This essay was first published by Seoul National University's Institute for Future Strategy. You can also view the Korean version.

Technological hegemony surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) has emerged as a central facet of national economies and security. Global competition among countries and corporations to secure high-level talent has intensified into a matter of survival. Worldwide demand for AI talent now exceeds supply by more than threefold. In Silicon Valley, AI dominates the discussion, and competition among big tech firms to attract talent is escalating. Ultimately, the rivalry between the United States and China will be decided not only by capital or technology but by who succeeds in attracting and retaining global talent.

In South Korea, concerns over talent outflows from Korea are growing. Last year, Korea ranked fourth among the 38 OECD countries in terms of AI talent outflow. Compared to other advanced economies, Korea’s AI industrial ecosystem remains underdeveloped, while overseas firms offer better compensation and research environments. The recent phenomenon of 56 Seoul National University professors relocating abroad over the past four years, a “new brain drain,” must be understood in this broader structural context.

This reality is also clearly reflected in the Global Talent Competitiveness Index, published annually by INSEAD. Korea ranked 31st this year, a position disproportionately low relative to its economic standing, and fell seven places compared to two years ago. In particular, Korea performed poorly in attracting and retaining talent, ranking 55th and 37th, respectively. These findings suggest that, beyond economic incentives, social, cultural, and environmental factors play a decisive role in talent mobility.

Korea’s talent outflow is especially alarming because it coincides with record-low fertility rates and rapid population aging. Before this convergence hardens into irreversible decline, Korea must establish a Ministry of Human Resources to oversee a comprehensive national talent strategy and devise systemic measures for talent development, attraction, and utilization.
 

Talent Portfolio Theory
 

In a recent book published by Stanford University Press, The Four Talent Giants, I proposed a framework titled “talent portfolio theory.” Just as financial investment strategies adopt a portfolio approach, national talent strategies should also be portfolio-based, emphasizing diversification to minimize risk and continuous adjustment (rebalancing). In other words, just as financial portfolios are composed of cash, stocks, real estate, and bonds, talent portfolios consist of four elements—the “4B's”: brain train, brain gain, brain circulation, and brain linkage.

Moreover, just as investors design different portfolios, each country’s talent portfolio varies depending on its economic needs as well as cultural and institutional contexts. Japan, Australia, China, and India (all discussed in the book) include all four B's but have constructed distinct portfolios that contributed to their respective economic development. A portfolio approach transcends the traditional binary of “brain drain versus brain gain” and offers a more comprehensive and flexible framework for understanding national talent strategy, one that is particularly relevant for Korea.

First, “brain train” refers to developing domestic human resources through education and training. It is a fundamental element of any portfolio. In Japan’s portfolio in particular, homegrown talent accounts for a large share. Japan has favored domestically educated and trained talent over foreign or overseas-trained individuals, making them the backbone of its economic development.

By contrast, Australia places greater emphasis on “brain gain.” Brain gain involves importing foreign labor, and approximately 30 percent of Australia’s workforce is foreign-born. Until the 1970s, Australia upheld the “White Australia” policy, but a major shift toward multiculturalism subsequently elevated brain gain to a central position in its portfolio. Brain gain pathways include the study-to-work route, where international students remain for employment, and the work-to-migration route, where individuals enter on work visas and later settle. Australia has effectively utilized both pathways.

“Brain circulation” involves bringing back nationals who were educated or employed abroad, and it has been critical to China’s portfolio. Following China’s opening in the 1980s, Chinese nationals came to represent the largest share of participants in the global talent market, including international students. Approximately 80 percent of them returned to China after the 2000s. Known as haigui (sea turtles), these returnees played prominent roles in China’s science, technology, education, and economy, supported by numerous central and local government programs designed to promote talent circulation.

“Brain linkage” refers to those who do not return home after studying or working abroad but instead serve as bridges between their host countries and their homeland. By leveraging their local networks, social capital, they support their home country from abroad, making this a key component of India’s portfolio. India refers to them as a “brain bank” or “brain deposit,” exemplified by leaders of Silicon Valley big tech firms such as Google CEO Sundar Pichai.

However, all talent portfolios carry inherent risks. When adjustment is delayed or fails, risks can escalate into crises with negative effects on the broader economy. The experiences of the four countries illustrate this point.

Japan has faced two major risks. A talent strategy centered on domestic talent weakened its global competitiveness, while demographic decline reduced its labor pool. Although Japan actively attracted foreign students to increase brain gain, its exclusive social and cultural environment limited their integration into the workforce after graduation. While there are many reasons behind Japan’s “lost 30 years” since the 1990s, one factor was its failure to adjust a portfolio overly concentrated on domestic talent in a timely manner.

Australia has confronted rising anti-immigration sentiment and tensions with China. Public concern grew over excessive immigration and perceived threats to national identity, prompting the government to tighten immigration policies. Amid conflict with China, Australia diversified its foreign talent sources from China to India and Southeast Asia. The pandemic, which restricted cross-border mobility, dealt a severe blow to Australia’s talent attraction efforts.

In China’s case, despite aggressive brain circulation policies, top-tier global talent has remained hesitant to return, as relinquishing careers built abroad is not easy. China accordingly shifted its focus toward brain linkage for these elite individuals. At the same time, brain circulation and linkage strategies became a source of friction with the United States, and rising anti-immigration and anti-China sentiment in the U.S. and Europe reduced opportunities for study and employment abroad. Recently, China has adjusted its portfolio to strengthen domestic talent development.

India, despite its strong brain linkage, remains vulnerable to brain drain. However, as economic opportunities expand domestically, return migration has increased, gradually reshaping its portfolio composition.
 

What Should Korea’s Talent Portfolio Strategy Be?

What, then, about Korea? Let us examine Korea’s situation by comparing it with the four countries through the lens of talent portfolio theory.

Brain train: Human resources have been critical to Korea’s economic development, with the government playing a central role. Key examples include preferential policies for technical and commercial high schools during the 1970s under the Park Chung Hee administration to support industrialization, and efforts to internationalize universities in the 1990s as part of globalization. While less dominant than in Japan, brain train has constituted a significant share of Korea’s talent portfolio.

Brain gain: Korea has imported low- and semi-skilled labor from China and Southeast Asia to fill so-called 3D jobs, but attraction of global high-level talent has remained limited. As in Japan, social exclusivity and cultural barriers continue to impede integration.

Brain circulation: Comparable to China, brain circulation has played a vital role in Korea’s economic development. Overseas education and experience have carried strong premiums, and China explicitly benchmarked Korea and Taiwan when designing its own policies.

Brain linkage: Compared to brain circulation, brain linkage has, until recently, occupied a relatively small share of Korea’s portfolio.

Facing the AI era, low fertility, and the crisis of a new brain drain, what strategy should Korea pursue in the global competition for talent? As noted above, rather than fragmented and ad hoc measures, Korea must comprehensively review and continuously adjust its talent strategy through a portfolio approach.

Brain train: Korea must cultivate talent for future industries, particularly in science and engineering. Training should be aligned with AI-related fields to better match university output with corporate demand. The excessive concentration of top students in medical schools must be corrected. Support mechanisms to retain domestic talent should be strengthened. A recent Bank of Korea survey of 1,916 science and engineering master’s and doctoral degree holders working domestically found that 42.9 percent of science and engineering master’s and doctoral graduates are considering overseas employment within three years—an alarming signal. While brain train will remain vital, its relative share is likely to decline.

Brain gain: As demographic crises intensify and the share of brain train diminishes, the necessity and importance of brain gain will grow. In particular, Korea must actively utilize the more than 300,000 foreign students currently in the country as human and social capital. At present, universities focus merely on filling enrollment quotas, and most foreign students either leave Korea immediately after graduation or remain employed only briefly. This, too, constitutes a form of brain drain. To increase the share of brain gain in the portfolio, foreign students must be managed holistically from selection to graduation and employment. While immigration is ultimately inevitable, it must be approached cautiously and deliberately, considering its impact on the domestic labor market and anti-immigration sentiment. Australia’s successful experience offers useful lessons.

Brain circulation: Although it occupies a relatively modest share of Korea’s portfolio, a certain level should be maintained. With declining numbers of students studying abroad and reduced inclination among overseas Koreans to return, care must be taken to prevent a sharp drop in this component. Otherwise, Korea risks losing global competitiveness, as Japan’s experience warns.

