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An analysis of the foundations and future of the trilateral relationship from a U.S. perspective, highlighting the critical role the United States has played in mediating tensions between the Republic of Korea and Japan.

The essay is also part of an expanded NBR Special Report with co-authors Yul Sohn and Yoshihide Soeya that offers insights into both the past and future of trilateral cooperation and provides recommendations for leaders in all three nations to move relations foward.

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North Korea’s fourth test of a nuclear device on February 6 and its rocket launch four weeks later in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions have caused a new sense of crisis on the Korean Peninsula. As if the tests themselves weren’t sufficiently provocative, Pyongyang is now claiming to have a hydrogen bomb and is threatening, if challenged, to launch a nuclear attack on both the United States and its ally South Korea. Whatever the exact state of North Korea’s capabilities, the tests underlined two basic facts: Pyongyang’s apparent determination to continue its efforts until it can indeed one day credibly threaten the United States with nuclear attack, and the international community’s resolve never to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.
 
The international community responded with unprecedentedly tough sanctions against Pyongyang. On March 2, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2270. It targets the hard currency that Pyongyang desperately needs to realize its byeongjin strategy of simultaneously trying to grow its economy and continuing nuclear weapons development. In addition, a number of countries, including the United States and Japan, introduced their own new bilateral sanctions. Perhaps most dramatically, South Korea on February 10 effectively permanently closed its decade-long joint North-South industrial park in the city of Kaesong in North Korea. It was the last project putting significant amounts of South Korean cash into the hands of the North Korean leadership.
 
North Korea’s response to the international community has included issuing even more threats, testing a series of new missiles, and sentencing an American college student to fifteen years’ imprisonment, allegedly for trying to filch a propaganda poster.
 
To help make sense of the new North Korea crisis, please stay tuned to this page for Korea Program Associate Director David Straub’s analysis and commentary. Straub is a former senior American diplomat whose thirty-year career focused on Korean affairs. His experiences include participation in the Six Party Talks and accompanying former President Clinton to Pyongyang in 2009 for a meeting with then-leader Kim Jong Il.
 
Latest Commentaries
In an interview with Radio Free Asia, Straub discusses the background and implications of the recent defections to South Korea of workers in North Korea's restaurants in China.
 
In a recent public lecture at Stanford, Straub explains why the critics of the Obama administration are wrong, and forecasts how the next U.S. administration is likely to approach the North Korea problem.
 
Straub tells NK News, a subscription-based website for the North Korea expert community, that the United States government may eventually have to further discourage or even ban American tourism to North Korea to protect citizens from arbitrary incarceration and prevent Pyongyang from blackmailing Washington for their release. 
 
In an interview with the University of Virgina's student newspaper, Straub discusses North Korea's imprisonment of UV student Otto Warmbier for allegedly attempting to steal a poster inscribed with the slogan "Let's firmly arm ourselves with Kim Jong-il patriotism!” Straub explains how the alleged offense fits in with the cult of personality surrounding the Kim Il Sung family dynasty.
 
Overall Situation
In the aftermath of North Korea’s latest nuclear test, Straub joined Stanford colleagues in analyzing its import and discussing possible policy responses, in an interview published by the Stanford Report.
 
In an interview with South Korean newspaper Segye Ilbo (in Korean) immediately following North Korea’s latest nuclear test, Straub argued that South Korea had the stature and ability to lead the international community in imposing greater costs on North Korea. His recommendations included considering closing the Kaesong industrial park.

Straub told the Washington Post that calls by some South Koreans for their country to develop its own nuclear weapons to counter the North were mostly a media phenomenon. Responsible South Korean leaders know that pursuing nuclear weapons would be disastrous for their country.

Sanctions
Straub told Voice of America’s Korea Service (in Korean) that the new UN Security Council sanctions reflected years of preparation by the Obama administration and would significantly increase the psychological pressure on North Korea’s leaders to abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons.
 
Kaesong Closure
In an interview featured on the front page of Chosun Ilbo (in Korean), South Korea’s biggest newspaper, Straub supported South Korean President Park’s controversial decision to close the Kaesong industrial park in North Korea.
 
Peace Treaty Proposals
Straub told Associated Press that North Korea’s proposal for a peace treaty with the United States was a non-starter in Washington as long as Pyongyang continued to pursue nuclear weapons.
 
