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Debating China - The Washington Quarterly, Vol 46, Issue 4.

In this article, authors Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton discuss US policies to manage relations with China, and argue that they cannot succeed if they are based on a distorted understanding of PRC politics.

The authors provide critiques of the flawed characterizations of PRC politics and policymaking that often prevail in Washington, then offer their own explanation of what has driven the shift in PRC behavior. Concluding with recommendations for policy and approach, the authors thereby suggest realistic and modest measures to avoid unmitigated hostility and pave the way toward a future guided by the search for coexistence, bounded competition, and productive cooperation.

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Visiting Scholar at APARC, 2024
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Huixia Wang joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as a visiting scholar for the 2024 calendar year. She is currently Associate Professor of Economics at Hunan University. While at APARC, she conducted research examining the effects of air pollution on healthcare expenditure and children's health in China.

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Visiting Scholar at APARC, 2023-2024
China Policy Fellow, 2023-2024
Tsinghua University
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Wei Da joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as Visiting Scholar, China Policy Fellow for the winter quarter of 2024. He currently serves at Tsinghua University as Professor in the Department of International Studies, as well as Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy. While at APARC, he conducted research with the China Program and Professor Jean Oi regarding contemporary China affairs and U.S.-China policy.

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This Q&A originally appeared in Al Jazeera


Southeast Asian nations are stuck in “troubling divisions” over Myanmar’s coup crisis and China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, according to Scot Marciel, a veteran United States diplomat.

And the former US ambassador to Indonesia and Myanmar, who has just published the book Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia, argues the US should use this time not to focus on countering Chinese influence in the region, but instead to prioritise its own engagement efforts.

Washington should focus “more on showing itself to be a consistent, reliable, trusted, and good partner across the board”, Marciel told Al Jazeera.

Imperfect Partners is a hybrid of personal memoir and foreign policy analysis of relations between the US and Southeast Asia, based on Marciel’s decades-long diplomatic career.

Joining the State Department in 1985, he was the first US diplomat to be posted to Hanoi since the Vietnam War. His career took him across the region, from witnessing the People Power revolt in the Philippines to responding to coups in Thailand and the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar.

Marciel retired from the foreign service in 2022 and is currently an Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Stanford University’s Walter H Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Al Jazeera spoke to Marciel about his book and regional politics.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Al Jazeera: Imperfect Partners covers different countries in Southeast Asia over an extended period. The Philippines and Vietnam are strengthening their relations with the US, while Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos appear to be firmly in China’s orbit. Are divisions in Southeast Asia deepening amid big power rivalry?

Scot Marciel: There are certainly some troubling divisions within Southeast Asia, but I wouldn’t necessarily attribute them primarily to the US-China rivalry, and I don’t see a division within ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] between a pro-China and a pro-American group.

What we’re seeing is all the countries of Southeast Asia wanting to have good relations with China and the US. Some will lean more one way than the other, depending on the issue and the time, but they’re also working very hard to bolster their relations with other countries such as Japan, Australia and India.

The divisions are concerning when it comes to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the situation in Myanmar, and the South China Sea, which may have some relationship to the US-China rivalry. But that rivalry isn’t the cause of the South China Sea tension.

Al Jazeera: The US and Vietnam upgraded their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership recently. This represents a massive change from several decades ago when Ho Chi Minh’s regime and the US were fighting each other in the Vietnam War. You were the first US diplomat to work in Hanoi since the end of the Vietnam War. Could you tell us more about what it was like back then?

Scot Marciel: I arrived in Hanoi in August of 1993. We still didn’t have diplomatic relations. But we, over the previous handful of years, had begun talking. The Vietnamese, after the fall of the Soviet Union, which they had depended on, were looking to diversify their relationships but also build economic partnerships because they had begun their economic reform efforts.

For the US, it was more about healing the divisions from the war. At the end of the Cold War, the US wasn’t looking at it so strategically, but we were very interested in getting Vietnam support for a Cambodian peace process.

