The Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL) has received two grants to offer guidance for more effective U.S. foreign policy strategies in Asia and propose structural reforms that propel the region toward growth, innovation, and democratic resilience. The first grant, from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), supports SNAPL's policy engagements with stakeholders in Washington, D.C., forthcoming this September. The second grant, from Stanford Global Studies, funds a series of SNAPL-hosted research workshops throughout the 2024-25 academic year.

Both funded initiatives underscore SNAPL's commitment to generating evidence-based policy recommendations and promoting transnational collaboration with academic and policy institutions to advance the future prosperity of Asia and U.S.-Asia relations.

Housed at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), SNAPL is led by Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, a senior fellow at FSI, and the director of APARC and the Korea Program. The lab’s mission is to address emergent social, cultural, economic, and political challenges facing Asia-Pacific countries and guide effective U.S. Asia policies through interdisciplinary, comparative research and collaboration with academic and policy research institutions in Asia and the United States.  

“We are grateful to FSI and Stanford Global Studies for supporting SNAPL's interdisciplinary, policy-relevant research,” says Shin. “The two grants provide a tremendous boost as we work to contribute evidence-based recommendations to advance a more nuanced understanding of Asia's role in global affairs and informed new directions for U.S. Asia policies.”

Policy Considerations for U.S.-China and U.S.-Asia Relations

With a grant from FSI to support policy engagement, SNAPL team members will share research findings from several of the lab’s flagship projects. The SNAPL team — including Shin, Research Fellow Xinru Ma, and Postdoctoral Fellows Gidong Kim and Junki Nakahara — will travel to Washington, D.C. in September 2024 to present these findings at forums and meetings with academic and policy communities. The trip includes a joint symposium with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a presentation at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, and meetings with think tanks and Congress members.

Three core projects the team will share guide U.S. policies in Asia, particularly toward China. The first project challenges many pundits’ framing of the U.S.-China competition as a “new Cold War.” In contrast to this narrative, a recent SNAPL study reveals that contemporary U.S.-China relations are markedly different from the U.S.-Soviet Cold War dynamics. “Our analysis of over 41,000 Congressional speeches spanning 36 years suggests that current U.S. discourses on China mirror those on the past economic competition with Japan rather than the ideological or military conflicts with the USSR in the Cold War era,” says Ma. “Applying Cold War analogies to today's geopolitical landscape would thus misguide efforts to navigate current U.S.-China tensions.”

The research findings from a second SNAPL study offer a better understanding of how U.S. alliance relationships and U.S.-China tensions shape public attitudes toward China in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, another study challenges the conventional wisdom that democracy promotion gives the U.S. a competitive edge in its foreign policy over China. “Our research indicates that liberal values do not serve as a key lens through which Asia-Pacific citizens view recent geopolitical developments,” notes Kim. “The United States should therefore pivot from focusing on liberal rhetoric to emphasizing its role in promoting shared benefits with Asia-Pacific citizens in economic, trade, and military security areas.”

These studies are part of SNAPL’s U.S.-Asia Relations research track.

Racism in Global Context

At George Washington University, the SNAPL team will discuss findings from a project the lab explores as part of another research track, Nationalism and Racism. Recognizing that racism is a global problem with diverse roots and manifestations, this research track examines how nationalism and racism intertwine to create forms of exclusion and marginalization in Asia and provides policy recommendations to advance more inclusive societies in the region and beyond.

At this discussion, to be hosted by the Elliott School of International Affairs’ Sigur Center for Asian Studies, the team will present findings from a study that analyzes how 16 Northeast, Southeast, and South Asian nations discuss and justify their positions on race and racial discrimination. “Our study reveals various forms of racism ‘denial’ rooted in nationalist and religious ideologies, hindering efforts to address ongoing inequalities,” says Nakahara. “Addressing these forms of denial is crucial for promoting critical dialogue on race and racism in Asia and dismantling systems of oppression in the region and elsewhere.”

A Platform for Interdisciplinary Research on Contemporary Asia

SNAPL’s second grant, awarded by Stanford Global Studies, will enable the lab to host throughout the 2024-25 academic year a research workshop series focused on projects from the two research tracks above. Involving scholars and students from Stanford and Asia, the six-part series will foster cross-disciplinary dialogue and share policy-relevant findings grounded in the lab’s research.