Brain linkage: Alongside brain gain, brain linkage is crucial to Korea’s portfolio adjustment. Key target groups include departing domestic talent (the new brain drain), foreign students, and the diaspora. Although their likelihood of reemployment in Korea is low, their potential for exchange and collaboration with Korea remains open. Like India, Korea should foster and support brain linkage by treating them as a “brain bank” or “brain deposit.”
 

Toward the Establishment of a Ministry of Human Resources

At the national level, a control tower is needed to design an optimal talent portfolio and make timely adjustments. Korea should establish a Ministry of Human Resources by consolidating functions currently dispersed across the Ministry of Education (universities and graduate schools), the Ministry of Science and ICT (R&D), and the Ministry of Employment and Labor (foreign employment support). It is worth recalling that Singapore, ranked first globally in talent competitiveness, established its Ministry of Manpower early on. Expanded and reorganized from the Ministry of Labor in 1998, it played a pivotal role in transforming Singapore into a talent powerhouse. Through education and development investments, Singapore strengthened domestic talent competitiveness while opening its doors to multinational talent, and it also implemented policies to promote talent circulation and linkage. From the perspective of talent portfolio theory, Singapore represents a successful case of diversification and continuous adjustment. In the increasingly fierce global competition for talent in the AI era, nations and firms that fall behind cannot secure their future. Korea is no exception.

When Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin left his home country of South Korea in 1983 to pursue graduate studies at the University of Washington, he was certain he would return to Korea upon graduation. More than 40 years later, Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, is still in the United States. 

Yet he does not consider himself a case of brain drain for Korea. Shin, who is also the founding director of the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and APARC director, has continuously contributed to Korea by leading transnational collaborations, researching and publishing on pressing issues in Korean affairs, and otherwise engaging in diverse intellectual exchanges with the country.

Shin’s experiences sparked his interest in the sociological patterns of mobile talent and a central question: How do countries attract, develop, and retain talent in a globalized world? His new book, The Four Talent Giants (Stanford University Press, 2025), explores that question regarding transnational talent flows from a comparative lens by examining how four strikingly different Asia-Pacific nations – Japan, Australia, China, and India – have become economic powerhouses.

We interviewed Shin about his book – watch:

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The book’s main idea, Shin explains, is that how countries manage talent is key to their strength and future success. He calls the four Asia-Pacific nations the book examines “talent giants” because each has used a distinct talent strategy that has proven critical to national development. Three of these nations – China, Japan, and India – are among the top five economies in the world in terms of GDP, and Australia, despite its relatively small population size, is third in terms of wealth per adult.

In The Four Talent Giants, Shin investigates how these four nations have become global powers and sustained momentum by responding to risks and challenges, such as demographic crises, brain drain, and geopolitical tensions, and what lessons their developmental paths hold for other countries.

A New Framework for Studying Human Resource Development 

Asia’s robust economic growth over the past forty years is nothing short of a remarkable feat. The Asia-Pacific today continues to be the world's fastest-growing region, despite global economic uncertainty. How did this phenomenal ascendance come about?

The existing literature has emphasized common “recipes” of success among Asia-Pacific powers. Endeavoring to find one-size-fits-all formulas that could be replicated in other countries seeking rapid development, it has overlooked the distinct developmental journeys of Asian nations. “We need a new lens, or framework, to explain their successes, while also accounting for cross-national variation in development and sustainability,” writes Shin. 

In his book, Shin examines talent – the skilled occupations essential to a nation’s economy – as a key driver of economic development. While all countries rely on human resources for development, their talent strategies vary based on historical, cultural, and institutional factors. Shin introduces a new framework, talent portfolio theory (TPT), inspired by financial portfolio theory, to analyze and compare these national approaches.

“TPT views a nation’s talent development, like financial investment, as constructing a ‘talent portfolio’ that mixes multiple forms of talent – domestic, foreign, and diasporic – adjusting its portfolio over time to meet new risks and challenges,” he explains. Just as an investor may select different financial products in a mix of assets, countries can create talent portfolios by picking from various strategies.

Shin identifies four main strategies by which a country can harness talent – what he calls the four B's: 

• “Brain train” signifies efforts to develop and expand a country’s domestic talent or human capital.
• “Brain gain” refers to attracting foreign talent to strengthen the domestic workforce.
• “Brain circulation” involves bringing back nationals who have gone abroad for work or study.
• “Brain linkage” means leveraging the global networks and expertise of citizens living overseas through transnational collaboration.

Shin uses TPT as an analytical framework to examine how each of the four talent giants has constructed its distinct national talent portfolio and how this portfolio has evolved. As in an investment portfolio rebalancing, a nation can maintain diversification across the four B's and within each B. TPT therefore offers a holistic framework for understanding the overall picture of a country’s talent strategy, and how and why it may “rebalance” its talent portfolio.

Throughout the book, Shin shows that, while Japan has relied on the brain train strategy, Australia, whose population was too small for such an approach, emphasized brain gain. China used brain circulation: it first sent students and professionals abroad to learn, then implemented policies to encourage them to return. India, by contrast, established linkages among its diaspora and used them to develop its economy.

New Geopolitics of Global Talent: Lessons and Policy Implications

The case studies of the four talent giants reveal that there is no single path to talent-driven development. Each of the four Asia-Pacific countries has built its unique talent portfolio, balancing human and social capital, homegrown and foreign-educated individuals, and domestic and diasporic talents. While the talent giants use all four B's to some extent, each emphasizes them differently, reflecting diverse strategies and development paths. The core findings of these studies offer valuable insights for countries aiming to design effective talent policies. 

The four B's were instrumental in the economic rise of the four Asian nations, and they will be equally critical in addressing new challenges facing all economies, from demographic crises to emergent geopolitical tensions. For the United States, one such challenge is its sprawling competition with China, where the battle for talent is heating up in the race for technological supremacy.

Shin warns that the advantage the United States has long held in technological innovation, driven by its ability to attract skilled foreign talent, is now at risk from the Trump administration’s anti-immigration policies, pressures on universities, and cuts to research funding. “Immigrants have not just filled jobs,” he emphasizes. “They have created new industries and helped the US and their home countries. If the US makes it harder for talent to come in and stay, it risks hurting its long-term success.”

The Four Talent Giants is an outcome of Shin’s longstanding project investigating Talent Flows and Development, now one of the research tracks he leads at the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL), which he launched in 2022. Housed at APARC, the lab is an interdisciplinary research initiative addressing Asia’s social, cultural, economic, and political challenges through comparative, policy-relevant studies. SNAPL’s education mission is to cultivate the next generation of researchers and policy leaders by offering mentorships and fellowship opportunities for students and emerging scholars.

Shin notes that the SNAPL team illustrates all four B’s in his talent portfolio theory, as some members are U.S.-born and trained, some come from Asia and, after working at the lab, return to their home countries, whereas some stay here, promoting linkages with their home countries. “In many ways, this project shows what is possible when we invest in talent and encourage international collaboration.”

In the Media

Stanford Scholar Reveals How Talent Development Strategies Shape National Futures
The Korean Daily, July 13, 2025 (interview)
- English version
- Korean version

Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is delighted to welcome a new cohort of fellows joining us starting in summer 2025.

APARC offers multiple prestigious fellowship opportunities for Stanford doctoral students, emerging scholars of exceptional promise, and accomplished faculty and mid-career experts researching contemporary Asia topics. Supported by these fellowships, our incoming fellows will complete dissertation research, work on book manuscripts, undertake new research projects, and engage with the center's scholarly community.

Meet the Fellows

Minyoung An is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the University of Arizona. Her research lies at the intersection of gender, transnational migration, and knowledge production, combining statistical modeling, computational methods, and in-depth interviews.

Her dissertation analyzes gendered migration patterns in South Korea and among international PhD students in the U.S., revealing how gender inequality in countries of origin produces distinct selection effects and return migration dynamics. She also studies academic career trajectories and prestige hierarchies, exploring how gender and national origin affect integration into global academia.

At the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, she will pursue two projects that extend this research agenda: one using computational analysis of social media data to examine gendered migration intent, and another investigating the academic trajectories and institutional reception of international scholars from East Asia. Through these projects, she aims to advance understanding of how transnational inequalities shape global mobility, opportunity, and inclusion. 