When I first arrived, Vietnam’s reforms had been under way for only a few years. It was still quite poor but you could feel the energy in the country. You could see lots of little shops opening up. During those early days, we were trying to build basic trust after the war by working on issues that were in effect legacies of the war, such as accounting for missing Americans.

The economic relationship began to develop rapidly after those early years, and that in my view has driven the relationship ever since. Very quickly it became a trade and investment relationship and broadened to include health, climate change, a little bit of security and so on. The upgrade to a comprehensive strategic partnership has a significant economic component, with both countries seeing an opportunity for Vietnam to play a bigger role in global supply chains.

Al Jazeera:  You were ambassador to Indonesia. Indonesia’s presidential election will take place soon, in February next year. What’s at stake in the upcoming election in terms of geopolitics and what the US is watching?

Scot Marciel: Indonesia’s transition to democracy is one of the more underappreciated stories of Southeast Asia. It’s truly a remarkable achievement.

If you look back at the Soeharto years, and then in 1998, and the next several years, they marked a very turbulent transition to democracy, but the transition has held up and deserves a lot of admiration.

The elections next year will hopefully reinforce that democracy. The Indonesians have run good elections, very transparent and fair, with high voter turnout.

In terms of geopolitics, one never knows for sure. But there appears to be a consensus in favour of what Indonesians call a free and active foreign policy. They’re not going to suddenly align with any major powers. I think Indonesia will continue to play a very strong, independent role within ASEAN and within the broader world, and will still speak with their very own Indonesian voice on regional and global issues.

Al Jazeera: Laos is taking over the ASEAN chairmanship in 2024. What do you expect to change regarding the South China Sea and Myanmar under the leadership of Laos?

Scot Marciel:  ASEAN member states agree on a lot of issues but also disagree on some important ones, including the South China Sea, where the disagreement is mostly between those who have claims and those who don’t and therefore don’t want to pick a fight with Beijing.

I’d be surprised if Laos would lead a major change regarding the crisis in Myanmar. ASEAN doesn’t really know what to do. Even under Indonesia’s chairmanship, with all due respect, the bloc didn’t do all that much. There’ll unlikely be anything dramatic under Laos.

Laos may be more inclined to engage with the State Administration Council than Indonesia. I assume bringing the Burmese junta back to ASEAN’s top political meetings is a decision of the whole ASEAN, instead of the chair. Laos could certainly take a trip to Naypyidaw and talk to the generals, but that – while unfortunate – wouldn’t change much on the ground.

Al Jazeera: How have China’s diplomacy and behaviour changed during your decades-long diplomatic career? The US appears keen to counter China’s influence in Southeast Asia.

Scot Marciel: When I started in the mid-80s, China wasn’t a big factor in Southeast Asia. It was in the early days of Deng Xiao Ping’s reforms and kept a relatively low profile. It was also coming out of that era when Beijing backed communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia. For more than 20 years beginning in the late 1980s, China increased its engagement and economic ties with all the Southeast Asian countries.

From around 2008 onwards, we started seeing China shifting from a charm offensive to being a little bit more muscular in its diplomacy, particularly in the South China Sea. In recent years, Chinese diplomacy could be quite assertive and even aggressive – throwing its weight around.

China’s influence has increased significantly. That’s a fact. I think there’s an unfortunate tendency to worry about China because it has influence, as opposed to worrying about specific Chinese behaviour that is problematic, such as in the South China Sea.

The US should focus less on countering China, because China’s going to be there and countries are going to want to have the relationship, and more on showing itself to be a consistent, reliable, trusted and good partner across the board.

I think the US in general has done that, but not always with the consistency that the region would like to see. It’s been lagging on the economic side, most notably by pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. So Washington should focus on improving its own efforts in the region, rather than countering China.

Al Jazeera: Thai journalist Kavi Chongkittavorn brought up the US Burma Act in a column and warned of a ‘mini proxy war’ in Myanmar. Is this based on a misunderstanding about the Burma Act?

Scot Marciel: With all due respect to my good friend Kavi, I don’t see the Burma Act or anything else that the US is doing is in any way stoking a proxy war. Between the US and China, only one of the two countries is providing weapons to one party in this conflict, and it’s not the US.

