International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Co-sponsored by the Stanford Center for International Development

In 1986 then-Stanford professor Moses Abramovitz argued in a seminal article that all countries that are relatively backward in their levels of productivity had the potential for rapid advance, and indeed could quickly catch up with the leading economies if they could realize that potential. Their ability to catch up was to a large extent determined by their “social capability.” Although a number of European economies and Japan had narrowed the productivity gap with the USA in the post-1950 era, few low or middle income economies had managed to do this. Prof. Booth will examine the record inside Southeast Asia, where the gap in per capita GDP between Singapore and Malaysia compared with the region’s other economies has not narrowed much since 1960, and compared with some of them has actually widened. A particular puzzle concerns the Philippines, which was well ahead on most economic and social indicators in 1960 compared with Thailand and Indonesia, but fell behind over the ensuing 50+ years. Prof. Booth will explore the reasons for this.

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anne booth
Anne Booth has been an Asia-focused professor of economics in the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, since 1991. She studies the modern economic history of Southeast Asia with emphasis on the 20th century. Her many writings in this field include Colonial Legacies: Economic and Social Development in East and Southeast Asia. Her latest book, Economic Change in Modern Indonesia, is due from Cambridge University Press in April. Before coming to SOAS, she held research and teaching positions in Singapore and Australia. Her degrees are from Victoria University of Wellington (BA) and the Australian National University (PhD). Before 1991 she held research and teaching positions in Singapore and Australia. She grew up in New Zealand.

Anne Booth 2015-16 NUS-Stanford Lee Kong Chian Distinguished Fellow on Southeast Asia, Stanford University
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After several years of tough negotiations, agreement was reached this month among 12 nations, led by the United States and Japan, to form the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a multilateral trade and investment pact that promises to transform economic relations in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. South Korea and China, the two largest economies in the region not involved in the TPP talks, now face the choice of opting to join the new pact, or remain outside. And approval of the pact also faces tough sledding in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere. A panel of experts from Shorenstein APARC will discuss these questions, and the strategic implications of the TPP for the region.

Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C-327
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-9149 (650) 723-6530
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Shorenstein APARC Fellow
Affiliated Scholar at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
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Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow from 2010 through 2015 and the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford in 2009.

From 2005 through 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94), and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969 and Ph.D., 1977 both in political science). His most recent books are From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from Intelligence Reform (Stanford University Press, 2021), Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011), The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform, editor (Stanford University Press, 2016), Uneasy Partnerships: China and Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (Stanford, 2017), and Fateful Decisions: Choices that will Shape China’s Future, co-edited with Jean Oi (Stanford, 2020). His most recent article is, "The Role of Intelligence in Countering Illicit Nuclear-Related Procurement,” in Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, William C. Potter, and Leonard S Spector, eds., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology (Cambridge, 2018)."

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<i>Distinguished Fellow, FSI, Stanford University</i>
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Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Affiliated Faculty, CDDRL
Affiliated Scholar, Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies
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At Stanford, in addition to his work for the Southeast Asia Program and his affiliations with CDDRL and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, Donald Emmerson has taught courses on Southeast Asia in East Asian Studies, International Policy Studies, and Political Science. He is active as an analyst of current policy issues involving Asia. In 2010 the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars awarded him a two-year Research Associateship given to “top scholars from across the United States” who “have successfully bridged the gap between the academy and policy.”

Emmerson’s research interests include Southeast Asia-China-US relations, the South China Sea, and the future of ASEAN. His publications, authored or edited, span more than a dozen books and monographs and some 200 articles, chapters, and shorter pieces.  Recent writings include The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century (ed., 2020); “‘No Sole Control’ in the South China Sea,” in Asia Policy  (2019); ASEAN @ 50, Southeast Asia @ Risk: What Should Be Done? (ed., 2018); “Singapore and Goliath?,” in Journal of Democracy (2018); “Mapping ASEAN’s Futures,” in Contemporary Southeast Asia (2017); and “ASEAN Between China and America: Is It Time to Try Horsing the Cow?,” in Trans-Regional and –National Studies of Southeast Asia (2017).