Gaea Morales is a political scientist specializing in global environmental governance, with a focus on the intersection of global and local climate politics in Southeast Asia. Gaea’s dissertation and book project, “Agents of Mass Construction: How Cities Localize through the Sustainable Development Goals,” asks why and how cities choose to translate global agreements to shape local policy, a process known as “localization.”

The project explains the motivations and mechanisms by which cities localize environmental norms using case studies of three climate-vulnerable coastal capitals: Jakarta, Indonesia; Metro Manila, Philippines; and Bangkok, Thailand. Drawing from a global dataset of Sustainable Development Goal localization and a year of fieldwork across Southeast Asia, the project illuminates how cities engage in a dynamic process of policy implementation that is locally driven and globally informed.

At APARC, Gaea will revise her book project and adapt her dissertation into an article manuscript. She will also pursue further projects that cross-cut issues in local and global governance, the political economy of climate and the environment, and human rights. She is especially interested in urban disaster resilience, inclusive climate finance, and environmental migration and security within and beyond the Asia-Pacific region.

Gaea completed her master's degree and doctorate in political science and international relations at the University of Southern California. She holds a bachelor's degree in diplomacy and world affairs and in French studies from Occidental College.

Isabel Salovaara is a doctoral student in Stanford's Department of Anthropology. Her dissertation, “Engendering the State: Aspiration, Government Jobs, and the Coaching Industry in Bihar, India,” analyzes the effects of organized exam preparation systems on urban life, gender and kin relations, and the politics of (un)employment. Through ethnographic engagement with young people preparing for government recruitment examinations in India, Isabel's work investigates the social life of "shadow education" – a burgeoning industry across much of Asia. Her research complicates the common framing of shadow education as a social ill by showing how young women and members of disprivileged caste groups harness India's coaching institutes to pursue forms of security and independence for themselves and their families.

Isabel received a bachelor's degree in history from Harvard University and a master's degree in social anthropology from the University of Cambridge. 

Teren Sevea is the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Associate Professor of Islamic Studies at Harvard Divinity School. He is a historian of Islam in Southeast Asia, with research focusing on Islamic texts, oral traditions, and devotional practices across the Malay-Indonesian world and the broader Indian Ocean. His first book, Miracles and Material Life: Rice, Ore, Traps and Guns in Islamic Malaya (Cambridge University Press, 2020), was awarded the 2022 Harry J. Benda Prize by the Association for Asian Studies.

While at the National University of Singapore and Stanford as a Lee Kong Chian Fellow, Sevea is completing his second monograph, Singapore Islam: The Prophets’ Ports and Sufism Across the Oceans. The book explores the Sufi networks that connected Singapore to religious communities across Asia and Africa, highlighting the roles of miracle workers, reformist scholars, royals, and lay believers. Drawing on multilingual texts and oral histories, the project examines how sacred sites, including ruins and relocated graves, serve as living archives of an Islamic past often overlooked by official narratives. The work combines historical and ethnographic approaches to reveal how Singapore’s devotional communities preserve and reimagine Islamic memory across generations.

Gavin Shatkin is a professor of public policy and architecture at Northeastern University. He is an urban planner who works on the political economy of urbanization and urban planning and policy in Southeast Asia. His recent research has addressed the role of state actors in the emergence across Asia of very large, developer-built "urban real estate megaprojects," the implications of climate change-induced flood risk for questions of property rights in coastal cities, and the geopolitical dynamics shaping the "infrastructure turn" in urban policy in large Southeast Asian cities. His articles have been published in the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Urban Studies, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, and numerous other journals in urban studies, planning, geography, and Asian studies. His most recent book is Cities for Profit: The Real Estate Turn in Asia’s Urban Politics (Cornell, 2017). 

While at APARC, Gavin will primarily focus on a book manuscript examining the implications of Cold War political legacies for contemporary urban development and planning in Southeast Asia. The book focuses on three megalopolises – Jakarta, Bangkok, and Metro Manila – that were the capitals of nations that saw the consolidation (with American support) of authoritarian regimes during Southeast Asia’s "hot Cold War" in the 1960s and 1970s. The book examines the legacies of Cold War-era law, policy, and political discourse in three areas: property rights and land management, the production of knowledge about urbanization, and definitions of urban citizenship and belonging.

Dr. Theara Thun is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Faculty of Education, University of Hong Kong, funded by Hong Kong’s Research Grants Council. His research interests include intellectual history, ethnic politics, and post-war education, with a particular focus on Cambodia and Southeast Asia.

He holds a doctorate in history from the National University of Singapore through a joint doctoral program with the Harvard-Yenching Institute (Harvard University). He was the recipient of the 2019 Wang Gungwu Medal and Prize for the Best PhD Thesis in the Social Sciences/Humanities.

His first book, Epistemology of the Past: Texts, History, and Intellectuals of Cambodia, 1855-1970 (University of Hawaii Press, 2024), critically explores scholarly debates of Cambodian, Thai, and French intellectuals. The book presents one of the largest original indigenous manuscript collections ever assembled in Southeast Asian Studies scholarship. It argues that precolonial historical scholarship persisted alongside Western historical writings, leading to the development of a unique body of knowledge with its distinct epistemology.

At APARC, Dr. Thun will work on his second book project, which explores post-war intellectual and higher education development in Cambodia. The project seeks to understand how Cambodia’s universities have transformed following the destruction of the entire educational system and the massacre of most teaching personnel during the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979.

Yuli Xu is a doctoral student in economics at the University of California, San Diego. Her research focuses on labor and health economics, with particular interests in how female labor force participation and fertility decisions are influenced by labor market institutions and past birth experiences. In her thesis, "Gendered Impacts of Privatization: A Life Cycle Perspective from China," she demonstrates that the reduction in public sector employment has widened the gender gap in the labor market while narrowing the gender gap in educational attainment. She also finds that this structural shift has delayed marriage among younger generations. In another line of research, Yuli examines the effects of maternity ward overcrowding. She finds that overcrowding reduces the use of medical procedures during childbirth without negatively impacting maternal or infant health. While it has no direct effect on subsequent fertility, she shows that mothers, especially those with a college degree, are more likely to switch to another hospital for subsequent births after experiencing overcrowding.

During her time at APARC, Yuli will further investigate patient-physician relationships in the Chinese healthcare system, where patients have considerable flexibility in choosing their doctors at each visit. She will explore the persistence of these relationships and examine how patients respond when their regular doctors are temporarily unavailable.

Yuli holds a bachelor's degree in economics from the University of International Business and Economics in China.

Stanford University seeks candidates for three faculty positions in Asian Studies. All three appointments will be at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and affiliated with the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC). The deadline for submissions is November 30, 2024. Read on for more information about each position. Candidates should submit their applications via the Stanford Faculty Positions website.

Faculty Appointment in Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy

Stanford University seeks candidates for a new faculty position in the politics and foreign policy of Japan. The successful candidate will have expertise in politics, policy studies, diplomacy, security studies, international relations, or global affairs relating to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region, and will be expected to advance research and education on Japanese politics and foreign policy, in the Japan Program of APARC. This is an open-rank search.

The new faculty member will be appointed as a Senior Fellow or Center Fellow in FSI, affiliated with APARC. Senior Fellows at Stanford University are full members of the Professoriate and Academic Council, with a rank equivalent to tenured associate or full professor. Center Fellows at Stanford University are also members of the Professoriate and the Academic Council, with a rank equivalent to tenure-track assistant professor. Center Fellows are appointed for a fixed term of years with the possibility of promotion to Senior Fellow.

For more information and to apply, view the job posting on the Stanford Faculty Positions website > 

Faculty Appointment in Korean Studies

Stanford University seeks candidates for a faculty position in Korean Studies. The successful candidate will be expected to advance research and education on Korea, in the Korea Program of APARC.

The new faculty member will be appointed as Center Fellow in FSI, affiliated with APARC. Center Fellows at Stanford University are the equivalent rank of tenure-track assistant professor. They are members of the Professoriate and the Academic Council, eligible to serve as principal investigators, and accrue sabbatical. Center Fellows are appointed for a fixed term of years with the possibility of promotion to Senior Fellow.

For more information and to apply, view the job posting on the Stanford Faculty Positions website >

Faculty Appointment in Taiwan Studies

Stanford University seeks candidates for a new faculty position on Taiwan. The successful candidate will have expertise in policy studies, social sciences, international relations, or global affairs relating to Taiwan, and will be expected to advance research and education on Taiwan studies, in the newly established Taiwan Program of APARC. This is an open-rank search.