America has offered rhetorical and diplomatic support, as well as humanitarian aid to the people of Myanmar. After all, we have to remember the people of Myanmar overwhelmingly don’t want the military to be in power. This is a horrific junta that has no popular support. The US very much sympathises with and supports the people of Myanmar, but it’s not providing weapons.

The Myanmar crisis is not at all about the US and China. It’s about what’s going on inside Myanmar and the Myanmar people saying, ‘We’ve had it with the military. We need to get them out once and for all.’ I think they’re right about it. It’s unfortunate that so many countries are not supporting them, with some neighbours even supporting the junta.

I do fear that the Burma Act may have led some in China to worry excessively that the resistance was some US-backed group, and that misunderstanding led Beijing to be more supportive of the junta.

China enjoyed perfectly good relations with a democratically elected government under Aung San Suu Kyi. If and when democratic forces return to power in Myanmar, they will want to have good relations with China, too. That makes sense. So Beijing doesn’t need to worry about the resistance being a US proxy and should not see the crisis there as a US-China matter.

The Burma Act expresses support for the restoration of democracy and offers the possibility of nonlethal assistance but not weapons. This is about people who have been brutalised by a horrific military for decades saying, ‘Enough. We want to restore our own power’. They’re not doing this at anyone’s behest.

Al Jazeera: Russia has kept a very high profile and gone further than China in backing the Burmese junta, such as recent talks about supporting the regime’s ambition to develop nuclear energy. Is Moscow’s behaviour in Myanmar and other parts of the region troubling?

Scot Marciel: We can see every day in the news what kind of destructive power Russia is and its support for the Burmese junta reflects that attitude: It is an absolutely, completely amoral and unprincipled foreign policy, and an opportunity to sell weapons.

Moscow is also seeking to expand its influence, although I don’t think it’s ever going to be very influential in Myanmar. It’s creating chaos and suffering. Myanmar is the most extreme case. Russia still has some influence in Vietnam and Laos due to a historic legacy of past support.

Compare this with China. Beijing could play a more helpful role in Myanmar’s crisis because the instability isn’t in China’s interest and any democratic government that takes power will likely want to be on good terms with Beijing. But there’s no hope for Russia as long as Putin is in power.

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Myanmar nationals hold a sign that reads "Save Myanmar" in front of the United Nations on March 04, 2021 in Bangkok, Thailand.
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International Support for a Nation in Crisis: Scot Marciel Examines Myanmar’s Struggles Toward a Democratic Future

As Myanmar continues to grapple with the aftermath of the 2021 military coup, APARC’s Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow Scot Marciel explores the fundamental challenges that Myanmar must address and the role the international community can play in supporting the Myanmar people's aspirations for a more hopeful nation.
International Support for a Nation in Crisis: Scot Marciel Examines Myanmar’s Struggles Toward a Democratic Future
Ambassador Scot Marciel and his new book, "Imperfect Partners"
News

New Book from Ambassador Scot Marciel Examines U.S. Relationships with Southeast Asia

In "Imperfect Partners," Ambassador Scot Marciel combines a memoir of his 35 years as a Foreign Service Officer with a policy study of U.S. relations with the countries of Southeast Asia, a region proving to be critical economically and politically in the 21st century.
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U.S. President Joe Biden and his counterparts from nine Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries take part in the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in Washington, D.C., on May 13, 2022.
Q&As

Scot Marciel on the State of U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations

“Absent a major crisis, policy toward Southeast Asia tends to be a corollary of policies toward those major powers, most notably China.”
Scot Marciel on the State of U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations
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Myanmar nationals hold a sign that reads "Save Myanmar" in front of the United Nations on March 04, 2021 in Bangkok, Thailand.
Myanmar nationals hold a sign that reads "Save Myanmar" in front of the United Nations on March 04, 2021 in Bangkok, Thailand.
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Scot Marciel says Washington should focus on engaging with the region rather than trying to counter Chinese influence.

