Economic Affairs
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Adam Liu Poster

The Henan bank protest, the Evergrande crisis, and the ongoing local government debt issue in China all point to one thing: there’s something wrong with the country’s banking system. Beijing needs to better regulate the numerous small banks that are now intimately intertwined with much of China's economic challenges. 

They’re working on it, but there’s no easy solution.

Adam Y. Liu will tell us the origins of the dilemma, the increasing role of small banks in China and local development, and what tradeoffs China will likely have to make to prevent a run-away banking crisis.

Speaker

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Adam Liu Headshot
Adam Y. Liu is assistant professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. His main research interests include Chinese politics and political economy. He is currently working on a book project that explores how central-local politics drove the formation, expansion, and operation of what he calls a "state-owned market" in China's banking sector. The project is based on his dissertation, which won the 2020 BRICS Economic Research Award. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University and was a postdoctoral associate with the Leitner Program in International and Comparative Political Economy at Yale University. 

Jean C. Oi

Virtual event via Zoom

Adam Y. Liu
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Portraits of Myung Hwan Yu and Gi-Wook Shin with text about Oct 18 webinar on the implications of US-China competition for South Korea

This event is part of APARC’s 2022 Fall webinar seriesAsian Perspectives on the US-China Competition.

With rising Sino-U.S. tensions, South Korea has increasingly been in a difficult position to choose policy decisions that may tilt it towards one hegemon or the other. The new Yoon Administration signaled its strengthened alliance with the U.S. by attending the NATO summit and joining the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), but there are concerns that such actions run the risks of potential economic backlash from China. With increasing tensions between the U.S. and China, what diplomatic and economic options are left for South Korea? How does the domestic political environment such as the rise of anti-China sentiments and the return of pro-alliance conservatives back to power influence South Korea’s outlook on international affairs? Former South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung Hwan, in conversation with Professor Gi-Wook Shin, will discuss the South Korean perspective on the rising U.S.-China rivalry.

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Myung Hwan Yu, former foreign minister of South Korea

 Myung Hwan Yu, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of South Korea, also served as Ambassador to Israel, Japan and Philippines, and as Minister of the Permanent Mission to UN. His experience extends across a broad range of issues in international relations including trade, security and nuclear negotiations with North Korea. After his retirement from the foreign ministry, Ambassador Yu was board chairman of the Sejong University in Seoul, visiting scholar in the Korea Program at APARC; and he is currently a senior advisor at Kim & Chang Law Office.

This event is made possible by generous support from the Korea Foundation and other friends of the Korea Program.

Gi-Wook Shin

Via Zoom: Register at https://bit.ly/3LjfeMW

Myung Hwan Yu <i>former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of South Korea</i>
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APARC Predoctoral Fellow, 2022-23
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Sally Zhang joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as the 2022-2023 APARC Predoctoral Fellow. She is currently a doctoral candidate in the Department of Economics at Stanford University. Her dissertation, "Hidden in Plain Sight: Asymmetric Information and Hidden Income within the Household," focuses on contemporary Indonesia.

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Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E301
Stanford,  CA  94305-6055

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Visiting Scholar at APARC, 2022-23
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Professor Nirvikar Singh joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as a Visiting Scholar for the 2022-2023 academic year. Singh serves as a Distinguished Professor in Economics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. While at APARC, he researched the political economic dynamics of India and the role of innovation in driving economic growth, especially in Asia.

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Cover of The China Quarterly, vol. 251.
The political connection between the state and firms in the context of China's corporate restructuring has been little explored. Using the clientelist framework and unpacking the incentives of both firms and the state, we analyse political connections as repeated patron–client exchanges where the politically connected firms can help the state fulfil its revenue imperative, serving as a failsafe for local authorities to ensure that upper-level tax quotas are met.

Leveraging original surveys of the same Chinese firms over an 11-year period and the variations in their post-restructuring board composition, we find that restructured state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with political connections pay more tax than their assessed amount, independent of profits, in exchange for more preferential access to key inputs and policy opportunities controlled by the state.

Examining taxes rather than profits also offers a new interpretation for why China continues to favour its remaining SOEs even when they are less profitable.

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Jean C. Oi
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Event Banner card for APARC Japan Program webinar on May 9: "The New Landscape of Economic Security and the U.S. - Japan Alliance, featuring headshot photos (from left to right) of Kazuto Suzuki, Mireya Solís, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui

May 9, 5:00 p.m - 6:30 p.m. PT / May 10, 9:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m. JT

Economic security has emerged as a key foreign policy issue in Japan in recent years. Arguably one of the most active players in this field, the Japanese government has developed a comprehensive policy on economic security that seeks to protect its economy from the vagaries of geopolitical disruptions. Recent legislative efforts have centered around supply chain risks, critical infrastructure, and sensitive technologies and patents. Prompted by risks associated with business with China and intensified further by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, concerns about economic security require governments and businesses to adjust their reliance on market mechanisms in international trade and compel them to formulate new policies and frameworks that would address these concerns. Featuring two leading experts on economic security and trade in Japan and the United States, this panel will discuss what those new policies might look like and what roles the US-Japan alliance should play in building resilient economic frameworks that would mitigate the economic damages of geopolitical disruptions.

