Governance

FSI's research on the origins, character and consequences of government institutions spans continents and academic disciplines. The institute’s senior fellows and their colleagues across Stanford examine the principles of public administration and implementation. Their work focuses on how maternal health care is delivered in rural China, how public action can create wealth and eliminate poverty, and why U.S. immigration reform keeps stalling. 

FSI’s work includes comparative studies of how institutions help resolve policy and societal issues. Scholars aim to clearly define and make sense of the rule of law, examining how it is invoked and applied around the world. 

FSI researchers also investigate government services – trying to understand and measure how they work, whom they serve and how good they are. They assess energy services aimed at helping the poorest people around the world and explore public opinion on torture policies. The Children in Crisis project addresses how child health interventions interact with political reform. Specific research on governance, organizations and security capitalizes on FSI's longstanding interests and looks at how governance and organizational issues affect a nation’s ability to address security and international cooperation.

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Flyer for Asia in 2030, APARC@40 Conference and Celebration with an image of Encina Hall facade

The culmination of a special event series celebrating Shorenstein APARC's 40th Anniversary, "Asia in 2030, APARC@40"

Join us in celebrating APARC's 40 years of research, education, and engagement. Recognizing the accomplishments of the past four decades and looking forward to the future, the two-day program will highlight multiple aspects of APARC’s core areas of expertise and examine key forces affecting Asia’s present and shaping its future.

1-1:30 p.m.

Opening Session

Opening Remarks

Gi-Wook Shin
Director of Shorenstein APARC and the Korea Program
William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea
Professor of Sociology
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Congratulatory Remarks

Kathryn Ann “Kam” Moler
Vice Provost and Dean of Research
Marvin Chodorow Professor
Professor of Applied Physics, Physics, and Energy Science Engineering
Stanford University

Condoleezza Rice
Tad and Dianne Taube Director of the Hoover Institution
Senior Fellow on Public Policy at the Hoover Institution
Denning Professor of Global Business and the Economy at the Stanford Graduate School of Business
Professor of Political Science
Senior Fellow at Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Scott D. Sagan
Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University


1:30-2:45 p.m. 

The Future of Diplomacy

John Everard
Former Ambassador to Belarus, Uruguay, and North Korea for the United Kingdom
Coordinator of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts on North Korea
Former Pantech Fellow at Shorenstein APARC

Laura Stone
Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Maldives
Former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for China and Mongolia;
Former Director of the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
Former Director of Economic Policy Office in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Visiting Scholar and Inaugural China Policy Fellow at Shorenstein APARC at Stanford University

Moderator

Michael Beeman
Former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
Visiting Scholar at Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University


2:45-3 p.m. ~ Coffee and Tea Break


3-4:15 p.m.

The Future of Asian Studies

Panelists

Donald K. Emmerson
Director of the Southeast Asia Program at Shorenstein APARC
Affiliated Faculty with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Affiliated Scholar with the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies
Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Thomas B. Gold
Professor of Sociology
University of California, Berkeley

Jisoo Kim
Korea Foundation Associate Professor of History, International Affairs, and East Asian Languages and Literatures
Director of the Institute for Korean Studies
Co-Director of the East Asia National Resource Center
The George Washington University

Moderator

Kiyoteru Tsutsui
Deputy Director of Shorenstein APARC
Director of the Japan Program
Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies
Professor of Sociology
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University


4:15-4:30 p.m. ~ Coffee and Tea Break


4:30-6 p.m.

Oksenberg Panel: The Future of U.S.-China Relations

Introduction

Jean C. Oi
Director of the China Program at Shorenstein APARC
Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University
William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Panelists

M. Taylor Fravel
Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director, Security Studies Program
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

David Michael Lampton
Professor Emeritus and former Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies, School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University
Former Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Shorenstein APARC

Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Moderator

Thomas Fingar
Former U.S. Department of State Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis, Director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, and Chief of the China Division
Former Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council
Fellow at Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
 

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The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to announce a suite of training, fellowship, and funding opportunities to support Stanford students interested in the area of contemporary Asia. APARC invites highly motivated and dedicated undergraduate- and graduate-level students to apply for these offerings:

APARC Summer 2023 Research Assistant Internships

APARC seeks current Stanford students to join our team as paid research assistant interns for the duration of the summer 2023 quarter. Research assistants work with assigned APARC faculty members on varied issues related to the politics, economies, populations, security, foreign policies, and international relations of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. This summer's projects include:

  • The Biopolitics of Cigarette Smoking and Production
  • The Bureaucratic State: A Personnel Management Lens
  • China’s Largest Corporations
  • Healthy Aging in Asia
  • Hiding in Plain Sight: How China Became A Great Power
  • Nationalism and Racism in Asia
  • U.S. Rivals: Construct or Reality?  
     

