Across the world, populations are aging rapidly as people live longer and fertility rates continue to decline. Asia is at the vanguard of this demographic shift. The number of older adults (aged 60 and above) in the region is projected to triple between 2010 and 2050, reaching nearly 1.3 billion people. As Asian economies face this “silver wave,” helping older adults live safely and independently at home – a concept known as aging in place – has become a policy imperative.

At a recent webinar held during Stanford Health AI Week, the Asia Health Policy Program (AHPP) at Shorenstein APARC brought together experts from China, Singapore, and South Korea to share insights into the potential of health AI to allow older adults to enjoy healthy aging and avoid or postpone institutionalization. 

Moderated by Stanford health economist Karen Eggleston, the director of AHPP, the webinar featured Hongsoo Kim, a professor of health policy and aging at Seoul National University’s Graduate School of Public Health and director of its Artificial Intelligence Institute’s Center for AI in Health and Care; Xiaochen Ma, an assistant professor of health economics at Peking University’s China Center for Health Development Studies; and Tien Yin Wong, a physician-scientist-innovator and the senior vice-chancellor of Tsinghua Medicine and vice-provost of Tsinghua University, who has also worked and held senior leadership roles in Singapore and Australia as a practicing retinal specialist with a research portfolio on retinal diseases, ocular imaging, AI, and digital technology.

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Here are six lessons from the front lines of Asia’s efforts to integrate AI into elderly health care and advance aging in place:

1. Adopt a Whole Systems Approach

In South Korea, the world's fastest-ageing society, automated systems like "CLOVA CareCall" – an AI-powered well-being dialer – conduct natural-sounding check-ins with solo-dwelling seniors, boasting a 96% response rate. Yet, Professor Kim emphasizes that checking in with people in need of health care is only half the battle.

If an AI flags an isolated senior at risk of depression, cognitive decline, or a physical abnormality, but the local community lacks the social workers or clinical pathways to intervene, then the health care system has failed.

“The question is not only whether AI can detect something, but how a health and care system acts on it,” she says. “Detection by itself changes nothing. A warning that no one follows up on helps no one. So the gap I care about is not the model’s cleverness itself. It is whether the system delivers.”

2. Solve the Entire "Care Cascade"

In rural China, traditional diabetic screening rates hover below 33%, leaving millions at risk of Diabetic Retinopathy (DR), a leading cause of blindness. Professor Ma shared how deploying an AI screening model successfully pushed screening rates past 85%.

The research team, however, discovered a glaring bottleneck: only 21% of high-risk patients actually followed up to receive sight-saving treatments. To fill in this gap, Ma’s team designed an "AI Plus” model (v2.0) that integrates immediate, local-language counseling at the point of screening. To keep seniors healthy at home, AI solutions must address the entire clinical journey, from initial scan to final treatment.

“Many of the AI tools have been focused on diagnosis accuracy or validation rather than going downstream to the entire cascade of whether improved screening will transfer into improved referral and the ultimate health outcomes,” says Ma.

3. Align with Local Workflows and Incentives

AI and other technology solutions for health often fail because they expect overworked care workers to adopt entirely new habits. Professor Ma noted that digital health interventions in rural China succeeded only when they integrated seamlessly into existing daily routines.

Instead of forcing clinicians to use complex new software, successful pilots utilized WeChat, the ubiquitous messaging app already open on every phone. Furthermore, the technology must align with the financial and professional incentives of frontline health workers. If an AI tool increases their administrative burden without simplifying their day or boosting their clinical efficiency, then it will remain unused.

4. Design Human-Centered AI for Health Equity

Professor Wong highlighted the ethical risk that AI tools will worsen, rather than reduce, health care disparities. This challenge is driven by the dynamics of “Inverse Care Law,” where AI disproportionately benefits the already advantaged, and the “Recursive Care Law,” where this inequality becomes a self-reinforcing cycle embedded in the system.

