime Minister of Japan, marking a historic moment for the country, which has one of the worst records among the world's developed democracies for gender equality. Yet, Takaichi's views on empowering women are complex, and she steps into office at a moment of internal party weakness and intense domestic and regional strategic pressures. On October 28, she will welcome President Trump to Tokyo, where the two leaders will hold a summit meeting.

In the following video explainer, Stanford sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and the director of APARC and its Japan Program, discusses Takaichi’s background and rise to power, her cabinet choices, and what they signal for Japan's future. Watch:

Video: Michael Breger

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In the Media

On October 28, 2025, on the heels of the summit meeting of Prime Minister Takaichi and President Trump, Tsutsui joined Scott Tong, host of WBUR's Here & Now, to discuss Takaichi's rise to power and what's next for Japan. Listen:

This commentary was first published in the Journal of Democracy.

Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party won South Korea’s June 3 presidential election with 49.4 percent of the vote. The outcome was widely anticipated, given a political climate that strongly favored the liberal camp in the aftermath of the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol. Still, Lee’s victory was not as overwhelming as some might have expected. With 99.6 percent of the votes tallied, the two main conservative candidates — Kim Moon-soo and Lee Jun-seok — together garnered a slightly higher combined vote share of 49.5 percent (41.2 percent and 8.3 percent, respectively) Why, then, did Korean voters ultimately choose Lee Jae-myung but with a measured endorsement rather than a landslide victory, and what does it mean for Korean democracy?

This election followed a period of intense political turmoil that began with President Yoon’s declaration of martial law on December 3 of last year and his impeachment just two months ago. While the election results were expected, they still raise important questions about the future of Korean democracy. Do the last six months reflect the resilience of democratic institutions — capable of self-correction through legal and electoral processes — or, have these events exposed the fragility of Korea’s democracy, with its deep political divisions and public distrust in leadership?

In many ways, the answer is both. Civic engagement and a peaceful transfer of power during such a challenging episode suggest a strong democratic foundation. At the same time, the election outcome still shows a highly polarized electorate, underscoring the hurdles that lie ahead for Korean society and politics.

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2017 vs. 2025

This was the second time in a decade that Korea held a snap presidential election. The first occurred eight years ago, following the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye. In this regard, Koreans have grown familiar with the impeachment process and snap elections. In both instances, the impeached presidents — Park in 2017 and Yoon in 2025 — were conservatives, and both elections resulted in liberal victories, with Moon Jae-in (2017–22) and now Lee Jae-myung taking office.

The 2025 election, however, differs significantly from the 2017 contest, with important implications for Korean democracy.

First, the impeachment process this time was far more divisive. In 2017, liberal groups mobilized millions in mass protests demanding Park’s removal, and conservatives largely accepted the outcome without major resistance. In contrast, Yoon’s impeachment was extremely contentious, sparking counterprotests from conservative groups. Waving “Stop the Steal” signs, far-right movements gained strength, determined not to see a repeat of 2017, which not only led to defeat at the polls but also a brutal campaign of political retribution by the ensuing liberal government.

Second, this polarization profoundly influenced voting behavior. Even conservatives who criticized Yoon’s declaration of martial law ultimately rallied behind Kim, a candidate less critical of the controversial order. The left-right political divide had deepened during the Moon and Yoon administrations. In 2017, a centrist candidate like Ahn Cheol-soo could attract more than 20 percent of the vote. In 2025, however, such space for a centrist voice has all but vanished. The election became a fierce contest between liberals (Lee Jae-myung) and conservatives (Kim Moon-soo and Lee Jun-seok), reflecting the polarized electorate.

Third, the tense political atmosphere left little room for substantive policy debate. While important topics including artificial intelligence, energy, climate change, social reconciliation, and foreign policy were included in their campaign pledges, discussions around these issues remained superficial at best. Instead, the campaign was dominated by harsh personal attacks and negative rhetoric from all sides.

Reformer or Strongman?

Given that this was a snap election, the new administration will assume office immediately on June 4 without the usual transition period. What can we expect from the new leader, particularly regarding Korea’s democratic future?

Lee’s appeal lies in his image as a pragmatic reformer, someone who speaks to economic struggles and social inequalities facing ordinary Koreans. His personal story itself resonates deeply: Born into poverty, he overcame significant hardship to become a human-rights lawyer, then rose through the political ranks as mayor of Seongnam, a city near Seoul, and later as governor of Gyeonggi Province, the most populous province in the country, before taking the Democratic Party leadership. This dramatic personal and political ascent has inspired many Korean citizens.