The new faculty member will be appointed as a Senior Fellow or Center Fellow in FSI, affiliated with APARC. Senior Fellows at Stanford University are full members of the Professoriate and Academic Council, with a rank equivalent to tenured associate or full professor. Center Fellows at Stanford University are also members of the Professoriate and the Academic Council, with a rank equivalent to tenure-track assistant professor. Center Fellows are appointed for a fixed term of years with the possibility of promotion to Senior Fellow.

For more information and to apply, view the job posting on the Stanford Faculty Positions website >

This essay originally appeared in Korean on January 3 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as part of a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download. 

The Indian diaspora has made its presence felt beyond the economic sector. Numerous graduates of the All India Institutes of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) practice medicine in the United States, and renowned scholars of Indian heritage serve on the faculty of elite American universities. For instance, Stanford selected Dr. Arun Majumdar to serve as the inaugural dean of the Doerr School of Sustainability, which opened its doors in the fall of 2022. Majumdar completed his undergraduate studies at IIT Bombay and obtained his PhD from UC Berkeley in 1989. His career has spanned the public and private sectors, and he now spearheads Stanford’s first new school in 70 years—an ambitious effort to “tackle urgent climate and sustainability challenges facing people and ecosystems worldwide.”[2] It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Indian diaspora now has greater influence and impact in Silicon Valley than the Chinese diaspora.

Moreover, India plays a central role in Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, which has become the focal point of American foreign policy. New Delhi was the leader of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War, but it is now building closer ties with liberal democracies around the world. Unlike China, India is not locked in a strategic competition with the West. High English proficiency among Indians also facilitates relations and exchanges at all levels. It is also worth noting that there are now influential politicians of Indian heritage in major countries, including Kamala Harris in the United States and Rishi Sunak in the United Kingdom. India prides itself on being the most populous democracy in the world, and its stature in the international community is only likely to grow in the coming decades.

Despite these developments, Korean public sentiment toward India is largely negative. There is broad awareness of the legacy of historical figures like Mahatma Gandhi and cultural achievements such as the Taj Mahal. However, many Koreans still perceive India as a poor and chaotic country with rigid and obsolete customs, including the caste system. There are substantial cultural, social, and historical differences between Korea and India, but it is time for Korea to cast aside any prejudices and take a clear-eyed view of India. It is encouraging to see the Yoon Suk-Yeol administration stress in its recently announced Indo-Pacific Strategy that Korea “will advance [its] special strategic partnership with India, a leading regional partner with shared values.” The document also rightly notes the importance of “enhanced economic cooperation” between the two countries.[3]

In this context, it is especially vital for Korea to pay attention to the rise of the Indian diaspora in the United States and beyond. They are a force to be reckoned with in the global market. Unlike the state-driven development models of East Asia, India has pursued a market-driven policy since liberalizing its economy in 1991. The country’s overseas diaspora also plays a unique role in catalyzing economic growth. Korea should learn from the successes of India’s diaspora and build closer ties with such networks.

The Rise of Japan, China, and India

Japan was the undisputed leader of the Asia-Pacific in the 1980s, and China has taken on this mantle since the dawn of the 21st century. As China closes its doors amidst its intensifying strategic competition with the United States, India is emerging as the new regional leader. A close examination of the rise of these three countries reveals crucial differences. The contributions of the overseas diaspora to economic development, as noted above, are a distinguishing factor.

Let us begin with Japan. Relying on a well-educated workforce and meticulous training within companies, Japan built upon proprietary technology from the West to achieve incremental innovation. Sony’s worldwide success in consumer electronics, for example, can be attributed to sophisticated engineering and attention to detail in product design, not to significant advancements in the underlying technologies. Furthermore, Japan took great advantage of short-term overseas training programs to learn and utilize advanced technologies to further its own economy. This strategy enabled Japan to increase its economic heft without suffering a “brain drain,” to the point of challenging U.S. dominance over the global economy in the 1980s. There were, however, disputes with the United States over intellectual property rights (IPR).

Throughout this process, Japan’s diaspora did not play a visible role. Many Japanese abroad had already assimilated into their countries of residence, and the few that contributed only provided low-skilled labor. Japanese Americans, for example, have largely assimilated into American society despite the traumatic experience of forced internment during World War II. Contact with their home country was fairly limited. Some Japanese immigrants who settled in South America later returned to Japan, but most of these returnees were low-skilled laborers. After experiencing hardships and discrimination, however, they went back to South America once again after the 2008 global financial crisis.

China took a different path. The Chinese diaspora has a long history centered on Southeast Asia, and its role in enabling China’s reform and opening by providing much-needed capital is well known. In the 1980s, China adopted an “open door” policy and enabled large numbers of students to study abroad. It also proactively pursued a policy of “brain circulation” by inviting these students to return to China and contribute their talents to the country’s development. No country has sent more students abroad than China. With rapid economic growth in the 2000s, over 80% of these students returned. These individuals are called haigui (sea turtles) in China.[4] In Beijing’s Zhongguancun, China’s Silicon Valley, there are a plethora of programs and facilities tailored to haigui. They have not only spearheaded China’s technological innovation, but also made important contributions to the economy, scientific research, and higher education.

China’s pursuit of “brain circulation” has seen some success, but it also created friction with the United States. After studying and gaining work experience in the United States, Chinese talent returned home and directed their know-how toward accelerating China’s rise. However, U.S. authorities began to suspect that China’s talent policy was being misused for industrial espionage, especially in advanced technologies. For example, the Pentagon stated in 2018 that China’s Thousand Talents Program was a “toolkit for foreign technology acquisition.” U.S. intelligence officials added that the program was “a key part of multi-pronged efforts to transfer, replicate and eventually overtake U.S. military and commercial technology.”[5]

India has taken yet another path, although it resembles China’s experience in some respects. Like China, India experienced an enormous brain drain. It is second only to China in the number of overseas students. In terms of highly skilled emigration, it has seen the largest outflow of any country. Unlike Chinese talent, Indian immigrants tended to settle down in host countries, where they have built successful careers. During the 1980s, over a third (37.5%) of IIT Bombay graduates went abroad, and 82% of these individuals stayed abroad.[6] Between 2004 and 2016, 30% of grantees in Optional Practical Training (OPT), a temporary employment visa for F-1 students in the United States, were students from India.[7] Many of these students arrived in America after receiving a rigorous education in STEM or medicine in India. Their native fluency in English is also an important asset. Since India itself is extremely diverse in terms of religion, ethnicity, and culture, prior experience with diverse settings also gives Indian students an advantage for studying and living in America.

Even if Indian talent mostly stays abroad, they create “brain linkages” through extensive interaction with their home country. They bring young talent from India to overseas universities and companies, support start-up entrepreneurs in India, and connect global companies to India’s low-cost, high-quality workforce.

Immigrants from India make up the bulk of H-1B visa recipients in the United States. In fiscal year 2021, 74% consisted of Indian nationals.[8] Unicorn companies formed with diaspora support are appearing left and right in Bangalore, the hub for India’s high-tech industry. The total investment in Bangalore’s tech sector has jumped from $550 million in 2010 to $2 billion in 2017, spread across 6,000 start-ups.[9] This amount is projected to reach $30 billion by 2025.[10] Furthermore, unlike China, India is not currently engaged in disputes with the United States or other major economies over talent policy or IPR in advanced technologies.

Modi’s Visit to Silicon Valley

In 2015, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke to a crowd of 20,000 at the Shark Tank in San Jose. Many in the diaspora community gathered for the occasion. Modi asserted that “what looks like brain drain is actually a brain deposit.”[11] He also met with leaders of the Indian diaspora during his visit, including Sundar Pichai (Google) and Satya Nadella (Microsoft), and secured support for the government’s “Digital India” initiative.[12] Naren Gupta, a member of India’s diaspora and the co-founder of Nexus Venture Partners, played an instrumental role in planning the visit. Modi’s tour of Silicon Valley encapsulated the power and influence of the Indian diaspora in America. It also revealed the strength of the brain linkages that the community had built with its home country.