Earlier work includes “Sunnylands or Rancho Mirage? ASEAN and the South China Sea,” in YaleGlobal (2016); “The Spectrum of Comparisons: A Discussion,” in Pacific Affairs (2014); “Facts, Minds, and Formats: Scholarship and Political Change in Indonesia” in Indonesian Studies: The State of the Field (2013); “Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends” in Indonesia Rising (2012); “Southeast Asia: Minding the Gap between Democracy and Governance,” in Journal of Democracy (April 2012); “The Problem and Promise of Focality in World Affairs,” in Strategic Review (August 2011); An American Place at an Asian Table? Regionalism and Its Reasons (2011); Asian Regionalism and US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation (2010); “The Useful Diversity of ‘Islamism’” and “Islamism: Pros, Cons, and Contexts” in Islamism: Conflicting Perspectives on Political Islam (2009); “Crisis and Consensus: America and ASEAN in a New Global Context” in Refreshing U.S.-Thai Relations (2009); and Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (edited, 2008).

Prior to moving to Stanford in 1999, Emmerson was a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he won a campus-wide teaching award. That same year he helped monitor voting in Indonesia and East Timor for the National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center. In the course of his career, he has taken part in numerous policy-related working groups focused on topics related to Southeast Asia; has testified before House and Senate committees on Asian affairs; and been a regular at gatherings such as the Asia Pacific Roundtable (Kuala Lumpur), the Bali Democracy Forum (Nusa Dua), and the Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore). Places where he has held various visiting fellowships, including the Institute for Advanced Study and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 



Emmerson has a Ph.D. in political science from Yale and a BA in international affairs from Princeton. He is fluent in Indonesian, was fluent in French, and has lectured and written in both languages. He has lesser competence in Dutch, Javanese, and Russian. A former slam poet in English, he enjoys the spoken word and reads occasionally under a nom de plume with the Not Yet Dead Poets Society in Redwood City, CA. He and his wife Carolyn met in high school in Lebanon. They have two children. He was born in Tokyo, the son of U.S. Foreign Service Officer John K. Emmerson, who wrote the Japanese Thread among other books.

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<i>Senior Fellow, FSI, Emeritus, Stanford University</i>
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William J. Perry Fellow
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Kathleen Stephens was the William J. Perry Distinguished Fellow at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center from 2015 to 2017


Kathleen Stephens, a former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea, is the William J. Perry Fellow in the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC). She has four decades of experience in Korean affairs, first as a Peace Corps volunteer in rural Korea in the 1970s, and in ensuing decades as a diplomat and as U.S. ambassador in Seoul.

Stephens came to Stanford previously as the 2013-14 Koret Fellow after 35 years as a U.S. Foreign Service officer. Her time at Stanford, though, was cut short when she was recalled to the diplomatic service to lead the U.S. mission in India as charge d'affaires during the first seven months of the new Indian administration led by Narendra Modi.

Stephens' diplomatic career included serving as acting under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs in 2012; U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 2008 to 2011; principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 2005 to 2007; and deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs from 2003 to 2005, responsible for post-conflict issues in the Balkans, including Kosovo's future status and the transition from NATO to EU-led forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

She also served in numerous positions in Asia, Europe and Washington, D.C., including as U.S. consul general in Belfast, Northern Ireland, from 1995 to 1998, during the negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement, and as director for European affairs at the White House during the Clinton administration, and in China, following normalization of U.S.-PRC relations.

Stephens holds a bachelor’s degree in East Asian studies from Prescott College and a Master of Public Administration from Harvard University, in addition to honorary degrees from Chungnam National University and the University of Maryland. She studied at the University of Hong Kong and Oxford University, and was an Outward Bound instructor in Hong Kong. She was previously a senior fellow at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.

Stephens' awards include the Presidential Meritorious Service Award (2009), the Sejong Cultural Award, and Korea-America Friendship Association Award (2013). She is a trustee at The Asia Foundation, on the boards of The Korea Society and Pacific Century Institute, and a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy.

She tweets at @AmbStephens.

