On October 21, 2025, Ms. Sanae Takaichi, a hardline conservative, became the first female Prime Minister of Japan, marking a historic moment for the country, which has one of the worst records among the world's developed democracies for gender equality. Yet, Takaichi's views on empowering women are complex, and she steps into office at a moment of internal party weakness and intense domestic and regional strategic pressures. On October 28, she will welcome President Trump to Tokyo, where the two leaders will hold a summit meeting.

In the following video explainer, Stanford sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and the director of APARC and its Japan Program, discusses Takaichi’s background and rise to power, her cabinet choices, and what they signal for Japan's future. Watch:

Video: Michael Breger

Subscribe to APARC newsletters to receive our experts' analysis and commentary >

In the Media

On October 28, 2025, on the heels of the summit meeting of Prime Minister Takaichi and President Trump, Tsutsui joined Scott Tong, host of WBUR's Here & Now, to discuss Takaichi's rise to power and what's next for Japan. Listen:

This post, first published by the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, is based on the co-authors' recent European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 872/2025.

Introduction

Conventional accounts of the rivalry among global stock exchanges emphasize regulatory competition to attract initial public offerings (IPOs). This framing – often cast as a “race to the bottom” – suggests that exchanges compete primarily by lowering governance and disclosure standards to secure marquee listings. In a new paper, we argue that this view is both incomplete and outdated. By examining stock exchanges through the broader lens of political economy, we demonstrate that IPO competition represents only a fraction of the forces shaping today’s capital markets. Exchanges have become strategic assets at the intersection of commercial imperatives, national economic goals, and geopolitical rivalry.

Our analysis makes two central contributions. First, we show that the importance of IPO competition to exchanges, and the regulatory arbitrage thought to propel it, is often overstated. While competition, particularly between New York and non-US exchanges, can be fierce, IPOs generate only marginal revenues for exchanges in comparison to revenues from data and analytics, and private capital is an increasingly important alternative source of finance. Second, we bring nation states into the picture. Governments are active participants in global stock exchange competition, with strong economic, policy, and geopolitical stakes in the health of their domestic or regional exchanges. We highlight how exchanges increasingly function as mechanisms of policy transmission, instruments of financial sovereignty, and geopolitical screening devices – sometimes at the expense of their economic functions.
 

The Shein Listing Saga as a Microcosm

The recent saga of fast-fashion retailer Shein illustrates the new dynamics. After confidentially filing for a New York listing in 2023, Shein encountered pushback from U.S. lawmakers over alleged use of forced labor in its supply chain. It then turned to the London Stock Exchange, which was eager to obtain a high-profile listing despite the allegations, only to face heightened scrutiny from U.K. advocacy groups. Ultimately, Beijing itself blocked the company’s foreign listing, possibly fearing the enhanced scrutiny it would entail, forcing Shein to pursue a Hong Kong listing instead.

This episode highlights several themes we explore in the paper: the enduring prestige of high-profile IPOs and the willingness of regulators to adjust standards to obtain them; and, crucially, the role of governments in shaping access to capital markets in light of geopolitical tensions and policies unrelated to investor protection.
 

Limits of IPO Competition

Stock exchanges have long competed for listings, including by lowering listing or governance standards, but this rivalry is subject to important limitations and caveats:

1. Demutualization and Profit Motives: Most exchanges have demutualized and now operate as profit-oriented shareholder-owned corporations. Listing fees today account for only a small fraction of exchange revenues. For example, listing fees on the London Stock Exchange account for just 3% of its parent company’s income; for the NYSE, the figure is around 10%.
    
2. Regulatory Competition and Governance Standards: Exchanges have historically relaxed rules to secure listings. The London Stock Exchange diluted its rules on related-party transactions in an unsuccessful attempt to attract Saudi Aramco. London, Hong Kong, and Singapore revised their listing rules to allow multiple-voting shares to compete with U.S. exchanges. While these episodes raise familiar race to the top/bottom questions, the importance of regulatory arbitrage in the global capital markets today can be overstated, in part for reasons explained in points 3 and 4 below.
    
3. Economic Motivations Beyond Regulation: Many firms choose the NYSE or Nasdaq not principally for regulatory reasons but for liquidity, visibility, and greater opportunities in areas such as M&A in the huge U.S. market. To name a few recent examples, Flutter Entertainment, CRH, Wise, Spotify, and Arm all explained that they listed in New York for these reasons.
    