All summer research assistant positions will be on campus for eight weeks. The hourly pay rate is $17.25 for undergraduate students, $25 for graduate students.

The deadline for submitting applications and letters of recommendation is March 1, 2023.

Please follow these application guidelines:

I. Prepare the following materials:


II. Fill out the online application form for summer 2023, including the above two attachments, and submit the complete form.

III. Arrange for a letter of recommendation from a faculty to be sent directly to Shorenstein APARC. Please note: the faculty members should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu. We will consider only applications that include all supporting documents.

For more information and details about each summer research project, visit the Summer Research Assistant Internships Page >


APARC 2023-24 Predoctoral Fellowship

APARC supports Stanford Ph.D. candidates who specialize in contemporary Asia topics. The Center offers a stipend of $37,230 for the 2023-24 academic year, plus Stanford's Terminal Graduate Registration (TGR) fee for three quarters. We expect fellows to remain in residence at the Center throughout the year and to participate in Center activities.

Applications for the 2023-24 fellowship cycle of the APARC Predoctoral Fellowship are due March 1, 2023.

Please follow these application guidelines:

I. Prepare the following materials:

  • A current CV;
  • A cover letter including a brief description of your dissertation (up to 5 double-spaced pages);
  • A copy of your transcripts. Transcripts should cover all graduate work and include evidence of recently-completed work.

II. Fill out the following online application form, including the above three attachments, and submit the complete application form.

III. Arrange for two (2) letters of recommendation from members of your dissertation committee to be sent directly to Shorenstein APARC.  
Please note: the faculty/advisors should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu.

We will consider only applications that include all supporting documents. The Center will give priority to candidates who are prepared to finish their degree by the end of the 2023-24 academic year.

For more information, visit the APARC Predoctoral Fellowship Page >


APARC Diversity Grant

APARC's diversity grant supports Stanford undergraduate and graduate students from underrepresented minorities who are interested in contemporary Asia. The Center will award a maximum of $10,000 per grant to support a wide range of research expenses.

The Center is reviewing grant applications on a rolling basis.  
To be considered for the grant, please follow these application guidelines:

I. Prepare the following materials:

  • A statement describing the proposed research activity or project (no more than three pages);
  • A current CV;
  • An itemized budget request explaining research expense needs.

II. Fill out the following online application form, including the above three attachments, and submit the complete application form.

III. Arrange for a letter of recommendation from a faculty to be sent directly to APARC.  

Please note: the faculty members should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu.

For more information, visit the APARC Diversity Grant page >

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Tongtong Zhang
Q&As

Predoctoral Fellow Spotlight: Tongtong Zhang Examines Channels for Public Deliberation in China

Political Scientist and APARC Predoctoral Fellow Tongtong Zhang explores how the Chinese Communist Party maintains control through various forms of political communication.
Predoctoral Fellow Spotlight: Tongtong Zhang Examines Channels for Public Deliberation in China
Portrait of Ma'ili Yee, 2020-21 APARC Diversity Fellow
News

Student Spotlight: Ma’ili Yee Illuminates a Vision for Building the Blue Pacific Continent

With support from Shorenstein APARC’s Diversity Grant, coterminal student Ma’ili Yee (BA ’20, MA ’21) reveals how Pacific island nations are responding to the U.S.-China rivalry by developing a collective strategy for their region.
Student Spotlight: Ma’ili Yee Illuminates a Vision for Building the Blue Pacific Continent
Stanford main quad at night and text calling for nominations for APARC's 2023 Shorenstein Journalism Award.
News

Nominations Open for 2023 Shorenstein Journalism Award

Sponsored by Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the annual award recognizes outstanding journalists and journalism organizations for excellence in coverage of the Asia-Pacific region. News editors, publishers, scholars, and organizations focused on Asia research and analysis are invited to submit nominations for the 2023 award through February 15.
Nominations Open for 2023 Shorenstein Journalism Award
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To support Stanford students working in the area of contemporary Asia, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Center is offering research assistant positions for the duration of the 2023 summer quarter, a predoctoral fellowship for the duration of the 2023-24 academic year, and a Diversity Grant that funds research activities by students from underrepresented minorities.

