Click the link for a full transcript of “What We Need To Talk About When We Talk About Taiwan.“

The Likelihood of Invasion

In stark terms, Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, believes there’s a 100% chance China will use some sort of force against Taiwan in the next five years. For the last twenty years, China has been making concerted efforts to modernize its military and increase its capabilities not only to assert force against Taiwan, but to deter intervention from the United States.

In the majority of scenarios, the United States wins in a conflict with China over Taiwan. But the United States also carries a distinct geographic disadvantage. The distance across the Taiwan Strait between the island and mainland China is approximately 100 miles, which is roughly the distance between Richmond, Virginia and Washington D.C. If China moves quickly, PRC forces could take Taiwan before U.S. forces have time to move into position.

When considering possible outcomes in Taiwan, it is equally important to consider the motivations driving Beijing’s ambitions. The leadership on the mainland has been planning and thinking about how to retake Taiwan since 1949. With the modernized capabilities coming online, the balance of power has shifted in China’s military favor, and the cost-benefit calculus favors Beijing’s ambitions. The long-term planning stage is now reaching its end, and the prospects of direct action are increasing.

The View from Taipei

Political leaders in Taiwan recognize the growing danger they face across the Strait. In Larry Diamond’s assessment, the end of Hong Kong's autonomy and the suppression of the “one country, two systems” model, the rising military incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone and coastal waters, and the whole rising pace of Chinese military intimidation has sobered Taiwan and visibly impacted Taiwanese public opinion.

Concerningly though, while the political elite recognize the real and present danger of the situation, polling of the general Taiwan public suggests that the vast majority of citizens still feel like an attack or an invasion by China is unlikely. Similar majorities suggest that they would be willing to fight in Taiwan’s defense, but volunteering for military service remains at a minimum.

To maximize safety, Taiwan needs to find ways to strengthen itself in its ability to defend, resist, and deter China, while still avoiding any appearance of moving toward permanent independence or any other action that could be deemed by Beijing as a provocation, says Diamond.

What the United States Can Do

When it comes to the defense of Taiwan, the strategic crutch hobbling the United States is geography. Most of the U.S. Pacific forces are not in Asia. The majority are in Hawaii and California, as well as a few bases and airfields in Japan. To be able to effectively deter China, the U.S. needs far greater forward deployed military capability in order to be able to either stop or stall the movement of Chinese troops into Taiwan, says Mastro.

Taiwan needs greater onshore military deterrence capabilities as well. One such strategy is the “porcupine approach,” which increases the number of smaller mobile lethal weapons. By Larry Diamond’s assessment, increased citizen participation in military training is also crucial, with an emphasis on weapons training and urban defense tactics. The U.S. could support these aims by overhauling the current system for weapons procurement to speed up the production and delivery of weapons systems not just for Taiwan, but to the benefit of U.S. defense and other contingencies as well. Working with leadership to create strategic stockpiles of food, and energy should also be a priority, says Diamond.

The U.S. also needs to put much more effort into its diplomatic efforts on behalf of Taiwan. Many U.S. allies and partners are reluctant to ostracize China because of economic ties and concerns over sparking their own conflict with China in the future. A key ally in all of this is Japan. If Japan fights with the United States on behalf of Taiwan, it is a guaranteed win and enough to effectively deter China. But much more needs to be done much more quickly in order to secure those guarantees and present them in a convincing way to Beijing.

“The clock is ticking,” Larry Diamond says. “And the problem is we don’t know how fast it’s ticking. “Taiwan is moving in the right direction. But we need to move faster than we're moving.”

China's ruling Communist Party concluded its 20th National Congress on October 22, cementing Xi Jinping's status as the country’s most powerful leader in decades by awarding him an unprecedented third five-year term as party general secretary. The CCP also revealed the new lineup of the Politburo Standing Committee, China’s most powerful political body, made up entirely of Xi loyalists. APARC scholars outline the key takeaways from the Congress and consider its implications for China and the world.  

Xi's “Work Report” address to the party congress indicates continuity in policy direction. Xi’s long-term ambitions, driven by the grand “Chinese dream” of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” have not changed, but now he can be more assertive than before in pursuing them, writes APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin in a co-authored Los Angeles Times opinion piece. Xi has demonstrated that he does not shy away from conflict with the United States, and China will likely strengthen ties with Russia, North Korea, and other like-minded authoritarian nations, says Shin. With Xi at the helm for a third term, “we should expect a more aggressive China and increasing turbulence in the regional and global order."

Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert in Chinese military and Asia security, agrees that the next five years under Xi’s leadership look set to get more confrontational between the world’s two great powers. In coverage by multiple media outlets, Mastro explains the implications of the Party Congress for the United States and its partners.

Subscribe to APARC newsletters to receive our scholars' latest updates.

In Xi's report to the Party Congress, he called for further investments in the military and reaffirmed that China will not rule out using force to bring Taiwan under its control. His address indicates that, despite recent challenges, such as economic slowdown and the rippling effects of the COVID pandemic, the Chinese think their country is on track with its trajectory, whether it be toward reunification with Taiwan or having a world-class military, Mastro tells the Christian Science Monitor. “We will probably continue to see, in their minds progress, and in our minds disruptions and harassment.”

Along with securing a third term in office, Xi also named two top generals as vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, the top body overseeing the armed forces, as he looks to modernize China’s military and keep up pressure on Taiwan. One vice chair role went to He Weidong, who led the military command responsible for Taiwan. There is speculation He played a role in planning China’s unprecedented military drills around the island following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit in August 2022, Mastro says via Bloomberg. “The promotion of He Weidong is generally considered within China as a sign that Beijing is strengthening military preparations, or in the words of some Chinese military commentators, ‘strengthening combat preparations for military struggles against Taiwan,’” she notes.

China wants to reach the point where its predominant power allows its actions to go uncriticized and countries in its periphery accommodate Chinese preferences, Mastro explains in another interview with Bloomberg.

Under Xi’s watch, China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, has undergone a tremendous modernization, with the goal of becoming a “world-class force” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. One area in which the PLA appears to be making progress is in bringing forces together for more complex joint exercises, helped by interaction with other militaries, especially Russia’s. “We are observing an increasing complexity and sophistication in how they are performing in exercises,” Mastro tells the Wall Street Journal.

With regards to the Taiwan flashpoint, it is almost guaranteed we will see lower-level conflicts and disruptions, Mastro predicts. China does not have to impose a complete blockade over the island, and could do something like a blockade for a week or two “just to teach Taiwan a lesson if they don’t like what happens in the next election, for example,” she says in an interview with the Hindustan Times.

China’s consistent trajectory of improving its military capabilities means a heavier reliance on those capabilities to achieve its goals over time, Mastro explains via Radio Free Asia. “The bottom line is, the next five years are undoubtedly going to be rockier for U.S.-China relations and for other countries with security concerns in the region,” she concludes.

The scenes from the 20th Party Congress reinforce the idea in the Biden administration’s new National Security Strategy, which recognizes that “the PRC presents America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge.” National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, speaking hours after the strategy’s release, singled out China and did not mention Russia in his opening remarks to reporters, underscoring an intention to not allow Moscow’s war against Ukraine to distract from the Biden administration’s assessment that Beijing is a more crucial challenge to U.S. national security, Mastro tells the South China Morning Post. “I think the administration correctly assessed that in order to compete with China we have to stay focused, and we couldn’t be distracted by other challenges which are absolutely important but are not of the same severity or calibre as what China presents.”

More media coverage:

• Report from the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China: What does Xi Jinping's Third Term mean for US-China relations and Taiwan? – VOA Chinese, October 22
• What Will Xi’s Third Term Mean for India-China Ties? – The Hindustan Times, October 17

Taiwan is currently the single biggest point of contention in U.S.-China relations, and U.S. allies have a crucial role to play in efforts to prevent a great-power war over the island. South Korea, however, has remained relatively ambiguous about its willingness to support U.S. efforts to push back against China’s growing influence in the region, including in the Taiwan Strait. As the Yoon administration is now creating an opening for a more proactive approach, what can South Korea do in a Taiwan contingency?

A new article in The Washington Quarterly provides a framework for analyzing South Korea’s potential role in this era of strategic competition through the lens of war over Taiwan. The authors — Oriana Skylar Mastro, a Center Fellow at APARC, and Sungmin Cho, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies — build upon traditional concepts of balancing to create a nuanced, operationally relevant strategy for South Korea to contribute to the defense of Taiwan.

They explain South Korea’s approach to the Taiwan issue to date; evaluate South Korea’s strategic importance and what it can do to support U.S.-led efforts to compete with China; explore how China and North Korea may respond to increased South Korean cooperation with the United States, along with the potential obstacles this cooperation could create; and recommend ways to leverage the US-ROK alliance to enhance deterrence against China with respect to Taiwan.

Subscribe to APARC newsletters to receive our scholars’ updates.