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Today’s geopolitical climate has created new and dangerous challenges for America’s defense and the support of democracy and freedom worldwide. These challenges demand a reexamination of the U.S. defense budget to ensure that America’s forces retain the capabilities to defend the nation and deter aggression abroad. The expert authors of the new volume Defense Budgeting for a Safer World (Hoover Institution Press) review the significant areas of debate in the U.S. defense budget and provide recommendations for aligning it with new global realities. Chief among these new realities are China’s modernized military and the nation’s objectives in the South China Sea and for reunification with Taiwan, testing U.S. dominance in the world order and raising questions about allies’ security and the U.S. ability to counter threats from the People’s Liberation Army.

In her contribution to the new volume, in a chapter titled “The Military Challenge of the People’s Republic of China,” Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro reviews the last quarter-century of developments in China’s strategy for reunification with Taiwan. Mastro explains that the original shape of that strategy, strengthening ties with Taiwan to persuade the population, “has failed” and now takes the form of belligerent air and sea incursions, increasingly sophisticated military exercises, and official Chinese rhetoric about the inevitability of reunification and the impossibility of Taiwan’s independence has intensified.

China’s military modernization has focused on the ability to prevent a decisive U.S. response, referred to as its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy.
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow

Mastro notes that “China’s military modernization has focused on the ability to prevent a decisive U.S. response, referred to as its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy." The United States, as a non-resident power in the Asia-Pacific, depends on its aircraft carriers to project power in the South China Sea, but these carriers are vulnerable to Chinese ballistic systems. Because it will likely have to operate outside the first island chain — that is, the “barrier” extending from Japan, past Taiwan and the Philippines, to maritime and peninsular Southeast Asia — the U.S. military depends on “enablers” to accomplish its missions, like aerial refueling and satellites for cyber capabilities. These assets are likewise vulnerable to Chinese disruption/attack, as are U.S. forward bases in Asia, such as Okinawa.

Mastro’s recommendations to mitigate current U.S. weaknesses to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan include "more access, basing, and overflight," "more mass on targets," and "leveraging partners." While Chinese military power has not surpassed that of the United States, Mastro warns that if U.S. deterrence is not maintained and improved, Chinese leadership may become confident enough to move against Taiwan, resulting in a war with the United States. On the other hand, she assesses that the needed deterrence is possible if the proper steps are taken now.

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U.S. Seaman Xi Chan stands lookout on the flight deck as the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) transits the Taiwan Strait during routine underway operations.
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This Is What America Is Getting Wrong About China and Taiwan

For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.
This Is What America Is Getting Wrong About China and Taiwan
A pair of Kawasaki P-3, part of Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force
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The Cost of the "Taiwan Contingency" and Japan's Preparedness

The ultimate choice that must be made.
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Michael McFaul, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Ken Jimbo, Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Larry Diamond, and Francis Fukuyama speaking at the Yomiuri Conference, Tokyo.
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Stanford Experts Explore the Roles of Taiwan and Ukraine in Countering Autocratic Challenges to Democracy

At the Yomiuri International Conference, Freeman Spogli Institute scholars Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Michael McFaul, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui examined lessons from the war in Ukraine, the risks of a crisis over Taiwan, and the impacts of both geopolitical flashpoints for defending democracy and for a coordinated approach to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
Stanford Experts Explore the Roles of Taiwan and Ukraine in Countering Autocratic Challenges to Democracy
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An F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned to the “Golden Dragons” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 192 launches off the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), Jan. 23, 2022. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Megan Alexander
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With contributions from military, government, and academic experts, a new volume explores what changes will be necessary in the U.S. military budget to keep the nation secure in a new geopolitical environment. A chapter by Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro focuses on how to update military spending to enhance U.S. capability to deter Chinese ambitions in Taiwan and beyond.

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Cover of the book "Defense Budgeting for a Safer World," showing a helicopter highlighted against the setting sun.

The authors of Defense Budgeting for a Safer World review the significant areas of debate in the U.S. defense budget and provide their expert suggestions for aligning it with new global realities.

One of those new realities is a modernized Chinese military with dramatically increased funding. It raises questions with U.S. allies about their own security and the U.S. ability to counter threats from the People’s Liberation Army, including the possibility of forced reunification with Taiwan.