Yet Lee’s candidacy has not been without controversy. He remains under multiple criminal investigations and court trials related to charges of bribery, corruption, and breaking election laws, and his often-combative style has created the perception of a deeply polarizing figure. Many conservatives view Lee as a radical populist who shows insufficient regard for democratic norms and institutional checks.

Given the mixed perception and expectation surrounding President Lee, what kind of leadership can we expect from his administration? Two possible paths seem to lie ahead for the new leader still relatively unknown to the outside world: one resembling the approach of former president Moon Jae-in, and the other inspired by the legacy of Korea’s first liberal president, Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003). The direction Lee chooses will have major implications for the future of Korean democracy.

Lee may follow in the footsteps of Moon Jae-in, leading a campaign of political retribution that pushes Korea toward illiberal democracy. Lee has personal reasons for political resentment: He was aggressively investigated by the Yoon administration and still faces ongoing legal challenges. He has spoken publicly about the need to root out what he calls “forces of insurrection,” raising concerns that he might pursue a hardline campaign similar to Moon’s controversial efforts to “eradicate deep-rooted evils.”

Lee’s party has also pledged to advance judicial reforms that could weaken the Supreme Court, which on May 1 overturned an earlier acquittal by the Seoul High Court of Lee’s criminal charge of election-law violation. With his party now holding a parliamentary majority, traditional checks and balances could be on the line. If Lee uses his consolidated executive and congressional power to settle political scores, the result will only deepen social divisions and facilitate democratic backsliding. In such a scenario, he risks being viewed in Korea and elsewhere as yet another strongman leader in a world where such figures have been on the rise.

Alternatively, Lee could chart a course akin to that of former president Kim Dae-jung, who is widely considered a respected statesman and reformer. Kim overcame intense personal hardship, including a death sentence under a military regime, and yet chose reconciliation over revenge when he took power. He formed a coalition with conservative leader Kim Jong-pil and guided the country through the Asian financial crisis with a focus on national unity and pragmatic reform. Unlike Moon, who turned over power to the conservatives after five years, Kim effectively enabled a liberal succession.

Lee, often viewed as less ideological and more pragmatic than Moon, could take a similar path — one centered on cooperation, healing, and practical solutions. This possibility appears plausible given that his key advisors on both domestic and foreign affairs are not cut from the same cloth as Moon’s inner circle. By emulating Kim’s legacy, Lee could rise above political divides and earn broad national and international respect.

What Lies Ahead?

The political drama of the last six months ended with this election, but its impact on Korea’s democracy will be enduring. On one hand, the peaceful resolution of a snap election, especially following the highly contentious impeachment process, demonstrates the strength and resilience of Korean democratic institutions. Voters remained highly engaged (turnout was 79.4 percent, the highest since 1997), and the electoral process held firm under pressure.

On the other hand, the deep partisan divides expose fissures in Korea’s democratic fabric. Mistrust in political elites, a divided society, and a highly polarized media environment often dominated by sensationalism continue to threaten constructive democratic dialogue. Moreover, the rise of populist rhetoric on both the left and right reflects an electorate increasingly driven by emotional appeals or identity politics rather than substantive policy debate or national vision. Without a concerted effort by both liberals and conservatives toward reconciliation, political polarization is likely to deepen. Bridging that divide will be one of the most critical and difficult tasks for Korean democracy.

Despite his election victory, Lee faces a challenging road ahead, both personally and politically. Since the Supreme Court overturned Lee’s acquittal of violating election law, the case is set to go back to the Seoul High Court for retrial on June 18. While the final ruling is likely to be delayed until after his term ends, the case may continue to cast a shadow over his integrity and credibility as the country’s top leader.

Lee also has the daunting task of delivering the institutional reforms promised during his campaign. In particular, he needs to follow up on his pledge to replace the current single five-year presidential term with a four-year term allowing for a subsequent reelection. This change could bring political stability, as presidents would have an incentive to perform well during their first term to secure a second one. Furthermore, a potential eight-year presidency would provide more time to implement long-term policies. Past presidents have made similar promises, but none have succeeded in realizing them. It remains to be seen whether Lee’s administration can rise above partisan politics and rebuild public trust through meaningful reforms.

