In 2008, the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) published the fourth installment in its effort to identify “megatrends” likely to shape world events a decade or more into the future. Shorenstein APARC Fellow and China expert Thomas Fingar, the then chairman of the NIC, oversaw that report, Global Trends 2025. The unclassified report uses scenarios to illustrate some of the ways in which the factors driving world events – from climate change to demographic decline to changing geopolitical powers – may interact to generate challenges and opportunities for future decisionmakers. One of these scenarios is the emergence of a global pandemic that bears a chilling resemblance to COVID-19.

We sat down with Fingar for an online conversation about the NIC report and its pandemic scenario, the government action it spurred, the United States’ failed initial response to the COVID-19 outbreak, and the implications of the current crisis for U.S.-China relations. Watch:

Twelve years after its publication, the NIC’s "Potential Emergence of a Global Pandemic" scenario (p. 75) has proven to be woefully accurate:

“The emergence of a novel, highly transmissible, and virulent human respiratory illness for which there are no adequate countermeasures could initiate a global pandemic. If a pandemic disease emerges by 2025, […] it probably will first occur in an area marked by high population density and close association between humans and animals, such as many areas of China and Southeast Asia […] Slow public health response would delay the realization that a highly transmissible pathogen had emerged […] Despite limits imposed on international travel, travelers with mild symptoms or who were asymptomatic could carry the disease to other continents. Waves of new cases would occur every few months. The absence of an effective vaccine and near-universal lack of immunity would render populations vulnerable to infection.”

[To get more stories like this delivered to your inbox sign up for our newsletters]

It was not a prediction, recalls Fingar, but rather an attempt to urge policymakers to think “beyond tomorrow,” past the end of their administration, and to stimulate strategic thinking about how to reinforce positive trends and change or ameliorate negative ones. If the report and its global pandemic scenario are precise, he notes, it is because the NIC’s effort involved the best specialists within the U.S. intelligence community and engaged numerous and varied groups of non-U.S. Government experts.

Yet the United States has been unprepared for the COVID-19 pandemic and the crisis is now worsening U.S.-China tensions. To address the crisis, however, argues Fingar, both countries must cooperate in the international fora. “Let that be the way that builds towards a better bilateral relationship.”

What is COVID-19? 
COVID-19 comes from the same family as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), a respiratory illness first identified in southern China in 2003 that killed more than 700 people; and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), which emerged in Saudi Arabia in 2012. Scientists still aren’t sure how humans first became infected with COVID-19, but suspect that the virus arose from bats, Relman said.

“That’s the best guess, simply because all of the most closely related viruses we know of in the world are ‘bat viruses,’” said Relman, who is a senior fellow at FSI and an expert on emerging infectious diseases.

Where Did the Virus Come From?
While many of the first cases of COVID-19 have been linked to the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan, recent data suggests that about half of the earliest cases appear to have no obvious connection to the market.

“Could they have been indirectly connected somehow, or could they too have been exposed through the movement of animals that ended up in the market? These are things that are unknown,” Relman said. 

Meanwhile, there has been speculation that the virus did not originate at the market and was instead created in a laboratory. Relman acknowledged that while he thinks it’s possible that scientists in China could have been studying the virus and let it out by mistake, he doesn’t think that’s what happened in this case.

Why Has COVID-19 Spread So Quickly?
The rapid transmission of the virus likely has to do with how it interacts with the human host. Most likely, it is growing to large numbers in the upper parts of the respiratory tract, and is therefore primed to be transmitted more easily, Relman noted.

“One of the biggest questions is whether people are contagious before they have symptoms,” Relman said. “And that is perhaps the most critical question as to whether this is going to be contained in the very near term or not.” 

What’s Been the Effect on China?
China was much better prepared for this epidemic than it was 17 years ago for SARS, said Eggleston, who is also a senior fellow at FSI and director of the Stanford Asia Health Policy Program. Still, China’s economy and connectivity within the global economy mean that this time around, it’s even more of a crisis, Eggleston said.

Many of the people who have died from the virus were healthcare workers who weren’t properly protected, due to a combination of strained resources and a shortage of testing kits and protective gear, she added. 