In chapter 2 of the book, “The Military Challenge of the People’s Republic of China,” Oriana Skylar Mastro focuses on this threat. She first reviews the last quarter-century of developments in China’s strategy for reunification with Taiwan. This plan has evolved from strengthening ties to belligerent air and sea incursions and increasingly sophisticated military exercises. At the same time, Xi Jinping has stepped up rhetoric about the inevitability of reunification and the unacceptability of an independent Taiwan.  

The United States has significant weaknesses in the face of a Chinese anti-access/area denial strategy, primarily due to the United States not being a resident power in the Asia-Pacific but also the vulnerability of U.S. aircraft carriers to Chinese ballistic systems. Because it will likely have to operate outside the first island chain, the U.S. military depends on “enablers” to accomplish its missions, like aerial refueling and satellites for cyber capabilities. These assets are vulnerable to Chinese disruption/attack.

Mastro’s recommendations to mitigate current U.S. weaknesses to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan include expanding the number of agreements to base in countries around the Asia-Pacific, increasing stockpiles of munitions effective against naval vessels, and strengthening partnerships and allies in the region.

While Chinese military power has not surpassed that of the United States, Mastro warns that if U.S. deterrence is not maintained and improved, Chinese leadership may become confident enough to move against Taiwan, resulting in a war with the United States.

 

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A chapter in Defense Budgeting for a Safer World: The Experts Speak, edited by Michael J. Boskin, John Rader, and Kiran Sridhar.

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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Hoover Institution Press
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Shorenstein APARC's annual report for the academic year 2022-23 is now available.

Learn about the research, publications, and events produced by the Center and its programs over the last academic year. Read the feature sections, which look at Shorenstein APARC's 40th-anniversary celebration and its conference series examining the shape of Asia in 2030; learn about the research our postdoctoral fellows engaged in; and catch up on the Center's policy work, education initiatives, publications, and policy outreach. Download your copy or read below:

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Flyer for the seminar "Debt Trap Diplomacy: BRI’s Ultimate Aim? Or an Unfortunate Media Fabrication?"

Within the discourse surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the concept of debt trap diplomacy has garnered significant attention. Critics argue that the BRI is a cunning strategy to ensnare nations in debt and exert control, while proponents maintain that such claims are distorted by media sensationalism. In this session, we dissect the origins, evidence, and consequences of debt trap diplomacy allegations, aiming to uncover whether they reflect a genuine strategy or an exaggerated narrative. Join us for a nuanced exploration of this pivotal aspect of the BRI conversation.


Dr. Deborah Brautigam is the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of Political Economy and Director of the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Her most recent books include The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (OUP, 2010) and Will Africa Feed China? (OUP, 2015). Before joining SAIS in 2012, she taught at Columbia University and American University. Dr. Bräutigam’s teaching and research focus on international development strategies, governance, and foreign aid. She has twice won the Fulbright research award and is a recipient of fellowships from the Council on Foreign Relations, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and research grants from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the UK Centre for Economic Policy and Research (CEPR). She has served as a consultant for Transparency International, the United Nations, the World Bank, DFID, GIZ, DANIDA, the African Development Bank, and USAID, and has provided commentary to the Financial Times, the New York Times, the Guardian, CNN, NPR, Al-Jazeera, VOA, CCTV, and MSNBC. Dr. Bräutigam has been a visiting scholar at the World Bank, a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and advised more than a dozen governments on China-Africa relations. Her PhD is from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a faculty member of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). He is also Director of Stanford's Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, and a professor (by courtesy) of Political Science. Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues in development and international politics. His 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His most recent book, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, was published in Sept. 2018. His latest book, Liberalism and Its Discontents, was published in May 2022. Francis Fukuyama received his B.A. from Cornell University in classics, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, and of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State. From 1996-2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and from 2001-2010 he was Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He served as a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 2001-2004. Dr. Fukuyama holds honorary doctorates from Connecticut College, Doane College, Doshisha University (Japan), Kansai University (Japan), Aarhus University (Denmark), and the Pardee Rand Graduate School. He is a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and at the Center for Global Development. He is also a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rand Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Pardee Rand Graduate School and the Volcker Alliance, and a member of the American Political Science Association and the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Fukuyama is married to Laura Holmgren and has three children.

