Donald Trump’s decisive victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election has reignited debates about the United States' role in a world increasingly defined by geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainty, and democratic recession. The return of Trump to the White House will have profound implications for Asia. To assess the stakes for the region, APARC convened a panel of experts who weighed in on the potential risks and opportunities the second Trump administration’s policies may pose for Asian nations and how regional stakeholders look at their future with the United States. Another panel, organized by APARC’s China Program, focused on what’s ahead for U.S.-China relations.

High Stakes for the Asia-Pacific

APARC’s panel, The 2024 U.S. Presidential Elections: High Stakes for Asia, examined how the return of Trump’s political ideology and the macroeconomic effects of his foreign policy will affect Asia.

“We are witnessing the solidification of Trumpism as an influential political ideology,” stated APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin at the opening of the discussion, “one that has begun to transcend traditional  American conservatism. Trumpism — marked by a blend of economic nationalism, nativism, and a strongman approach to leadership —could have a huge impact not only in American society but also on the liberal global order.”

According to Shin, Trump’s policies, particularly his focus on unilateralism and economic self-interest, could significantly alter the political and economic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region.

Political scientist Francis Fukuyama, the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, argued that Trump’s victory was no longer an anomaly but part of a larger trend of working-class voters shifting allegiance from the Democratic to the Republican Party. Fukuyama expressed concerns about Trump’s aggressive economic policies, including imposing broad tariffs on allies and adversaries alike, and warned that such policies could result in inflation, trade tensions, and long-term economic instability. In addition, he asserted that Trump’s reluctance to engage in foreign conflicts could undermine the United States’ commitments to security alliances, particularly in Asia.

APARC Deputy Director and Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui emphasized the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s policies, noting that Trump’s "America First" approach could further erode the international liberal order. He suggested that Japan would face significant challenges navigating the unpredictability of Trump’s foreign policies. According to Tsutsui, “There might be greater pressure to line up with the United States in dealing with China economically, which would  put a great deal of strain on the Japanese economy.” Such an alignment might also muddle Japan’s own diplomatic and security interests.

Gita Wirjawan, a visiting scholar with Stanford's Precourt Institute for Energy and former visiting scholar at APARC, focused on the stakes for Southeast Asia. Wirjawan argued that Trump’s economic policies, such as protectionism and prioritizing economic growth over democratic principles, could embolden right-wing populist movements in Southeast Asia. He suggested that parts of Southeast Asia could be a natural beneficiary of a reallocation of financial capital from the U.S. as companies diversify supply chains by establishing operations outside China in response to Trump’s planned tariffs. Yet, growing economic inequality in Southeast Asia, particularly in urban areas, could fuel the rise of similar nationalist policies, undermining efforts to promote inclusive, democratic development.

Shin highlighted the challenges South Korea might face under a second Trump presidency. Trump will likely demand higher defense payments from South Korea, potentially straining the U.S.-ROK alliance. This could put President Yoon in a tough spot, especially as trilateral U.S.-Japan-Korea cooperation has been progressing well but faces uncertainty. Economically, South Korean firms may struggle if U.S. policies like the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act are rolled back, as subsidies were crucial for their investments in the U.S. On North Korea, Shin noted that Trump may resume summit diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, leaving South Korea sidelined and potentially sparking an arms race in Northeast Asia. 

The panelists all emphasized that Asia, with its diverse political landscapes, would need to navigate a new era of economic nationalism and geopolitical unpredictability, with potential challenges to economic stability and democratic norms.

A Focus on U.S.-China Relations 

The second panel, "Crossroads of Power: U.S.-China Relations in a New Administration," focused specifically on the evolving dynamics of U.S.-China relations in the wake of the election. Moderated by APARC China Program Director Jean Oi, the discussion featured Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, and Peking University's Yu Tiejun, the APARC's China Policy Fellow during fall 2024. The panelists analyzed the potential trade, security, and diplomacy shifts between the two global superpowers, particularly in light of Washington's bipartisan consensus on China. 

Central to the discussion was the continuity of U.S. policy toward China under the first Trump administration and the Biden administration. Examples of this continuity included recent tariff increases on Chinese imports, a new U.S. Department of the Treasury program to screen U.S. outbound foreign investments in key sectors, and tighter export controls on critical technologies like quantum computing and advanced semiconductors. The panelists explored the economic and strategic ramifications, noting that these policies could disrupt existing trade patterns. 

