China and the United States have lately been characterized as geostrategic rivals and on a path toward inevitable conflict. But, according to Fu Ying, chairperson of China’s Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress and former ambassador to the Philippines, Australia and the United Kingdom, this picture is incomplete and misrepresents a reality that is much more nuanced.

Fu discussed the current state of U.S.-China relations in a keynote speech at Stanford on Tuesday. Speaking to a full house in Encina Hall, she described different perspectives and shared challenges of China and the United States, and urged a new consensus between the world’s two largest economies.

“In the past thirty years, we’ve had friendly moments, but we were never very close. We had problems, but the relationship was strong enough to avoid derailing.

“Now we are at a higher level. If we work together now, we are capable of making big differences in the world. But if we fight, we will bring disasters – not only to the two countries, but to the world,” Fu said.

Fu’s visit was co-hosted by the China Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, two centers in the Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI). Following her remarks, Thomas Fingar, a Shorenstein APARC Distinguished Fellow and former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, offered comments and took questions from the audience.

Fu opened her speech by saying she welcomed alternative views and “a debate.”

Misunderstandings, she said, afflict the U.S.-China relationship. Confusion shared between the two countries can largely be attributed to a “perception gap,” which, she said, is aggrandized through media reporting.

Concern on the American side over China, she said, is tied to its own doubts over its “constructive engagement” strategy. An approach held during the past eight U.S. administrations, the strategy was based on an assumption that supporting market-based reforms in China would lead to political change, she said. However, this has not occurred, and some in the U.S. are now urging the construction of another “grand strategy.”

The United States, she said, also has “rising anxiety about what kind of a global role China is going to play,” and about the future direction of the Chinese economy after its growth slid to hover around seven percent in the last two years compared to its once double digit growth in the past decade.

China interprets the United States’ apprehension as misguided, Fu said. “We see it as a reflection of the United States’ fear of losing its own primary position in the world.”

On the other hand, China, she said, is “relatively more positive” about its overall engagement with the United States. The purpose of Chinese foreign policy, Fu said, is to improve the international environment and to raise the standard of living of its people without exporting its values or seeking world power. “We believe China has achieved this purpose,” she added.

The United States and others must also remember that the past can loom large in the minds of the Chinese people, Fu said.

In attempting to understand China, “one should not lose sight of the historical dimension,” she said. China at various times in the nineteenth to early twentieth century was under occupation by foreign powers, she said, and this is a reason why sovereignty is a closely held value in the Chinese ethos.

The overall “perception gap” between China and the United States has moved from misunderstanding to fear, and that, she said, is causing negative spillover effects for both countries.

Two manifestations of this fear, she cited, are the United States’ “reluctance to acknowledge China’s efforts to help improve the existing order,” such as the development of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, and the U.S.’ “growing interference” in South China Sea issues.

“Will it lead to a reckless urge to ‘throw down the gauntlet’?” Fu asked.

She acknowledged that collision is a concern. China is focused on addressing its challenges with the United States, including avoiding potential incidents and finding ways “to adapt to and participate in adjustment in international order,” Fu said.

Yet, she cautioned that the two countries be realistic in their aims and know that China is not seeking to emulate the United States. China and the United States, unlike Japan and South Korea, do not have a formal strategic or security alliance, and they need not have one, Fu said.

“China is not an ally, and it should not be an enemy either,” she said.

“Can we accept and respect each other, and build new consensus?” she asked. She then stated, “I want to end my speech with a question mark as a salute to Stanford University which is renowned for its capability of addressing difficult questions.”

Fingar gave a brief response to Fu’s address.

Calling it largely “fictional,” he challenged the notion that there is high “American anxiety” about China. Instead, he noted, “Americans do not think very much about China,” as reflected in the multitude of polls taken recently during the primary campaigns. Thus, “there isn’t a lot of public drive to do things differently with China.”