The four workshop installments in fall and winter quarters 2024 will be dedicated to the projects discussed above. The spring quarter 2025 workshops will focus on two additional projects: one that examines the discursive construction of U.S. rivals and the respective roles of the media, executive, and legislative branches in this process, and the second that investigates elite articulation of “multiculturalism” in four Asia-Pacific nations.

“These workshops will be invaluable to advancing exchange and partnerships with academics and experts from Stanford and across Asia,” says Shin. “They directly promote SNAPL’s mission to serve as a platform that facilitates trans-Pacific, network-based collaboration."

Visit SNAPL's website for information about the workshops’ schedule and discussion topics.

This opinion piece originally appeared in The New York Times. 

Over the past 15 years, China has expanded its once-minimal military presence in the South China Sea into a significant one. Beijing has laid claim to nearly all of the strategic waterway, a vital shipping lifeline for the global economy that is rich in energy and fishery resources. China has used nonmilitary assets such as its Coast Guard, fishing vessels and maritime militia to bully its neighbors, blockade their ships and build Chinese military bases on disputed islands.

America is partly to blame. It has condemned China’s behavior, but, eager to avoid escalation, has consistently refrained from standing up militarily, which has only further emboldened Beijing. A new approach is needed. The United States must take real action to strengthen alliances and confront China before it eventually takes control of this hugely important body of water without firing a shot. 

Like any unchallenged bully, China has become increasingly aggressive. Last month, Chinese Coast Guard personnel attacked a Philippine supply vessel with axes and other crude weapons — Manila says a Filipino sailor and several others were injured — in one of the worst acts of violence between China and its rivals in the South China Sea in years. The incident took place near the Sierra Madre, a rusting World War II-era ship that the Philippines had beached 25 years ago at Second Thomas Shoal to assert its territorial claim. The shoal lies about 120 miles off the Philippine island of Palawan and is well within the nation’s exclusive economic zone.

China also had past territorial confrontations in the South China Sea or other waters on its periphery with Vietnam, the United States, Australia, Japan and Taiwan. In 2012, China took control of the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, and run-ins between China and the Philippines have grown in number and intensity in recent years. In late May, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines warned that any Filipino deaths caused by a “willful act” by a foreign force in the South China Sea would be “very close to what we define as an act of war.”

Concern has grown in Manila, Beijing and Washington that tensions in the South China Sea — perhaps even more than Taiwan — could trigger a conflict with China. These fears are overblown. I study Chinese military strength and strategy, and I’m convinced that if the United States were to take a more assertive stance in the South China Sea, Beijing would be likely to back down to avoid a war it knows it would lose.

China may enjoy military advantages in a potential conflict with Taiwan, which is just off the mainland. But its position is less secure in the South China Sea. Over the past 15 years China has built more than two dozen military outposts on disputed islands. Among the largest — at Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef — there are air strips, fighter jets, radar systems, and laser and jamming equipment. But so far China lacks sufficient antiaircraft and anti-ship missile systems in the region to deny U.S. forces the ability to operate, which leaves the Chinese bases vulnerable to air and naval bombardment.

And the South China Sea is vast — about half the size of the continental United States. The Sierra Madre is around 800 miles from the Chinese mainland. A conflict there would require the People’s Liberation Army to mount joint air and naval resupply operations and to refuel its fighters across great distances — something it has never done and is not equipped for.

If the Philippines is in the fight, treaty obligations would trigger the participation of the United States, which would have access to nine Philippine air and naval bases, greatly enhancing its already considerable ability to project military power in the region. China does have “carrier-killer” ballistic missiles based on its mainland. But U.S. carriers could still send fighters into parts of the South China Sea from outside the range of those missiles. In conjunction with land-based fighters operating from the Philippines, the United States could gain crucial air superiority over a Chinese surface fleet.

China has spent huge sums on its aircraft carrier program and has two in operation, with two more in development. But those still cannot rival the number or capabilities of nuclear-powered U.S. carriers, which are larger, support more aircraft and need to refuel only about every 20 years. China’s carriers need to be refueled about every six days. And learning how to effectively conduct carrier operations takes time; the Chinese have only just begun.