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In 2004, when Stanford sociologist Xueguang Zhou deliberated on his next research project, he realized he had grown out of touch with China as radical reforms were enacted and massive economic growth transformed the nation. So he immersed himself in fieldwork in a northern Chinese rural township to see the changes firsthand.

That fieldwork led Zhou to delve into the workings of China’s massive bureaucracy in an attempt to answer the question: How is China governed? The empirically-informed theoretical framework Zhou developed to address this question is the subject of his new book, The Logic of Governance in China: An Organizational Approach (Cambridge University Press). We spoke with Zhou, the Kwoh-Ting Li Professor in Economic Development, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and APARC faculty, about the book and some of the insights it offers into the institutions and mechanisms in the governance of China. Watch the conversation:

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How does policy formulated in Beijing translate to and get executed at local levels? The problem of how to govern China from a centralized seat of power has been, as Zhou says, “a fundamental tension” for thousands of years. Beijing tends to move “decision rights and resources” to the center, although these are exactly what is needed for effective governance at the local level.

Through his years of fieldwork, Zhou was able to develop a “bottom-up kind of approach to understanding how China has been governed by macro policies [...]  implemented through local bureaucrats.” This approach, he says, is largely missing from studies of contemporary Chinese society, which tend to focus on Beijing’s top-down decision-making. Zhou’s framework explains how — given the fundamental tension between Beijing’s “all-encompassing role” and local governance — domestic policy gets effectively carried out at the municipal or even village levels.

A Paved Road to Every Village

One phenomenon through which Zhou looks at how national policy translates to the local level is the case of the “Paved Road to Every Village” (PREV) project. When this project was launched by the provincial government in 2004, there were ample large highways in the region, but villagers were still forced to traverse rutted dirt roads that were prone to flooding in the rainy season, a clear obstacle to growing the agricultural economy. 

 

The growth and energy of the Chinese economy have not been a result of direct government activity, but rather of government use of private entrepreneurs to participate in public projects, financing, and development.
Xueguang Zhou

Project funding, however, was complicated. Beijing was supplying 70,000 renminbi (RMB) per kilometer of road, but the actual cost was RMB 240,000/km, so villages had to come up with the rest (for context, the average per capita annual income in the region was 3,000 RMB). Facing such a deficit, many villages simply refused to take part in PREV. Zhou’s fascinating case study looks at two village leaders — one entrepreneurial, one reluctant — who decided to take up the challenge.

To explain how projects like this get funded in China, Zhou expands on Hungarian economist Janos Kornai’s concept of “soft budget constraints.” Kornai saw that in a socialist economy, state ownership of enterprise meant that factories or companies experiencing financial difficulties had to be rescued by the state. As Zhou explains, the “concept is upward, demanding new resources” from the state. In the Chinese context, however, local authorities move downward to, for example, the companies in their region. That’s why Zhou calls the phenomenon inverted soft budget constraints: at the local level, officials attempt to enlist private enterprises to underwrite government projects. Why would they be willing to do that? Businesses understand that if they do fund such projects, then the officials will later provide “privileged access” to the resources for other government projects.

This reliance on local enterprises to accomplish national programs illustrates another important lesson for Zhou, who says that the growth and energy of the Chinese economy have not been a result of direct government activity, but rather the government has made use of “private entrepreneurs [...] to participate in this kind of public project, financing, and development.”

This process, however, does not always work as expected. Officials can end up compelled to rely on informal social ties to purchase required items like cement, sand, and equipment on credit, which can incur huge collective debts that the village is unable to repay. In the end, these debts can do great harm to the financial viability of small villages. This sort of ad hoc funding is problematic, Zhou observes, because both entrepreneurs and villagers “want to live in a more certain environment,” where necessary projects are well-financed, rather than resorting to a desperate attempt to gather resources by any means possible.

The Distribution of Authority in the Bureaucratic State

In another case study, one that looks at environmental regulation, a doctoral student Zhou had been directing was embedded in a municipal environmental protection bureau during the implementation of a five-year plan by the central government’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) to control sulfur dioxide and chemical oxygen demand (an indicator of water pollution level). 