 

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<i>William J. Perry Distinguished Fellow, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University</i>
<i>Associate Director for Research, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University</i>
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For more than two decades the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has been at the center of multilateral arrangements for security in the Asia-Pacific. That keystone role has gained global support. In 2010 Secretary of State Clinton called ASEAN “the fulcrum of regional architecture”; in 2014 her successor said, “We must continue to support ASEAN’s centrality.” The governments of China, Japan, India, and Australia, among many others, have joined the chorus of support for ASEAN’s linchpin role. What explains ASEAN’s success?

Prof. Vuving’s answer is threefold: In the first place, ASEAN’s hard power weakness is a diplomatic strength, captured in the legitimacy of cooperative norms such as “open regionalism” and the “ASEAN Way.” Second, ASEAN’s location and character as an autonomous but inoffensive actor between Northeast and South Asia, between China and the United States, and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans allows it to play a “bridging” role between different geopolitical zones and potentially rival players.  Third, this bridging position has proven useful in managing changes in the relative power and status of major Asian-Pacific states. Prof. Vuving will also suggest that the unity of ASEAN’s own member states is less critical to ASEAN centrality than commonly thought.

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alex vuving
Alexander L. Vuving’s teaching, research, and consulting encompass topics such as Asian security, the rise of China, Chinese strategy, Vietnamese politics and foreign policy, Southeast Asia’s international relations, the South China Sea dispute, and the concept of soft power. He has published widely on these subjects and is a frequent media interviewee. He is a member of the editorial boards of the journals Asian Politics and Policy and Global Discourse. He received his PhD in political science from the Johannes Gutenberg University in Germany and has been a post-doctorate fellow and research associate at Harvard University.

Alexander L. Vuving Professor, Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu
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Lisa Griswold
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In a new book, David Straub explains why massive anti-American protests erupted across South Korea in 2002 and considers whether it could happen again.

South Korea is often seen as a pro-American ally, a model country that went from a poor, postwar nation into a maturing democracy in just four short decades.

But despite a historic alliance between South Korea and the United States, anti-Americanism flared throughout the Asian nation between 1999-2002 when a series of events and longstanding tensions aligned, according to Stanford researcher David Straub.

“It was a sort of venting of steam,” said Straub, an associate director at Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

“Many Koreans at the time were grossly overinterpreting issues and incidents involving the United States. And this was because they were viewing the U.S.-Korea relationship through a lens of historic victimization by other nations, including the United States,” he added.

Straub, who held a thirty-year diplomatic career in the State Department, headed the political section of the American embassy in Seoul during those years and was deeply involved in managing problems in the bilateral relationship.

Boiling point

Since the end of the Korean War, the United States Forces Korea (USFK) has been stationed in Seoul – now about 28,500 uniformed personnel.

In June 2002, a USFK vehicle struck two Korean students in a tragic accident. In December of that same year, after a U.S. court martial found the drivers of the vehicle not guilty of wrongdoing, hundreds of thousands of people protested in Seoul and other major Korean cities. Not only did activists partake but ordinary citizens too, he said.

Straub said the South Korean public had been “unintentionally primed” for such a reaction to the USFK traffic accident; it was the “spark that lit the firestorm” after years of escalation. A series of events led-up to the mass protests, they included:

  • A few months before the USFK traffic accident, a Korean athlete was disqualified at the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City during a speed skating competition. American athlete Apolo Anton Ohno instead won gold after a disputed call.
  • A non-governmental organization in May 2000 revealed that USFK personnel dumped formaldehyde into a drain that ran into the Han River in Seoul.
  • In Sept. 1999, the Associated Press published its first investigative story examining the Nogun-ri incident of 1950, when hundreds of Korean refugees were killed in an alleged massacre by U.S. service members.

Asymmetry of attention

Straub said the shaping of Koreans’ views of Americans and fanning of tensions could be attributed in part to an “asymmetry of attention” on the part of the Korean and American publics to the U.S.-Korean relationship.

While the Korean public put tremendous focus on U.S.-Korean relations and the presence of U.S. military personnel in Korea, the American public was unaware of Korean attitudes and feelings, he said.

