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Michael H. Armacost
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With his second inauguration looming, President Bush has his hands full in the Middle East and with ambitious plans for domestic reform during his second term. In this context, Beijing's recently announced plans for anti-secession legislation is particularly unwelcome.

The content of the anticipated legislation remains uncertain, and its motivation and timing are puzzling. According to letters sent by the Chinese Embassy in Washington to key members of Congress, it is intended to "give full expression to the strong resolve of the Chinese people of never allowing the 'Taiwan independence' forces to cut off Taiwan from the rest of China under any name or by any means." Or as a pro-Beijing daily in Hong Kong put it, "It will leave 'Taiwan independence' forces with no room for ambiguity to exploit."

This suggests that the legislation's main aim will be further to deter President Chen Shui-bian's salami-slicing separatist tactics. An additional motivation may be to further energize U.S. efforts to restrain Chen in order to head off a future crisis. And, to be sure, the new legislative initiative may be attributable to internal political forces.

But why now, within weeks of President Chen's setback in the Dec. 11 legislative elections? One can only guess.

Perhaps Beijing chalked up the Democratic Progressive Party's difficulties in the elections to their own martial rhetoric, and decided to pile on new forms of political pressure. Perhaps it has concluded that despite the election results, Chen will still move aggressively on his stated intention to revise Taiwan's constitution -- thus moving a step closer to independence -- before the conclusion of his term in 2008. Perhaps it deduced from the pointed warnings directed at Chen by senior U.S. officials during the recent Taiwanese elections that Washington will now tolerate blunter threats to reinforce the People's Republic of China's "red lines."

Whatever the suppositions behind Beijing's plan for anti-secessionist legislation, they probably underestimate the substantial risks involved. Such legislation will doubtless alienate many Taiwanese voters, perhaps contributing inadvertently to the evolution of a growing sense of Taiwan's separate political identity, and producing wider legislative support in Taipei for major arms purchases from the United States.

It could also set off an action/reaction cycle with Taiwan that would undermine any possibility of reviving a serious cross-Straits dialogue. While Beijing's planned legislation may be its "response" to Chen's frequent references to constitutional referenda, it is as likely to encourage such referenda as obstruct them. It will upset many Americans, and it will galvanize the Taiwan lobby in America to stir up unhelpful resolutions in Congress when it reconvenes.

The greatest risk, perhaps, is that this could exacerbate the dangerous remilitarization of the Taiwan issue that has emerged since 1995, marked by explicit People's Liberation Army deployments and training aimed at Taiwan contingencies on the one hand, and escalating U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, combined with closer cooperation between the United States and Taiwan's defense establishment, on the other.

To a disturbing degree, this process seems driven less by policy considerations than by the parochial interests of the PLA for enhanced equipment and budgets, and by the attractiveness of the lucrative Taiwan arms market for U.S. military suppliers. Not surprisingly, this evolution is convincing pessimists on each side that confrontation is simply a question of time, despite the disaster it would represent for all parties.

Stabilizing this situation will demand the Bush administration's attention, despite other urgent preoccupations. Stability in the Straits, moreover, is an achievable goal if good sense prevails on all sides. Realistic leaders in Beijing recognize that there is no short-term solution.

With Taiwan in full control of its domestic circumstances, no country whose support is necessary for its independence to be meaningful views such independence as worth the cost of conflict with Beijing. The growing economic interdependence between China and Taiwan also raises the ante of any such conflict for them both.

To be viable, a stabilization arrangement cannot negate the "one China" principle, but it should leave open the parameters of an eventual settlement. Its goal should be an end to explicit PRC threats to use force against Taiwan and of overt preparations for military contingencies in the Strait, supplemented by reduced missile deployments opposite Taiwan; reduced U.S. military sales to Taipei consistent with the lowered threat level; more international "space" for Taiwan in exchange for an indefinite halt to actions aimed at enhancing Taiwan's international position; augmented links across the Taiwan Strait; and cross-strait talks aimed at addressing immediate problems and encouraging the growth of greater mutual confidence.

At a moment when we are entering a new year, let us hope that progress toward stabilization can be achieved.

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About Mr. Chu

Yun-han Chu is Distinguished Research Fellow of the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University. He serves concurrently as the president of Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. Professor Chu received his Ph. D. in political science from the University of Minnesota and joined the faculty of National Taiwan University in 1987. He was a visiting associate professor at Columbia University in 1990-1991. Professor Chu specializes in politics of Greater China, East Asian political economy and democratization.