The Indian diaspora is a force to be reckoned with in Silicon Valley. Of all engineering and tech start-ups formed in America by immigrants between 2006 and 2012, 33.2% were created by individuals of Indian origin.[13]This exceeds the total number of companies created by entrepreneurs from China, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Israel, Russia, and Korea combined. Indian immigrants are also filling executive-level positions in major American IT companies. Those of Indian origin make up “just about 1% of the U.S. population and 6% of Silicon Valley’s workforce.”[14] However, they have an outsized impact. Immigrants from India to the United States tend to be highly educated, with over 70% possessing at least a bachelor’s degree.[15] This is markedly higher than the corresponding proportion for the U.S. population, which reached 37.9% in 2021.[16] Various factors help explain the Indian diaspora’s success in the United States: high levels of technical competence, a robust professional network, and strong communication skills based on native English fluency and familiarity with Western culture.

Moreover, Indian immigrants are very much willing to acquire citizenship in their host countries. In recent years, the number of Indian nationals who acquired U.S. citizenship through naturalization has been almost twice the number of Chinese nationals who were naturalized.[17] Indians reportedly do not have qualms about renouncing their Indian citizenship. Modi’s 2015 speech in San Jose, referenced above, clearly reflects how those in India view the overseas diaspora. Regardless of one’s citizenship or place of residence, there is a prevailing mentality of “once an Indian, always an Indian.” Leaders in India’s modern history, including Nehru and Gandhi, were also members of the diaspora. The tightly knit diaspora community gives rise to robust and mutually supportive professional networks, which helps elevate the presence of Indian immigrants in host countries. This is certainly the case in the United States.

Unlike China, India does not have a government-led policy to attract talent. Nevertheless, members of the overseas diaspora can temporarily return to India and engage in various activities with relative ease. There are also institutions that facilitate such endeavors. One is the legal status of “non-resident Indians” that is given to Indians who reside overseas for over 183 days in a given year. This status accords short-term diaspora visitors with legal and economic rights similar to that of resident citizens.

Since 2003, the Indian government has also officially recognized Non-Resident Indian Day (Pravasi Bharatiya Divas) on January 9, which commemorates the day of Gandhi’s return from South Africa to Mumbai in 1915. To mark the occasion, the Indian government presents an award to individuals in the diaspora community who have made significant achievements in their respective fields. Past recipients include Satya Nadella and Kalpana Chawla, an Indian American astronaut who posthumously received the award as the first person of Indian origin to go to space. By taking such steps, the Indian government promotes and strengthens solidarity between India and its diaspora, no matter where its members reside.

The New Argonauts

Members of the Indian diaspora are actively building ties to their home country. In 2021, they sent $87 billion in remittances to India. China’s diaspora came second with $53 billion.[18] This includes money earned by Indian immigrants in the United States, China, and other countries. Overseas Indians in the business sector not only invest in start-ups and real estate in India, but also give policy recommendations to their home government and provide support for higher education. They also organized charity fundraisers to assist COVID-19 response and recovery efforts, responding to the devastation that the pandemic wreaked across the country. According to my own analysis, 42% of 97 major Indian diaspora organizations in the United States maintain close ties with India. As a whole, they are even more active than Chinese diaspora organizations.

The IndUS Entrepreneurs (TiE), founded in Silicon Valley, is one of the best examples. It was established in 1992 with the goal of facilitating networking between entrepreneurs from South Asia, providing mentoring for the next generation, and incubating and investing in start-ups. As of 2020, TiE had 61 branches across 14 countries, with 20 offices in the United States and 23 in India, and boasted a membership of 15,000. To date, it has supported around 10,000 start-ups founded by entrepreneurs of Indian origin. The total valuation of these start-ups is approximately $200 billion. With offices in Mumbai, Bangalore, and Chennai, TiE has acted as a conduit for successful Indian businesspeople in Silicon Valley to interact with their home country. These individuals emphasized the importance of entrepreneurship to youth in India. They acted as role models, mentors, and investors at a time when there was little support to be found elsewhere. TiE continues to serve as a vital link between Silicon Valley and India.

The American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin (AAPI), founded in 1982, plays an essential role in creating brain linkages in the field of medicine. AAPI has 80,000 doctors and 40,000 students, residents, and fellows as members. It fosters closer ties between its members and pursues opportunities for cooperation with Indian medical schools. Since 2007, it has hosted an annual global healthcare summit in India. AAPI also operates 19 clinics across India and established a charitable foundation to provide medical relief. During the height of COVID-19, AAPI sent medical supplies and held various activities to help India overcome the pandemic. It is said that those in the diaspora community view such actions as a responsibility, not just as a charitable activity.

Furthermore, the Indian diaspora is heavily engaged in supporting higher education back home. Consider IIT Kharagpur, which opened its doors in 1951. Vinod Gupta graduated from this school, found success in the United States, and helped launch the Vinod Gupta School of Management at his alma mater in 1993. Arjun Malhotra, another IIT Kharagpur graduate, was involved in the creation of the G. S. Sanyal School of Telecommunications and the M. N. Faruqui Innovation Centre. In another example, leaders from the diaspora community joined forces in 2014 to establish Ashoka University, a private school modeled after American liberal arts colleges, a rarity in a higher education landscape dominated by public universities. Ashok Trivedi, one of the school’s founders, earned his bachelor’s and master’s at the University of Delhi before pursuing an MBA at Ohio University and subsequently co-founding IGATE, an IT services company. As these cases illustrate, leaders in the Indian diaspora community donate to their alma maters and even create new schools altogether. They also facilitate academic exchanges between prominent U.S. and Indian universities, including student exchange programs.

AnnaLee Saxenian, a professor at UC Berkeley’s School of Information, has referred to these immigrant entrepreneurs who maintain ties with their home country after building successful careers overseas as the “new argonauts.” Just like the Argonauts of Greek mythology who set sail across the Mediterranean in search of the Golden Fleece, these individuals have crossed oceans aboard their own Argo to seek success in the 21st century. Kanwal Rekhi emphasized to me that “the diaspora led India’s independence movement in the past, but now it is playing an important role for India’s economy.”

Will India Surpass China?

In a previous essay in this series, I argued that “China will not surpass the United States in our time.”[19] We could ask, in a similar fashion, whether India could overtake China in the future. While there are significant challenges on the road ahead, India could become a formidable competitor for China if current trends continue. At present, India lags far behind China in terms of overall national power. India has a much younger population, however, and its rate of economic growth will likely exceed China’s for the foreseeable future. India is the only country where the supply of highly skilled labor in the technology sector exceeds domestic demand. In addition to IITs and AIIMS, there are excellent engineering and medical schools across all regions of India. These institutions are an important source of talent for the global economy.

China is gradually closing its doors as the Sino-U.S. competition intensifies. In terms of its economy and trade relations, it is at risk of falling into a quagmire similar to Japan’s “Two Lost Decades.” Beijing must also contend with strong anti-China sentiment, especially among developed countries, and it must overcome the challenges that come with diplomatic isolation. India does not face the same geopolitical risks. As one of the four corners of the Quad, New Delhi is pursuing a foreign policy that includes various forms of cooperation with countries across the Indo-Pacific region in both economic and security issues. At the same time, the power and influence of the Indian diaspora only continues to grow. In an October 2022 op-ed on the subject, Tyler Cowen notes that Rishi Sunak is only one example of a much wider phenomenon. “It is now impossible to deny what has been evident for some while,” he says. “Indian talent is revolutionizing the Western world far more than had been expected 10 or 15 years ago.”[20]

To be sure, India faces a complex set of challenges at home. Poverty remains widespread, along with ethnic and religious conflicts. The Modi government has taken an authoritarian turn in its pursuit of Hindu nationalism, and there are serious governance challenges associated with corruption in both government and the private sector. Ajantha Subramanian, a professor of anthropology at Harvard, has pointed out that successful members of the Indian diaspora in Silicon Valley largely come from the upper castes. Some criticize these individuals for amplifying caste-based inequality overseas through their exclusive professional networks in ways that are no longer as prevalent in India. While accounting for such criticism and taking an honest look at India’s domestic issues, it would also be unwise for Korea to discount the importance of India and its diaspora in the coming decades.

To Become Asia’s Small Giant

A few years ago, I gave a lecture on Korea’s development at a leading university in New Delhi. I was deeply impressed by the passion and enthusiasm of the students who came to listen. There is growing interest in India about the story of Korea’s remarkable economic development, as well as K-pop and Korean dramas. Unfortunately, this has not always been reciprocated. In 2017, a bar in Itaewon, an area of Seoul famous for its multicultural atmosphere, drew controversy when it denied entry to a student from India.[21] In 2009, in another incident, an Indian research professor and a female Korean companion were harassed by a fellow bus passenger.[22] Such inexcusable acts of discrimination are ultimately rooted in prejudices and negative stereotypes about India in Korea.