Similarly during the 1999-2002 period, Korean media reported hypercritical views of the United States and USFK, while the American media paid far less attention.

In negotiating with U.S. officials, South Korean officials would often allude to strong Korean public opinion and demand U.S. concessions. With no American public opinion on Korea issues to point to, U.S. officials were at a major disadvantage, Straub said.

U.S. officials would sometimes note opinions shared by members of Congress, he said, “however, for Korean officials, those claims weren’t as powerful as having a social movement literally on the front doorstep.”

In plain terms, the United States is much larger than South Korea. This very imbalance – which translates to military and economic power – added to Koreans’ assumption that they were “getting the worse end of the bargain,” he added.

“Most Koreans saw Korea as a victim of great powers,” Straub said. “It’s not just the media. It’s more than that, it was – and still is – a shared national narrative.”

Koreans’ sense of national vulnerability is magnified by their historic victimization to neighbors. South Koreans do not want to become a de facto tributary state of China or a colony of Japan again, he said.

Will anti-Americanism return?

USFK incidents were a main focus of Korean attention during the 1999-2002 period, and while there is always a possibility of problems arising, the intensity is gone now, Straub said.

“Some steam is under the lid again,” Straub said. “But I don’t think it’s nearly at the level like it was back then. I’m doubtful that we’d see an exact repeat.”

The media landscape in South Korea has improved and shifted away from its earlier position of “criticize the United States first and ask questions later,” Straub said.

Today, South Korea and the United States are in good standing at the government-level and among the people. President Obama and Korean President Park Geun-hye have an established rapport.   

What troubles Koreans now is North Korea, a Japan focused on collective defense, and the strategic rivalry between the United States and China and its possible implications for Korea, he said.

“South Korea being sandwiched between the United States and China – based on a perception that China is going to be the world’s dominant power – is a real worry for many Koreans,” Straub said, and a large number of Koreans – albeit still a minority – feel that their country must find a more equidistant ground between the two.

Most Koreans, however, still believe in the need for the continued presence of USFK personnel, at least for the time being, said Straub, and must be reassured of their strategic alliance with the United States.

Obama and Park are expected to meet in Washington in mid-October, and Straub said it will be used as an opportunity for both sides to reinforce the importance they attach to the alliance and to pressing North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs.

Links to related articles

NK News: South Korean anti-Americanism dwindles, but roots remain: diplomat

NK News: South Korean anti-Americanism: a thing of the past?

Anti-Americanism in Democratizing South Korea, July 2015

Asia Times: American faces Seoul court over infamous unsolved murder

The Christian Science Monitor: South Korea: 20 years later, Californian son faces trial for Seoul murder

JoongAng Ilbo: Is anti-Americanism dead?

JoongAng Ilbo (Korean): 한미동맹은 빈틈없이 튼실한가 전 미국 국무부 한국과장의 진단

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A South Korean protestor holds an American flag on which protesters left their footprints at a Seoul rally in June 2003.
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Follow The Money

In many decades of western news coverage of China, 2012 was a watershed moment. In the space of just a few months, a Bloomberg News team headed by correspondent Michael Forsythe publishing a sweeping expose of how relatives of China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, had earned vast fortunes in a variety of often disguised business deals. Soon after, David Barboza of the New York Times published his own revelations of the wealth accumulated by the relatives of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao. Both exposes followed remarkable reporting by the Beijing press corps about the scandal which led to the fall of one-time Chongqing Communist Party Chief Bo Xilai.

These stories broke new ground, not only in terms of what they revealed about China’s new rich - but also as examples of a new kind of investigative journalism that has become increasingly important for covering a rapidly changing China. The correspondents took advantage of China’s evolution towards a more open, internationally engaged, market-style economy to unravel a series of complex, opaque, often hidden set of business dealings reaching to the highest levels in the People’s Republic.

The behind-the-scenes story of the journalists who conducted the investigations - and faced the dramatic, controversial, and often frightening consequences - is the subject of “Follow the Money.” Based on extensive interviews with most of the leading figures involved, the film chronicles the emergence of a new kind of journalism that will become increasingly crucial as reporters - and the public at large - seek to understand the dynamics of a new, wealthy, and increasingly powerful China.