Because younger, more tech-savvy individuals generate more health data, AI models become better at serving them than the intended users of aging-in-place technologies. This creates a vicious cycle where the very tools designed to support aging populations end up marginalizing them. Governments must devise policies to mandate fair data coverage and usability, ensuring that AI serves society's most vulnerable members equitably, Wong stated.

Professor Kim noted that her team found that only about 38% of community care agencies in Korea have adopted AI and that the adoption rate varied sharply by region. In fact, districts with the greatest need may have the least access to these powerful tools. This challenge is not a technology gap, Professor Kim argues, but a fundamental design gap. To be genuinely equitable, a system must be built from the start to actively track who is missing and automatically route support back to them. This requires two  human-centered design key principles:

I. Universal by Default: The hardest-to-reach should not have to be the most persistent in navigating the technology.

II. Connected Across Sectors: Long-term care, social care, and health care must act as one integrated system rather than disconnected silos, each of which sees only part of the person’s needs.

5. Augment, Do Not Replace, the Human Touch

The panelists rejected the trope of robots replacing human caregivers. Instead, they view AI as an essential force multiplier for an overstretched workforce.

Whether it is South Korea’s deployment of 12,000 AI companion robots to combat senior isolation, or automated triage tools in clinics, the goal should be to offload administrative and routine tasks. This frees up human social workers and clinicians to do what they do best: deliver hands-on, empathetic care.

6. Value Real-World Outcomes Over Technical Novelty

Healthcare systems should prioritize rigorous, real-world case studies that prove actual clinical value, such as reduced mortality, lower rates of blindness, or fewer nursing home admissions, rather than celebrating high validation benchmarks in a laboratory.

To build robust future health AI systems, the experts concluded, the academic and tech sectors must also courageously publish and analyze their failed trials to understand what truly works in the chaotic reality of home-based care.

While AI holds immense promise for helping people grow old at home, “age tech” alone cannot solve the elder care crisis, the panelists agreed.

In South Korea’s June 3, 2026, local election, the ruling Democratic Party won most contests, but lost the pivotal Seoul mayoral race, suggesting voters were reluctant to grant the party unchecked power. This election served as the first nationwide test of the Lee Jae Myung administration, Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC's Korea Program, told news agency AFP.

The Seoul mayoral race attracted particular attention because the office is widely viewed as a launching pad to the presidency. But while the re-elected conservative Seoul mayor, Oh Se-hoon, is a seasoned political veteran and one of the most recognizable figures in his party, "he projects a sense of political fatigue, offering no fresh image and no new agenda to anchor a national candidacy," Shin noted.

Read the two AFP reports featuring Shin's commentary:

• South Korea ruling party fails to flip Seoul in blemish on local poll results >
• South Korea's ruling party heads for local election sweep

South Korea's stock market has been the world's hottest over the past year, with the Kospi Index surging 165% on the back of the country’s two semiconductor powerhouses, Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. This new territory "is creating a lot of issues within Korea," Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC's Korea Program, tells Barron's.

The magazine's story – South Korea Has a Chip Conundrum – Huge Profits and a Serious Selloff – highlights how the two companies' mind-boggling earnings and bonuses have opened something of a Pandora’s box of social and economic friction. For example, disgruntled employees at less-privileged Samsung divisions are leaving their union and trying to form a new one, Shin says.

The story notes, however, that these controversies "might look like a mild kerfuffle if the chip makers’ shares keep falling back to earth." Despite a 150% year-to-date gain, Samsung shares dropped 16% last week amid foreign investor sales and leveraged local buying.

This blog first appeared in The National Interest.

The return of President Donald Trump to the White House has not only increased geopolitical volatility – it has fundamentally altered expectations about how far major powers are willing to go to secure strategic advantage. What once seemed rhetorical excess—such as his repeated remarks about acquiring Greenland – now appears less implausible in light of recent events. From the escalating crisis in Venezuela in early 2026 to the ongoing Iran War as of May 2026, the United States has signaled a willingness to pursue geopolitical advantage with fewer constraints than before.

Against this backdrop, the Arctic is no longer a peripheral theater. It is rapidly emerging as a central arena where climate change, energy security, and great-power competition intersect. The question is not whether the Arctic matters, but how states will position themselves in a region where the rules are still being written.