Another area of concern was China’s uneven implementation of the 2020 Phase One  trade deal it negotiated with the U.S., in which China had committed to domestic reforms and $200 billion of additional U.S. imports. This failure could buttress the new administration’s plan to increase tariffs, complicating diplomatic efforts between Washington and Beijing. Fingar noted that while China has made efforts to diversify its supply chains, these changes might not be enough to shield it from the effects of U.S. economic policies, which could include escalating tariffs or additional restrictions on Chinese exports. 

The conversation also touched on broader geopolitical considerations, particularly concerning China’s role in the ongoing war in Ukraine. The panelists discussed the potential for cooperation or de-escalation in U.S.-China relations, with China’s positioning on the war serving as both a point of contention and a possible avenue for diplomatic engagement. 

Underscoring the deepening complexities in U.S.-China relations post-election, the panelists highlighted the uncertainty surrounding U.S. foreign policy under a second Trump administration, particularly regarding the role of people-to-people exchanges in fostering mutual understanding.

Both events emphasized the multifaceted consequences of Trump’s return to power for Asia and the global international order. While the discussions highlighted the challenges posed by the rise of economic nationalism, trade tensions, and shifting security priorities, they also pointed to potential areas of cooperation and the evolving dynamics of global diplomacy.

In the Media

From Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro:

What a Second Trump Term Means for the World
OnPoint – WBUR, Nov 12 (interview)

Race to the White House: How the US Election Will Impact Foreign Policy
UBS Circle One, October 23 (interview)

From Visiting Scholar Michael Beeman:

On Korea-U.S. Economic Cooperation in the Era of Walking Out
Yonhap News, Nov 20 (featured)

Trump Looking for Trade 'Reset' with Most Countries: Ex-USTR Official
Nikkei, Nov 16 (interview)

How Southeast Asia Can Weather the Trump Trade Typhoon
The Economist, Nov 14 (quoted)

Stanford University seeks candidates for three faculty positions in Asian Studies. All three appointments will be at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and affiliated with the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC). The deadline for submissions is November 30, 2024. Read on for more information about each position. Candidates should submit their applications via the Stanford Faculty Positions website.

Faculty Appointment in Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy

Stanford University seeks candidates for a new faculty position in the politics and foreign policy of Japan. The successful candidate will have expertise in politics, policy studies, diplomacy, security studies, international relations, or global affairs relating to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region, and will be expected to advance research and education on Japanese politics and foreign policy, in the Japan Program of APARC. This is an open-rank search.

The new faculty member will be appointed as a Senior Fellow or Center Fellow in FSI, affiliated with APARC. Senior Fellows at Stanford University are full members of the Professoriate and Academic Council, with a rank equivalent to tenured associate or full professor. Center Fellows at Stanford University are also members of the Professoriate and the Academic Council, with a rank equivalent to tenure-track assistant professor. Center Fellows are appointed for a fixed term of years with the possibility of promotion to Senior Fellow.

For more information and to apply, view the job posting on the Stanford Faculty Positions website > 

Faculty Appointment in Korean Studies

Stanford University seeks candidates for a faculty position in Korean Studies. The successful candidate will be expected to advance research and education on Korea, in the Korea Program of APARC.

The new faculty member will be appointed as Center Fellow in FSI, affiliated with APARC. Center Fellows at Stanford University are the equivalent rank of tenure-track assistant professor. They are members of the Professoriate and the Academic Council, eligible to serve as principal investigators, and accrue sabbatical. Center Fellows are appointed for a fixed term of years with the possibility of promotion to Senior Fellow.

For more information and to apply, view the job posting on the Stanford Faculty Positions website >

Faculty Appointment in Taiwan Studies

Stanford University seeks candidates for a new faculty position on Taiwan. The successful candidate will have expertise in policy studies, social sciences, international relations, or global affairs relating to Taiwan, and will be expected to advance research and education on Taiwan studies, in the newly established Taiwan Program of APARC. This is an open-rank search.

The new faculty member will be appointed as a Senior Fellow or Center Fellow in FSI, affiliated with APARC. Senior Fellows at Stanford University are full members of the Professoriate and Academic Council, with a rank equivalent to tenured associate or full professor. Center Fellows at Stanford University are also members of the Professoriate and the Academic Council, with a rank equivalent to tenure-track assistant professor. Center Fellows are appointed for a fixed term of years with the possibility of promotion to Senior Fellow.