It’s telling that China has been careful to use Coast Guard and civilian vessels in its encounters with neighbors rather than hard military assets — the latter would signal an escalation that Beijing is not yet willing to embark on.

But there is another very good reason China is unlikely to risk war with the United States: It doesn’t need to. Its brinkmanship and use of nonmilitary assets to intimidate its Asian neighbors has been more than enough to take China from almost no military presence in the South China Sea in the late 2000s to a significant force today.

America should call China’s bluff and press its military advantage. This could include escorting Philippine resupply vessels headed to Second Thomas Shoal or even conducting some supply missions itself or with allies like Australia and Japan. This would send China the powerful message that its intimidation will no longer go unchallenged, while allowing Manila to remain visibly in the lead but part of a more enduring coalition. To save face for China, Washington could present operations like these as exercises or training to minimize pressure on Beijing to respond.

Manila is a strategically vital player in America’s regional competition with China. The United States and the Philippines should strengthen their alliance to allow for more U.S. bases in the Philippines and a stronger U.S. commitment to help defend against Chinese incursions into Philippine waters. Closer relations could also make it easier for the United States to resupply Taiwan from Philippine bases during a conflict with China and open the door for enhanced military cooperation with other South China Sea nations, whose fear of an unrestrained Beijing may be deterring them from taking that step. If China determines that its provocations are likely to draw in the United States, it might begin to moderate its behavior .

Of course, anything is possible — Beijing may respond with a full-on military escalation, a daunting prospect that should not be taken lightly. But that risk is low for a Chinese military whose own doctrine is to avoid any war in which victory is not ensured.

Neither U.S. option — standing up to China or backing down — is attractive. But unless the United States asserts itself, China will continue chipping away with its tactics of bluster and intimidation until its military presence in the South China Sea becomes so dominant that it no longer fears war.

The United States can re-establish a favorable balance of power, but it must act now.

The Indo-Pacific, the world’s fastest-growing region in the global economy, faces complex geopolitical and geo-economic risks. Amid Russia’s unrelenting war in Ukraine and its strengthening ties with a bellicose North Korea, China continues to exert its power through economic coercion and diplomatic pressures. Meanwhile, Asia's established and aspiring democracies must rise to the challenge of preventing further democratic decline and revitalizing their institutions. These trends dominated the agenda at the recent Nikkei Forum, The Liberal International Order in the Indo-Pacific.

Cohosted by Shorenstein APARC, the Keio Center for Strategy at the Keio University Global Research Institute, and Nikkei Inc., the forum was held on June 24, 2024, at Keio University and featured Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) and Keio experts. Its first session, moderated by Akio Fujii, executive chair of the editorial board at Nikkei Inc., included panelists Oriana Skylar Mastro, FSI center fellow at APARC, and Michael McFaul, the director of FSI. They examined the geopolitical effects of the war in Ukraine, deterrence and provocation in Taiwan, and their implications for security in the Indo-Pacific. The second session, moderated by Nikkei commentator Hiroyuki Akita, included Gi-Wook Shin, the director of APARC and director of the Korea Program, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the deputy director of APARC and director of the Japan Program. Panelists considered the connectivity of European and Indo-Pacific security, the rise of authoritarianism and global populism, international partnerships, and various ongoing efforts to protect the liberal international order in the Indo-Pacific. The session recordings in English and Japanese are available on the Nikkei Global Events YouTube channel. 

Conflict, Deterrence, and Provocation

Opening the first session, McFaul underscored the broader geopolitical implications of the invasion of Ukraine. Emphasizing the significance of Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent visit to North Korea, he highlighted the intertwined nature of European and Asian security. McFaul argued against the notion that global security should solely focus on China, stressing that Putin's actions demonstrate a critical link between European security concerns and global stability.

McFaul offered a mixed assessment of the war in Ukraine. He praised the international community's response in providing military support and economic aid to Ukraine, stating, “I have been mostly impressed with how the liberal free world, including Japan, came together to provide weapons first and foremost, to provide economic assistance secondarily, and to put in place sanctions [agsint Russia].” Yet he also criticized delays in Western responses, attributing them partly to internal political dynamics, including actions taken during the Trump administration.