I once had the opportunity to speak to Indian engineers who work in Korea. They told me that while they enjoyed working for Korean companies such as Samsung or SK, prejudice among Koreans toward India often made life difficult.[23] Building closer ties with India is a foreign policy imperative under the Yoon administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, but high-level policies alone will not be enough. It is vital for civil society to enhance mutual understanding between Korea and India by expanding cultural exchanges and strengthening people-to-people ties. The private sector also has an important role to play, as they can augment efforts by government-run Korean cultural centers and public entities such as the Korea Foundation.[24]

Indian talent could play an important role in Korea’s economic future. Korea will soon face significant labor shortages due to “a crisis on three fronts: a plummeting birth rate, an aging population, and a serious brain drain.”[25]On the other hand, India has a relatively young population and a large, highly skilled workforce. According to one estimate, “India is projected to have a skilled-labour surplus of around 245.3 million workers by 2030.”[26] There is also a natural synergy between the two economies. India excels in software, whereas Korea’s strength lies in hardware. If China provided opportunities for Korean manufacturers to export intermediate goods, India could provide the talent that Korea’s economy will increasingly rely on in the coming years.

Cowen argues that “India is by far the world’s most significant source of undiscovered and undervalued talent.” Anyone who is concerned about “the future of their own nation” in today’s world, he adds, “really should be focusing on India.”[27] Korea would do well to heed his advice.

While seeking ways to strengthen cooperation with India, Korea should also strive to build closer ties with the Indian diaspora and its networks. East Asian countries, including Korea, adopted a state-centered model of economic development. India took a different path, and its overseas diaspora has played a unique role in driving India’s economic growth. The ever-increasing influence of India’s new argonauts extends beyond Silicon Valley. Australia and Germany have sought to attract Indian talents and draw on their professional networks. The same goes for countries in the Middle East, including the United Arab Emirates. Korea could form closer partnerships with the extensive global networks of India’s diaspora community as it seeks to attract Indian talent and pursue new economic opportunities.

During the Cold War, Korea looked east toward the United States and Japan. As the Iron Curtain fell in the 1980s, Korea pursued Nordpolitik by normalizing ties with Moscow and Beijing. It is now time for Korea to look south. Even as Southeast Asia grows in importance, Korea must keep its eyes fixed on India. If Korea aims to become Asia’s small giant in this turbulent era, it would be wise for Seoul to use prevailing geopolitical currents to its favor.

[1]This essay draws on ongoing research by the author, which will be published in an upcoming book tentatively titled Talent Giants in the Asia-Pacific Century: A Comparative Analysis of Japan, Australia, China, and India.

[2] Amy Adams and Anneke Cole, “Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability, University’s First New School in 70 Years, Will Accelerate Solutions to Global Climate Crisis,” Stanford University, May 4, 2022, https://news.stanford.edu/2022/05/04/stanford-doerr-school-sustainability-universitys-first-new-school-70-years-will-accelerate-solutions-global-climate-crisis/.

[3] Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, December 28, 2022, 17, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322133.

[4] The terms “sea turtle” (海龟) and “return from overseas” (海归) are homophones for each other.

[5] Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Faces ‘Unprecedented Threat’ from China on Tech Takeover,” Bloomberg, June 22, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-22/china-s-thousand-talents-called-key-in-seizing-u-s-expertise.

[6] S. P. Sukhatme and I. Mahadevan, Pilot Study on Magnitude and Nature of the Brain-Drain of Graduates of the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay (Bombay: Indian Institute of Technology, 1987).

[7] Neil G. Ruiz and Abby Budiman, “Number of Foreign College Students Staying and Working in U.S. After Graduation Surges,” Pew Research Center, May 10, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/05/10/number-of-foreign-college-students-staying-and-working-in-u-s-after-graduation-surges/.

[8] Lubna Kably, “Indians Bagged 3.01 Lakh H-1B Visas During Fiscal 2021–74% of the Total,” Times of India, April 14, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/indians-bagged-3-01-lakh-h-1b-visas-during-fiscal-2021-74-of-the-total/articleshow/90845244.cms.

[9] Indian Tech Start-Up Ecosystem: Approaching Escape Velocity (Noida: NASSCOM-Zinnov, 2018), 6; Manish Singh, “Indian Tech Startups Raised a Record$14.5B in 2019,” TechCrunch, December 30, 2019, https://techcrunch.com/2019/12/29/indian-tech-startups-funding-amount-2019/.

[10] “HNIs to Invest $30 Billion in Indian Tech Startups By 2025: Report,” Economic Times, June 17, 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/startups/hnis-to-invest-30-billion-in-indian-tech-startups-by-2025-report/articleshow/83607846.cms.

[11] “Narendra Modi’s Speech at the Shark Tank, Silicon Valley As It Happened,” Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-IRTB-30506.

[12] Chidanand Rajghatta, “Silicon Valley Stars Sign on to PM Modi’s ‘Digital India’ Vision,” Times of India, September 27, 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech-news/silicon-valley-stars-sign-on-to-pm-modis-digital-india-vision/articleshow/49129060.cms.

[13] Vivek Wadhwa, AnnaLee Saxenian, and F. Daniel Siciliano, Then and Now: America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Part VII (Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2012), 3, https://www.kauffman.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Then_and_now_americas_new_immigrant_entrepreneurs.pdf.

[14] Nikhil Inamdar and Aparna Alluri, “Parag Agrawal: Why Indian-born CEOs dominate Silicon Valley,” BBC News, December 4, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-59457015.

[15] Jens Manuel Krogstad and Jynnah Radford, “Education Levels of U.S. Immigrants Are on the Rise,” Pew Research Center, September 14, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/14/education-levels-of-u-s-immigrants-are-on-the-rise/.

[16] United States Census Bureau, “Census Bureau Releases New Education Attainment Data,” February 24, 2022, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022/educational-attainment.html.

[17] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2022), 53–54, https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2020.

[18] “With $87 Billion, India Top Remittance Recipient in 2021: UN Report,” Economic Times, July 20, 2022, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/invest/with-87-billion-india-top-remittance-recipient-in-2021-un-report/articleshow/93012012.cms.

[19] Gi-Wook Shin, “Walking a Tightrope,” Shorenstein APARC, November 16, 2022, https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/korea/news/walking-tightrope.

[20] Tyler Cowen, “Rishi Sunak Shows the Growing Influence of Indian Talent in the West,” Bloomberg, October 28, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-10-28/rishi-sunak-shows-growing-influence-of-indian-talent-in-west.

[21] Ock Hyun-ju, “Itaewon Bar Accused of Discriminating Against Indian,” Korean Herald, June 7, 2017, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170607000796.

[22] Park Si-soo, “Indian Accuses Korean of Racial Discrimination,” Korea Times, August 3, 2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/08/117_49537.html; Paul Kerry and Matthew Lamers, “Setting a Precedent on Racism,” Korea Herald, March 30, 2010, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20091106000044.

[23] Gi-Wook Shin and Joon Nak Choi, Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea (Stanford University Press, 2015).

[24] For more information about the Korea Foundation, see the organization’s “About Us” page at https://www.kf.or.kr/kfEng/cm/cntnts/cntntsView2.do?mi=2126.

[25] Gi-Wook Shin, “Demographic Headwinds,” Shorenstein APARC, December 15, 2022, https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/news/demographic-headwinds.

[26] “India to Have Talent Surplus of 245 Million Workers by 2030: Study,” Economic Times, May 7, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/india-to-have-talent-surplus-of-245-million-workers-by-2030-study/articleshow/64064096.cms.

[27] Cowen, “Rishi Sunak Shows the Growing Influence of Indian Talent in the West.”

This essay originally appeared in Korean on September 30 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as part of a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download.

What, then, explains the power and influence of America’s universities? In this essay, I seek to answer this question based on my experiences during the 30 years I have spent as a professor in the United States. I also consider how this might inform the future of Korea’s universities, which are losing their vitality. Demographic changes have already begun to reduce student enrollment in Korea, and many schools face an increasingly bleak financial situation. Moreover, the regional imbalance between schools in and outside the Seoul metropolitan area continues to deepen.[1] Whether Korea’s universities can overcome these pressing challenges will have critical implications for the country’s future. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has vowed to pursue reforms in three areas: labor policy, pensions, and education. It is thus timely and important to examine how the educational policies of other countries could inform Korea’s own policies.