Mastro and Cho recognize that it is operationally and politically infeasible for South Korea to fight side-by-side with U.S. forces against China in a Taiwan scenario or to build its military sufficiently to deter Chinese aggression against Taipei. South Korean strategists must also consider the costs of China’s and North Korea’s potential responses to greater South Korean involvement in defending Taiwan. Still, Seoul can play a significant role in deterring Chinese aggression.

According to Mastro and Cho, South Korea’s optimal strategy to navigate the U.S.-China rivalry should meet two conditions. First, it should contribute to the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, including deterring Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Second, it should be able to make China hesitate to take punitive actions against South Korea. Thus, South Korea can provide rear-area support to the United States, such as intelligence gathering, ammunition supplies, or noncombatant evacuation. It can also support the strategic flexibility of US Forces Korea (USFK) and be more proactive in deterring North Korean aggression and provocation to free up U.S. resources to focus on China in a contingency scenario.

Moreover, South Korea could contribute toward forms of “collective resilience” against China’s economic statecraft, such as collective economic sanctions, and leverage its position as one of the world’s leading producers of advanced semiconductors to complicate China’s calculus. Finally, Seoul’s diplomatic support of U.S.-led efforts to defend Taiwan can influence Beijing to take seriously the international community’s potential united response against any attempt to invade Taiwan.

“Given the heightened urgency over tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Washington and Seoul should pursue these options immediately to maintain peace and stability in the region before it is too late,” the authors conclude.

Over the past decade, as China’s might and assertiveness have grown, countries around the Indo-Pacific have increasingly embraced informal partnerships, or minilateral groupings, to deepen international policy action and defense coordination. Two prominent examples of the minilateral model are the Quad, which comprises Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, and AUKUS, which includes Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, deterring China with minilateral groupings is more complex than traditional deterrence theory might suggest. Can minilateral groupings deter coercion and aggression in the Indo-Pacific, and if so, under what conditions? 

A collection of essays in a new Asia Policy roundtable tackles this question. Shorenstein APARC South Asia Research Scholar Arzan Tarapore is a co-editor of the roundtable. Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro is the author of the first essay in the collection.

Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive our scholars' updates.

The roundtable brings together six leading security experts to explore the nexus between deterrence and minilateralism in Indo-Pacific security politics. The motivation for this endeavor, Tarpore and co-editor Brendan Taylor of the Australian National University explain in the roundtable introductory essay, is to fill the gap in the existing literature, which has largely not addressed the possible convergence between these two increasingly dominant trends in the region.

The roundtable opens with Mastro's essay, in which she identifies the unique characteristics of the China challenge and considers how minilateral groupings can best enhance deterrence in these circumstances. First, she explains why minilaterals, such as the Quad, could address some of the challenges of “deterrence by punishment.” This traditional form of deterrence employs the threat of severe penalties — ranging from economic sanctions to nuclear retaliation — to prevent attacks by an adversary. Here, Mastro says, “economic or political costs may have greater deterrent value against Beijing than military costs, thus creating an opportunity for the Quad.”

Next is the category of “deterrence by denial,” which includes strategies that prevent or limit aggressive actions of an adversary by creating the perception that they will not succeed. Such denial-based strategies are more effective than punishment-based ones in circumstances where China could blunt U.S. attempts at punishment or choose to incur the costs. But the United States, Mastro says, “does not have the regional force posture to deny China its objectives.” 

Mastro then considers a third, less analyzed category, “deterrence by resilience,” where the goal is to encourage the perception that disruptive events such as military operations will not be effective in attaining the adversary’s objectives. Here, “resiliency is about signaling to China that the benefits of a particular action are less than China believes them to be.” By building resiliency, smaller countries can push back against Chinese coercion to abide by China's interests. Countries in minilateral groupings should therefore prioritize this form of deterrence as they consider ways to cooperate, Mastro concludes.

This commentary was first published by Nikkei Asia.

The White House has styled the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment announced by U.S. President Joe Biden in June as a $40 billion pathway to work with allies, partners and the private sector to offer sustainable, green infrastructure alternatives.

This marks the latest American effort to offer an infrastructure alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative. But given the disappointing results seen with previous such programs, it is imperative that Washington look for lessons in the successes of other more creative efforts in recent years.

Experience shows that the U.S. and its allies can win important infrastructure victories by being strategic, proactive and persistent, and by building close partnerships between government and private business.

Subscribe to APARC newsletters to receive our experts' commentary and analysis.