Michael Bennon is a Research Scholar at CDDRL for the Global Infrastructure Policy Research Initiative. Michael's research interests include infrastructure policy, project finance, public-private partnerships and institutional design in the infrastructure sector. Michael also teaches Global Project Finance to graduate students at Stanford. Prior to Stanford, Michael served as a Captain in the US Army and US Army Corps of Engineers for five years, leading Engineer units, managing projects, and planning for infrastructure development in the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan and Thailand.
 

Moderator:

Jean C. Oi is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the Department of Political Science and a Senior Fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. A Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan, she directs the China Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and is the Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University. She also is the current President of the Association for Asian Studies.

Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics at Stanford University

Philippines Room, Encina Hall 3rd floor, Room C330
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Dr. Deborah Brautigam, Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of Political Economy and Director of the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow, FSI; Director, Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy
Michael Bennon, Research Scholar & Program Manager, Global Infrastructure Policy Research Initiative (CDDRL)
Panel Discussions
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AIIB's Place in the BRI: Myths and Realities

As the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) continues to shape global connectivity, the role of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) within this expansive framework often sparks debate. In this session, we delve into a comprehensive analysis of the AIIB's actual contributions, dispelling myths and shedding light on its genuine impact within the context of the BRI.

Speakers:

Maria Adele Carrai is an Assistant Professor of Global China Studies at NYU Shanghai. Her research explores the history of international law in East Asia and investigates how China’s rise as a global power shapes norms and redefines the international distribution of power. She co-leads the Research Initiative 'Mapping Global China,' and is the author of Sovereignty in China: A Geneology of a Concept since 1840 (CUP 2019) and co-editor of The China Questions 2 - Critical Insights into US-China Relations (HUP 2022). Before joining NYU-Shanghai, she was a recipient of a three-year Marie-Curie fellowship at KU Leuven. She was also a Fellow at the Italian Academy of Columbia University, Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program, Max Weber Program of the European University Institute of Florence, and New York University Law School.

Rodrigo Salvado is a Director General at the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Salvado manages the Operational Partnership Department, which administers AIIB’s Special Funds resources. He also manages AIIB’s engagement with global and regional coordination mechanisms and partners to build relationships and mobilize additional resources for the Bank’s investment operations. Before joining AIIB in August 2022, he was Deputy Director, International Development Finance for the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, where he was in charge of building strategic partnerships and setting up innovative financing mechanisms to mobilize public and private resources toward the Sustainable Development Goals. Previously, he worked for the African Development Bank Group where he was in charge of the Performance Based Allocation System of the African Development Fund and the coordination of the Annual Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. He also worked as a policy analyst for the Center for International Development at Harvard University and as a senior financial officer at the Central American Bank for Economic Integration in Honduras. Rodrigo holds a master’s degree in public administration in International Development from Harvard Kennedy School of Government, a master’s degree in economics from the Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros in Madrid, and a bachelor’s degree of Science in Economics from the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in Argentina. He is from Italy and Argentina.

Moderator:

Jean C. Oi is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the Department of Political Science and a Senior Fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. A Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan, she directs the China Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and is the Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University. She also is the current President of the Association for Asian Studies.

Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics at Stanford University

Philippines Room, Encina Hall 3rd floor, Room C330
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

Maria Adele Carrai, Assistant Professor of Global China Studies, New York University - Shanghai
Rodrigo Salvado, Director General, Operational Partnership Department, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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This commentary originally appeared in The New York Times.


For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

That equilibrium has been upset. China is building up and flexing its military power; hostile rhetoric emanates from both Beijing and Washington. War seems likelier each day.

It’s not too late to restore the kind of balance that helped to keep the peace for decades, but it will require taking steps to ease China’s concerns. This will be difficult because of Chinese intransigence and the overheated atmosphere prevailing in Washington. But it is worth the political risk if it prevents war.

Deterrence came in the form of the implied use of U.S. military force to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Reassurance was provided by the understanding that the United States would not intrude on decisions regarding Taiwan’s eventual political status.