"Follow the Money" is the final episode of Assignment China, a 12-part series chronicling the history of American correspondents in China from the 1940s to the present day produced by the U.S.-China Institute at the University of Southern California, http://china.usc.edu/assignment-china-usci-series-american-reporting-china

Mike Chinoy was CNN's Senior Asia Correspondent and served as a foreign correspondent for more than thirty years. After joining CNN at its London bureau in 1983, Chinoy served as Beijing Bureau Chief from 1987 to 1995. During that time he covered the 1989 events at Tiananmen Square, earning the CableACE, duPont and Peabody awards. He was also Hong Kong Bureau Chief for five years. His other awards include the Silver Medal from the New York Film Festival and Asian Television Awards for his reporting in Indonesia and Taiwan. Chinoy's published two books, China Live: People Power and the Television Revolution (1999) and Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (2008). He taught at the USC Annenberg School of Communication and ran the School's Hong Kong summer program 2007-2009. From 2006-2009 he was Edgerton Senior Fellow at the Pacific Council for International Policy.

Mike Chinoy <i>Senior Fellow, U.S.-China Institute, University of Southern California</i>
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The U.S.-India relationship has found new momentum in the midst of deepening strategic and economic cooperation, U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma told a Stanford audience on Friday.

“It’s not a hyberbole to say the relationship has soared over the past year,” Verma said to a crowded room in Encina Hall. The title of Verma’s talk was “Why India Matters.”

His visit to campus, organized by Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, was part of a multi-day trip to the United States.

Arriving from Washington, D.C., he attended the first-ever U.S.-India Strategic and Economic Dialogue earlier that week. The meeting of Indian and American delegations was “hugely successful,” said Verma, who assumed his diplomatic post in January, following Kathleen Stephens, who is now is at Stanford as a distinguished fellow.

Verma was also in the Bay Area to accompany Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi during his visit to Silicon Valley, the first Indian head of state to visit the area since 1978. Prime Minister Modi used his visit to promote a vision of “Digital India,” tying Indian growth to the spread of information technology to all levels of Indian society, driven in part by investment from the technology industry in the United States. Leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party, Modi unseated one of the longest-serving governments in a landmark May 2014 election. He has won high public approval ratings and is one of the most followed public figures on Twitter.

Modi and President Obama have been a driving force behind the two countries’ growing alignment toward combatting global challenges, Verma told the audience. The two leaders share a “certain level of chemistry,” he said.

Obama and Modi held two summits within a four-month time period. And that, Verma said, “drives the governments to come together in a way that they might not ordinarily do.”

Verma noted the strategic overlap between the U.S. “rebalance to Asia” policy and India’s “Act East” policy, both of which commit the two countries to focus defense and economic commitments on the Asia-Pacific region. He praised rapid progress in security cooperation between the two powers, including growing sales of American defense technology to India.

On the strategic side, summit outcomes have included the creation of a joint-vision of cooperation and set up phone hotlines between the heads of state and their national security advisors.

The United States now looks upon India as a “net security provider in South Asia” and supports an increased role for India in international institutions, Verma said.

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Asked about how Russia fits in, Verma acknowledged that historically there “has been a close relationship between New Delhi and Moscow. Not one or two or three years, but for decades.” But the U.S. envoy added “we don’t see that as somehow being inconsistent with a close relationship with the United States.”

On the economic side, the two leaders have committed two of the world’s largest economies to increase bilateral trade– from $100 to $500 billion – and meet for an annual economic dialogue.

Modi campaigned on a commitment to reform the economy and eradicate corruption.

However, the pace of economic reform in India has not gone as quickly as the United States would have hoped, and corruption remains an issue across India and South Asia, Verma said.

Answering a question from the audience, Verma pointed to anecdotal evidence of progress from American business in the removal of obstacles to growth from corruption. “There’s obviously a long way to go but my sense is it’s a big priority not only for the prime minister but for the people.”

Although India is modernizing, it still has a number of big-ticket development issues to tackle. Today, 300 million people don’t have access to electricity. And with over 1.2 billion people, India’s size makes it near impossible to implement sweeping change in a short period of time.