How Damaging is COVID-19 Going to Be?
If COVID-19 can be transmitted before people are exhibiting symptoms, it’s much more likely that the virus will spread broadly within China and be passed on to more people in other countries, said Eggleston.

Relman predicted that the number of new cases of the virus will decline over the next few months into the summer, but that it will continue to pop up in certain parts — or “hotspots” — around the world.

“We’re probably looking at a future that now includes the persistence of this virus periodically, especially in winters for the next several years,” he warned.  

STANFORD, CA, April 8, 2020  — Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to announce that journalist and author Tom Wright is the recipient of the 2020 Shorenstein Journalism Award for excellence in coverage of the Asia-Pacific region. Wright, who over the past twenty-five years has worked mainly in South and Southeast Asia, is the coauthor of the New York Times bestseller Billion Dollar Whale, which unravels the story of one of the world's greatest financial scandals involving the multibillion-dollar looting of the Malaysian sovereign wealth fund 1Malaysia Development Bhd (1MDB). The book builds on Wright’s multiyear investigative reporting for the Wall Street Journal, where he most recently served as Asia economics editor. In the coming fall quarter, Wright will receive the award at a ceremony and headline a panel discussion at Stanford.

Wright started his career with Reuters in Indonesia in the 1990s at a time when Gen. Suharto’s military dictatorship was crumbling. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, he joined Dow Jones Newswires in Bangkok, later moving to the Wall Street Journal. He has investigated corruption in Indian companies, the failure of the U.S.’s civilian aid program for Pakistan, and was one of the first journalists to arrive at the scene of the raid in which Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden. His 2013 award-winning series on the Rana Plaza factory disaster in Bangladesh, which killed over 1,000 people, exposed how international garment manufacturers turned a blind eye to safety violations to reduce costs.

In 2015, he began investigations into the 1MDB scandal, one of the largest financial frauds of all time in which bankers at Goldman Sachs helped a young Malaysian financier steal at least $4 billion from Malaysian state fund 1MDB. The three-year investigation revealed the degree to which Western institutions, from Wall Street banks, law firms, auditors, and even Hollywood film companies, ignore malfeasance in the pursuit of profits. Wright’s work sparked investigations by law enforcement and regulators in multiple countries and outrage in Malaysia, where the ruling coalition, after 61 years in power, suffered a landslide defeat in a shocking 2018 election.

“Throughout his career, Tom Wright’s consummate reporting and persistent investigations have repeatedly shone a light on major Asian affairs and the complicity of Western institutions in the affliction of corruption in Asia,” said Gi-Wook Shin, Shorenstein APARC director. “His work embodies an unwavering commitment to the pursuit of truth and to advancing a critical consideration of both Asian and Western societies. We are delighted to recognize him with the Shorenstein Journalism Award.”

Presented annually by APARC, the Shorenstein award, which carries a $10,000 cash prize, honors the legacy of APARC’s benefactor, Mr. Walter H. Shorenstein, and his twin passions for promoting excellence in journalism and understanding of Asia. “We are grateful to the Shorenstein family for its support of our Center and its mission and to the members of the award selection committee for their expertise and service,” noted Shin.

The selection committee for the Shorenstein Journalism Award, which unanimously chose Wright as the 2020 honoree, includes Wendy Cutler, vice president and managing director, Washington, D.C. Office, Asia Society Policy Institute; James Hamilton, Hearst Professor of Communication, chair of the Department of Communication, and director of the Stanford Journalism Program, Stanford University; Raju Narisetti, global publishing director-elect, McKinsey & Company; Philip Pan, weekend editor, former Asia editor, the New York Times; and Prashanth Parameswaran, senior editor, the Diplomat. 

Eighteen journalists have previously received the Shorenstein award, including most recently Maria Ressa, CEO and executive editor of Rappler; Anna Fifield, the Washington Post’s Beijing bureau chief and long-time North Korea watcher; Siddharth Varadarajan, founding editor of the Wire; Ian Johnson, a veteran journalist with a focus on Chinese society, religion, and history; and Yoichi Funabashi, former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun.

Information about the 2020 Shorenstein Journalism Award ceremony and panel discussion featuring Wright will be forthcoming in the fall quarter.

Find out more at aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/events/shorenstein-journalism-award.

