Sometimes doing field research involves dodging cow pies in an actual field. At least, that was the case for a group of Jean C. Oi's students.

Oi discussed the importance of taking students beyond the classroom in a March 6 talk titled "Cow Pies and Democracy: Teaching in the Field," presented as part of the Center for Teaching and Learning's "Award-Winning Teachers on Teaching" lecture series.

Michele Marincovich, associate vice provost of undergraduate education and director of the Center for Teaching and Learning, introduced Oi, calling "Cow Pies and Democracy" the "most colorful title" in the lecture series.

Oi, the William Haas Professor in Chinese Politics, began her talk by laughingly apologizing for her word choice. "I still can't believe I chose that title, but I think it aptly describes what I do with my students," she said.

Oi teaches courses on political change in China, and much of her research has focused on village elections. Though China has been a single-party state since the Communist Party took control in 1949, the country has held direct elections for village officials since the 1980s, a move that has been greeted by some as a possible first step toward a more democratic state.

In 2001, Oi taught a course about village elections for Sophomore College, a three-week summer seminar for incoming sophomores.

Although the class was "very successful," her students kept saying, "I wish we could do this in China," Oi recalled. She agreed.

Without leaving Stanford's campus, "I think it's difficult to convey the different world [the Chinese] are living in," Oi added.

The year after she first taught Sophomore College, Oi had the chance to take students abroad for a class as part of the Overseas Seminar Program.

They spent two weeks at Peking University learning about village elections and China's political situation. They heard guest speakers from the country's Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the students designed research projects requiring them to interview villagers and village officials.

In the third week of the program, Oi and her students took a bus to Heilonjiang, a northeastern province on China's border with Russia. As the bus approached the village, the road became blocked by a long line of carts delivering corn to the local dairy farm. Oi had all the students get off the bus, and they walked through fields and pastures to get the rest of the way to the village.

"This is where we had to dodge the cow pies," Oi explained.

Oi characterized what she did with her students as "demystifying" the process of doing research. Students learned how to interview people in the field.

"When we got to the village, I said, 'OK! Go!' and they all just scattered," Oi said. "If you set your expectations high, students are going to produce."

Oi's students got to witness a village election. Villagers lined up to mark paper ballots to elect a village committee head. The votes were tallied on a chalkboard, and the winner got 509 votes, just a few more than the runner-up.

Many of the villagers that greeted the students had never seen Americans before, Oi said. "Russians were the only foreigners they had ever seen," she said.

One student was a 6-foot-7-inch Olympic gymnast who drew crowds wherever he went.

"I've seen them on TV, but I'd never seen a real one," one awestruck observer said, marveling at the tall athlete.

Oi said her students felt like they had earned "bragging rights" after their trip to China. "They felt like they had done something none of their peers had done," she said.

One even changed her career plans after the seminar.

"Her parents were very worried about what would happen to her in China, and maybe they should have been," Oi quipped. The student had been planning to go to medical school, but she instead decided to declare a major in political science and study rural China.

"I think I did change some student lives," Oi said.

Oi is also a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the director of the Stanford China Program.

South Korea’s new President, Lee Myung-bak, was inaugurated on February 25, 2008. President Lee, a conservative former businessman and popular mayor of Seoul, was elected with a wide margin in last year’s December election. During his inaugural address at the plaza of the National Assembly, President Lee declared that Korea is now on the path to becoming an advanced nation. Advancement means reaching the rank of the world’s top countries, both in terms of economic strength and cultural standards. To achieve this task, he called on Korea to move beyond the “age of ideology,” and to enter the “age of pragmatism.” He also pledged to pursue economic revival, to strengthen the alliance with the United States, and to end a protracted stand-off over North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

Since Lee’s landslide victory ended ten years of rule by Korea’s progressive government, he was widely expected to maintain his momentum and to enjoy a long honeymoon, at least during his first year in office. But the reality was quite different, and Lee’s term got off to a rough start. In fact, there are some signs that his honeymoon may soon be over. His approval ratings were in the 70 percent range in the wake of his election, but had fallen to the 50 percent range by the time of his inauguration.

Public sentiment toward President Lee slumped to lukewarm levels mainly because he and his staff mismanaged the two-month transition period between election and inauguration. Hasty announcement of unpopular policies by a transition committee and, more significantly, poor and reckless choices in his cabinet lineup angered the Korean public. The almost daily allegations of wrongdoings by many nominees for minister-level positions raised the serious doubts about the moral standard of a Lee government. Furthermore, his cabinet and top advisers—which consist of people mainly from Seoul and Lee’s native Gyeongsang Province—provoked a sense of alienation among Koreans from other regions of the country.