Such plans translate to thousands of projects nationwide, making the task load impossibly large for the central government to handle alone. To explain how authority rights are distributed among levels of government Zhou developed a “control rights” theory. In this case, that means the central government (principal) would retain the right to set pollution goals, the provincial bureau (supervisor) might retain the right of inspection, while the local governments (agents) might have the right to performance appraisal and incentive provision. Zhou holds that these control rights are distributed according to the different modes of Chinese governance, ranging from “tightly controlled,” where the central government retains all rights, to a federalism mode, where all rights are given away to the supervisor level.

Bargaining and Collusion

Zhou uses this and ancillary models to understand bureaucratic coping behaviors. One of those is bargaining. He offers examples of how municipal or county officials reacted to poor pollution inspections by bargaining with the provincial levels and redirecting blame to others, often successfully changing report results in their favor. 

Another strategy is collusion, which he argues “has become an informal but highly institutionalized practice,” one that is “common knowledge.” This was witnessed, for example, during provincial family-planning inspections. To prevent possible fraud or manipulation of data, provincial inspectors would have teams conduct unannounced “sudden attack” inspections. But local officials used “guerrilla tactics” to surveil and disrupt the provincial team’s efforts. Upon discovering that a provincial inspection team has arrived, local officials might record the team’s license plate numbers and share those with other officials elsewhere, and then begin shadowing them, providing mobile phone updates on their routes and possible next destinations.

Other collusive strategies might include the manipulation of data, or even ranking counties with good performance at the bottom of a list so that they are more likely to be the ones inspected, with the result being a glowing report

Zhou’s goal is not to expose these behaviors but to understand them. If we look closely at apparently contradictory bureaucratic patterns and cases, he says, then “we can theorize about the rationales behind why they behave this way, and under different circumstances, they behave differently.”

China’s zero-COVID policy is an example of campaign-style mobilization, a political instrument that Beijing has routinely deployed to achieve policy objectives and to reassert control at the local level.
Xueguang Zhou

Protest in the Chinese Context

In the last part of his book, Zhou looks at how individuals and social groups respond to authoritarian rule. How can large-scale collective action arise in China, where organizing outside of state-sponsored collective actions is forbidden? Zhou answers that the state — by imposing similar conditions across the country and reducing the majority of Chinese citizens to the same level — fosters the cultivation of similar grievances. At some point, this erupts into open protests, or alternatively, what Zhou calls “collective inaction,” like noncompliance with official campaigns. 

The recent protests in China against COVID measures are a perfect example of this phenomenon. After years under the strict zero-COVID policy, masses of Chinese citizens have similar grievances, leading to open protests. Zhou observes that “China’s zero-COVID policy is an example of campaign-style mobilization, a political instrument that Beijing has routinely deployed to achieve policy objectives and to reassert control at the local level.” But with this approach, there is a danger that local officials can become overzealous. In the case of the COVID pandemic, officials have been highly motivated to avoid responsibility for outbreaks.

By revealing the logic behind China’s governance, my book was probably a threat to China’s charismatic leaders, and also to the Leninist party, the very foundation of that party governance.
Xueguang Zhou

A Threat to China’s Charismatic Leaders

Another idea in Zhou’s book is that of charismatic leadership, which he asserts is “essential to the legitimacy of the Chinese state.” The Chinese Communist Party must continue to persuade citizens that they must “put all [their] power into the hands of one person or one ruling party.” As the deification of Xi Jinping in recent years shows, this is accomplished by depicting the leader and party as all-knowing and possessing “a mighty power to do all the right things.”

​​"Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret," political economist and sociologist Max Weber wrote in his treatise Economy and Society. The 'official secret' is the source of power and the specific invention of bureaucracy, he said, “and nothing is so fanatically defended by the bureaucracy as this attitude.”

Zhou’s empirically-informed findings and unified theory, however, shed light precisely on the secretive workings of the Chinese bureaucracy. This may explain why the original Chinese version of Zhou’s book, published in 2017, was “unshelved” after its initial print run, a euphemism for withdrawing a book from circulation and essentially making it disappear. When asked what he thought was the reason for the book’s disappearance from the Chinese market, Zhou invokes Weber’s idea of disenchantment, and suggests that by revealing the logic behind China’s governance, his book was “probably a threat to China’s charismatic leaders, and also to the Leninist party, the very foundation of that party governance.”