Ultimately, this election has been both a stress test and a reaffirmation of Korea’s democratic resilience. It highlights the urgent need for democratic renewal, while demonstrating that, even in times of deep political division, democratic institutions and norms can endure. This lesson holds global relevance, particularly for the United States, where democracy is also being put to the test.

Gi-Wook Shin's Election Analysis in the Media

Lee Jae-myung begins his road to power. Can he fulfill his promises amid numerous challenges?
Caixin Media, June 6 (Chinese, subscription) quoted)

He survived a knife attack, stormed Parliament, and campaigned in a bulletproof vest. Now he's going to heal a country.
Politiken, June 4 (Danish, subscription) (quoted)

Lee Poised for Decisive Win in South Korea's Snap Election
AFP, June 3 (quoted)

New South Korean President Lee Takes Power After Resounding Election Win
AFP, June 3 (quoted)

The Challenges Facing South Korea's New Leader Lee
AFP, June 3 (quoted) 

This interview first appeared in The Paper on April 4, 2025. The following English version was generated using machine translation and subsequently edited for accuracy and clarity.

It has been 122 days since South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol issued an "emergency martial law" order on December 3, 2024. On the morning of April 4, the Constitutional Court of Korea will issue a ruling on Yoon’s impeachment case. From the National Assembly’s motion to impeach to 11 court hearings and now the final verdict, 111 days have passed—far more than for former Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Park Geun-hye. Over these four months, the divide between the ruling and opposition parties — and within Korean society — has become increasingly apparent. Whether the Constitutional Court can safeguard the Constitution and public trust has become a major focus of public opinion in South Korea.

"I’ve long believed in the resilience of South Korean democracy, but over the past two or three months, I’ve started to worry. In the face of this current political stalemate, I wonder whether Koreans can still accept decisions that contradict their positions," said Gi-Wook Shin, Professor of Sociology at Stanford University, founding director of the Korea Program, and Director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, in an interview with The Paper. He noted that there are no signs South Korea will escape its current political polarization anytime soon — and that the situation may worsen.

Shin entered Yonsei University’s Sociology Department in the late 1970s. In the early 2000s, he founded the Korea Program at Stanford, focusing on social movements and nationalism. In 2024, he published Korea’s Democracy in Crisis: The Threats of Liberalism, Populism, and Polarization, a book whose concerns — resurgent populism and societal polarization — are now vividly reflected in real life.

On December 3, 2024, Yoon declared a state of emergency and described his political opponents as "anti-state forces." The language he used in his televised emergency address was directly reminiscent of the Cold War era. Meanwhile, during Yoon’s administration, opposition parties submitted a record 29 motions for impeachment. These episodes highlight deep rifts in Korean politics, intensifying the fierce struggle between the left and right across all levels of society.

The roots of South Korea’s political divide trace back to the post-WWII era. Under global pressures, political elites on the Korean peninsula quickly split into left-wing, right-wing, and various centrist groups, each hoping to build the country according to their ideals. After the United States and Soviet Union occupied different parts of the peninsula, a sharp ideological confrontation emerged, and the left and right failed to unite to establish a single nation.

During the military rule in South Korea, U.S.-backed authoritarian strongmen governed the country, laying the groundwork for today’s conservative political parties. Meanwhile, leftist forces were strengthened by decades of street protests. Since democratization in 1987, South Korean politics have swung between the left and the right. Under President Yoon, this shift toward the right has become even more pronounced.

Amid the growing hostility between conservatives and progressives, Yoon’s martial law declaration and subsequent impeachment proceedings have amplified South Korea’s political polarization and left-right conflict. Yoon’s supporters have launched massive demonstrations. Conservative voices have grown louder, with many chanting U.S.-style slogans like “Stop the Steal” in homage to Trump’s MAGA movement. Shin warns that among Asian countries, South Korea may be the only one to experience a phenomenon akin to “Trumpism.” A recent survey by Korea’s Center for Conflict Resolution found that most South Koreans see ideological division as the country’s most pressing social issue.

Conservative Voices Grow Louder, More Extreme

The Paper: From your observations, what changes has this political storm — from emergency martial law to the president’s impeachment — brought to South Korean society?