Promoting Coexistence and Cooperation

Whether it is in politics, economics, society, or culture, the health and effectiveness of any institution depends on the nature of the ecosystem that surrounds it. An institution cannot persist unless it promotes coexistence and facilitates fluid cooperation between its constituent members.

Let us begin by surveying the overall landscape of America’s higher education ecosystem. According to statistics from 2019, there are roughly 4,000 universities in the United States. About half are private institutions, and the other half consist of public universities that are associated with states or cities. Some schools have four-year programs, while others offer two-year degrees. Large research universities focus on research and training PhD students, whereas liberal arts schools tend to be smaller and dedicate resources to undergraduates. There are also community colleges that are open to anyone with a high school diploma. Although a minority, there are also for-profit colleges and universities, as well as those that only offer online classes.[2]

To ground the discussion, let us focus on the state of California, where I currently live. Its population of 40 million is slightly smaller than that of Korea, but its economy is about 1.7 times larger. There are large private universities such as Stanford and USC, as well as renowned liberal arts schools, such as Pomona College. California arguably maintains the most robust system of public universities in the United States.

California’s public schools consist of the University of California (UC), California State University (CSU), and community colleges. The UC system consists of 10 campuses, including those in Berkeley, Los Angeles, and San Diego, with a total enrollment of around 300,000. For California residents, the annual tuition fee is roughly $14,000 (as of 2022). This is much more affordable than private universities, which commonly charge upwards of $60,000. UC schools not only have highly regarded undergraduate programs, but also run reputable graduate programs and generate substantial research output.

The CSU system consists of 500,000 students across 23 campuses. There are many minority students, including Hispanic and Latino Americans. Admission is less competitive than at UC schools, with an admission rate of around 80%. Tuition fees are also cheaper, at $6,000 per year. There are many part-time students and faculty, and it typically takes six to eight years to graduate. CSU schools offer highly specialized programs. For example, over half of California’s certified schoolteachers are CSU graduates.

Lastly, California has 116 community colleges that offer two-year degrees. Tuition fees are only $2,000 a year. Classes are open to anyone with a high school diploma (or equivalent), and there are a total of 2.1 million students. Most importantly, the UC system, CSU schools, and community colleges maintain close relationships with each other. By doing so, they uphold a robust system of public schools in California.  

Transfer Students: Providing a Second Chance

UC schools are popular among prospective students and have low admission rates. However, only two-thirds of admitted students are high school graduates. The remaining third are transfer students, most of whom are community college graduates. According to data published by UCLA for 2021, 6,585 incoming students came directly from high school. There were 3,436 transfer students, and 93% of them had graduated from community colleges.

Furthermore, 44% of UCLA’s transfer students in 2021 were the first in their families to attend college. 36% were from ethnic minorities, and 72% received financial aid. The admission rate for transfer students was 19%, which was higher than the 11% admission rate for high school seniors. This is typical of schools in the UC system. If transferring to a UC school is difficult, students opt to transfer into a CSU school instead. For students who cannot immediately attend a four-year college after high school due to financial considerations or other personal circumstances, transfer applications offer a valuable second chance.

In this way, UC schools, CSU schools, and community colleges complement each other to sustain a stable ecosystem of public universities in California. This stands in stark contrast to Korea, where schools in the Seoul metropolitan area engage in a zero-sum competition with schools in other regions. Moreover, it is common for students in Korea to retake the College Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT) multiple times in the hopes of obtaining a better score to attend a highly ranked university.[3] After graduating high school, these students dedicate at least a year studying for the CSAT. The college one attends has an outsized impact on future job prospects and social standing in Korea, and there are no other pathways available.

How might we revitalize Korea’s universities? One way is to implement structural reforms among public universities such that a quarter of Seoul National University’s (SNU) admissions quota is allocated to transfer students from public schools in other regions.[4] In turn, public universities outside of Seoul could allocate a quarter of their admission quotas to students from professional schools that offer two- or three-year degrees.[5] Creating these pathways could allow SNU, regional public universities, and professional schools to form a more fluid, cooperative ecosystem of higher education. Some may respond that the differences in academic standards and expectations between SNU and regional public universities are too large to make this feasible. However, it is not uncommon to see transfer students from community colleges excel at schools with rigorous academics, such as UC Berkeley or UCLA. In fact, the graduation rate is higher among transfer students (88%) than those who entered as freshmen (84%).

By creating such pathways between different elements of the higher education ecosystem, it will be possible to ease the pressure on students. They will have alternatives to retaking the CSAT. Enabling the opportunity to transfer into different schools will also ease social inequalities. If they are willing, students at professional schools will be able to pursue further studies at regional public universities. In turn, students at these public universities will have the chance to study at SNU. This will help loosen the rigid vertical hierarchy among Korea’s universities and enhance diversity in higher education.

Why a Perfect SAT Score is Not Enough

Even carefully crafted institutions cannot fully realize their intended effects without the right people. Colleges and universities in the United States apply a variety of standards to select the faculty and students who make up the academic community.

At comprehensive research universities like Stanford or UCLA, faculty are evaluated primarily by their research output. The expression “publish or perish” reflects this reality. On the other hand, liberal arts colleges value teaching and mentoring as much as research. For faculty at community colleges, there is an emphasis on training and preparing students to successfully transfer into four-year colleges.

In the United States, the tenure system is the cornerstone of academia. Unless they are implicated in criminal activities, tenured professors can teach for as long as they want. (In Korea, tenured professors must retire by the age of 65.) Although the tenure system ensures job security, its primary purpose is to protect academic freedom. It enables professors to freely explore and debate ideas regardless of external circumstances, including the political atmosphere. This privilege is granted only after a rigorous evaluation. The most important factor in this process, which usually takes a year to complete, is the candidate’s academic caliber. The assessment is relatively objective, as it involves 12 or more outside experts.

Those who are denied tenure are given one year to find a position at a different school. If their research output is held in high regard, it is possible to transfer to a more prestigious institution. There is a fierce competition between schools to attract talented professors. Even if professors are denied tenure and move to a lower-ranked university, they can work to enhance their research portfolio to transfer to another university later on. In other words, the academic job market is much more flexible than that of Korea. I began my academic career at the University of Iowa, where I taught for three years. I then taught at UCLA for seven years before moving to Stanford in 2001. It is very rare for professors to move between three schools in Korea.

The selection of students is just as important as the hiring of faculty. Prestigious schools in the United States, including Stanford, do not admit students solely on the basis of academic excellence. Admissions offices use grades and SAT scores to assess an applicant’s academic ability, but these numbers alone do not guarantee admission. It is certainly not unheard of for straight-A students with multiple AP exams and a perfect SAT score under their belts to be denied admission. In recent years, colleges and universities have begun to phase out standardized test scores from the admissions process. UC schools have announced that they will be dropping the requirement altogether.

More than Just Academics

Colleges and universities in the United States vary considerably in their size, character, and founding mission. Schools thus apply a variety of criteria in the admissions process. In general, more reputable universities tend to admit students with a view to nurturing individuals who will make important contributions to American society and the world. Along these lines, the two decisive factors in evaluating applicants are leadership and commitment.

Leadership requires a sense of responsibility toward one’s community. It begins from a willingness to serve others and prioritize their needs above one’s own. The notion of commitment cannot be easily translated into Korean, but it refers to a persistent dedication to an area that one is passionate about, whether it is an academic subject, athletics, music, or community service.

In Korea, students spend an enormous amount of time and resources to build up their resume. This is colloquially referred to as “building up one’s spec,” which is short for specification. Students with extensive qualifications and experiences may appear brilliant on the surface, but it is hard to tell whether they have a sincere passion for any subject or activity at all. Just like the students and parents portrayed in the popular drama “SKY Castle,” an impressive resume may be nothing more than an exquisite mirage.[6] Colleges in the United States tend to seek out students who have shown a steadfast commitment to an activity or issue, more so than students with the most impressive academic credentials.

American universities also emphasize diversity when admitting students. At Stanford, students from ethnic minorities make up over half the student body. The gender distribution is also balanced, with 49% male students and 51% female students. As I mentioned in my previous column about diversity, schools in the United States place a high value on diversity when selecting students and faculty, even though they do not apply affirmative action policies.[7] Accordingly, applicants must be able to demonstrate how they can make a unique contribution to the academic community, instead of striving to meet a uniform standard based only on grades and test scores.