Media Contact:

Noa Ronkin
Associate Director for Communications and External Relations
Shorenstein APARC
noa.ronkin@stanford.edu

To support Stanford students working in the area of contemporary Asia, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center is offering up to ten research assistant internships for summer 2020 and up to three predoctoral fellowships for the 2020-21 academic year. The Center will review applications starting April 15 and expects to fill the positions by April 30, 2020. 

Amid the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, students are facing summer internship cancelations and hiring freezes. They are left wondering about the long-term implications of the current crisis for their academic careers and their access to future jobs and valuable work experience.

At Shorenstein APARC, we want to do all we can to support Stanford students. That’s why we are announcing new internship and fellowship opportunities for current students working in the area of contemporary Asia: research assistant internships for the summer quarter of 2020 and predoctoral fellowships for the 2020-21 academic year.

The summer internships are all remote: research assistants will work as telecommuters. Regarding the predoctoral fellowships, we hope we can all have a normal 2020-21 academic year, in which case we expect the fellows to be in residence, but we will reassess the evolving COVID-19 situation closer to the appointment start dates and shift to flexible, online options as needed.

APARC will review applications for both opportunities on a rolling basis starting April 15, 2020. The Center will select up to ten research assistants and up to three predoctoral fellows by April 30, 2020.

Read on to learn more about these offerings and the application requirements, and follow the guidelines below to submit your candidacy.

Summer 2020 APARC Research Assistant Internships

Shorenstein APARC is seeking highly motivated and dedicated undergraduate and graduate students to join our team as paid research assistant interns for the summer quarter of 2020. Research assistants will work with assigned APARC faculty members on projects focused on contemporary Asia, studying varied issues related to the politics, economies, populations, security, foreign policies, and international relations of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

All positions will be for eight weeks starting late June or early July 2020. The hourly pay rate is $17 for undergraduate students, $25 for graduate students.

Research assistant positions are open to current Stanford students only. Undergraduate- and graduate-level students are eligible to apply.

Apply Now

• Complete the application form and submit it along with these two (2) required attachments:
  • CV;
  • A cover letter (up to 1 page).
• Arrange for a letter of recommendation from a faculty to be sent directly to APARC. Please note: the faculty members should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu.

We will consider only complete applications that include all the abovementioned supporting documents.  

2020-21 Shorenstein APARC Predoctoral Fellowships

APARC is inviting applications from current Stanford students for the 2020-21 Shorenstein APARC Predoctoral Fellowship. The fellowship supports predoctoral students working within a broad range of topics related to contemporary Asia. 

Up to three fellowships are available to Ph.D. candidates who have completed all fieldwork and are nearing the completion of their dissertation. The Center will give priority to candidates who are prepared to finish their degree by the end of the 2020-21 academic year.

Shorenstein APARC offers a stipend of $36,075 for the 2020-21 academic year, plus Stanford's Terminal Graduate Registration (TGR) fee for three quarters. We expect fellows to remain in residence at the Center throughout the year and to participate in Center activities.

Apply Now

• Complete the application form and submit it along with these three (3) required attachments:
  • CV;
  • A cover letter including a brief description of your dissertation (up to 5 double-spaced pages);
  • A copy of your transcripts. Transcripts should cover all graduate work and include evidence of recently-completed work.
• Arrange for two (2) letters of recommendation from members of your dissertation committee to be sent directly to Shorenstein APARC. Please note: the faculty/advisors should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu.

We will consider only complete applications that include all the abovementioned supporting documents. 

Technology companies in South Korea helped tackle COVID-19. The U.S. government can incentivize U.S. tech companies do the same.

As a resident of Silicon Valley heading into our second week under the shelter in place order, what surprises me is the sudden low profile of the tech companies that dominate this area. Until just a month ago it seemed like these companies were taking over the world - churning out new products, connecting people online, providing information and news, and in turn driving equity and real estate prices to unprecedented new highs. But as the COVID-19 cases explode in the US, we rarely hear about them. Public health workers are at the frontlines fighting the war against COVID-19, and grocery stores and retailers are stepping up to the challenge of trying to maintain normalcy of life and providing for the people.