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Caught in the Middle: How Asian Nations Are Navigating the U.S.-China Competition

This fall, APARC brought together scholars and policy experts to examine the security competition that has come to define an era from the perspectives of Asian nations.
Caught in the Middle: How Asian Nations Are Navigating the U.S.-China Competition
Chinese President Xi Jinping waves during a meeting.
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China’s Xi Expands Power at Party Congress: Commentary Roundup

With Xi at the helm for a third term, we should expect to see a more assertive China and more turbulence in the regional and global order, say APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin and Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro. They offer their assessments of the outcomes of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and its implications for China’s trajectory and U.S.-China relations.
China’s Xi Expands Power at Party Congress: Commentary Roundup
U.S. President Joe Biden hosts a Quad Leaders Summit at the White House.
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New Essay Collection Examines Minilateral Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

A new Asia Policy roundtable considers whether and how minilateral groupings, such as the Quad and AUKUS, can deter coercion and aggression in the Indo-Pacific. The roundtable co-editor is APARC South Asia Research Scholar Arzan Tarapore, and it opens with an essay by Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro.
New Essay Collection Examines Minilateral Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific
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In a new book, Stanford sociologist and APARC faculty Xueguang Zhou offers a unified theoretical framework to explain how China's centralized political system maintains governance and how this process produces obstacles to professionalism, bureaucratic rationalism, and the rule of law.

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Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow, 2022-2023 & 2023-2024
Elbegdorj_2023_Headshot

Former President of Mongolia Elbegdorj joined the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) in 2023 as Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow from February 2023 to July 2023, and from November 2023 to April 2024, after a career in public service to Mongolia as a Member of Parliament, Prime Minister, and President. Currently, Mr. Elbegdorj is continuing his work to improve public policy, governance, and democracy through the Elbegdorj Institute, a think tank he founded in 2008. Mr. Elbegdorj holds a Master of Public Administration from Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government (2002) and Bachelor’s Degree in Journalism from Land Forces Military Academy of Lviv of former USSR (1988).

While at Stanford, his focus included democracy, disarmament, and governance across Asia.

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Event flyer with portraits of Richard Heydarian, Huong Le Thu, and Don Emmerson

When the U.S. Senate voted to expand NATO into the USSR’s sphere of influence in Europe in 1988, American diplomat-scholar George Kennan called it "the beginning of a new [U.S.-Russia] cold war” and said that Moscow would “gradually react quite adversely." Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 following a joint statement by Moscow and Beijing criticizing the United States. In May 2022, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi said U.S.-China relations were on the "brink of a new Cold War.”  What does this mean for Southeast Asians? Are they refusing to choose between the United States and its opponents? How much does the fate of Ukraine matter to Southeast Asians? Do they want peace or justice—to prevent big-power escalation or to reverse imperial expansion? How are they balancing those different views and the contending pressures to side with the United States or Russia+China?

This event is part of APARC’s 2022 Fall webinar seriesAsian Perspectives on the US-China Competition.

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Heydarian 112922
Richard Heydarian is a Manila-based scholar and columnist serving as a senior lecturer at the Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman. His academic career has included professorial positions in political and social science at the University of the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila University, De La Salle University, and a visiting fellowship at National Chengchi University. As a columnist, he has written for leading publications such as Foreign Affairs, The Guardian, and The New York Times, and has regularly contributed, for example, to Al Jazeera English, Nikkei Asian Review, South China Morning Post, and The Straits Times. His books include The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Struggle for Global Mastery (2019); The Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt against Elite Democracy (2017), and Asia's New Battlefield: The USA, China and the Struggle for the Western Pacific (2015).

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Huong Le Thu 112922
Huong Le Thu, an Australia-resident analyst of geopolitics in Southeast Asia, is a principal policy fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre, University of Western Australia and a non-resident fellow in CSIS Washington’s Southeast Asia Program. She has worked in universities and think tanks in Australia, Singapore, and Taiwan, and has held visiting positions in the University of Malaya and the ASEAN Secretariat among other places.  Her scholarly writings have appeared in journals including Asia Policy, Asia-Pacific Review, Asian Security, and Foreign Policy, and  she has been quoted in the Financial Times, The Japan Times, The New York Times, The Straits Times, and The Washington Post among other media.  Her degrees are from the National Chengchi University (PhD) and Jagiellonian University in Poland (MA).  She speaks five languages and has published in four of them.