Consider the deal under which U.S. private equity group Cerberus Capital acquired a bankrupt shipyard in the Philippines last April, keeping it out of Chinese hands.

The U.S. embassy in Manila had alerted Washington to the business' failure in 2019, noting that its Subic Bay location provided the closest deep-water port access and ship supply and repair facilities to the disputed South China Sea and that Philippine officials were concerned about the prospect of Chinese companies moving in. Some in Washington showed interest, but the bureaucracy initially struggled to translate this into action. Fortunately, key players in the government persisted.

Working closely with Cerberus executives to overcome delays and a decision by the U.S. International Development Finance Corp. (DFC) not to participate in the project, these officials developed a creative solution: obtaining commitments from the U.S. Army and the Philippine Navy to lease parts of the project area, thereby guaranteeing Cerberus the steady revenue stream it required to proceed. The deal was a big win but happened only through the ad hoc efforts of a few people.

The Australian government took a more proactive approach toward the sale of the Pacific arm of Digicel Group, which controlled much of the communications and internet infrastructure in six island nations, including Papua New Guinea. Two Chinese state-owned companies had immediately expressed interest in the assets when Irish billionaire Denis O'Brien put them up for sale in 2020.

The U.S. took a different but equally strategic approach toward a third infrastructure development of strategic importance: China's building of a deep-water port at Kyaukphyu on the Bay of Bengal in Myanmar.

CITIC Group, the Chinese state-owned lead investor, had initially proposed a $7.3 billion port complex which would have made Kyaukphyu as big as Southern California's massive Long Beach freight hub.

Some U.S. and Myanmar officials were concerned that Naypyidaw could be saddled with sizable debt for a project of questionable commercial viability as the Chinese proposal included loans worth hundreds of millions of dollars for Myanmar to finance its 15% stake. CITIC was to take 85%.

In response to a request from the National League for Democracy-led government, Washington's embassy in Yangon used funds from an existing U.S. Agency for International Development program to hire independent experts to conduct due diligence on the project.

They succeeded in downsizing the project to $1.3 billion and doubling Myanmar's equity participation to 30%, thus avoiding the need for borrowing from China. Going ahead on a smaller scale then greatly reduced concerns about potential repercussions.

These three efforts demonstrate that the U.S. and its allies can, when they focus imaginatively, offer countries in the region viable infrastructure options that reduce their dependence on Chinese investments.

They also highlight, however, that this process remains ad hoc and needs substantial improvement. For the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment to be successful, the U.S. and its partners must adopt a more systematic strategic approach.

This approach should include three components. First, the U.S. should build on its recent appointment of a global infrastructure coordinator at the State Department by moving that position to the White House. It should give the coordinator authority to bring together personnel from different agencies and ample staff of his or her own and provide a clear mandate to identify and pursue priority infrastructure projects aggressively.

Second, the U.S. must make better use of existing tools by bolstering the DFC's flexibility, requiring each embassy to assign an officer to identify potential projects and ensuring senior officials match Beijing's aggressive lobbying efforts.

Third, the U.S. infrastructure team should forge partnerships with private companies on specific infrastructure projects and redouble efforts to overcome the obstacles that have hindered cooperation with allies, including Japan, which on its own has achieved success on the infrastructure front, to co-finance and coordinate so as to avoid needless competition.

These recommendations will take commitment, political will and resourcing. But if Washington wants PGII to succeed, it will require the White House's strong commitment and a willingness to be nimble and creative in responding to opportunities.

The U.S. has made many promises in a variety of programs on global infrastructure development and consistently under-delivered. PGII must prove it can get things done.

James Carouso leads the advisory board to the Australia chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Scot Marciel is the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center of Stanford University and a former U.S. ambassador to ASEAN, Indonesia and Myanmar. Both are senior advisers at strategic advisory firm BowerGroupAsia.

This commentary was first published by the Los Angeles Times.

The 104-minute speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the country’s 20th party congress reveals a leader who believes he is on a historic mission to save China’s self-described socialism in the 21st century.

Xi’s Oct. 16 speech launched the twice-a-decade meeting, which concludes this weekend, where the national Communist Party appoints its leadership and announces China’s policy direction for the coming years. The address reads very much like a sequel to his previous one five years ago. At that time, Xi cryptically said China had entered a “new era” of socialism. This time, he characterized his aim as “building a modern socialist country,” which the state media touted as the highlight of the speech. This statement clarifies his ambition to prove the superiority of socialism by 2049, with an implicit aim to surpass the U.S. by the centennial anniversary of the People’s Republic of China’s founding in 1949.