President Lee’s shaky popularity will be tested in earnest in the upcoming parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for April 5. Until recently, it was predicted that Lee’s ruling Grand National Party would easily take over the majority in parliament, mainly because the April election will be held during the new president’s presumed honeymoon period. As the Korean public has become increasingly disenchanted with the Lee administration, however, the April election will be a tough battle for the ruling party candidates. In fact, the United Democratic Party, the main opposition party that was demoralized and divided by internal rivalry after December’s humiliating defeat, has shown renewed vigor and has taken the offensive against the Lee government. Without a resounding victory in the parliamentary election, President Lee’s governing leadership will be substantially undermined—if not in jeopardy—and he will be plagued further with factional rivalry within the ruling party.

The economy is the most crucial issue facing the Lee presidency. The Korean economy has lost its vitality in recent years, with a GDP growth rate that has stagnated at less than 5 percent since 2003. Though President Lee has pledged to revitalize the economy as his government’s most critical task, current economic circumstances are not favorable for the new president. The Korean economy, heavily reliant upon foreign trade, has been further slowed by the sluggish cycle of the world economy. The new finance minister, Kang Man-soo, has forecast that the Korean economy will again grow less than 5 percent this year, falling short of the 7 percent that Lee pledged during his campaign. Without a visibly improved economic outlook and new job creation, it is highly likely that high public expectation for an economic recovery under President Lee will instead become a major disappointment.

Dealing with unpredictable North Korea is another daunting task for the new government. President Lee has declared his skepticism of the engagement policy pursued by the two liberal governments that preceded him, and accordingly has announced a new North Korea policy initiative: the “Denuclearization Opening 3000 Initiative.” Through this initiative, President Lee showed his commitment to assist North Korea opening its economy, once it gives up its nuclear programs completely. According to President Lee’s vision and as a result of this economic opening, North Korea will be able to upgrade its per capita income to $3000 over the next ten years. The Denuclearization Opening 3000 Initiative clearly shows that President Lee seeks to revamp South Korea’s approach to North Korea, shifting from a policy of unilateral appeasement to a strategy of reciprocity. North Korea has not yet revealed its response to the new policy. But many experts remain unconvinced that the new initiative will succeed in abolishing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its nuclear ambitions.

Since its transition to democracy in 1987, one of the key features of Korean politics has been its recurring cycle of high expectation and subsequent disappointment. Every president has begun his term with high approval ratings and ended with lame duck status, due to various scandals and declining popularity. At this point, it is too early to determine whether the Lee presidency prove the exception to this cycle. Perhaps the administration’s rough start will serve as a wake-up call for President Lee and his staff, who must now realize that the Korean public is demanding and tough to satisfy. Korean voters, who overwhelmingly supported President Lee in the December election, are now eager to scrutinize his policies and performance, and have their enthusiasm justified.

In December 2007, for the first time ever, South Koreans, anxious about the economy, elected a businessman as their president. Pro-growth conservative Lee Myung-bak won a resounding victory, with 49 percent of the vote, over left-center candidate Chung Dong-young, who won only 26 percent. Lee's margin would have been even greater had it not been for the late entry into the race by another conservative, Lee Hoi-chang, who finished third with 15 percent.

Korean voters had become tired of ten years of rule by the left-center, and they saw incumbent President Roh Moo-hyun as confrontational and ineffective. By contrast, Lee, a former Hyundai Engineering and Construction CEO, has a reputation for being a pragmatic, can-do leader. As mayor of Seoul (2002-2006), he beautified the city and reformed its mass transit system.

Lee is scheduled to be inaugurated on February 25 for a single five-year term, but he faces two early challenges. First, just before the election, the left-center camp passed a bill establishing a special prosecutor to investigate allegations that Lee had been involved in business fraud and other corruption. The special prosecutor is supposed to announce his findings before the inauguration. A regular prosecutor earlier found the charges to be unfounded, and most observers think that the special prosecutor will not turn up significant new information.

Second, President-elect Lee must counter centrifugal forces in the conservative party ahead of parliamentary elections on April 5. Lee Hoi-chang's defection has already split the conservative camp, and now President-elect Lee and former conservative party leader Park Geun-hye (daughter of the late President Park Chung Hee) are feuding over how much say each should have in choosing candidates for the parliamentary election.

If President-elect Lee is cleared by the special prosecutor and if he successfully manages relations with Park, Lee's party will likely win a very large majority in the parliamentary election, offering him the opportunity to be a strong and effective executive.