He currently serves on the editorial board of Journal of Democracy, International Studies Quarterly, Pacific Affairs, China Review, Journal of Contemporary China, and Journal of East Asian Studies. He is the author, co-author, editor or co-editor of eleven books. Among his recent English publications are Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Institute for National Policy Research, 1992), Consolidating Third-Wave Democracies (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), China Under Jiang Zemin (Lynne Reinner, 2000), and The New Chinese Leadership: Challenges and Opportunities after the 16th Party Congress (Cambridge University Press 2004). His works also appeared in some leading journals including World Politics, International Organization, China Quarterly, Journal of Democracy, Pacific Affairs, Asian Survey, and many others.

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Yun-han Chu Distinguished Research Fellow Keynote Speaker Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica
Larry Diamond Hoover Senior Fellow Commentator Hoover Institution
Thomas Gold Professor of Sociology Commentator University of California, Berkeley
Ramon Myers Hoover Senior Fellow Commentator Hoover Institution
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Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is Indonesia's new president. He and his vice presidential running mate, Jusuf Kalla, were elected by a landslide on 20 September 2004 and inaugurated one month later. On 18 November, when Prof. Liddle speaks, the new government will have been in office for nearly a month. What can be said about its performance to date - and in the future? Prof. Liddle will cover a range of topics related to the new leadership in Jakarta, including the prospects for democratic consolidation.

R. William Liddle is a well-known Indonesia specialist. He has written about Indonesian politics since the early 1960s. His recent scholarly publications include: "Indonesia's Approaching Elections: Politics, Islam, and Public Opinion" (with Saiful Mujani), Journal of Democracy (January 2004) and "Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules," in Andrew Reynolds, ed., The Architecture of Democracy (2002). Prof. Liddle writes and speaks often for international and Indonesian media.

Bahtiar Effendy has written widely on Islam and politics in Indonesia. His latest book is Islam and the State in Indonesia (2003). He is deputy director of the Institute for the Study and Advancement of Business Ethics. He also co-hosts a popular Indonesian television talk show on public affairs.

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R. William Liddle Professor of Political Science Speaker Ohio State University
Bahtiar Effendy Lecturer Commentator University of Indonesia and Islamic State University, Jakarta
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RSVPs are required for the buffet luncheon that will accompany this panel. Please RSVP to Debbie Warren at dawarren@stanford.edu or 650-723-2408 by Friday, April 9, 2004.

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His Excellency Vincent Siew Former Premier of Taiwan (1997-2000) Panelist
Michaek Kau Deputy Miniter of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan Panelist
Ramon Myers Senior Fellow Panelist Hoover Institution
Lawrence J. Lau Panelist
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Former Shorenstein APARC Fellow
Michael_Armacost.jpg PhD

Michael Armacost (April 15, 1937 – March 8, 2025) was a Shorenstein APARC Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) from 2002 through 2021. In the interval between 1995 and 2002, Armacost served as president of Washington, D.C.'s Brookings Institution, the nation's oldest think tank and a leader in research on politics, government, international affairs, economics, and public policy. Previously, during his twenty-four-year government career, Armacost served, among other positions, as undersecretary of state for political affairs and as ambassador to Japan and the Philippines.

Armacost began his career in academia, as a professor of government at Pomona College. In 1969, he was awarded a White House Fellowship and was assigned to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State. Following a stint on the State Department's policy planning and coordination staff, he became a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo from 1972 to 74, his first foreign diplomatic post. Thereafter, he held senior Asian affairs and international security posts in the State Department, the Defense Department, and the National Security Council. From 1982 to 1984, he served as U.S. ambassador to the Philippines and was a key force in helping the country undergo a nonviolent transition to democracy. In 1989, President George Bush tapped him to become ambassador to Japan, considered one of the most important and sensitive U.S. diplomatic posts abroad.

Armacost authored four books, including, Friends or Rivals? The Insider's Account of U.S.–Japan Relations (1996), which draws on his tenure as ambassador, and Ballots, Bullets, and Bargains: American Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections (2015). He also co-edited, with Daniel Okimoto, the Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia, published in 2004 by Shorenstein APARC. Armacost served on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards, including TRW, AFLAC, Applied Materials, USEC, Inc., Cargill, Inc., and Carleton College, and he currently chairs the board of The Asia Foundation.  

A native of Ohio, Armacost graduated from Carleton College and earned his master's and doctorate degrees in public law and government from Columbia University. He received the President's Distinguished Service Award, the Defense Department's Distinguished Civilian Service Award, the Secretary of State's Distinguished Services Award, and the Japanese government’s Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun.

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Donald K. Emmerson
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There were worries that the rise of anti-United States sentiment shown by recent public opinion surveys might translate into greater support for Muslim parties whose rhetoric is laced with criticism of the US and its policies. But U.S. experts now feel that this scenario is unlikely. They believe that the election result will be determined more by domestic matters than by foreign affairs and relations with the West.