Donald K. Emmerson

Via Zoom webinar

Richard Heydarian Senior Lecturer, Asian Center, University of the Philippines Diliman
Huong Le Thu Principal Policy Fellow, PerthUSA Centre, University of Western Australia
Seminars
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Illustration of the globe as a chessboard with the king piece draped in China's flag with portraits of speakers David Shambaugh, Glenn Tiffert, and Jean Oi.

This event is co-sponsored by the Hoover Project on China’s Global Sharp Power. 

If you cannot join in person but would like to attend virtually, please join us via Zoom meeting. Meeting ID: 953 0045 6111 Password: 120122

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China over 70 years ago, five paramount leaders have shaped the fates and fortunes of the nation and the ruling Chinese Communist Party: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. Drawing on his recent book, China’s Leaders: From Mao to Now, in this lecture Professor David Shambaugh will explore the differing backgrounds, contrasting leadership styles, and impact of each paramount leader.

Speaker

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David Shambaugh Headshot
David Shambaugh is the Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science & International Affairs, and Director of the China Policy Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, at George Washington University. Professor Shambaugh joined the George Washington faculty after serving as Reader in Chinese Politics at the University of London’s SOAS and as editor of The China Quarterly. As an author, Professor Shambaugh has published 35 books, including most recently International Relations of Asia (3rd ed., 2022), China’s Leaders: From Mao to Now (2021), Where Great Powers Meet: America & China in Southeast Asia (2021), and China & the World (2020).

Chair

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Jean Oi Headshot
Jean C. Oi is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the Department of Political Science and a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. She directs the China Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and is the Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University.

Discussant 

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Glenn Tiffert Headshot
Glenn Tiffert is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a historian of modern China. He co-chairs the Hoover project on China’s Global Sharp Power and works closely with government and civil society partners to document and build resilience against authoritarian interference with democratic institutions. Most recently, he co-authored and edited Global Engagement: Rethinking Risk in the Research Enterprise (2020).

Jean C. Oi

Hybrid at Philippines Room, Encina Hall 3rd Floor

David Shambaugh
Glenn Tiffert
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China's ruling Communist Party concluded its 20th National Congress on October 22, cementing Xi Jinping's status as the country’s most powerful leader in decades by awarding him an unprecedented third five-year term as party general secretary. The CCP also revealed the new lineup of the Politburo Standing Committee, China’s most powerful political body, made up entirely of Xi loyalists. APARC scholars outline the key takeaways from the Congress and consider its implications for China and the world.  

Xi's “Work Report” address to the party congress indicates continuity in policy direction. Xi’s long-term ambitions, driven by the grand “Chinese dream” of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” have not changed, but now he can be more assertive than before in pursuing them, writes APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin in a co-authored Los Angeles Times opinion piece. Xi has demonstrated that he does not shy away from conflict with the United States, and China will likely strengthen ties with Russia, North Korea, and other like-minded authoritarian nations, says Shin. With Xi at the helm for a third term, “we should expect a more aggressive China and increasing turbulence in the regional and global order."

Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert in Chinese military and Asia security, agrees that the next five years under Xi’s leadership look set to get more confrontational between the world’s two great powers. In coverage by multiple media outlets, Mastro explains the implications of the Party Congress for the United States and its partners.


Subscribe to APARC newsletters to receive our scholars' latest updates.

We will probably continue to see, in [Chinese people's] minds progress, and in our minds disruptions and harassment.
Oriana Skylar Mastro

In Xi's report to the Party Congress, he called for further investments in the military and reaffirmed that China will not rule out using force to bring Taiwan under its control. His address indicates that, despite recent challenges, such as economic slowdown and the rippling effects of the COVID pandemic, the Chinese think their country is on track with its trajectory, whether it be toward reunification with Taiwan or having a world-class military, Mastro tells the Christian Science Monitor. “We will probably continue to see, in their minds progress, and in our minds disruptions and harassment.”

Along with securing a third term in office, Xi also named two top generals as vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, the top body overseeing the armed forces, as he looks to modernize China’s military and keep up pressure on Taiwan. One vice chair role went to He Weidong, who led the military command responsible for Taiwan. There is speculation He played a role in planning China’s unprecedented military drills around the island following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit in August 2022, Mastro says via Bloomberg. “The promotion of He Weidong is generally considered within China as a sign that Beijing is strengthening military preparations, or in the words of some Chinese military commentators, ‘strengthening combat preparations for military struggles against Taiwan,’” she notes.