4. Competition from Private Capital: Perhaps the most important caveat is that exchanges increasingly compete less with one another than with private markets. Assets under management in private equity, venture capital, and private credit have ballooned from $9.7 trillion in 2012 to over $24 trillion by 2023. Firms avoid public markets to sidestep disclosure burdens, compliance costs, and shareholder activism. Since 2022, take-private deals have outpaced IPOs more than threefold.
    

Taken together, these trends suggest that the long-running narrative on regulatory competition for IPOs misses major contemporary market dynamics.
 

States as Stakeholders

If capital is global, why should governments be deeply invested in the fate of their domestic exchanges? We identify three reasons.

1. Direct and Indirect Economic Benefits: Domestic exchanges generate tax revenues, create jobs, and facilitate capital formation. They provide a platform for small and medium-sized enterprises less likely to seek foreign listings, thereby stimulating domestic firm growth and innovation.
    
2. Preventing Corporate Exodus: Policymakers fear that firms listing abroad may eventually relocate headquarters, talent, and tax bases overseas. European reports, for example, have warned of a “technology drain” as innovative firms list on U.S. markets. Domestic exchanges thus serve as anchors against corporate flight.
    
3. Home Bias: Evidence shows that investors retain a preference for domestically listed companies. Governments reinforce this tendency by encouraging pension funds and other institutional investors to allocate assets domestically.
    

Exchanges as Geopolitical Instruments

Perhaps the most profound shift lies in the politicization of public capital markets. Exchanges now function not simply as neutral financing infrastructure but as levers of economic statecraft and policy transmission. Some examples:

1. United States–China Rivalry: The Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, Ant Group’s aborted IPO, Didi’s delisting from the NYSE, and heightened scrutiny of Chinese firms on U.S. markets illustrate how capital markets are enmeshed in national security, data security, and geopolitical concerns.
    
2. Europe: The EU’s Capital Markets Union, recently reframed as the “Savings and Investment Union,” is now explicitly tied to European economic sovereignty and geopolitical positioning. Separately, ESG regulations such as the CSRD and the Supply Chain Directive extend Europe’s normative agenda globally by imposing climate and human rights obligations on listed firms.
    
3. Other Jurisdictions increasingly view exchanges as state assets. For example, Singapore has called relisting on the SGX a “national duty.” India frames domestic listings under the banner of self-reliance. Israel highlights its stock exchange as a force for resilience in wartime. Japan has used the TSE as a tool to implement corporate governance reforms.
    

In short, capital market policies and listing decisions now intersect with areas of government interest well beyond economics, including national security, human rights, financial sovereignty, and industrial policy. But efforts to harness exchanges for strategic ends risks fragmenting global markets and undermining their economic role.
 

Conclusion

Global stock exchanges today operate in a transformed environment. They remain commercial enterprises competing for listings, but they are also strategic assets deeply embedded in state policy and geopolitical rivalry. High-profile IPO competition, though still active, is only part of the story. As private capital expands and governments assert new forms of control, exchanges have been repurposed as instruments of financial sovereignty and normative policy enforcement.

About the Authors

Curtis J. Milhaupt is the William F. Baxter – Visa International Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, Senior Fellow, by courtesy, at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, and Fellow at the European Corporate Governance Institute. Wolf-Georg Ringe is Professor of Law and Finance at the University of Hamburg, Visiting Professor at the University of Oxford, and Research Member at the European Corporate Governance Institute.

This opinion piece was first published by Project Syndicate >

STANFORD/LOS ANGELES – It is tempting to frame the Sino-American economic rivalry as a clash between engineering doers and lawyerly naysayers, as the Chinese-Canadian analyst Dan Wang does in his new book Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future. But this is a false dichotomy, because law is a crucial feature of US capitalism.

We have heard the lawyers-versus-engineers argument before. Forty years ago, Japan’s economic rise induced similar anxieties, most famously articulated in the American sociologist Ezra Vogel’s book Japan as Number One: Lessons for America. Commentators fretted that America was mired in lawsuits while Japan’s best minds were solving problems and driving their country’s meteoric growth. Yet over the ensuing decades, the United States, with its mammoth legal industry, outperformed Japan by a wide margin.

Today’s panic about an Asian economic challenger is equally unwarranted and counterproductive. Invoking national security and the competition with China, Donald Trump’s administration is pursuing increasingly anti-capitalist and legally dubious interventions into private industry, with potentially high costs for American dynamism.