As president, Lee will face two long-term challenges. First, as Lee has promised Korean voters, he must strengthen the economy. While the Korean economy has been growing at a rate of about 5 percent in recent years, the average Korean has felt hard-pressed by large increases in housing and education costs. Lee plans to focus on deregulation and attracting foreign investment. He has, however, already been forced to scale back his promise of 7 percent annual growth to 6 percent at least for his first year in office.

Second, although North Korea was not a major issue in the election campaign, due to the apparent progress in Six-Party talks to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program, many experts are skeptical that North Korea will fully abandon its nuclear ambitions. Lee supports engagement of North Korea and continued humanitarian aid, but he has said he will not provide major economic aid to North Korea until it ends its nuclear weapons program. This marks a significant departure from the policy of his predecessors Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung. A renewal of tensions with North Korea could threaten South Korean economic growth and Lee's popularity.

Lee strongly supports South Korea's alliance with the United States. He may seek talks with the United States to adjust or delay implementation of agreements reached in recent years to reduce the United States' role in South Korea's defense. Lee also supports early ratification of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the largest U.S. free trade agreement since NAFTA. (The U.S. Congress has not yet approved the U.S.-Korea FTA.)

Many experts believe that the near coincidence of Lee's election and the inauguration of a new U.S. administration in January 2009 offers a major opportunity to strengthen U.S.-South Korean relations. Shorenstein APARC and the New York-based Korea Society recently announced the formation of a study group of senior former U.S. officials and experts to issue a report and recommendations on how the next U.S. administration can work with President Lee. The study group will travel to Seoul in early February for meetings with President-elect Lee and his economic, foreign policy, and security advisors.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the election of Lee was that Koreans did not think it remarkable. They simply took it for granted that the election would be free, fair, and peaceful. Yet it has only been twenty years since South Koreans literally forced a military-backed government to allow them to vote democratically for their chief executive. In those two decades, there have been five presidential elections, with Lee's victory making the second full-fledged transfer of power between political camps. Moreover, this election was conducted at very low cost, using public funds; companies were not "squeezed" for campaign contributions as in the past. South Korea has demonstrated itself to be, along with Australia and New Zealand, the most democratic country in East Asia and a model of political development for the entire international community.

New York and Stanford, CA., Jan. 10, 2008 -- With South Koreans having elected a new president last month and Americans going to the polls in November to choose a new leader, Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the New York-based Korea Society today announced the formation of a non-partisan group of distinguished American former senior officials and experts to study ways to strengthen the alliance between the two countries.

The New Beginnings' study group will gather at the end of the month at Stanford University to discuss and analyze the implications of the Korean election for alliance relations. The group will then proceed to Seoul in early February for meetings with South Korean President-elect Lee Myung-bak and his top aides, as well as other leading figures in Korean business, academic, media and policy circles. Based on these meetings, the group will prepare a report in March on their findings and recommendations to present to American policymakers, including those from the leading U.S. presidential campaigns.

Korea Society President Evans J.R. Revere and Stanford University Professor Gi-Wook Shin said group members believe that U.S.-South Korean relations are critically important to the United States' role in East Asia and that the inauguration of new administrations in both the U.S. and South Korea offers a unique opportunity to create "new beginnings" in the alliance relationship.

They also noted that the two presidential elections coincide with a critical phase in multinational talks to end North Korea's nuclear weapons programs and that close U.S.-South Korean cooperation is essential to successful diplomacy in dealing with North Korea.

Shin and Revere said that the Bush and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, after initial policy differences over North Korea especially, had recently significantly improved their cooperation, but that the two countries could do much more to strengthen bilateral relations.

Shin and Revere said they regarded the study project as a continuing collaborative effort by their two institutions. After issuing the report in March, they intend to continue to meet with U.S. and South Korean policymakers and other leaders. They plan to update the report and recommendations after the U.S. presidential election.

Study group members are:

• Michael H. Armacost, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; currently the Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow at Stanford University
• Stephen W. Bosworth, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, and a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea
• Robert Carlin, a visiting scholar at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a former State Department Northeast Asia intelligence chief
• Victor Cha, director of Asian Studies and D.S. Song Professor at Georgetown University, and former director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council and U.S. deputy head of delegation for the Six Party Talks in the George W. Bush administration
• Thomas C. Hubbard, Kissinger McLarty Associates, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea
• Don Oberdorfer, chairman of the U.S.-Korea Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and former longtime Washington Post foreign correspondent
• Charles L. Pritchard, president of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, D.C., and former U.S. ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with North Korea
• Evans J.R. Revere, president of the Korea Society, and former principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
• Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC; the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies; and professor of sociology at Stanford University
• Daniel C. Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University, and formerly a foreign affairs correspondent and columnist
• David Straub, Pantech Research Fellow at Stanford's Shorenstein APARC, and a former State Department Korean affairs director