Panelists
 

 

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Photo portrait of Kazuto Suzuki

Kazuto Suzuki is a Professor of Science and Technology Policy at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo, Japan, and senior fellow of Asia Pacific Initiative (API), an independent policy think tank. He graduated from the Department of International Relations at Ritsumeikan University and received a Ph.D. from Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex, England. He has worked in the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique in Paris, France, as an assistant researcher, Associate Professor at the University of Tsukuba from 2000 to 2008, and served as a Professor of International Politics at Hokkaido University until 2020. He served as an expert in the Panel of Experts for the Iranian Sanction Committee under the United Nations Security Council from 2013 to July 2015. 

Suzuki currently serves as the President of the Japan Association of International Security and Trade. His research focuses on the conjunction of science & technology and international relations; subjects including space policy, non-proliferation, export control, and sanctions.  His recent work includes Space and International Politics (2011, in Japanese, awarded Suntory Prize for Social Sciences and Humanities), Policy Logics and Institutions of European Space Collaboration (2003), and many others.

 

 

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Square photo portrait of Mireya Solís

Mireya Solís is director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies, and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. Prior to her arrival at Brookings, Solís was a tenured associate professor at American University’s School of International Service.

Solís is an expert on Japanese foreign economic policy, U.S.-Japan relations, international trade policy, and Asia-Pacific economic integration. She is the author of "Banking on Multinationals: Public Credit and the Export of Japanese Sunset Industries" (Stanford University Press, 2004) and co-editor of "Cross-Regional Trade Agreements: Understanding Permeated Regionalism in East Asia" (Springer, 2008) and "Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim" (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Her most recent book, “Dilemmas of a Trading Nation: Japan and the United States in the Evolving Asia-Pacific Order” (Brookings Press, 2017), offers a novel analysis of the complex tradeoffs Japan and the United States face in drafting trade policy that reconciles the goals of economic competitiveness, social legitimacy, and political viability. “Dilemmas of a Trading Nation” received the 2018 Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Award.


Moderator
 

 

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Square photo portrait of Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Kiyoteru Tsutsui is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor, Professor of Sociology, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Deputy Director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, where he is also Director of the Japan Program. He is the author of Rights Make Might: Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan (Oxford University Press, 2018), co-editor of Corporate Responsibility in a Globalizing World (Oxford University Press, 2016) and co-editor of The Courteous Power: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific Era (University of Michigan Press, 2021). 

Kiyoteru Tsutsui
Kiyoteru Tsutsui

via Zoom Webinar

Kazuto Suzuki Professor Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo
Mireya Solís Director and Senior Fellow – Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies Brookings
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The fundamental reason for the extreme leverage today in China’s banks, enterprises and the state itself is found in the decentralized fiscal arrangements of highly self-reliant local governments. This problem has been compounded by the excessive stimulus lending over the past decade. As a result Beijing has promoted the creation of an extensive shadow banking system designed to protect the stability of the major state banks. Stepping back this has led to the state’s growing leverage. This presentation focuses on the impact of the shadow banking system on the state’s finances and compares the costs of China’s response to the global financial crisis with the US response.



 

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Portrait of Carl Walter

Carl Walter joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as visiting scholar with the China Program for the 2021-2022 academic year. Prior to coming to APARC, he served as independent, non-executive Director at the China Construction Bank. He was also previously a visiting scholar with APARC during the winter and spring terms of the 2012–13 academic year after a career in banking spent largely in China. 

His research interests focus on China's financial system and its impact on financial and political organizations. During his time at Shorenstein APARC Walter will continue his book project on how fiscal reforms in China have impacted the banking system, the overall economy and the prospect for financial reform going forward. Walter has contributed articles to publications including Caijing, the Wall Street Journal and the China Quarterly. He is also the co-author of Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundations of China's Extraordinary Rise (2012) and Privatizing China: Inside China's Stock Markets (2005).

Walter lived and worked in Beijing from 1991 to 2011, first as an investment banker involved in the earliest SOE restructurings and overseas public listings, then as chief operation officer of China's first joint venture investment bank, China International Capital Corporation. Over the last ten years he was JPMorgan's China chief operating officer as well as chief executive officer of its China banking subsidiary.

Walter holds a PhD in political science from Stanford University, a certificate of advanced study from Peking University and a BA in Russian Studies from Princeton University.