Below are excerpts from the Straits Times piece. The piece is not reprinted in its entirety due to copyright reasons. Please visit the link below below to read the whole article. "...Said Indonesia specialist Donald K. Emmerson at the Institute for International Studies at California's Stanford University: 'My sense is that the election will be primarily about crime, stability, prices, not about religious issues.' Many Indonesia watchers in the U.S. have been surprised that Islam has not appeared to be a dominant factor in the campaign. Said Dr Emmerson: 'It's quite remarkable that in the Malaysian election religion was very important with respect to the PAS factor, but in Indonesia that is just not the case. And that is a huge relief to the US as it seeks to win the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims in the war against terrorism. ..."

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Ever since 1998, the year of India and Pakistan's nuclear tests, many commentators have argued that, in the absence of U.S. intervention, the two nations are headed for armed conflict that will likely end in nuclear war. The logic underlying this view is twofold. First, that religious radicalism--defined as the participation in political and/or military activities by groups in the name of religion--has become sufficiently powerful in Pakistan to make ongoing support for the Kashmir insurgency inevitable. Second is that India's concurrent growth of nationalism and religious radicalism, as well as a rise in economic power, will make the state less willing to tolerate Pakistan's support for insurgency in Kashmir. Against this seemingly inevitable clash, Pakistani President Musharraf is viewed as a lonely holdout against the forces of religious radicalism in Pakistan. U.S. support is therefore argued to be critical for sustaining Musharraf, whether through political support for Pakistan's policies in Kashmir, or economic support.

This paper reaches a different conclusion: that peace is about to "break out" between India and Pakistan. Our conclusion is based on the following analysis. First, Islamic radicalism in Pakistan relies (and has always relied) on the army to survive, as it lacks sufficient popularity to influence state policy through political parties or popular agitation. Second, the army has previously supported Islamic radicalism tactically, but not ideologically, providing such support only when it has perceived the state to be in crisis. Contrary to a common view, the elections of 2002 were no different in this respect. Third, Hindu radicalism in India, though gaining in both popular and political support, is insufficiently popular to support irrational aggression against Pakistan. At the same time, India's improved economic prospects have influenced its rulers to favor accommodation with Pakistan. Third, the outcomes of recent elections in India and Pakistan have shifted the Pakistani army's strategic priorities toward negotiating a civilian-military balance, and away from destabilizing civilian politics through "crisis-mode" tactics that have included support for Islamic radicalism.

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Rafiq Dossani
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Daulah Islamiyya (Islamic sovereignty, or an Islamic state) is a declared objective of the Southeast Asian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyya. In Malaysia, where parliamentary elections are expected to be held in April, both the Muslim-Malay party (UMNO) in the ruling coalition and the Islamist party (PAS) opposed to UMNO have offered rival visions of Malaysia as an Islamic state. Radical groups in Indonesia have proposed replacing the "Pancasila state" in their country with an Islamic state. So what exactly is an "Islamic state"? And why does it matter so much for politics -- radical or democratic -- in Muslim Southeast Asia? Dr. Martinez will review and explore the contexts, in theory and in practice, that can help us understand what this debate is about. Patricia Martinez, a Malaysian, is among the most highly regarded and widely published scholars working on Islam in Southeast Asia. She is based at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, where she is senior research fellow for Religion and Culture and Head of Intercultural Studies at the Asia-Europe Institute. Her writings relevant to her talk include "Islam, Constitutionalism and the Islamic State" (2004) and "The Islamic State or the State of Islam in Malaysia"(2001). A 2003 essay, "Deconstructing Jihad; Southeast Asian Contexts," is available at http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/new-publi.asp. Dr. Martinez has just returned to Stanford from speaking engagements in Australia.

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Asia-Pacific Research Center
Encina Hall E301
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-9741 (650) 723-6530 PhD
Fulbright Visiting Scholar
Patricia Martinez
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India?s national elections for its 14th parliament must take place by October 2004, and will probably happen by April. They will be held in the context of a new environment for the country: recognition of its nuclear capability, a new global order post 9/11, and its rising economic power. Yet many parts of the country still have very low levels of social development. Social divisiveness also continues to threaten civic stability. In the context of these opportunities and challenges, this seminar will discuss the electoral strategies of the main political parties and likely outcomes. Professor Pradeep Chhibber studies party systems, party aggregation, and the politics of India. His research examines the relationship between social divisions and party competition and the conditions that lead to the emergence of national or regional parties in a nation-state. Professor Chhibber received an M.A. and an M.Phil. from the University of Delhi and a Ph.D. from the University of California, Los Angeles. He is currently the Indo-American Community Chair in India Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. Tea and samosas will be served.