Among U.S. academics, however, there is “puzzlement,” Fingar suggested. Puzzlement, he explained, borne less from any kind of loss of confidence in U.S. policy of constructive engagement but rather from China’s seeming departure from a trajectory that it had set for itself over the last 40 years. At the moment China’s reforms appear “bogged down;" its leaders, slow to take the critical steps necessary for economic growth; and its engagement with the outside world, increasingly unpredictable. “The puzzlement about China,” therefore, and “concern about policy has at least as much to do with concern that China may be stumbling as it does about a rising China,” he added. Debunking the zero-sum notion of international relations, Fingar emphasized instead that the United States has “done very well as a nation” in part because of its active engagement with and because of China’s success. “We welcome the rise of China, the rise of others,” he stated.

Fingar concluded with his opinion that the debacle in the South China Sea does not pose a serious threat to the relationship. Instead, “the world needs more examples of joint U.S.-Chinese cooperation and leadership” as was the case with recent breakthroughs in climate change between the United States and China. Otherwise, he added, other countries will not commit their resources for fear of a veto or objection from either the United States or China.

Later that day, Fu met with faculty members of FSI and Hoover.

Related links:

Photo gallery from the event

China has historically been the “most divisive element” in the U.S.-Japan relationship, Yoichi Funabashi, a former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun, told a Stanford audience last Friday at a panel discussion hosted by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC).

Funabashi said in his keynote speech that despite the past, “we are in a much, much better position now” as tensions between Japan and the United States have been contained lately. However, misperceptions between Washington and Tokyo over their approaches to China could challenge the positive trajectory we see now, Funabashi warned.

The discussion titled, “Continuity and Change in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” was part of the Shorenstein Journalism Award ceremonies at the Freeman Spogli Institute, an annual honor that recognizes an accomplished journalist who is committed to critical reporting, and who has helped unravel the complexities of Asia through his or her writing. Fourteen journalists have received the prestigious award since its founding in 2002.

Funabashi, the 2015 award recipient, was joined by a distinguished panel of Japan experts. Susan Chira, a deputy executive editor at the New York Times, and Michael Armacost, a Stanford distinguished fellow and former U.S. ambassador to Japan, provided comments to Funabashi’s remarks, and Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, moderated the discussion.

The United States views Japan’s approach to China as “too balance-oriented,” while Japan thinks the U.S. administration under Barack Obama is “more engage-oriented,” Funabashi said. This disjuncture has caused some observers to describe China’s relationship with the West as having already entered a “new Cold War,” he said.

Funabashi quickly dismissed that idea, saying, “I do not think [we’ve] entered into a new Cold War,” and recognized that Japan, the United States and others around the world must identify ways of working with China despite differences.

Funabashi said Japan “can offset the prospect or danger of China and Russia ganging up against Japan” through its strategic engagement with both countries, but that the United States would require some reassurance and understanding of how Japan views its relationship with Moscow and Beijing.

“The approach to China will remain the most crucial factor to managing the U.S.-Japan relationship,” he said.

Chira later added that the U.S.-Japan alliance has been the beneficiary of the shift in focus to a “rising China.” She said it had both “diminished American concern” over the once-heightened economic friction between Japan and the United States in the 1980s, and “underlined the importance of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.”

Image

Funabashi also predicted that the U.S.-Japan alliance “could be very much affected by the U.S. presidential election.” Tendering another warning, he said that the 2016 presidential election cycle “may not be political business as usual.”

Candidates have adopted strong positions on foreign policy early on and have been coupling it with harsh rhetoric. “It will have ramifications beyond their actions” and could have a “long-term impact on the U.S. relationship with the Asia-Pacific,” he said.

Over the past eight years, the Obama administration has been leading its “rebalance” policy in Asia that has both symbolized a pulling-away from Europe and the Middle East, and carried a layer of economic and strategic reassurance for the region. Funabashi said Asian leaders are now “deeply concerned” about what will happen to America’s staying power under the next U.S. president.

Part of the success of the rebalance strategy hangs on the outcome of the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s passage through the U.S. Congress. Funabashi said it “will make or break issues,” and yet, each candidate currently running does not support the 12-nation trade pact. Funabashi characterized trade politics during campaign season as challenging. Armacost later said he agreed.

“The chance of ratifying something between now and the election is somewhere between negligible and nil,” said Armacost, who held a 24-year career in the U.S. government. Attempting approval during the lame duck session is very problematic, he said.

Funabashi also addressed whether President Obama should make a trip to the atomic bombing site at Hiroshima on the periphery of the G7 summit later this month.