Xi is driven by the grand “Chinese dream,” the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” that he referenced in his 2017 and 2022 National Congress speeches. He appears to view himself as the sole individual who can achieve this dream in the 21st century, perhaps casting himself as a 21st-century Mao Zedong. His plans — including “common prosperity” and “socialist modernization” — are long term and unlikely to shift even following the recent turmoil caused by COVID-19, China’s harsh lockdowns in response and the resulting economic pains.

These ambitions are the same ones promoted by the Xi administration over the last decade. But by the end of this latest congress, Xi will have cemented an unprecedented third term as president, and he can now be more aggressive than before in their pursuit.

Subscribe to APARC newsletters to receive our experts' commentary and analysis.

It follows then that U.S.-China relations are unlikely to improve in Xi’s next term. He has shown, time and again, that he differs from his predecessors, except Mao, in that he does not shy away from conflict with the United States. Xi has felt comfortable declaring that “the East is rising while the West is declining” and positioning the U.S. as a challenge to overcome, rather than an obstacle to avoid, on the road to the Chinese dream.

On the other hand, China will probably strengthen ties with Russia, North Korea and other like-minded authoritarian nations, just as the U.S. is strengthening alliance networks in the region, including with Japan and South Korea. We are, as Henry Kissinger once said, in the “foothills of a Cold War.”

The Taiwan Strait remains central to how quickly and drastically conflict could escalate. Xi’s latest speech reiterated that China wanted to gain Taiwan peacefully but “will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.” He frames unification not as a choice but as a historical responsibility, which has been placed on his shoulders. Xi’s direct mention of Taiwan unification at the party congress suggests that he will use that issue as a justification for his long-term reign.

One factor that will help determine the actual longevity of Xi’s rule is whether meaningful protests against him will emerge. Xi’s policies and crackdowns against dissent have yielded sporadic protests that made international headlines. In China, however, the threshold for revolution is quite high, creating major barriers to a regime change. A large dose of state-led nationalism and indoctrination convinces people that the U.S. in particular is determined to torpedo China’s quest for modernity, creating an enemy to rally the country around.

China’s economic challenges pose another hurdle for Xi’s long-term agenda. The country’s rigid zero-COVID policy has limited growth, and Xi has displayed a heavy-handed approach toward private businesses, dampening entrepreneurial spirit. If Chinese people come to think of Xi’s anti-market tendency as the underlying problem, it will erode his authority.

To stave off such threats, Xi is likely to continue his iron-fist rule. He has purged enough rivals and earned enough grievances over the years that relaxing his power grip at this juncture will likely invite criticism, if not revenge, toward him. He is eager to turn China into a global power that will awe the West. As Xi put it at the 2017 party congress, China is increasingly taking “center stage in the world.” With Xi still at the helm, we should expect a more aggressive China and increasing turbulence in the regional and global order.

Gi-Wook Shin is the director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. Seong-Hyon Lee is a senior fellow at the George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations.

Subscribe to APARC's newsletters to receive updates from our guest speakers and experts.

Feng is recognized by the Shorenstein Journalism Award for her stellar reporting on China under strenuous conditions. She was joined by two other China experts on a panel about the future of China reporting: Stanford’s Jennifer Pan, a professor of communication and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Affairs (FSI), whose research focuses on political communication and authoritarian politics, and Louisa Lim, an award-winning journalist who reported from China for a decade for NPR and the BBC, and who also serves on the selection committee for the Shorenstein Journalism Award. FSI Senior Fellow Andrew Walder, the Denise O'Leary and Kent Thiry Professor at Stanford, chaired the discussion. 

The Appearance of Foreign Media Coverage 

As China has grown into a geopolitical superpower, understanding Beijing’s decision-making is more crucial than ever. Yet under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the number of foreign correspondents on the ground has atrophied, digital surveillance has intensified, and online censorship of sources has tightened. Being tailed constantly during reporting trips is now the norm, says Feng, and many sources are running dry, no longer willing to talk to reporters. “This kind of digital surveillance not only stymies public discourse and civil society in China but also inhibits our understanding of the country,” Feng notes.  

More worrisome still is the rise of harassment, in person and online, of foreign correspondents and the portrayal of their work as intelligence gathering for foreign governments. Feng described how Chinese state media outlets, local government officials, and security personnel have been gradually laying the ground to cast foreign reporters as agents of foreign influence — accusations that carry physical danger and legal costs for reporters. “That kind of language is particularly tough on ethnic Chinese reporters like me,” says Feng, who has personally confronted race-based harassment and xenophobic nationalism. A year ago, for example, she discovered she had been unknowingly subject to a national security investigation related to a story she had done half a year earlier.