Continue reading at Project Syndicate >

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to invite applications for a suite of fellowships in contemporary Asia studies to begin in fall quarter 2026.

The Center offers postdoctoral fellowships that promote multidisciplinary research on Asia health policy, contemporary Japan, and contemporary Asia broadly defined, as well as postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions with the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab and a visiting fellow position on contemporary Taiwan. Learn more about each opportunity and its specific application requirements:

2026-27 Asia Health Policy Program Postdoctoral Fellowship

Hosted by the Asia Health Policy Program at APARC, the fellowship is awarded to one recent PhD recipient undertaking original research on contemporary health or healthcare policy of high relevance to countries in the Asia-Pacific region, especially developing countries. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2026. The application deadline is December 1, 2025.

2026-27 Japan Program Postdoctoral Fellowship

Hosted by the Japan Program at APARC, the fellowship supports research on contemporary Japan in a broad range of disciplines, including political science, economics, sociology, law, policy studies, and international relations. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2026. The application deadline is December 1, 2025.  

2026-27 Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Asia

APARC offers two postdoctoral fellowship positions to junior scholars for research and writing on contemporary Asia. The primary research areas focus on political, economic, or social change in the Asia-Pacific region (including Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia), or international relations and international political economy in the region. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2026. The application deadline is December 1, 2025. 
 

2026-27 Taiwan Program Visiting Fellowship

Hosted by the Taiwan Program at APARC, the fellowship is awarded to one mid-career to senior-level expert with extensive experience studying contemporary Taiwan. The fellowship research focus is on issues related to how Taiwan can meet the challenges and opportunities of economic, social, technological, environmental, and institutional adaptation in the coming decades, using a variety of disciplines, including the social sciences, public policy, and business. The application deadline is March 1, 2026.  
 

Mounting hidden local government debt is one of China’s pressing challenges. Held by local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and estimated between US$8-10 trillion, this off-the-books debt originates from a long-running tug-of-war over tax revenue between China’s central government and the localities. In the years before COVID-19, LGFVs controlled their debt by drawing on steady non-tax revenues. In summer 2020, however, approximately six months after the pandemic broke out in Wuhan, the hidden debt held by LGFVs began rising dramatically. Today, many of them are nearing default, and local governments are increasingly going broke.

​​Why did hidden LGFV debt rise so much during COVID?

A recent study, published in The China Journal, sheds light on this question. The study’s co-authors – including Jean Oi, the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and director of the China Program at APARC – use quantitative data to show how China’s central government’s regulatory crackdowns on income tied to the real estate sector during the pandemic disrupted the revenue sources LGFVs and their local governments relied on to service their debts. These policy changes “interacted with the zero-COVID policy to create a perfect storm, pushing hidden local government debt to new highs,” they write. 

Their study draws on a wide array of quantitative data, tracking information on factors ranging from COVID shocks (including confirmed cases and deaths) to, among others, government medical responses, special treasury bonds and their allocation, local debt, land purchases, and business activities. Using these sources, the co-authors built a province-level dataset covering all 31 of China’s provincial units from 2018 to 2022, allowing comparative analyses before and after China’s COVID shocks. They organized the data into three categories: (1) the impact of COVID on small and medium enterprises; (2) government fiscal responses and COVID expenditures during the pandemic; and (3) local government finances and debts.

Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive our scholars’ research updates >

The Pre-COVID Era: The Grand Bargain That Failed

China’s local debt problem traces back to the 1994 fiscal reforms, which recentralized tax revenues in Beijing and left local governments with chronic budget shortfalls. To bridge the gap, the central government struck a “grand bargain”: while claiming a larger share of tax income, localities could generate new non-tax revenues through special-purpose vehicles, namely, local government financing vehicles. These LGFVs were set up as state-owned enterprises to incur and hold debt off-the-books, yet not illegally, on behalf of local governments.

The workaround fueled rapid development for years but laid the groundwork for today’s mounting hidden debt crisis.

“The success of LGFVs hinged largely on revenue generated through land finance,” explain Oi and her co-authors. “Local governments provided LGFVs with cheap land as collateral for bank loans and bonds. Further revenue was generated from preparing and selling land to real estate developers.”