Gi-Wook Shin: Regarding presidential impeachment, Roh Moo-hyun’s case in 2004 was dismissed by the Constitutional Court, and Park Geun-hye was removed from office in 2017. Both previous cases strictly followed legal procedures with clear rules. But this time, the situation is far more chaotic, with fiercer partisan conflict. In a sense, we’re witnessing a threat to the rule of law.

On the other hand, mass mobilization by both the left and the right is very active, especially the anti-impeachment forces, whose scale and influence are significant. This shows that political polarization has deepened, and social division has worsened — developments that deeply concern me.

The Paper: In this wave of political turmoil, what is the core conflict between conservatives and progressives?

Shin: When martial law was declared, the right tried to assert control over state power and justified their actions with claims that pro-North Korean forces needed to be purged from the country. Their stance clearly supports the South Korea-U.S. alliance. In their protests, you’ll often see both Korean and American flags, as well as images of Trump and Yoon Suk-yeol side by side.

The left, by contrast, believes that this emergency declaration is essentially destroying the democracy that South Koreans fought so hard to achieve. They see the right not just as opponents, but as anti-state and anti-people forces.

Today’s political confrontation in South Korea is filled with resentment and hostility. It has become a kind of “identity politics.” That’s why compromise is so difficult. The two sides no longer see each other as legitimate political rivals, but as “evil forces” or enemies to be defeated at all costs.

The Paper: It’s been over three months since the martial law controversy began. As time passes, conservative voices have grown louder, the ruling People Power Party's approval ratings have rebounded, and anti-impeachment rallies are massive. Are we seeing signs of an expanding conservative base?

Shin: Large-scale protests aren’t new in South Korea. In the past, they were usually led by liberal or progressive groups. In recent years, however, right-wing and conservative forces have increasingly mobilized for protests. This is a new trend. You could already see this during the 2022 presidential election: it was extremely close, with Yoon and Lee Jae-myung separated by less than 1 percent of the vote. Conservatives realized the importance of mobilizing public support to counterbalance the left.

Indeed, conservative voices have grown louder and more extreme. We’re even seeing cases of storming courts and self-immolation. But that doesn’t necessarily mean their numbers are increasing. Overall, South Korea’s population is roughly divided into 30 percent liberals, 30 percent conservatives, and about 40 percent swing voters. Sometimes conservatives use “bluffing” to create the impression of overwhelming influence and suppress progressive mobilization.

The Paper: The far right is now active on the political frontlines, loudly supporting the conservative camp. Some far-right individuals even stormed the court. Right-wing YouTubers have become among Yoon’s most fervent defenders. In this context, will the People Power Party continue shifting further right, or even toward the far right?

Shin: What’s visible now is that the ruling People Power Party has some connection to the far-right forces in the current street protests. Especially in the wake of the martial law declaration and impeachment, the far right has taken the lead in organizing massive demonstrations, mobilizing hundreds of thousands every weekend.

There is latent cooperation between the ruling party and the far right. But now that the impeachment has triggered an early presidential election, the People Power Party must also appeal to a broader base, which means distancing itself from the far right — creating a dilemma.

If the People Power Party continues working with the far right, it may retain its base and ensure right-wing support. But elections are won by swing voters. Distancing from the far right helps avoid being labeled “extreme” and attracts moderates.

Given that the election will happen within 60 days of the impeachment, the ruling party has little time to adjust its campaign strategy. They must quickly decide how to handle their relationship with far-right street forces: should they continue cooperating or distance themselves? This will be a core political challenge in the coming weeks.

South Korea’s Democratic Crisis Reflects a Global Trend

The Paper: At conservative protests, many people carry signs with slogans like “Stop the Steal,” borrowed from Trump supporters. Trump had the “Make America Great Again” movement. Yoon has the Taegeukgi Budae movement (a far-right group of older conservatives, many of them fundamentalist Christians who strongly support Yoon). How do you see Trump’s influence on Korean politics?

Shin: It’s interesting. Among Asian countries, South Korea may be the only one to experience something like “Trumpism.” Two factors are worth noting.

First, there are organizational similarities between the Korean and American contexts. Yoon and Trump supporters share common traits, especially religious ones. That’s not the case in other Asian countries. For example, the Philippines is Catholic, others are predominantly Muslim or Buddhist. South Korea is the only Asian country where fundamentalist Christians have strong political influence. (Editor’s note: According to Yonhap, Korea’s Yoido Full Gospel Church is currently the largest Christian church in the world.) There seems to be a connection or sense of identification between American evangelicals and Korean Christian fundamentalists.