The scale of India, alone, motivates the United States to work with India, a nation that will play a “consequential role for decades to come,” Verma said. “When these two countries come together they can have a big impact on peace and prosperity across the world.”

Assessing the relationship potential for the longer-term, Verma said India and the United States’ are rooted in similar values and share diaspora communities. Support for a close U.S.-India relationship is widely expressed in the Congress, from both parties and the Ambassador anticipates the coming U.S. election will not bring any change in that commitment.

A growing number of Americans are choosing to study in India and a similar pattern is being seen in Indians coming to study in the United States. Last year, about 130,000 Indian students studied in the United States. In 2005, that number was only 30,000.

“Fundamentally, I’m optimistic because the people-to-people relationship is so strong,” Verma said.

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Richard Verma, the 25th U.S. ambassador to India, visited Stanford and delivered a talk titled "Why India Matters," on Sept. 25, 2015.
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Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in the United States last week for his first state visit. Maintaining a busy schedule, Xi met with President Obama at the White House, technology leaders in Seattle and the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

In Washington, Xi and Obama agreed to create a common vision toward a climate agreement at the Paris summit ‘COP21’ later this year and further establish shared norms in the area of cyberspace, according to a report from the White House.

Two Stanford scholars offer their analysis of Xi’s visit in a Q&A. Thomas Fingar discusses outcomes from the Chinese leader’s summit with Obama. Recently returning from Beijing, Karl Eikenberry offers his views on the media and reactions that occurred in China during the week preceding Xi’s visit.


Q&A: Thomas Fingar

Thomas Fingar is a China expert and a distinguished fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is a former deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and previously served as the director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific in the U.S. Department of State.


Coming out of the meeting, where do China and the United States stand on climate change?

China and the United States have declared a willingness to work together on climate change, further than in the past. At their meeting, Xi and Obama agreed to build upon agreements announced last November that proclaim a common vision for the upcoming Paris meeting on climate change. Taken together, these statements mark a dramatic reversal of the antagonism between China and the United States at the 2009 talks in Copenhagen. It sends a strong signal that China and the United States are prepared to cooperate.

Moreover, other countries should no longer fear that their own efforts will be negated by disagreement between the two largest producers of greenhouse gases. They can no longer excuse their own inaction by claims that any potential international agreement on climate change would be vetoed by either China or the United States. The message is — it’s time to get serious.

Was there any progress on cybersecurity issues?

Obama and Xi committed to mitigate malicious cyber activity from their national territory and to refrain from targeting critical infrastructure in peacetime. The former is more significant than the latter. But of course the proof of significance will be how—and how quickly—it is implemented.

However, what is worth noting is the restraint on cyber targeting of infrastructure declared by the United States and China. The two leaders agreed to bring that arena within the purview of the United Nations. It’s a step toward the establishment of an international control regime for cyberspace. Such a regime is badly needed and would be a concrete example of how the two countries can work bilaterally, and multilaterally, to update the global order and address 21st century challenges.

Would you say Xi's trip was a success?

We won’t know how important any of the agreements from Xi’s visit are until we see how they are implemented. Rather than carp about the failure to adopt detailed and binding commitments, however, we should recognize and applaud the fact that the state of U.S.-China relations is less fraught and more future-focused than pessimists maintain.

This is an excerpt of a larger piece written by Thomas Fingar.


Q&A: Karl Eikenberry

Karl Eikenberry is the director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative and a distinguished fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Eikenberry is a former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and, among other positions, served as defense attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.


How do the Chinese view Xi’s visit?

Chinese state media coverage was intense – far greater than had appeared in the United States Every detail of Xi’s itinerary and exhaustive analyses of the issues likely to be discussed between the two presidents dominated the news. Interestingly, the state media reporting tended to emphasize the hosting arrangements, supportive of President Xi’s desire to place China within the Asia-Pacific Region and globally on an equal footing with the United States.

Whereas U.S. Government leaders hope for specific security and economic agreements – so-called “deliverables” – with China during this visit, Xi and his team place more of a premium on being accorded respect. The Chinese media is an arm of the communist party, and reinforces the party’s goals in its reporting of major issues.