He said he hoped that such a trip would not “backfire” on the U.S.-Japan relationship, and relations with China and Korea. A visit by Obama could create an expectation for a Japanese prime minister to visit Pearl Harbor, and for Japanese political leaders to make a trip to the site of the Nanjing Massacre in China.

Funabashi also emphasized that a reconciliation process between Japan and the United States already exists and harkened back to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Ratified in 1952, the treaty reset Allied powers and Japan on a path toward friendly relations and to settle questions of war.

“We have proved [our ability] to reconcile on a working level, on a day-to-day level, so we don’t necessarily have to convince the public on both sides.

“Nonetheless, I think that this visit could be seen as a furthering of the reconciliation process,” Funabashi said.

“I hope the president does visit,” Sneider added. Acknowledgement of the bombing by the United States is “long overdue” and could set “a certain moral example,” he said.

Following the panel discussion, later that evening, Funabashi received the journalism award among many colleagues and friends.

Orville Schell, a director at the Asia Society New York and a member of the jury that selects the award recipient, described Funabashi as a leading “exemplar” of someone who “thinks clearly and writes extremely well.”

Related links:

Shorenstein Journalism Award 2015 Acceptance Speech: Yoichi Funabashi

Former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun to receive 2015 Shorenstein Journalism Award

Stanford scholar explores how the US election system shapes foreign policy

Should President Obama visit Hiroshima?

Divided Memories and Reconciliation research project

From atomic bombs to harsh military occupations in the World War II period, the past is very much the present in the Asia Pacific region.

Stanford scholars are striving to help heal these wounds from yesteryear. Helping old enemies better understand each other today is the aim of the Divided Memories and Reconciliation project, a multi-year comparative study of the formation of historical memory regarding the wartime period in countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States.

Left unattended, misguided wartime narratives may exacerbate current disputes to the point of armed conflict, said Daniel Sneider, associate director of research at Stanford's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He leads the Divided Memories project along with Gi-Wook Shin, a Stanford sociology professor and the Shorenstein center director.

Sneider points out the critical importance of textbooks and what is taught in schools – especially given the rise of nationalism among youth in China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

"Dialogue among youth of the different nations is needed, along with an appreciation for the diversity of views and the complexity of history," he said.

Shin said, "Each nation in northeast Asia and even the U.S. has selective or divided memories of the past, and does not really understand the views of the other side."

Education and history

Launched in 2006, the Divided Memories project has published research findings, issued recommendations and convened conferences. In the early days, the researchers examined high school history textbooks in China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and America.

Image

"Formal education is a powerful force in shaping our historical understandings," Sneider noted. "We wanted to look at the textbooks that have the most impact and usage."

A 2014 book, Confronting Memories of World War II: European and Asian Legacies, which was co-edited by Shin, Sneider and Daniel Chirot, a sociologist with the University of Washington, compared successful European WWII reconciliations with lagging Asian efforts. Another book, Divided Lenses, published earlier this year, examined the impact of dramatic film and other forms of popular culture on wartime memory. A new book is due out this summer, Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific War, which focuses on leaders in politics, the media and academia in Japan, China, South Korea and the U.S.

The Divided Memories project aims to generate discussions and collaborations among those who create "historical memories" – educators, policymakers and government leaders. One report that grew out of such dialogues included suggestions for reconciliation:

• Create supplementary teaching materials on the issue. 
• Launch dialogues among Asian, American and European historians. 
• Offer educational forums for journalists, policymakers and students. 
• Conduct museum exchanges and create new museums, such as one wholly dedicated to WWII reconciliation in Asia. 
• Increase student exchanges among all the countries involved. 

History is reflected in today's geopolitics, as noted in the revived disputes by these nations over rival claims to islands in the South China Sea and elsewhere. Without resolution, these disagreements can flare up into military conflicts, Sneider wrote.

"The question of history taps into sensitive and deeply rooted issues of national identity," he noted.

Whether recounting Japanese atrocities in China, China's exaggerated account of its Communist fighters' role in World War II, or the U.S. decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan, no nation is immune to re-creating the past to further its own interests today, Sneider wrote.