I wonder whether Apple is still pre-occupied with the development of the next iteration of the iPhone, and Google with the development for better search algorithms. Wouldn’t today’s tech companies with their vast resources, creative minds, and technical skill be able to help minimize the impact of COVID-19?

Tech companies in South Korea have played an important role in containing the spread of the virus and reducing casualties. Soon after the first COVID-19 case was confirmed within South Korea, at least four tech companies have launched apps that provide detailed information of the movement of all people who tested positive for COVID-19 – from which restaurant the person visited at what time, to the seat number the person sat in which movie theatre.

The information was collected from a variety of sources including smartphone location data and credit card transactions. The names were anonymized but providing such detailed information raised privacy concerns. However, the South Korean government was swift to declare COVID-19 a public health emergency, which ultimately gave the people the right to information for their safety, and companies to use such data. Moreover, the government allowed companies to by-pass traditional regulatory hurdles.

When Seegene, a biotech company in Seoul, used artificial intelligence to develop South Korea’s first COVID-19 test kit, it needed to get government approval for use. The approval process typically can take over a year, but the Korea Center for Disease Control approved it in a week. Though COVID-19 cases surged in South Korea soon after its first case, the aggressive testing policy and the information provided through these apps have helped South Korea to quickly “flatten the curve,” that is, slow the rate of new infections.

So why don’t we see U.S. tech companies developing new technologies and innovation that can help contain the spread of the virus, minimize the impact, and develop strategies that help people cope with the crisis? It’s because such actions would not generate immediate returns to the company. Despite the greater societal benefit of slowing down the spread of the virus, unless there are clear private returns CEOs and shareholders will be unlikely to devote their resources to fighting a virus with so much uncertainty.

In simple economics terms, it’s a classic case of market failure; and the standard remedy in cases of market failure is government intervention. The government needs to provide incentives, either through relaxing regulatory hurdles or by subsidizing research and development, to encourage tech companies to help contain the virus and minimize the impact of COVID-19 on our society. It is not an issue of big vs. small government, but governments creating the right incentives when private firms can’t easily make the right call.

The U.S. has finally taken measures in the manufacturing sector to fight COVID-19. The White House after several days of going back and forth, eventually invoked the Defense Production Act to order GM to produce ventilators. But hospitals around the country also need masks and personal protection equipment. Unlike smaller countries without a strong manufacturing base, the U.S. has the manufacturing capacity to produce these goods, if the will is there. These manufactured goods are essential for our doctors and nurses in helping patients and fighting the virus.

However, we need more innovative approaches, beyond traditional public health approaches, to fight COVID-19 and future pandemics. Tech companies, in addition to pharmaceuticals and biotech companies that are developing vaccines and cures, can play a significant role in fighting pandemics. Tech companies can use information and communication technology (ICT) to inform the public and reduce the spread of diseases, use machine learning to diagnose new diseases, predict future outbreaks and the spread of current outbreaks, and predict when and which resources would be in need in different parts of the country. Furthermore, there may be more innovative ways to tackle the virus that many of us have not yet thought of. The government can induce tech companies to actively take action by offering R&D grants and loans, providing access to critical information and data, and reducing red-tape.

The South Korean government recognized the urgency of the situation and enlisted the help of private tech firms allowing them to do what they do best with minimal red tape and access to the necessary resources. The European Union has recently put out a call for startups that are developing technologies and innovation related to COVID-19 to apply for fast-track funding.

Chinese tech giants like Alibaba and Tencent, potentially through explicit or implicit government directive, have been actively involved in fighting the COVID-19 crisis. Alibaba has deployed an AI algorithm that predicts COVID-19 from lung CT scans. The procedure only takes a few seconds, which not only substantially speeds up diagnosis but also reduces the risk of doctors and nurses being exposed to the virus. Tencent has committed over 1.5 billion Yuan (over 210 million USD) to help fight COVID-19, which will be spent on prevention and control but also on funding companies that are developing new ways to overcome the pandemic and help with the recovery.

People are sacrificing their individual rights and income. Small businesses are closing doors. All this for the good of the greater public. U.S. tech companies, together with the right push from the federal and state governments, should be able to put aside private returns and short-termism for the moment and work towards an innovative approach to mitigating the impact of today’s crisis.

Yong Suk Lee is an Economist at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Deputy Director of the Korea Program at Stanford University.

The Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU), the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), and the APARC China Program jointly hosted a workshop on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in early March. The workshop, held on March 2 and 3, welcomed researchers from around the world with expertise in the Initiative. Unfortunately, because of the rapidly developing health emergency related to the coronavirus, participants from not only China, but also Japan, were prevented from attending. As described by Professor Jean Oi, founding director of SCPKU and the China Program, and Professor Francis Fukuyama, director of CDDRL and the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, who co-chaired the workshop, the meeting aimed to provide a global perspective on the BRI, consolidate knowledge on this opaque topic, and determine the best method and resources for future research.  

The workshop began with presentations from several of the invited guests. Dr. Atif Ansar from the University of Oxford’s Saïd Business School kicked off the first day by describing not only the tremendous opportunity that the BRI presents to developing economies, but also the serious pitfalls that often accompany colossal infrastructure projects. Pointing out the poor returns on investment of mega infrastructure projects, Ansar examined the frequest cost and schedule overruns, random disasters, and environmental degradation that outweigh the minimal benefits that they generally yield. China’s own track record from domestic infrastructure projects does little to mitigate fear of these risks, Ansar claimed. In response, he urged professional management of BRI investments, institutional reforms, and intensified deployment of technology in BRI projects. Dr. Ansar was followed by Dr. Xue Gong of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Dr. Gong’s analysis centered on the extent to which China’s geopolitical motivations influenced its outward foreign direct investments (OFDI). Although her research was still in the early stages, her empirical analysis of China’s OFDI inflows into fifty BRI recipient countries from 2007-2018 nevertheless revealed that geopolitical factors often outweigh economic factors when it comes to China’s OFDI destinations.

Image

Professor Curtis J. Milhaupt and Scholar-in-Residence Jeffrey Ball, both at Stanford Law School, followed with individual presentations on the role of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the BRI and the emissions impact of the BRI on climate change, respectively. Professor Milhaupt  characterized Chinese SOEs as both geopolitical and commercial actors, simultaneously charged with implementing Party policies and attaining corporate profits. Chinese SOEs are major undertakers of significant overseas BRI projects, acting not only as builders but also as investors, partners, and operators. This situation, Milhaupt asserted, carries significant risks for SOEs because these megaprojects often provide dismal returns, have high default rates, and can trigger political backlash in their localities. Milhaupt highlighted the importance of gathering firm-level data on businesses actually engaged in BRI projects to better infer geostrategic, financial, or other motivations. Jeffrey Ball turned the discussion to carbon emissions from BRI projects and presented preliminary findings from his four-country case studies. He concluded that, on aggregate, the emissions impact of the BRI is still “more brown than green.” Twenty-eight percent of global carbon emissions may be accounted for by BRI projects, Ball asserted, underscoring the importance of the BRI to the future of global climate change.

The day concluded with presentations by  Michael Bennon, Managing Director at the Stanford Global Projects Center, and Professor David M. Lampton, Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Bennon first presented findings from two empirical case studies of BRI projects and then went on to describe how the BRI is now practically the “only game in town” for infrastructure funding for developing countries. Lengthy environmental review processes at Western multilateral banks have turned the World Bank, for example, from a lending bank into a “knowledge bank,” he argued. He also highlighted that, in general, economic returns on BRI projects for China are very poor, even though recipient countries may accrue macroeconomic benefits from these projects. Finally, Professor Lampton turned the discussion back to Southeast Asia, where China is currently undertaking massive cross-border high-speed rail projects through eight ASEAN countries. He described how each host country had varying capacity to negotiate against its giant neighbor, and how the sequential implementation of these cross-border rail projects also had varying impacts on the negotiating positions of these host countries. BRI played out differently in each country, in other words, eliciting different reactions, push-backs and negotiated terms.

The second day of the workshop was dedicated to working toward a collaborative approach to future BRI research. The group discussed the key gaps in the existing research, including how to know what China’s true intentions are, how to measure those intentions, who the main players and their interests in both China and the host countries are, and even what the BRI is, exactly. Some cautioned that high-profile projects may not be representative of the whole. Participants brainstormed about existing and future sources of data, and stressed the importance of diversifying studies and seeking empirical evidence.