Thus, LGFVs powered over a decade of rapid growth in China, driving infrastructure booms and urbanization that made the real estate sector a cornerstone of the economy. The model appeared mutually beneficial: the central government gained more tax revenue as the economy grew, while local governments used land sales and debt to fund development. But this growth depended on a continuous flow of non-tax income, making the system increasingly fragile.

After the 2008 global financial crisis, Beijing launched a sustained push to rein in local government hidden debt, focusing heavily on LGFVs. By 2017, officials labeled the risk a “gray rhino.” Yet this drive for fiscal discipline ground to a halt with the onset of COVID.

A Perfect Storm of Policy and Pandemic

The pandemic’s impact was swift and severe. Small and medium-sized businesses, especially in the hardest-hit regions like Hubei Province, saw their incomes collapse by up to 90%. In response, Beijing provided a massive fiscal support package to localities, including one trillion yuan in special COVID bonds to offset the costs from the initial onslaught of the pandemic. Crucial for LGFVs, these bonds cushioned the impact of the pandemic on land sales.

By summer 2020, however, as China was still locked away from the rest of the world and COVID was under control, Beijing resumed its policy agenda to enforce fiscal discipline and curb local government debt. The central government’s most consequential measure was the “three red lines” policy, which dealt a major blow to China’s real estate sector by sharply restricting developers’ ability to borrow once debt thresholds were crossed. The policy, expanded from 12 pilot firms in 2020 to cover the entire sector by 2021, disrupted the “borrow-to-grow” model and triggered a liquidity crisis. Evergrande, China’s second-biggest property developer, was among the first groups affected.

As borrowing dried up, firms struggled to repay debt, halted construction, and stopped buying land, slashing local government revenues. Land sales plummeted across provinces, with national revenue growth from land transfers plunging into negative territory by 2022. The crisis deepened when unfinished housing projects led to mortgage boycotts by frustrated home buyers, prompting more state intervention.

For local governments, the shift came at a steep cost. They were ordered to step in, using LGFVs to purchase land and inject cash into public budgets. As a result, even wealthier provinces like Shanghai and Guangdong saw sharp increases in LGFV debt.

“The call for LGFVs to buy land to create revenue for local governments made matters worse, turning land from a key source of revenue into a source of new debt and forcing LGFVs further to increase borrowing, all of which caused soaring increases in LGFV debt, without any alternative revenue source to service or pay that debt,” explain Oi and her co-authors.

A Fiscal Reform Imperative

The study shows how China’s shifts in central government policies during the pandemic – especially the three red lines and the directive for LGFVs to buy up unwanted land — exacerbated long-standing vulnerabilities in local public finance. What had been a delicate balancing act quickly became unsustainable.

“At the root of China’s continuing crisis of LGFVs' debt is China’s flawed fiscal system,” the co-authors emphasize. Before the pandemic, the system masked deficits by relying on LGFVs to generate off-the-books revenues, primarily through land sales fueled by a booming real estate market. This arrangement allowed Beijing to capture the bulk of tax revenue while localities chased growth. But when COVID struck and the property sector collapsed, the facade crumbled.

The fallout exposed how deeply local governments had come to depend on land finance – an unstable, non-institutionalized revenue stream. With the real estate sector once accounting for over 20 percent of GDP, its collapse left localities and their financing vehicles adrift. “In the context of a crisis such as COVID, the weakness of the fiscal system and LGFVs was exposed as policy instability added to the volatility of the economic situation,” Oi and her co-authors note.

The local government debt problem might not trigger a financial crisis in China, “but LGFVs and their local governments remain in dire straits,” they write. More worrying, the economy has not rebounded in the post-COVID years as hoped, and “as long as the real estate sector remains depressed, land finance will not be able to make local government budgets whole as it once did. The grand bargain can’t work.”

Rather than assume the debt, Beijing is extending lifelines: urging banks to offer LGFVs 25-year loans with temporary interest relief, approving debt swaps into longer maturity municipal bonds, and allowing new issuances of special-purpose bonds. But these are stopgaps, not solutions.

Hidden debt will keep resurfacing unless China overhauls the fiscal system born out of the 1994 reforms, Oi and her co-authors conclude. Institutionalized, dependable, alternative revenue streams for local governments are needed, or the crisis will persist. “It may be time for Chinese leadership to stop kicking the can down the road and undertake institutional reforms of the fiscal system. This may be painful, but there is no other sustainable solution.”