A Strategic Arctic, not a Peripheral One

The renewed US interest in Greenland should not be understood narrowly as a territorial ambition. Rather, it reflects a broader strategic calculation about the Arctic. The melting of Arctic ice – combined with technological advances—is making previously inaccessible resources and shipping routes increasingly viable. In this sense, Greenland is not the story – the Arctic is.

The Arctic is estimated to hold roughly 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its natural gas, making it one of the last major frontiers of global energy development. At the same time, new maritime routes such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the emerging Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) promise to significantly shorten shipping distances between Asia and Europe.

For major powers, the implications are profound. Russia has already positioned itself as the dominant Arctic actor, leveraging its geography and resource base. China, through its “Polar Silk Road” initiative, seeks to embed the Arctic into its broader connectivity strategy. Meanwhile, the United States, increasingly viewing the region through a strategic lens, is attempting to mobilize its alliances to counterbalance these moves.

As recent studies suggest, the Arctic is becoming a new frontier of great-power competition – one where economic, military, and legal dimensions are deeply intertwined.

Why South Korea Is Paying Attention to the Arctic 

For South Korea, interest in the Arctic may appear surprising at first glance – especially given the ideological orientation of its current progressive government. Traditionally, progressive administrations in Seoul have emphasized engagement with continental powers such as China and Russia, while seeking rapprochement with North Korea. They have also shown interest in infrastructure connectivity across the Eurasian landmass.

Yet the Arctic presents a different kind of opportunity – one that aligns with both geopolitical necessity and economic ambition.

Eunjung Lim, a professor in the Division of International Studies at Kongju National University (KNU), is a visiting scholar at Shorenstein APARC from April 2026 to February 2027. She is also a member of the governing board of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network and a member of the Subcommittee on Energy and Just Transition of the Presidential Commission on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth. She earned a BA from the University of Tokyo, an MIA from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, and a PhD from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

At a seminar on reactionary politics in South Korea, University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa sociologist Myungji Yang argued that the large far-right mobilizations defending former President Yoon Suk Yeol after his martial law declaration were not an isolated development. Instead, they were the product of decades of ideological conflict, authoritarian legacies, and organizational infrastructure on the Korean right.

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Cold War Legacies and Conservative Hegemony

Yang argued that much of the existing scholarship on the far right focuses on globalization, economic insecurity, and anti-immigrant politics. In South Korea, however, the far-right is shaped less by immigration than by the country’s Cold War history and deeply entrenched anti-Communism during the authoritarian era.

For decades, anti-Communism functioned as a dominant state ideology, defining the boundaries of acceptable political thought. Under authoritarian governments, even moderate reform movements could be dismissed as sympathetic to Communism or North Korea. Yang argued that these ideological structures were never fully dismantled after democratization.

As a result, the boundary between mainstream conservatism and the far right remains blurred. Yang suggested that what is often labeled as conservatism in Korea would be considered far-right politics in many other democracies.

Far-right politics in Korea is organized around anti-Communism, hostility toward North Korea and China, and strong pro-Americanism. It is also tied to nostalgia for authoritarian leaders such as Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee, and, increasingly, Chun Doo Hwan, who are remembered by supporters as figures who protected the nation and delivered economic growth.

Building a Right-Wing Infrastructure

Rather than viewing the far right as a fringe movement, Yang described it as a broad right-wing infrastructure made up of parties, religious groups, intellectuals, media organizations, and grassroots activists.

She emphasized that these actors are closely connected. Conservative politicians often participate in far-right rallies, while influential pastors, online personalities, and activists help shape the broader political agenda and organize these events. In this sense, Yang argued, the Korean far right cannot be understood simply through party politics or street protests alone. It is the interaction between formal institutions and social movements that gives the far right its durability.

Yang traced the growth of this infrastructure to the “lost decade” between 1998 and 2008, when reform-oriented governments and former democracy activists became newly influential. Many conservatives viewed this period as a moment of political and cultural displacement. In response, the “New Right” invested heavily in think tanks, publishing houses, online media, and cultural organizations to spread conservative worldviews and challenge the legacy of the democratization movement.