The United States and its regional allies must continue to create a robust military deterrence. But U.S. leaders and politicians also need to keep in mind the power of reassurance, try to understand China’s deep sensitivities about Taiwan and should recommit — clearly and unequivocally — to the idea that only China and Taiwan can work out their political differences, a stance that remains official U.S. policy.

During the Cold War, Beijing and Washington signed a series of communiqués related to Taiwan. One of them said the United States “reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” This and other wording was deliberately ambiguous, but it was accepted by all sides as a commitment to avoid rocking the boat. China still views this arrangement as binding.

To be clear, it was China that began rocking the boat first.

Since 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected president of Taiwan (succeeding a more China-friendly administration), Xi Jinping has repeatedly brandished China’s military power with large-scale military exercises and other pressure tactics apparently meant to discourage independence sentiment on Taiwan.

U.S. political figures have rightly responded with rhetorical support for democratic Taiwan, by supplying it with weapons and by strengthening the U.S. military presence in the region. But the American reaction is also pouring fuel on the fire.

Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow

I have worked on U.S. defense strategy in various military roles for more than a decade. I recently traveled to Beijing, where I met with Chinese government and military officials, leading academics and experts from Communist Party-affiliated think tanks. During these talks it was clear that Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity and toward supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence.

They have plenty of evidence to point to.

In December 2016, Donald Trump became the first U.S. president or president-elect since the normalization of China-U.S. relations in 1979 to speak directly with a Taiwanese leader, when Ms. Tsai called to congratulate him on his election victory. President Biden has, on four occasions, contradicted the U.S. policy of ambiguity by saying we would support Taiwan militarily if China attacked. The number of U.S. Congress members visiting Taiwan — which China views as overt support for the island’s independence — reached a decade high last year, including an August 2022 trip by Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House at the time and the highest-ranking U.S. official travel to Taiwan since the 1990s. That has continued this year: In June a nine-member congressional delegation, the largest in years, arrived in Taipei.

Provocative legislation has not helped. Last year the Taiwan Policy Act, which articulated support for Taiwan’s role in international organizations, was introduced in the Senate, and in July of this year the House passed a similar act. House Republicans introduced a motion in January to recognize Taiwan as an independent country.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow

Actions like these put great pressure on Mr. Xi, who won’t tolerate going down in history as the Chinese leader to have lost Taiwan. That would be seen in Beijing as an existential threat, potentially fueling separatist sentiment in restive regions like Tibet and Xinjiang.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. But if he concludes that the United States has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily. The United States might be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as necessary might be impossible to achieve.

Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose the island’s peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan’s fate is up to Taipei and Beijing. It would mean moving away from attempts to create international space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei’s diplomatic partners. The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.

There would doubtless be blowback in Washington and Taipei, and Mr. Xi may already have made up his mind to seize Taiwan, regardless of the U.S. stance. But a politically neutral position on Taiwan is what the United States has followed for decades. Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and George H.W. and George W. Bush advocated peaceful dialogue between Taipei and Beijing to resolve their differences.

There also are longer-term repercussions to consider: If the combination of deterrence and reassurance fails and China attacks Taiwan, it will set a precedent in which Chinese leaders kill and destroy to achieve their goals. But if a pathway remains for China to eventually convince Taiwan’s people — through inducements or pressure — that it is in their interest to peacefully unify, then that may be a China that we can live with.

In the best-case scenario, the United States and China would reach a high-level agreement, a new communiqué, in which Washington reiterates its longstanding political neutrality and China commits to dialing back its military threats. This would avert war while giving China political space to work toward peaceful unification. That might mean using its clout to isolate Taiwan and eventually convince the island’s people that it should strike a deal with Beijing. But it isn’t Washington’s place to prevent the unification of the two sides — only to ensure that doesn’t happen through military force or coercion.

A war between the United States and China over Taiwan could be the most brutal since World War II. As politically difficult as it may be, U.S. leaders have a duty to try to prevent conflict, and that means speaking more softly but carrying a big stick.

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For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

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