For more information and to apply, view the job posting on the Stanford Faculty Positions website >

The Korean Peninsula stands at a perilous crossroads. Recent missile tests and provocations, coupled with historical trends, paint a worrisome picture of the current state of affairs, prompting some analysts to warn of a looming conflict. The Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC recently hosted two events to analyze these escalating tensions that have sparked global concern.

On February 21, the seminar “Slow Boil: What to Expect from North Korea in 2024,” featured Victor Cha, D.S. Song-KF Chair, Professor of Government at Georgetown University, and Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cha discussed historical behavioral patterns of North Korean missile tests, military provocations, and weapons demonstrations, and what all these might mean for security on the Korean peninsula.

The following week, on March 7, at the seminar  “Is North Korea Preparing for War?,” we were joined by Robert Carlin, a non-resident scholar at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and Siegfried Hecker, a professor of practice at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, and in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at Texas A&M University. Carlin and Hecker, both formerly our colleagues at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, discussed their recent 38 North article, “Is Kim Jong Un Preparing for War?,” which posits that Pyongyang has already made the strategic decision to go to war. 

The speakers at both events delved into the various rationales behind North Korea's actions and provided contrasting viewpoints on the trajectory of the situation. While Carlin and Hecker painted a grim picture of North Korea's intentions to engage in warfare and advocated for robust security measures, Cha argued that, while 2024 will be a challenging year, established approaches such as diplomacy and deterrence will remain effective in managing relations with Pyongyang. 

Rhetorical Preparations for Conflict

Carlin and Hecker provided a grave assessment, suggesting that “Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war,” akin to his grandfather's stance in 1950. Hecker provided historical context, indicating that despite attempts at normalization with the United States, each North Korean leader has simultaneously explored the development of its nuclear weapons arsenal and accumulation of its conventional armaments. Hecker argued, "The Korean War was never settled, it was an armistice, and so, more or less, North Korea has been preparing for war, but this is different and we are really concerned.”

Carlin noted a shift that occurred at the Workers’ Party plenum at the end of 2022, in which “Pyongyang announced new measures that demonstrated that the old policy with the U.S. was over and that they were going to move much more towards the Russians.” The plenum also marked a rhetorical shift where Kim Jong Un introduced the phrase “war preparations.” “Some people say, ‘Oh that's normal North Korean rhetoric’ — it's not normal. They had not been talking at that level to their own people about war preparations […] they talked a lot about deterrence which meant building up, but not war preparations,” said Carlin.

According to Carlin, Pyongyang has “primed the pan for a clash in the Yellow Sea […] everything we have seen in the last year suggests very strongly that this is a decision the regime has made, and that it will patiently move in this direction.”

The speakers both argued that Kim's shift stems from a perceived failure of past diplomatic endeavors and a traumatic setback at the 2019 Hanoi summit, when, as Hecker indicated, the North Koreans decided to abandon the 30-year policy of seeking normalization with the United States. “This is a more dangerous time than any time since the start of the Korean War,” Hecker warned.
 

The Inevitable Tensions of Deterrence

In contrast, Cha’s assessment of the situation is more cautiously optimistic, anticipating a surge in North Korean provocations in 2024 but attributing it to historical patterns rather than a definitive strategic shift. According to Cha, we should  expect North Korean belligerence to increase in 2024, while dialogue looks unlikely.” He highlighted North Korea's tendency to ramp up provocations during U.S. election years, produced data on the increasing number of provocations since the 1990s, and emphasized Kim's repeated rejections of dialogue with the Biden administration.

Cha also provided four reasons why he does not expect a war with North Korea in 2024: “First, Pyongyang is not confident enough in its capability to deter U.S. and South Korean retaliation […] Second, the uptempo in U.S.-ROK and U.S.-ROK-Japan exercising […] Third, if North Korea were ready to go to war, they would not be selling all their ammunition to Russia […] and fourth, if North Korea were really ready to go to war, they would not be decoupling from South Korea.”

Cha suggested that, while war is unlikely, “coercion, particularly against South Korea, and North Korea-Russia relations are only going to grow.” He described North Korea’s transfer of armaments from Najin to Dunai in Russia to three munition storage facilities near the Ukrainian front. Cha sees a possible change in the U.S. North Korea policy approach from focusing on denuclearization to curtailing and disincentivizing this behavior.