 


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This event is part of the 2022 Winter webinar series, The Future of China's Economy, sponsored by the APARC China Program.

 

Via Zoom Webinar. Register at: https://bit.ly/3rC581k

Carl Walter Visiting Scholar, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University
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This is a virtual event. Please click here to register and generate a link to the talk. 
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Once considered incapable of innovation, China’s contribution to technological advancement has become impossible to ignore as it continues its historic rise. Now home to such tech giants as Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei, China is competing in the global market. But what does this technological success mean in the context of China's internal and international politics, particularly its tense relationship with the United States? Will efforts to decouple help or hinder progress in tech? Can China’s educational system produce the next generation of innovators and propel them to the forefront of technology? What effects, if any, is the recent tightening on tech giants having on the sector at large? In this program, experts Denis Simon, Senior Adviser to the President for China Affairs at Duke, and Dan Wang, technology analyst for Gavekal Dragonomics, will be discussing the status and consequences of decoupling for the US and China and their technological sectors.  

 


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Portrait of Denis Simon
Denis Fred Simon is Senior Adviser to the President for China Affairs at Duke and Professor of China Business and Technology at Duke's Fuqua School of Business.  He also serves as Executive Director of the Center for Innovation Policy at Duke.  Fluent in Mandarin Chinese, Simon has more than four decades of experience studying business, competition, innovation and technology strategy in China. In 2006, he was awarded the China National Friendship Award by Premier Wen Jiabao in Beijing.  Prior to returning to Duke, Dr. Simon served as Executive Vice Chancellor at Duke Kunshan University in China (2015-2020).  Simon’s career included spells as senior adviser on China and global affairs in the Office of the President at Arizona State University; vice-provost for international affairs at the University of Oregon; and professor of international affairs at Penn State University’s School of International Affairs. He also has had extensive leadership experience in management consulting having served as General Manager of Andersen Consulting in Beijing (now Accenture) and the Founding President of Monitor Group China.

Simon is the author of several books including Corporate Strategies Towards the Pacific Rim; Techno-Security in an Age of Globalization; and China’s Emerging Technological Edge: Assessing the Role of High-End Talent.

 

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Portrait of Dan Wang
Dan Wang is the Shanghai-based technology analyst for Gavekal Dragonomics, the China economics research firm. He tracks the prospects for China's industrial policy, US regulatory measures and the activities of multinationals in China. He has given keynotes for a variety of organizations and his work is widely cited in the press. Dan previously worked in Silicon Valley and studied philosophy at the University of Rochester. Dan's essays have been published in Foreign Affairs, The Atlantic, New York Magazine, and he is a contributor to Bloomberg Opinion

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New Frontiers event series promo image

This event is part of the 2022 Winter webinar series, New Frontiers: Technology, Politics, and Society in the Asia-Pacific, sponsored by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

 


 

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Chinese 100 yuan bills

This event is part of the 2022 Winter webinar series, The Future of China's Economy, sponsored by the APARC China Program.

 

Via Zoom Webinar. Register at: https://bit.ly/3IA7MdJ

Denis F. Simon Senior Adviser to the President for China Affairs, Duke University; Professor of China Business and Technology, Duke Fuqua School of Business
Dan Wang Technology Analyst, Gavekal Dragonomics
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China’s rapidly growing local government debt problem has long been recognized by foreign observers as a risk, but inside China, only recentlywas this problem called out as alarming.Why has local government debt been allowed to grow with little direct intervention from central authorities? We argue that it has much to do with a “grand bargain” between the central government and localities during the 1994 fiscal recentralization reform. While much scholarly attention has been paid to the consequences of the 1994 reform that left localities with a tremendous fiscal gap, our findings show that Beijing in fact gave localities the green light to create new backdoor financing institutions that counteracted the impact of fiscal recentralization. In essence, these institutions were the quid pro quo offered to localities to sustain their incentive for local state-led growth after 1994.

The bargain worked, and growth continued. The drawback, however, was that China’s economic growth has been accompanied by the accumulation of local government debt with little transparency and central control. When the global financial crisis slowed growth, and local deficits and debts spiked, Beijing began to shut down backdoor financing and opened front-door options that were transparent and under the control of national authorities—but with limited success. In the wake of COVID-19, the question is whether the pendulum will swing back toward more tolerance of local debt for the sake of economic growth.

 

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Over much of the last four decades, China's economy has ballooned, growing to become the world's second-largest economic power behind the United States, when measured by GDP. Yet alongside the rapid growth came mounting local government debt. While foreign observers have long recognized China’s local government debt as a risk, only recently did the Chinese Communist Party call out the problem as alarming. 