For example, Divided Memories research on Chinese textbooks shows how the Chinese government in recent decades embarked on a "patriotic education" campaign to indoctrinate young people by exaggerating its role in Japan's WWII defeat. This narrative suits the nationalistic desires of a Chinese government no longer exclusively motivated by communist ideology, Sneider said.

One project of APARC and its Japan Program that was also an outgrowth of Divided Memories involved Stanford scholars urging Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to show "clear, heartfelt remorse" in a 2015 speech on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII. A 15-page report featured hypothetical statements suggesting what Abe might say to make amends for Japanese actions in China and Korea.

"While we cannot claim to have directly influenced the prime minister, his statement did go further in the direction of an expression of remorse over the war and the need to continue to look clearly and honestly at the past than many expected," said Sneider.

Image

A workshop on history textbooks co-hosted by Shorenstein APARC and Academia Sinica's Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies takes places in Taipei, Sept. 3, 2008.

Generations and grievances

Consciousness-raising on other fronts, however, is getting results, thanks to Stanford's Divided Memories project. A 2015 landmark agreement between Japan and South Korea over the WWII "comfort women" dispute was reached due to extensive U.S. involvement. Comfort women were women and girls who were forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army in occupied territories before and during World War II.

In an article, Sneider explained how the U.S. perceived that the dysfunctional relationship between South Korea and Japan over this issue, among others, threatened to undermine American strategic interests in Asia. 

Shin highlights the importance of U.S. involvement. "The U.S. is not just an outsider to historical and territorial disputes in the region," he said. "From a geopolitical perspective, the U.S. has done a wonderful job in reviving the devastated region into a prosperous one after 1945, but from a historical reconciliation perspective, the U.S. has done a poor job."

He suggests that America should "play a constructive role in promoting historical reconciliation" among the countries involved. And so, the Divided Memories project has included the United States in its efforts.

According to Sneider, Divided Memories is unique among all reconciliation projects for its emphasis on the inclusion of the U.S.; comparative analyses across countries; and real-world policy impacts. As part of the Shorenstein research center, it is housed within Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

"This project reflects what Stanford, our center and the Freeman Spogli Institute are all about – true interdisciplinary research and engagement," Sneider said.

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

Straub told the Washington Post that calls by some South Koreans for their country to develop its own nuclear weapons to counter the North were mostly a media phenomenon. Responsible South Korean leaders know that pursuing nuclear weapons would be disastrous for their country.

Stanford experts from the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) spoke with media in Asia and the United States about the dynamics on the Korean Peninsula following recent provocations by North Korea; a roundup of those citations is below.

The United Nations imposed a new set of sanctions against North Korea on March 2 in response to the country’s fourth nuclear test in January and subsequent rocket launch in February of this year. Shorenstein APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin offered his view in an interview with Dong-a Ilbo:

“The new sanctions are unprecedentedly strong and comprehensive, but the dominant view is pessimistic,” he said, emphasizing that the sanctions’ effectiveness stands largely on the shoulders of China, which is North Korea’s largest trading partner.

“Only if China doesn't fizzle out after a few months – but continuously enforces the sanctions – will we see any meaningful effect,” he said.

Shin also called upon South Korea to play a leadership role in dealing with North Korea because the United States has only limited interest in solving the nuclear problem, and China, will not change its approach and continue to move according to its own interests.

Shin relayed a similar message in an interview with Maeil Shinmun last December. South Korea must break from its own perception that it is the “balancer” between China and the United States. South Korea, often described as a “shrimp among whales,” should instead strive to play a larger role as a “dolphin,” he said.

Furthermore, Shin told Maeil that the U.S.-Korea relationship and the U.S.-China relationship are very different from each other, and should be viewed as they are. He pointed out that the U.S.-Korea relationship is an alliance where the two countries act accordingly as one body, whereas the China-Korea relationship is a strategic partnership insofar as the two countries cooperate on selective issues of mutual interest.

In a separate interview with the Associated Press, David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program, was asked about the possibility of peace talks with North Korea as an alternative to or parallel with the U.N. sanctions. Straub said “it would not make sense” and that “there is no support for such an approach in Washington” because of the strategic partnership between China and North Korea. He also told Voice of America that the new sanctions will significantly increase the political, diplomatic, and psychological pressures on North Korea's leaders to rethink their pursuit of nuclear weapons.