An Uncertain Year Ahead

Whether or not the escalating tensions since the 2019 Hanoi Summit mean that Pyongyang is headed to war, its increased belligerence is a clear signal that Kim’s government has shifted its efforts. North Korea is now pursuing its security and economic agendas without any indication of attempting to normalize relations with the United States or South Korea. Furthermore, it continues to strengthen its partnership with the China-Russia bloc. The assessment of continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula is undisputed.

Ultimately, both perspectives shared by the speakers highlight the need for vigilance, strategic coordination, and innovative policy solutions to address the escalating tensions in the region.
 

This commentary first appeared in Foreign Affairs.

North Korea has long been a source of instability, but a new development over the past year threatens to make things even worse: the country is teaming up with Russia. At a meeting in Pyongyang last July, North Korea’s defense minister, Kang Sun Nam, and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, vowed to expand their countries’ military cooperation to “resolutely stand against” their “common enemy,” the United States. Then, at a September summit with President Vladimir Putin in Russia, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un toasted the Kremlin’s “sacred struggle” against “a band of evil”—a reference to Western countries—and called Putin the “Korean people’s closest friend.”

The North Korean–Russian convergence goes beyond rhetoric. Russia has been propping up the Kim regime with food aid, along with fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, and equipment for ballistic missile production. There are signs that Russia is sharing its expertise, too. In July, North Korea conducted a test launch of a technologically sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile, and in November, it managed to send its first military reconnaissance satellite into orbit after several failed attempts.

The transfer of critical supplies goes both ways. North Korea is sending Russia much-needed artillery shells to use in its war in Ukraine, with U.S. officials confirming in October that more than 1,000 containers of arms had arrived in Russia by ship and by train. Pyongyang’s equipment is hardly world-class—its shells have a 20 percent failure rate, whereas most advanced U.S. munitions have failure rates in the low single digits—but many of North Korea’s missiles are difficult for Ukraine to defend itself against because they are long-range, which allows Russian forces to fire from deep within their own territory, and low-tech, which helps them evade detection. North Korean military assistance could therefore be decisive in Russia’s campaign to halt Ukrainian troops’ progress. For Pyongyang, meanwhile, the arms transfer is an opportunity to test its wares in battle.

In addition to undermining U.S. and allied efforts to defend Ukraine, expanding North Korean–Russian cooperation threatens to destabilize the Korean Peninsula. On January 5, less than a week after reports emerged that Russia had launched its first North Korean–made ballistic missiles into Ukraine, North Korea fired hundreds of artillery rounds into the sea near its disputed border with South Korea. On January 14, North Korea conducted its first intermediate-range ballistic missile test of the year and formally announced that it no longer considered South Korea a “partner of reconciliation and reunification” but an enemy that had to be conquered—through nuclear war, if necessary.

As if this were not enough, China is playing a counterproductive role. Beijing’s security relationship with Russia has deepened: Russia has provided critical weapons and defense-industrial expertise to China, and the two countries are engaging in more frequent and sophisticated joint military exercises. Beijing, in effect, has sanctioned a larger Russian military role in Asia and provided the political cover and economic lifeline Putin needs to continue fighting in Ukraine. China has also shielded North Korea from international sanctions and pressure designed to force Kim to give up his nuclear weapons program. There is historical precedent for the three countries’ working together, too. During the Cold War, China, North Korea, and Russia were all committed to “opposing imperialism”—code for their anti-Western activities. Their cooperation facilitated conflict around the world, including in eastern Europe, on the Korean Peninsula, and across the Taiwan Strait.

The good news, however, is that this trilateral alignment turned out poorly for all three countries during the Cold War—and if the United States plays its cards right, it can fail this time around, too. Chinese and Soviet backing helped North Korea fight South Korea and its allies to a draw, leading to an armistice agreement in 1953, but subsequent decades of poverty and international pariah status can hardly be considered a victory for Pyongyang. As for Beijing and Moscow, cooperation soon gave way to the Sino-Soviet split and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Although today’s circumstances are different, familiar signs of unease are already visible among China, North Korea, and Russia—rifts the United States can exploit.

An Unstable Triangle
 

China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union’s falling out over the course of the 1950s is instructive. The decade began with the two larger powers, China and the Soviet Union, committed to each other’s security and to supporting other communist countries, including North Korea. In 1950, Beijing and Moscow signed an alliance agreement vowing mutual defense in the event of an attack and pledging to coordinate their activities against the West. Both supported Kim Il Sung, the founding father of North Korea and the grandfather of Kim Jong Un, in his bid to attack South Korea the same year. When China sent its own forces into the brutal fighting on the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union backed the Chinese effort with military aid and expertise. 