How important do Chinese leaders and the people consider the visit?

I was asked during an interview with Chinese television if this visit was as significant as that of Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the United States in 1979. That event had great historical meaning as it signaled Deng’s commitment to “open up” China after decades of relative isolation. President Xi’s visit can’t be compared with Deng’s in a historical sense. And yet, China has come along way since 1979.

When Deng visited the United States, China was a poor country. Now China is approaching middle-income country status and its GDP is the second largest in the world. President Xi was feted in Seattle this week by the captains of America’s IT industry and accompanied by China’s own IT captains. I expect Deng never could have imagined such a development even in his most optimistic moments.

China’s rapid growth over the past 35 years has been enabled by that country’s integration into the global economic and financial markets, and by an extended period of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States, in turn, has played a decisive role in ensuring these favorable conditions have existed.

Almost everyone I met during my recent Beijing trip expressed concern that Sino-American relations are becoming more punctuated by disputes, such as over maritime and cyber issues. China’s leaders and its people recognize that their country faces a daunting array of political, economic, and security problems that will be difficult to solve if world trade and stability in the Asia-Pacific region are disrupted, likely developments if the United States and China should ever enter into a period of confrontation. So I think that most Chinese are hoping that President Xi’s visit can help put U.S.-China relations on a more positive trajectory.

How would you critique Chinese media coverage of Xi’s visit?

I would give it mixed reviews. In terms of thoroughness, I give it good marks. Frankly, the average Chinese citizen – at least in urban areas – knows far more about this event than the average American citizen. On the other hand, China state media has a strong tendency to downplay America’s concerns about China’s policies – this is worrisome.

For example, I watched China Central Television (CCTV)’s coverage of National Security Advisor Susan Rice’s Sept. 21 speech on U.S.-China relations. The report showed all of the positive parts of Rice’s speech, but very few of her criticisms. This leads the Chinese people to have unrealistic expectations about Sino-American relations, and worse, to entirely blame the United States when inevitable setbacks occur.

There is also a bit of irony worth mentioning. President Xi agreed to provide answers to questions submitted by The Wall Street Journal. The questions were published in that newspaper on the eve of Xi’s trip. The next morning, I was watching CCTV and listened as a presenter read Xi’s answers verbatim. But I was perplexed, because I thought The Wall Street Journal’s website, like several other western publications, was blocked due to its tendency to occasionally restrict print news that the communist party deems unfit to print. I tried to connect online to The Wall Street Journal and quickly discovered the site was indeed blocked. CCTV, apparently, had not gotten the word.  

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China's President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Barack Obama arrive for a joint news conference at the White House on Sept. 25, 2015.
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Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea are often regarded as virtually indistinguishable from China’s. On paper, Taiwan and China appear to be making substantially the same claims and the controversial U-shaped dashed line may be found on ROC and PRC maps alike. Neither government has officially clarified the dashed line’s meaning or assigned its coordinates.

Dr Kuok, however, argues that Taiwan has in the past year taken small but significant steps toward clarifying its claims. It has also adopted a more conciliatory approach best illustrated by President Ma’s official launch of a South China Sea Peace Initiative in May 2015. These moves imply possible daylight between Taiwan and China regarding the South China Sea. Dr. Kuok will examine these developments, as well as the costs, benefits, and chances of widening or narrowing that daylight in the larger context of Taipei-Beijing relations, domestic considerations including the January 2016 election in Taiwan, and the responses of other actors in the region.

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Lynn Kuok’s latest publication is Tides of Change: Taiwan’s Evolving Position in the South China Sea (2015). She was recently a senior visiting fellow at the Centre for International Law (Singapore), and has held fellowships at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Her research interests include ethnic and religious relations and nationalism in Southeast Asia and the politics and security of the Asia-Pacific region. She has served as editor-in-chief of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs and the Singapore Law Review. She holds degrees from the University of Cambridge (PhD), the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (MALD), and the National University of Singapore (LLB).

Lynn Kuok Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Brookings Institution
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