North Korea’s Incarceration of American Citizens
In the wake of North Korea's sentencing of University of Virginia student Otto Frederick Warmbier to fifteen years' imprisonment of hard labor for allegedly trying to steal a propaganda poster, Straub talked with a reporter from the University of Virginia's student newspaper about the case. Straub draws on his experience of leading the office of Korean affairs at the U.S. Department of State to discuss the conditions faced by Americans incarcerated in North Korea as well as North Korean intentions.
 
 
 
 
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a factory inside the kaesong industrial zone
A factory inside the Kaesong Industrial Zone. South Korea’s closure of the massive joint industrial park reflected its conclusion that much stronger international pressure is required to force Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program. | John Everard
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Stanford experts from the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) spoke with media in Asia and the United States about the dynamics on the Korean Peninsula following recent provocations by North Korea; a roundup of those citations is below.

The United Nations imposed a new set of sanctions against North Korea on March 2 in response to the country’s fourth nuclear test in January and subsequent rocket launch in February of this year. Shorenstein APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin offered his view in an interview with Dong-a Ilbo:

“The new sanctions are unprecedentedly strong and comprehensive, but the dominant view is pessimistic,” he said, emphasizing that the sanctions’ effectiveness stands largely on the shoulders of China, which is North Korea’s largest trading partner.

“Only if China doesn't fizzle out after a few months – but continuously enforces the sanctions – will we see any meaningful effect,” he said.

Shin also called upon South Korea to play a leadership role in dealing with North Korea because the United States has only limited interest in solving the nuclear problem, and China, will not change its approach and continue to move according to its own interests.

Shin relayed a similar message in an interview with Maeil Shinmun last December. South Korea must break from its own perception that it is the “balancer” between China and the United States. South Korea, often described as a “shrimp among whales,” should instead strive to play a larger role as a “dolphin,” he said.

Furthermore, Shin told Maeil that the U.S.-Korea relationship and the U.S.-China relationship are very different from each other, and should be viewed as they are. He pointed out that the U.S.-Korea relationship is an alliance where the two countries act accordingly as one body, whereas the China-Korea relationship is a strategic partnership insofar as the two countries cooperate on selective issues of mutual interest.

In a separate interview with the Associated Press, David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program, was asked about the possibility of peace talks with North Korea as an alternative to or parallel with the U.N. sanctions. Straub said “it would not make sense” and that “there is no support for such an approach in Washington” because of the strategic partnership between China and North Korea. He also told Voice of America that the new sanctions will significantly increase the political, diplomatic, and psychological pressures on North Korea's leaders to rethink their pursuit of nuclear weapons.

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The U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts resolution 2270, imposing additional sanctions on North Korea in response to that country’s continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program, March 2, 2016. | United Nations
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The sixteenth session of the Strategic Forum brings together distinguished South Korean and U.S. West Coast-based American scholars, experts, and former officials to discuss the U.S.-South Korean alliance, North Korea, and regional dynamics in Northeast Asia. The session is hosted by the Korea Program in association with The Sejong Institute, a top South Korean think tank.

 
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While power asymmetry typically defines security relationships between allies, there exist other forms of asymmetry that influence alliance politics. In order to illustrate how they can shape policy outcomes that cannot be explained solely through the lens of power capabilities, the authors examine the role of relative attention that each side pays to the alliance. It is their central argument that since the client state has a greater vested interest in the alliance and given that attention depends on interest/need, the client state can leverage attention to get its way. By analysing two specific cases, the 2002 South Korean schoolgirls tragedy and the 2008 beef protests—instances where the South Koreans succeeded in compelling U.S. concessions—the authors show that because the alliance was more central to the client state’s agendas, there existed an asymmetry of attention that offered leveraging opportunities for the weaker ally. In this study, the authors emphasise the role of media attention as a key variable, and seek to contribute to debates on weaker party leverage in asymmetrical alliances.

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Gi-Wook Shin
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In a recent interview with Yonhap News, David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program, says "Although the United States and the PRC certainly have differences [in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue], they pale in copmarison to U.S.-Soviet differences."

Yonhap News article in English (February 12, 2016)

 

Straub also offers, in an extended interview with South Korea's Segye Ilbo newspaper, his thoughts on Pyongyang's motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons. He argues that the appropriate policy response is to continue to increase pressure on the regime to convince it that nuclear weapons will bring more costs than benefits, while holding open the door to good-faith negotiations to resolve peninsular issues. 

Segye Ilbo article in Korean (January 8, 2016)

 

 

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