McFaul expressed concern that Russian defensive positions now hinder prospects for a breakthrough on the Ukrainian side, with future developments tied to the outcome of the next U.S. presidential election. He underscored the importance of democratic nations organizing against autocratic regimes, framing the conflict in Ukraine as a critical battleground for liberal democratic values amidst global power struggles. McFaul described that “what I see, tragically, is the breakdown of the liberal International order. We're going back to an earlier period where there was not one order, but two, and maybe many orders, and one of those divisions is between autocrats and democrats.”

Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro addressed the moderator's query about Ukraine’s implications for East Asia by delving into the complexities of deterrence and provocation in relations with China. She highlighted three main concerns: the blurred distinction between actions that deter China versus those that provoke it, the conflicting priorities of reassuring allies versus deterring adversaries post-Ukraine, and the delicate balance between showcasing military capabilities and demonstrating resolve. Mastro argued that while military build-up might deter China, political gestures, such as enhancing Taiwan's international stature, could provoke tensions.

She emphasized the challenges in aligning U.S. and Japanese strategies, especially regarding Taiwan, where differing interpretations of deterrence and provocation persist. “Attempts to signal resolve can be much more provocative than attempts to demonstrate capabilities [...] It seems that the United States and Japan at least have to be on the same page about what is reassuring versus what deters China, what deters China versus what provokes China, and what is more important, capabilities or resolve,” she explained

Mastro stressed the importance of nuanced policy decisions considering how actions perceived as deterrence in one context might provoke, in another, thus impacting regional stability. “I prefer for the United States to speak softly and carry a big stick, meaning we have a lot of capability but we should stop talking about it so much,” she said. She underscored the U.S. and Japan must coordinate closely on strategic messaging to ensure a cohesive approach to managing China's responses and maintaining regional security.

FSI and APARC scholars meet with Yoshimasa Hayashi.

During their visit to Tokyo, the Stanford delegation met with Japanese government officials, including Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi.

Michael McFaul gave an interview to the Japan Broadcasting Corporation's (NHK) prime-time news show News 7, which you can view here >

Manifold Pressures on Liberal Democracy

During the second panel, Gi-Wook Shin discussed the contemporary challenges facing liberal democracy, citing instances of foreign influence from authoritarian states like Russia and China. He began with a personal anecdote from Mongolia, where a friend running for parliament reported intimidation by authorities allegedly supported by Russia. Shin drew parallels to previous instances of interference, such as Russia's involvement in the 2016 U.S. election and China's actions in Taiwan and Korea.

In contrast to the American and British leadership against fascism and communism in the 1930s and 1940s, Shin described the current crisis in global leadership to safeguard liberal values. He questioned whether any country could now step up to combat rising authoritarianism, citing Modi’s India and alliances forming between leaders like Putin, Kim Jong-Un, and Xi Jinping. “I don't think I can say with confidence that the U.S. can defend liberal democracy, I don't see any leader in Europe either, and I don't see anyone in Asia,” he lamented.

He called for strategies to restore and strengthen global leadership in promoting and defending liberal democracy against mounting authoritarian challenges from China, Russia, and others.

In his remarks, Kiyoteru Tsutsui addressed these global challenges to democracy and emphasized Japan's role in safeguarding it. Tsutsui noted Japan's relatively stable democratic environment compared to nations experiencing greater political divisions. Despite recent economic fluctuations in the country,, “Japanese democracy is functioning quite well,” he argued. “Apart from that, Japanese society is peaceful, safe, and stable. Although the economic growth rate is low, people's discontent is not gushing out and they can live quite a good life.”

Tsutsui emphasized Japan's economic and diplomatic contributions to promoting democracy, citing its trusted role in assisting Asian countries through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JAICA). He suggested Japan could assert its influence not only through traditional democracy promotion but also by establishing standards in areas like infrastructure and public health. “If we look at the global rankings, Japan has quite a big influence.” He underscored the importance of Japan's discreet but impactful diplomacy in upholding democratic values globally, including its involvement in initiatives like the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, The Quad, and CPTPP. Through practical actions and international cooperation, he said, Japan  demonstrates its commitment to democratic values and counters global trends of democratic decline. Throughout the forum, the panelists agreed that the Indo-Pacific remains at the center of the global struggle between democracy and autocracy. They emphasized the need for collaborative action to bolster democratic institutions worldwide and urged nations to unite quickly to prevent further escalation of tensions in the region and beyond.