For students, life on campus is not confined to the classroom. It is not necessary to select only those students with the highest grades. Universities should be a place for cultivating leaders who not only possess a sense of responsibility toward their community, but also fulfill necessary roles in society. When students from varied backgrounds and diverse interests come together, they will spark each other’s curiosity. It is not a coincidence that the founders of companies like Google or Yahoo formulated innovative ideas while they were students at Stanford. In this way, admissions policies can directly influence a school’s atmosphere.

Korea should also give serious thought to how it can prepare and nurture students for the 21st century, so that they can contribute to Korea and the global community. The Yoon administration’s education policies must incorporate measures to achieve this goal.

Meeting Social and Economic Demands

Universities do not exist in a vacuum. They should not be an ivory tower, detached from the rest of society. Rather, they must play a proactive role in tackling important social and economic problems.

Frederick Terman, who served as a professor of engineering and provost at Stanford, was a pioneer of academia-industry collaboration. He is widely known in Korea for his role in establishing the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), which is one of the country’s most prestigious science and engineering schools. Terman also played a central role in the 1951 creation of Stanford Industrial Park, which hosted high-tech firms. He was a visionary who encouraged students to create companies. Since then, Stanford graduates have established 40,000 companies. Terman is widely regarded as the “father of Silicon Valley.” Such momentous developments were possible because Terman, as an academic administrator, positioned Stanford to directly contribute to emerging social and economic trends. Stanford has played a leading role in major technological developments for many decades, from semiconductors to the IT boom and now artificial intelligence.

This year, Stanford launched the Doerr College of Sustainability. It was the first time in 70 years that Stanford established a new school. This is an intriguing development, since schools within universities typically focus on professional fields—engineering, medicine, or business—instead of addressing specific issues that may not be well known to the general public. By creating this new school, Stanford seeks to play a leading role in researching and devising solutions to two critical challenges that humanity will face in the coming decades: climate change and the energy crisis. In addition to drawing on existing faculty from other departments, Stanford plans to hire 60 new faculty members, with the goal of connecting scientific research to policy issues.

A $1.1 billion donation from Ann and John Doerr, one of Silicon Valley’s most successful venture capitalists, was crucial to the school’s establishment. Gifts from other donors brought the total to $1.69 billion. As in this case, outside donations often enable America’s universities to prepare for the future. Private institutions such as Harvard ($53.2 billion) and Stanford ($37.8 billion) have sizable endowments. Public schools are no exception. The University of Texas system has an endowment of $42.1 billion dollars, and the UC system has $12.1 billion. Universities rely on these resources for their long-term development.

In Korea, these donations are commonly misunderstood as payments to secure admissions. It is true that private universities have legacy admissions to account for familial ties or recognize those who have contributed to the school’s development. However, it is difficult to imagine students being accepted only because of donations. In fact, there have been several cases in recent years where parents who engaged in these practices were found criminally responsible. The students also had their admissions revoked.

As is the case with the Doerrs, colleges and universities in the United States use outside donations to address future challenges and support pioneering research. Furthermore, donations allow schools to hire talented professors and provide financial assistance to students from low-income households. At Stanford, families with an annual income below $75,000 do not have to pay tuition, room or board. At UCLA, around 45% of all students are exempt from paying tuition. Schools in the U.S. offer merit-based scholarships as well, but need-based scholarships are far more common. There are policies to help ease the financial burden for those who seek to pursue a college degree. In the bigger picture, donations to universities are a form of redistribution. To incentivize such donations, individuals are allowed to claim tax deductions for donations to non-profit educational institutions.

Korea’s universities face a difficult financial situation. Both tuition fees and professors’ salaries have been frozen for a decade. Donations from individuals and companies are negligible. Stanford and SNU have roughly the same number of faculty, but Stanford’s annual operating budget ($8.2 billion) is many times larger than that of SNU ($1.1 billion). Korea’s Ministry of Education allocates 12 trillion won ($8.3 billion) in its budget toward universities. This is only one-sixth of the ministry’s budget for preschool and elementary school, and is the lowest among OECD countries.

Universities cannot play a proactive role in addressing economic and social challenges unless they are financially stable. The Korean government must provide greater resources to universities, while also giving them more latitude. There should be incentives for individuals and companies to donate to universities with an eye to the future. At the same time, universities must maintain a sense of social responsibility and be faithful to their role in leading the way toward the future.

The Perils of Short-term Governance

The last issue is internal governance. Compared to Korea, administrative leaders at American universities stay in office for a much longer duration. This yields greater continuity. Charles Young, who served as chancellor when I was at UCLA, led the university for 29 years. John Hennessy, who was Stanford’s president when I arrived in 2001, served in that position for 16 years. Deans also typically serve for many years. In my case, I have been the director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford since 2005.

The governance of U.S. colleges is decentralized to a significant degree, compared with Korean universities. There are specific matters that require the dean’s approval, such as hiring decisions for faculty. Some issues require the assistance of legal counsel. By contrast, in Korea, most issues must be reviewed by the university’s administrative headquarters, which reports to the president. For example, suppose that Shorenstein APARC pursues a partnership with a research center at a Korean university. Issues that I can directly approve as APARC’s director often require the approval of administrative headquarters on the Korean side.

Although the governance of American universities is decentralized, faculty members must work within strictly prescribed boundaries. At Stanford, professors have to submit two documents to the university every May. (There are similar procedures at other schools.) Faculty members have to declare whether there were any conflicts of commitment over the past year, as well as any conflicts of interest.

Several years ago, a Korean university approached me to offer a position as an adjunct professor. It seemed like a promising opportunity. I asked the Stanford administration whether this arrangement would be possible, but I was told that there would be a conflict of commitment. I had no choice but to respectfully decline the offer. Stanford allows its faculty to spend 52 days a year on external activities, including consulting. However, any activities that seriously impede the ability to fulfill one’s basic duties as a Stanford professor are strictly regulated, as they are considered to create a conflict of commitment.

The same is true for conflicts of interest. Professors who wish to participate in external projects must adhere to detailed regulations to avoid conflicts of interest. There are also measures to protect the school’s reputation. For example, Stanford’s logo or name cannot be used in external consulting projects. Moreover, Stanford faculty cannot take on positions with decision-making authority, such as director or manager, while taking part in these projects.

Korea’s universities could also consider institutionalizing strict rules for professors’ activities, allowing for freedom within these boundaries. In Korea, there are frequent controversies about so-called “polifessors,” or professors who engage in political activities. Questions often arise about the appropriate scope of external activities for professors. It may be helpful to examine these issues from the perspective of conflict of commitment and conflict of interest.

As is the case with Korea’s politics, university presidents only serve for a short period of time. This undermines continuity in leadership. Most university presidents in Korea serve one four-year term, with no possibility of a second term, regardless of their performance. Deans and other administrative positions also only last between two and four years. It is thus difficult to create and implement long-term, future-oriented plans. Instead, there is a narrow focus on achieving short-term goals. When a new president takes the helm, he or she tends to break from the predecessor’s policies.

These structural issues are inextricably tied to the direct election of university presidents. In many Korean universities, faculty members vote for the university president. This would be unimaginable in the United States, where schools usually form a search committee consisting of professors, members of the board of trustees, and alumni. After thoroughly evaluating and considering candidates for at least several months, this committee selects the next president. Given the rigorous nature of this process, presidents typically serve for many years as long as there are no serious concerns about their performance. The direct election of university presidents was a natural and legitimate outgrowth of Korea’s democratization, but it has created serious side effects, including the politicization of the academy. It is time to reform the governance structures of Korea’s universities.

The Driving Force of a Global Superpower

There continue to be debates about the decline of American power, but the United States still remains a global hegemon. Its ability to lead and influence the world arises in no small part from its universities, which are the source of America’s technological innovation and its military and economic heft. Korea’s dramatic transformation over the past 70 years was also driven by an intense focus on education, giving rise to a highly skilled and educated population.

Today, Korea’s universities face a serious crisis. There are severe regional imbalances between schools in the Seoul metropolitan area and other parts of the country. Universities lack the financial resources to create and implement long-term plans. Furthermore, the governance of Korea’s universities has become excessively politicized. For Korea to leap into the future, its universities need to be revitalized. As it pursues educational reforms, the Yoon administration must remember that the country’s future depends on its universities.