China wants to reach the point where its predominant power allows its actions to go uncriticized and countries in its periphery accommodate Chinese preferences, Mastro explains in another interview with Bloomberg.

Under Xi’s watch, China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, has undergone a tremendous modernization, with the goal of becoming a “world-class force” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. One area in which the PLA appears to be making progress is in bringing forces together for more complex joint exercises, helped by interaction with other militaries, especially Russia’s. “We are observing an increasing complexity and sophistication in how they are performing in exercises,” Mastro tells the Wall Street Journal.

With regards to the Taiwan flashpoint, it is almost guaranteed we will see lower-level conflicts and disruptions, Mastro predicts. China does not have to impose a complete blockade over the island, and could do something like a blockade for a week or two “just to teach Taiwan a lesson if they don’t like what happens in the next election, for example,” she says in an interview with the Hindustan Times.

China’s consistent trajectory of improving its military capabilities means a heavier reliance on those capabilities to achieve its goals over time, Mastro explains via Radio Free Asia. “The bottom line is, the next five years are undoubtedly going to be rockier for U.S.-China relations and for other countries with security concerns in the region,” she concludes.

The scenes from the 20th Party Congress reinforce the idea in the Biden administration’s new National Security Strategy, which recognizes that “the PRC presents America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge.” National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, speaking hours after the strategy’s release, singled out China and did not mention Russia in his opening remarks to reporters, underscoring an intention to not allow Moscow’s war against Ukraine to distract from the Biden administration’s assessment that Beijing is a more crucial challenge to U.S. national security, Mastro tells the South China Morning Post. “I think the administration correctly assessed that in order to compete with China we have to stay focused, and we couldn’t be distracted by other challenges which are absolutely important but are not of the same severity or calibre as what China presents.”


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A new Asia Policy roundtable considers whether and how minilateral groupings, such as the Quad and AUKUS, can deter coercion and aggression in the Indo-Pacific. The roundtable co-editor is APARC South Asia Research Scholar Arzan Tarapore, and it opens with an essay by Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro.
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With Xi at the helm for a third term, we should expect to see a more assertive China and more turbulence in the regional and global order, say APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin and Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro. They offer their assessments of the outcomes of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and its implications for China’s trajectory and U.S.-China relations.

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This is a chapter from the volume Economies, Institutions and Territories: Dissecting Nexuses in a Changing World, edited ByLuca Storti, Giulia Urso, and Neil Reid (Routledge, 2022).


Historically, local elites play a central role in governance in traditional Chinese society. This social stratum has been conspicuously absent in the People’s Republic of China since 1949. This chapter revisits and examines the role of local elites in China’s governance and economic development. Conceptually, the authors argue that stable bureaucrats in China’s local governments who stay in a locality in their career play the role of local elites, with a double identity as state agents and as representatives of local interests. Empirically, they examine patterns of “movers” and “stayers” in bureaucratic mobility in over 100 counties (districts) in Jiangsu Province and identify the location and distribution of those local officials as local elites in administrative jurisdictions. On this basis, they examine the effect of local elites on economic development.

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Chapter in the volume Economies, Institutions and Territories: Dissecting Nexuses in a Changing World.

 

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Ling Zhu
Xueguang Zhou
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Gi-Wook Shin
Seong-Hyon Lee
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This commentary was first published by the Los Angeles Times.


The 104-minute speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the country’s 20th party congress reveals a leader who believes he is on a historic mission to save China’s self-described socialism in the 21st century.

Xi’s Oct. 16 speech launched the twice-a-decade meeting, which concludes this weekend, where the national Communist Party appoints its leadership and announces China’s policy direction for the coming years. The address reads very much like a sequel to his previous one five years ago. At that time, Xi cryptically said China had entered a “new era” of socialism. This time, he characterized his aim as “building a modern socialist country,” which the state media touted as the highlight of the speech. This statement clarifies his ambition to prove the superiority of socialism by 2049, with an implicit aim to surpass the U.S. by the centennial anniversary of the People’s Republic of China’s founding in 1949.