In addition to whittling down the number of foreign correspondents on the ground and increasing the pressure on those who remain in the country, China’s COVID restrictions have been detrimental to press freedom. The foundations of journalistic work — talking to people, fact-checking, traveling to gather information — have become nearly impossible. 

These increasingly challenging conditions have forced Feng and other China reporters to sacrifice the kind of stories they tell about the country, often filing dry reports that diminish global interest in China. “The result,” says Feng, “is a growing opacity, and opacity about a country as big as China breeds suspicion and mistrust. But it seems to be what China wants: the appearance of foreign media coverage without truly getting to the heart of what is going on in the country and without access to the people making the stories happen.”

A Vehicle for the CCP

In her remarks, Professor Pan described China’s changing media landscape and the rise of digital repression. Fundamentally, she explains, media in all its forms in China is a vehicle for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to preserve its staying power. But while the Chinese government has always worked hard to control the domestic information environment, it is now increasingly limiting what the world can know about the country. “The Chinese government thinks it can tell the China story better.”

Altogether, Pan notes, these recent trends — the rise of digital censorship in all its forms, the government’s ability to influence the production and consumption of information, cyber harassment, and undermining of journalists and their work — indicate that the Chinese government has many levers at its disposal to constrain not only the activity of journalists but also limit their reach and influence.

It remains to be seen, however, whether all these efforts will produce the outcomes the Chinese regime wants. Clearly, by eliminating access to foreign correspondents, the world will know less about China, Pan says. “It’s less clear whether this will be advantageous in the long term for the CCP.”

Reshaping the World’s Media

What is filling China’s information vacuum? Since she left the country after reporting from China for a decade for the BBC and NPR, Lim has been interested in this question, or what she calls “the other side of the campaign to marginalize foreign journalists and to cut down on the coverage from China.” 

Jointly with the International Federation of Journalists, Lim has examined how China is trying to shape a singular story from its perspective by bypassing resident correspondents who speak Chinese, study China, and are savvy about Chinese history, culture, and politics. Her investigations reveal that the Chinese government targets journalists — particularly local journalists from countries in China’s periphery, like Pakistan or Bangladesh — offering them paid tours in China and other enticements in exchange for pro-China reports that it then features in state media. For example, in these pro-China reports, the political indoctrination camps in Xinjiang are portrayed as vocational training camps designed to combat extremism.

“You can see how foreign journalists are being used to legitimize and validate China’s tactics,” says Lim. “That’s why it’s so important that we have sources on the ground telling other stories, but also why that work has become harder. It speaks to the importance of the media and of what China calls ‘discourse power,’ how important it is to China to tell the China story in a particular way.”

Reconfiguring Our Knowledge of China

What is the future of China reporting? There has been a noticeable shift to remote reporting, Feng explains: not only in the sense of reporting on China outside of the country but also in relying on different sources of information. “Traditionally, in journalism, we travel and meet people, but I find more and more that reporting relies on data. The advantage is obvious: you might be blocked from accessing a detention center in Xinjiang, but it’s hard to block satellite images of these camps. This opens up a whole new area of China reporting that relies on data journalism.”

Another development, notes Feng, is the emerging beat of “China and the rest of the world.” Foreign correspondents now increasingly report from outside of China on the perceptions of China around the world and tell stories about how China influences all manners of countries and sectors. However, there are costs to this process of reconfiguring our knowledge of China without being in the country, Feng says. “The cultural context and the human reporting are lost, and it is that kind of in-country reporting that helped us make sense of the facts and figures that come out of this massive country.”

Feng, therefore, worries about the future of China reporting. “I don’t worry that China is about to take over the world or invade Taiwan, but I do worry that in the off-chance that this does happen, we won't have enough correspondents on the ground to make sense of that.”

She also cautions that there is no next generation of China correspondents building experience to replace those who are leaving the country and to take up reporting when she and others move on. “There are no new young academics or journalists who want to come to the country, and those who want to are unable to do so. In this vacuum of explanatory, investigative, or simply empathetic reporting on the country, I fear we begin to accelerate toward more misunderstanding, mistrust, and perhaps even conflict.”

“I look forward to returning to China and reporting again if I can, but I hope other people take up the mantle soon,” she concluded.