DBJ Initiatives for Japan's Growth Strategy
Toru Hashimoto was a member of the Board of Directors and President and Chief Executive Officer of the Development Bank of Japan Inc. (DBJ) from June 2011 to June 2015. He is currently Senior Advisor of the DBJ. Previously, Mr. Hashimoto was Chairman of Deutsche Securities Inc., an investment banking subsidiary in Japan of Deutsche Bank, from July 2003 to September 2008 after serving as Senior Advisor from January 2003 to June 2003. Prior to joining Deutsche Securities, he was Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Fuji Bank, Limited (currently the Mizuho Financial Group) from June 1996 to March 2002. Earlier, he was President and Chief Executive Officer from 1991 to 1996. He began his career at the bank in 1957. Mr. Hashimoto served as Vice Chairman of the Board of Councilors of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations from 1997 to 2001 and Chairman of the Japanese Bankers Association from 1995 to 1996. He was also Vice Chairman of the Institute of International Finance, Inc. from 1997 to 1999. Mr. Hashimoto received a bachelor's degree in law from the University of Tokyo in 1957. He was a Fulbright Scholar at the Graduate School of Economics of the University of Kansas from 1959 to 1960.
FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
While Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has emerged as the strongest Japanese leader in a decade, the dark underside of his administration has been widespread accusations of heavy-handed intimidation of the press. Especially in the last year, there have been numerous high-profile cases in which major media organizations have appeared to capitulate to such pressure, often engaging in a preemptive self-censorship known in Japan as jishuku, or “self-restraint.” A close examination of some of these cases reveals that the Abe administration has indeed engaged in an aggressive effort to shape press coverage using both the carrot of access, and the stick of political pressure and unbridled nationalist intimidation. However, much of the blame also belongs in the media organizations themselves, which have appeared unable, at least initially, to resist the administration’s pressure tactics. Indeed, the Abe government has appeared adept at exploiting weaknesses in Japan’s major media that include a competitive obsession with scoops, a heavy dependence on government sources seen in the so-called press club system and the lack of a shared sense of professional ethics and identity. The collapse of political opposition parties, and the strengthening of state secrecy laws during the second Abe administration also play roles. Deeper historical trends will also be considered, including weak notions of civil society and a moral centrality of the state that has its roots in the crash nation-building of the Meiji period.