Xi is driven by the grand “Chinese dream,” the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” that he referenced in his 2017 and 2022 National Congress speeches. He appears to view himself as the sole individual who can achieve this dream in the 21st century, perhaps casting himself as a 21st-century Mao Zedong. His plans — including “common prosperity” and “socialist modernization” — are long term and unlikely to shift even following the recent turmoil caused by COVID-19, China’s harsh lockdowns in response and the resulting economic pains.

These ambitions are the same ones promoted by the Xi administration over the last decade. But by the end of this latest congress, Xi will have cemented an unprecedented third term as president, and he can now be more aggressive than before in their pursuit.


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It follows then that U.S.-China relations are unlikely to improve in Xi’s next term. He has shown, time and again, that he differs from his predecessors, except Mao, in that he does not shy away from conflict with the United States. Xi has felt comfortable declaring that “the East is rising while the West is declining” and positioning the U.S. as a challenge to overcome, rather than an obstacle to avoid, on the road to the Chinese dream.

On the other hand, China will probably strengthen ties with Russia, North Korea and other like-minded authoritarian nations, just as the U.S. is strengthening alliance networks in the region, including with Japan and South Korea. We are, as Henry Kissinger once said, in the “foothills of a Cold War.”

The Taiwan Strait remains central to how quickly and drastically conflict could escalate. Xi’s latest speech reiterated that China wanted to gain Taiwan peacefully but “will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.” He frames unification not as a choice but as a historical responsibility, which has been placed on his shoulders. Xi’s direct mention of Taiwan unification at the party congress suggests that he will use that issue as a justification for his long-term reign.

One factor that will help determine the actual longevity of Xi’s rule is whether meaningful protests against him will emerge. Xi’s policies and crackdowns against dissent have yielded sporadic protests that made international headlines. In China, however, the threshold for revolution is quite high, creating major barriers to a regime change. A large dose of state-led nationalism and indoctrination convinces people that the U.S. in particular is determined to torpedo China’s quest for modernity, creating an enemy to rally the country around.

China’s economic challenges pose another hurdle for Xi’s long-term agenda. The country’s rigid zero-COVID policy has limited growth, and Xi has displayed a heavy-handed approach toward private businesses, dampening entrepreneurial spirit. If Chinese people come to think of Xi’s anti-market tendency as the underlying problem, it will erode his authority.

To stave off such threats, Xi is likely to continue his iron-fist rule. He has purged enough rivals and earned enough grievances over the years that relaxing his power grip at this juncture will likely invite criticism, if not revenge, toward him. He is eager to turn China into a global power that will awe the West. As Xi put it at the 2017 party congress, China is increasingly taking “center stage in the world.” With Xi still at the helm, we should expect a more aggressive China and increasing turbulence in the regional and global order.

Gi-Wook Shin is the director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. Seong-Hyon Lee is a senior fellow at the George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations.

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Xi's plans are long term and unlikely to shift, but he can now be more aggressive than before in their pursuit.

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Event flyer with portrait of speaker Daniel Leese.

This event is co-sponsored by the German Historical Institute, Pacific Office Berkeley and the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius. 

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faced a major predicament. Since the new leadership did not allow a free exchange of opinions, the problem was how to obtain reliable information and prevent the circulation of rumors and “fake news.” To deal with this “dictator’s dilemma,” the CCP developed a two-pronged approach. Besides public news items that catered to the mobilizational aspects of party policies, it established secret feedback channels, the so-called neican, or internal reference, bulletins. These were strictly tasked with separating facts from opinion to provide the leadership with an objective account of developments in China and abroad. Over time, a distinct system for the controlled circulation of intelligence, an “information order,” took shape. In this talk, Leese will outline some general features of this information order and comment on whether it was able to circumvent the problem of information bias in authoritarian systems.

Speaker

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Daniel Leese Headshot
Daniel Leese is professor of Chinese history and politics at the University of Freiburg, Germany. He is, among others, the author of Mao cult. Rhetoric and Ritual during China’s Cultural Revolution (CUP 2011) and Mao’s Long Shadow: How China dealt with its Past (in German), which won the ICAS Best Book Award and was shortlisted for the German Non-Fiction Award. He currently works on a new project that traces what the party leadership knew about domestic and international affairs through secret communication channels.

Andrew G. Walder

In-Person at Okimoto Room, Encina Hall 3rd Floor

Daniel Leese
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