Drawing on ideas of cultural hegemony, these groups focused not only on elections but also on shaping how Koreans think about history, democracy, and national identity.

New Strategies and New Constituencies

Yang also highlighted how the Korean far right has adopted new forms of mobilization. Far-right activists increasingly portray themselves as defenders of freedom and democracy, borrowing the language of civil disobedience and resistance. In their view, they are protecting South Korea from totalitarian threats associated with North Korea, China, and the domestic left. Some even compare their actions to the struggles of figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela, framing themselves as guardians of democracy rather than opponents of it.

At the same time, anti-feminism has become a powerful source of support, particularly among younger men. Yang noted that many men in their twenties and thirties have been drawn to right-wing politics because anti-feminist rhetoric resonates strongly with their frustrations and sense of exclusion. These appeals have allowed the far right to expand beyond its traditional base of older anti-Communist conservatives and build support among a younger generation.

Yang also pointed to the far-right’s growing transnational connections. Korean conservative activists increasingly borrow strategies, messaging, and organizational models from global right-wing movements, while cultivating relationships with foreign donors and international conservative networks.

Yang concluded that South Korea’s far right is best understood as “old wine in a new bottle.” Its core narratives – anti-Communism, fear of the left, and nostalgia for authoritarian order – are not new. What has changed are the strategies, technologies, and social coalitions through which those ideas are expressed.

Key Takeaways
 

• Cold War legacies remain central: anti-Communism and authoritarian political culture continue to shape South Korea’s right-wing politics.
• The boundary between conservatism and the far-right is often blurred in Korea, making far-right ideas more socially accepted than in many other democracies.
• South Korea’s far-right operates through a broad infrastructure of parties, churches, media outlets, and protest movements rather than through fringe groups alone.
• Old narratives have found new forms: anti-feminism, social media, conspiracy theories, and transnational conservative networks are helping the far right expand its influence.

Kerstin Norris is a research associate at APARC’s Korea Program and managerial editor of The Journal of Korean Studies.

The Journal of Korean Studies (JKS), the flagship peer-reviewed publication in the field of Korean studies, returns to Stanford University’s Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) with the publication of Volume 31, Issue 1. JKS publishes a broad range of original scholarly articles related to Korean history, culture, politics, and society. The journal also publishes reviews of new Korea-related books, making it both a venue for original research and a guide to the field’s expanding literature. Its contributors and readership span disciplines and continents, bringing together historians, literary and cultural scholars, sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists representing the wide range of disciplinary approaches in Korean studies.

The journal’s institutional history traces the arc of Korean studies in the United States. The journal was originally established in 1969 at the University of Washington in Seattle, the early center of gravity for Korean studies in America. After the publication of two standalone volumes (1969, 1971), James Palais, an influential historian of premodern Korea, shaped the journal's intellectual character through serial publication (1979-1987). Michael Robinson, at Indiana University-Bloomington, carried the journal forward as editor (1988-1992) before a long publication hiatus. In 2004, JKS was revived at Stanford University by co-editors Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and director of the Korea Program at APARC, and John Duncan, professor of Korean history at UCLA and former director of its Center for Korean Studies. It was housed at Stanford until 2008. The journal has since been guided by editorial leadership at the University of Washington (Clark Sorensen), Columbia University (Theodore Hughes), and The George Washington University (Jisoo Kim). JKS returns to Stanford under the new editorial team of Paul Chang (Shorenstein APARC), Yumi Moon (Department of History), and Dafna Zur (Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures).

JKS welcomes manuscripts from researchers at all career stages, working across the full range of topics, periods, and methodologies reflected in the field of Korean studies. Korean studies is undergoing genuine growth with new generations of scholars producing compelling work that is reshaping our understanding of Korea’s past and present. The Journal of Korean Studies exists to support and disseminate that work.

Kerstin Norris is a research associate at APARC’s Korea Program and managerial editor of The Journal of Korean Studies.