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Pradeep Chhibber Associate Professor of Political Science University of California, Berkeley
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Rafiq Dossani
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With the next round of presidential primary elections coming up Tuesday, billboards are popping up across South Carolina with a political message that might resonate with any Democratic contender: "Lost your job to free trade and offshoring yet?"

The issue of employment is high on the agenda in this political season. President Bush can take credit for an economic recovery, but he is vulnerable when it comes to jobs. The stock market is up, but job growth is dismal -- only 1,000 jobs were created in December, a fraction of the 300,000 new jobs the Bush administration projected.

As the temperature rises over disappointing job growth, the practice of "offshoring" -- sending jobs overseas to cheap labor markets -- has worked its way into the rhetoric of the presidential campaign trail.

Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, the Democratic front-runner after victories in Iowa and New Hampshire, has been denouncing the Bush administration for rewarding "Benedict Arnold CEOs" who move "profits and jobs overseas." Howard Dean, the populist former governor of Vermont, has told his audiences that America needs a president "who doesn't think that big corporations who get tax cuts ought to be able to move their headquarters to Bermuda and their jobs offshore."

Significance unknown

There's no consensus among economists and experts over the long-term significance of the trend toward offshoring, jargon that combines the words "offshore" and "outsourcing." It generally refers to the export of white-collar jobs in information technology and other professional fields such as accounting and banking services.

But blue-collar workers have borne the brunt of the pain. South Carolina, a key battleground state for the Democrats, has been hit hard by overseas outsourcing in the textile industry, and has lost about 64,000 manufacturing jobs over the past three years, according to the American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition, the Washington-based lobbying group that paid for the billboard ads.

Offshoring statistics are fuzzy at best. One report estimates that 300,000 of the 2.4 million jobs lost since the beginning of the recession in 2001 can be attributed to offshoring. Future projections are all over the map: One predicts 3.3 million service-sector jobs will go overseas in the next 15 years, while a University of California-Berkeley report estimated 14 million U.S. service jobs are at risk.

"I think the issue is going to be exaggerated and manipulated by both sides in the political debate," said Dean Davison, an analyst at the Meta Group, a technology research and advisory firm in Stamford, Conn. "There are distinct differences of opinion in what corporations should do to take responsibility, and what kind of public policy should be implemented."

Legislation has been introduced in Congress to address the issue, some of it intended to stir up debate rather than win passage. Kerry introduced a bill in November that would require call-center operators to disclose their physical location to consumers who phone in for customer service or technical help, ostensibly to discourage U.S. companies from moving such jobs overseas.

On the other end of the ideological spectrum, Sen. Craig Thomas, R-Wyo., won passage for his amendment to the Senate's omnibus appropriations bill last week that bans some federal contracts to vendors using offshore labor. News of this caused a furor over the weekend in the New Delhi press, on the assumption the lucrative Indian industry in back-office contracting operations was threatened by congressional sanctions. But that was a false alarm.

Few firms affected

The ban applies only to a relatively small number of U.S. companies bidding for contracts under a Bush administration program to privatize certain federal government services, such as architectural design work, explained John Palatiello, a Washington-based lobbyist representing domestic companies bidding for privatization contracts. The strategy, he said, was to prevent federal unions from claiming their jobs were being sent overseas.

"The motivation wasn't to stop offshoring per se," Palatiello said, "but rather to get it out of the debate on privatizing federal services."

Antipathy to offshoring has deep political roots. Manufacturers in the toy and apparel industries have gone overseas for decades to produce their goods from contractors using cheap labor. Gradually, electronics makers and Silicon Valley's computer brands all followed -- and more recently software and professional services.

Presidential wannabe Ross Perot immortalized this inexorable force of globalization as the "giant sucking sound" from Mexico when he campaigned against the North American Free Trade Agreement in the 1992 election. Twelve years later, many of those Mexican manufacturing jobs have moved to China.

The fuss over job loss in this presidential election year is of particular concern in India, the nation that is benefiting most from the offshoring boom. A Jan. 19 article in the Times of India, headlined "Why is the U.S. running scared?" captured the dismay: "The issue has become a political hot potato. It has even entered the presidential debate, with Democrat Howard Dean attacking his rival contender Wesley Clark for being soft on it. Why the big hoopla over outsourcing?"

Rafiq Dossani, a consulting professor at Stanford University's Asia-Pacific Research Center, published a study of companies moving operations to India last year. He is a proponent of the business efficiencies of offshore labor markets. But even he is concerned about the long-term political consequences.

"This may be a problem in the minds of some politicians now, even before there's been sufficient analysis of what is going on," said Dossani, a New Delhi native. "But I think over the next five years this is going to have a huge impact. The range of jobs that can be offshored is mind-boggling."

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