But this cooperation was not to last. After the death of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, introduced political reforms and pursued “peaceful coexistence” with the United States. The Soviet Union’s pivot threatened to undermine the Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s domestic project, which emulated Stalin’s harsh governance. Meanwhile, Chinese attacks on Taiwanese-controlled islands, China’s 1962 border war with India, and the Great Leap Forward—Beijing’s disastrous economic and social program of that period—elicited contempt in Moscow. Mao’s personal jabs at the Soviet leadership did not help matters, either. By 1960, the Soviet Union had canceled 12 aid agreements and roughly 200 science and technology projects in China.

Back then, as now, Beijing and Moscow were revisionist great powers with limited willingness to advance the other’s ambitions. Both expected more from a partnership than mere protection. Beijing sought financial assistance for its defense-industrial base and political support to lend legitimacy to the regime. Moscow wanted to lead an ever-expanding communist bloc and to secure China’s help in undermining the United States’ position in Asia. Although the two sides shared many of the same interests, their priorities differed. And they would clash over tactics, especially when it came to dealing with third parties. Beijing and Moscow disagreed, for instance, about how to respond to Polish and Hungarian resistance against Soviet control in 1956: Mao even warned that China would support Poland if the Soviet Union dispatched troops to quell the unrest. 

Chinese and Soviet leaders weighed the benefits and risks of teaming up. Great powers can use alliances to strengthen their militaries and enhance their deterrence, but forming a partnership can also provoke a potential adversary or draw one of the great powers, against its wishes, into its ally’s disputes. During the 1950s, for example, Soviet leaders grew concerned that China’s dispute with Taiwan would undermine their plans to discuss détente with the United States. 

Similar stresses could now be opening fissures between China and its partners. Closer cooperation between North Korea and Russia has highlighted a fundamental tension in Russia’s relationship with China: unlike Pyongyang, Beijing has been unwilling to aid Moscow’s war effort directly. Russia’s requests for military equipment and aid from China have gone unanswered. (Russian officials have claimed that China secretly agreed to provide lethal weapons, but U.S. assessments have found no evidence that this is true.) Beijing’s official stance on the war in Ukraine is to remain neutral. It has called for de-escalation, reiterated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, and affirmed the sovereignty of all nations. None of China’s statements have contained explicit rebukes of Russia, but they have not expressed full-throated support, either. The fact that Russia had to turn to North Korea for aid shows how little material assistance Moscow is receiving from Beijing. In the immediate term, Russia has no choice but to take what help it can get, but eventually the discovery that its “no limits” partnership with China does, in fact, have limits may force a reckoning with the risks of relying on Beijing. 

For China’s part, the North Korean–Russian relationship undermines Beijing’s influence on the Korean Peninsula. With no indication of having consulted China, Russia opted to ignore United Nations trade sanctions (which both China and Russia had signed on to) and sell North Korea the advanced military technology its leaders have long desired. Now that Russia is willing to provide benefits that China will not, Pyongyang is turning closer to Moscow, and Beijing has lost significant leverage. To be sure, China is still North Korea’s largest trading partner. And even when North Korea was almost wholly dependent on China, Kim sometimes felt free to dismiss Chinese leaders’ preferences. But Russian support gives Pyongyang a stronger hand to take action that could impede Beijing’s regional and global ambitions. For example, Beijing will not want North Korea—or Russia, for that matter—to jeopardize its attempts to unify Taiwan with mainland China. But a crisis on the Korean Peninsula could spoil China’s plans by driving the United States and its allies toward deeper defense integration, just as the North’s 1950 invasion of the South pushed the United States to rethink its security interests in the region and sign a defense pact with Taiwan in 1954.

The most damning consequence of North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia may be that it is damaging China’s broader diplomatic and security environment. An emboldened North Korea and an aggressive Russia do nothing to improve China’s image or help it compete with the United States. Nothing unites U.S. allies more than shared concerns about North Korean or Russian belligerence. And as a partner of both countries, China is expected to use its own political capital to solve the problems they cause. At a December summit with EU leaders in Beijing, for example, Chinese officials wanted to focus on long-term plans for bilateral relations and caution against a European “de-risking” strategy that threatens China’s technological ambitions and economic interests. But the European delegation instead opened the talks by urging China to leverage its economic influence over Russia “to put an end to the Russian aggression against Ukraine.” 