Second, ideologically, Korea’s right resembles America’s right. Their fondness for slogans like “Stop the Steal” reflects their belief in election fraud conspiracies. YouTube’s influence in Korea is possibly stronger than in most of the world, especially among the far right. It has become a vital tool for mobilization and organizing large-scale protests.

The Paper: South Korea’s democratization was closely tied to the U.S. export of democracy. After the Korean War, with U.S. support, South Korea adopted a democratic constitution and a relatively modern political framework. How has foreign influence shaped Korean democracy? Is it connected to the current democratic crisis?

Shin: U.S. influence on Korean democracy is complex. Until the 1980s, the United States supported South Korea’s military dictators like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. Only after 1987 did the United States back democratic development. But ultimately, it was the Korean people who fought for democracy. That’s why so many opposed the martial law declaration on December 3. They don’t want to give up hard-won freedoms. Many made great sacrifices for democracy.

South Korea has been democratic for over 40 years. What we see today may be tense or even extreme, but many places worldwide are also experiencing democratic backsliding. It’s unclear whether the United States is doing any better, especially in the Trump era. Many European countries — France, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain — are facing similar crises.

South Korea’s current democratic crisis is part of a global trend. It’s just that the martial law announcement drew special attention. But populism, polarization, and identity politics are global issues.

The Paper: After democratization, South Korea again saw emergency martial law, fierce clashes between the president and law enforcement, and general chaos. Yet parliament quickly revoked the martial law order, the impeachment process followed legal procedure, and there were no bloodshed or full societal collapse. What has maintained this relative order?

Shin: South Korea has experienced many legal and political crises before. Also, civic engagement is very high: many LGBTQ+ and minority groups are highly politically active, perhaps even more than in the United States. That’s part of why political clashes are so intense, but it also shows a deep sense of civic participation.

Korea is a relatively well-governed country, with a strong bureaucratic system. I used to believe strongly in the resilience of Korean democracy, but over the past two or three months, I’ve started to worry. Can people still accept outcomes that contradict their positions?

In 2017, the Constitutional Court upheld Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, and most Koreans accepted it and moved on. But this time, it’s unclear whether Yoon’s supporters will accept a guilty verdict — they’re already challenging the court’s legitimacy. On the other hand, if the impeachment fails, opponents may also refuse to accept the result.

The political turbulence may persist for months, or even years.

How to Heal a Divided Society

The Paper: Beyond left-right ideology, what other messages are South Korean protesters trying to express? Also, Korean pop culture has entered these events: people are playing K-pop music and waving glowsticks. How do you see this unique cultural phenomenon?

Shin: Today, there are many legal disputes and procedural questions between the Constitutional Court, regular courts, the Corruption Investigation Office, prosecutors, and police. Sometimes the legal process is inconsistent or fragmented, which confuses the public and weakens faith in the legal system.

But Koreans have a long history of protest culture. They know how to demonstrate in an orderly way. Protests aren’t always serious or violent, sometimes they feel festive or recreational, with music, dancing, and food stalls. Some elderly people even travel from rural areas to Seoul for a day just to enjoy the atmosphere and social gathering.

Also, Korea is a highly centralized society — everything is concentrated in Seoul, and issues can quickly become national news.

The Paper: This political crisis has deepened Korea’s ideological rifts. A recent survey shows that ideological conflict is now seen as the most urgent social problem, even ahead of gender or wealth inequality. What can be done to prevent further division or begin healing?

Shin: There are no signs that Korea will overcome its political confrontation and polarization anytime soon. The divide may worsen. In the long term, I call for political reform.

Korea should adopt a parliamentary system. The current presidential system is “winner-takes-all,” so even if someone wins by less than 1 percent of the vote, they gain total control. A parliamentary system might encourage more cooperation and compromise. But I don’t think Korea currently has the political atmosphere to make that shift.

The electoral system also needs reform. Right now, each district elects just one representative — sometimes by a single vote — giving them total power.

Civic education is another area for reform. Koreans need to learn how to share and compromise. In Korean, “compromise” often carries a negative connotation. But in a democracy, compromise is essential. No one can get everything they want.

These are long-term reforms and there’s a long road ahead. What truly worries me is that in the next year or two, social division may grow even worse.