Why have central authorities allowed local government debt to grow with such little direct intervention? The answer to this question has much to do with a “grand bargain” between China's central government and localities during the 1994 fiscal recentralization reform, according to a new study, "China’s Local Government Debt: The Grand Bargain," published in the January issue of The China Journal.  The study’s co-authors are Stanford political scientist Jean Oi, a senior fellow at FSI and director of the China Program at APARC, Adam Liu, a former doctoral student of Oi, and Yi Zhang.


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The Origins of China's Massive Local Government Debt

The 1994 reform left localities with a tremendous fiscal gap. But then Beijing in fact gave localities enough autonomy to seek funding independently and the green light to create new backdoor financing institutions that counteracted the impact of fiscal decentralization, show Oi and her colleagues. They call this dynamic a “grand bargain.” The bargain’s purpose was to garner regional cooperation in fiscal and financial recentralization campaigns. The result, as the co-authors document, was far from the intended outcome. The policy resulted in greater decentralization, as local leaders used backdoor financing to meet expenditure responsibilities and bolster local development.

The study offers a fresh interpretation of the political economy surrounding the 1994 fiscal reform and a new understanding of the grand bargain, in which secretive financing was the quid pro quo offered to localities to sustain their incentive for local state-led growth after 1994. Oi and her colleagues draw upon municipal and county data as well as interviews and memoirs of key party leaders, architects of the 1994 fiscal reform, to support their assertions about the dynamics of China's economic rise and the local debt problem. Their findings highlight the "paradoxical political dynamics" of China’s political economy. As the 1994 fiscal reform recentralized tax revenues, "countervailing policies substantially promoted decentralization and fiscal empowerment of localities and decreased the transparency of local financial arrangements."

Granting localities the right to operate local state banks was a necessary but insufficient step for establishing the backdoor financing needed to sustain the grand bargain. Local governments needed a middleman to circumvent the bans on borrowing.
Liu, Oi, and Zhang

The grand bargain led to China's continued growth. The drawback, however, was that this economic growth has been accompanied by the accumulation of local government debt with little transparency and central control. When the global financial crisis impacted growth rates, local deficits and debts spiked. In response, Beijing began to shut down backdoor financing and opened front-door options that were transparent and under the control of national authorities — but with limited success.

Reining in Local Government Financing Vehicles

The researchers posit that "only beginning in 2017 did the Communist Party’s own Central Leading Group on Finance and Economic Affairs and various government-related media begin to label local government debt as a threat to the economy, raising the alarm bells by calling it a 'gray rhino,' a likely high-impact threat that was being ignored." Why, then, didn’t Beijing quickly put a stop to local government debt? Why did central authorities wait until 2015 to put measures in place, and wait even longer to identify local government debt as an economic threat?

Oi and her colleagues explain that studies of policy implementation and regulation in China tell us that the national government faces information asymmetry problems, where localities can subvert upper-level directives because the center has imperfect knowledge of what local agents are doing. Such subversion is most likely when local interests are not aligned with Beijing’s. Now, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the question is whether the pendulum will swing back toward more tolerance of local debt for the sake of economic growth.

All indications, the authors agree, suggest that during COVID-19 and its aftermath, especially as China also has vowed to win and maintain the fruits of the battle against poverty “at all costs,” localities are going to need extra resources, borrowed or not. The center’s pendulum, at least for now, is swinging further away from fiscal discipline toward local incentives and growth.

[Xi's] anticorruption tactics and exerting tighter control to reduce local government debt have not solved the debt problem because the root causes are institutional.
Liu, Oi, and Zhang

Evading Institutional Reforms

Oi and her colleagues contend that the expansion of local government debt is a feature of China's developmental model, which aims to "circumvent rather than tackle difficult institutional reform, kicking the can down the road, opting for an easier fix to avoid the potentially high political costs.” 

The authors' primary takeaway is therefore that local government debt in China is not a local problem. Similar to other developing nations that depend upon local partners, China faces a dual-commitment problem: "growing the local economy without debt requires the central state to simultaneously commit to respecting its local agents’ access to and control over the fruits of local development (of which local fiscal resources are the most crucial part), while exercising credible fiscal discipline over precisely the same set of local agents that the center seeks to incentivize.”

For nearly three decades, Chinese central authorities have relied on the grand bargain to boost the nation's economic might. Oi and her colleagues reveal that the problem of local government debt reverberates to the highest echelons of the Chinese state decision makers and continues to present strategic challenges for the economic juggernaut.  

Read the article by Oi et al

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(Left) Congratulations Adam Yao Liu, Winner of the 2020 BRICS Economic Research Award; (Right) Portrait of Dr. Adam Liu
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New research in 'The China Journal' by APARC’s Jean Oi and colleagues suggests that the roots of China’s massive local government debt problem lie in secretive financing institutions offered as quid pro quo to localities to sustain their incentive for local state-led growth after 1994

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