China has long regarded a trilateral alliance among Japan, South Korea, and the United States as a critical threat to its security, even seeking guarantees from Seoul and Tokyo that they would not enter such a pact. Part of the case Beijing is making to reassure both capitals is that China is prepared to serve as the “stabilizer” of Northeast Asia—a message it repeated in a meeting with Japanese and South Korean officials after North Korea launched its spy satellite in November. At the same meeting, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin urged Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to encourage North Korea to halt its provocations and pursue denuclearization. But China’s commitment to playing “a constructive role” could amount to little if North Korea, bolstered by Russia, does not respond to Beijing’s overtures. At a certain point, even if other countries in the region do not see China as complicit in North Korea’s bellicose actions, Japan, South Korea, and the United States are bound to make defense decisions that will be unwelcome in Beijing.

China, recognizing the danger of being grouped with North Korea and Russia, has tried to publicly distance itself from the two countries. In late January, Liu Pengyu, the spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington, told Voice of America that he was “unaware” that North Korea and Russia were cooperating on military matters. China has also denied playing any role in the two countries’ recent collaboration. In line with that claim, when Moscow suggested that North Korea join Chinese-Russian naval drills in September, Beijing did not respond. The official Chinese media has also downplayed the idea of a trilateral alliance among China, North Korea, and Russia. In China’s telling, such a partnership is “concocted” by Western media to justify closer military cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States and generate a Cold War mindset by framing regional politics in terms of two opposing blocs. Beijing still sees real, if limited, benefits from its relationships with North Korea and Russia, but it is clearly concerned that Moscow and Pyongyang’s actions will do China more harm than good.

Let the Chips Fall

The United States and its allies can encourage fissures in the emerging autocratic bloc, but they must proceed with caution. Erecting obstacles is the wrong approach. Taking a page from history, Washington should recognize that China, North Korea, and Russia will sabotage their triangular alignment all on their own. During the Korean War, for instance, Soviet air support for Chinese forces was not forthcoming despite promises from Moscow, and in the 1960s, the Soviet Union reneged on commitments to lend its nuclear expertise to China. Moscow’s continued reluctance to support Beijing, let alone extend security assistance, in times of crisis was a major contributor to the Sino-Soviet split.

Recently, the war in Ukraine provided a perfect opportunity for China to disappoint its partner by refusing to fully back Russia’s military campaign. But the Biden administration squandered that opportunity by threatening China with “consequences” should it assist the Russian war effort and by adding Chinese companies that it asserted were supporting the Russian military to a trade blacklist. Even without these warnings, Beijing would have been unlikely to provide significant aid. Now, however, Beijing can contain the damage to its relationship with Moscow by blaming the United States for China’s failure to help a friend. If Washington had left the issue alone or confined its threats to private channels, China and Russia’s disagreement might have snowballed into an even larger rift.

The best way for the United States to counter the Chinese-Russian alignment is by using it to rally U.S. allies and partners. Shared perceptions of a threat create a fertile environment for deepening alliances and breaking ground on new areas of defense cooperation. Such a mindset has already allowed Japan and South Korea to look past their historic animosities and work together more closely than ever before. Each country decided to reinstate the other’s preferred trade partner status last spring, and in December they resumed high-level economic talks after an eight-year hiatus. U.S. allies in Europe that were previously reluctant to push back against Beijing may also change their minds as they come to see China and Russia as a unified threat—perhaps enough to persuade them to help the United States deter Chinese aggression in Asia. China has been reluctant to support Russia’s military and political goals in Europe in part because Beijing values its economic relationships with European countries. If those countries join the United States in taking a harder line on China, Beijing may conclude that an association with Russia and its disruptive tactics comes with too high a cost.

For now, coordination between North Korea and Russia makes it harder for the United States and its allies to compel either country to leave behind its revisionist, aggressive tendencies and assume a constructive role in the international community. But if their relationship sufficiently threatens China, Beijing may choose to distance itself from both Moscow and Pyongyang. It might even go so far as to try to push North Korea and Russia apart. The United States and its allies were not the primary reason for the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War, and they will not be the cause of the next Chinese-Russian rift—but they can make the most of the regional dynamics hastening a divide.