Eun Young Park
He holds a J.S.D. and LL.M. from NYU School of Law and M. Jur. and B. Jur. from Seoul National University.
He holds a J.S.D. and LL.M. from NYU School of Law and M. Jur. and B. Jur. from Seoul National University.
With the looming great power competitions, Dr. Huang will discuss the concept of “free and open Indo-Pacific,” China’s rapid expansion of economic and military sphere of influence, and a critical examination of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” agenda from Taiwan’s perspectives. He will then inform and explain Taiwan’s current national security strategy, defense policy and the military modernization directions. Lastly, Dr. Huang will address current issues across the Taiwan Strait and the prospect of presidential elections in 2020.
SPEAKER:
Dr. Alexander C. Huang, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies
BIO:
Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang is a professor and has been director of the Institute of Strategic Studies and the Institute of American Studies at Tamkang University, Taiwan. He is also a senior associate at CSIS with the Freeman Chair in China Studies. Dr. Huang previously served in the Taiwan government as deputy minister of the Mainland Affairs Council and has worked closely with consecutive governments on foreign and security policy matters. He spent nearly 15 years in the United States before moving back to Taiwan in 2000. He was a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS (1999–2000) and a visiting fellow in the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution (1998–1999). In addition, he taught Chinese foreign policy and U.S. security policy at the University of Maryland at College Park (1998–2000). Between 1993 and 1998, he was a senior consultant on political and security affairs for the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington, D.C.
From Within and Without: Taiwan’s New Security Challenges
Since 2016, Beijing’s pressure campaign on Taiwan has threatened the island’s international space and domestic tranquility. Few, if any, areas of politics have gone untouched. Whether through attempts to pick off Taiwan’s diplomatic partners or lure away the island’s talent, the full range of PRC statecraft is on display. Taiwan’s political dynamics — especially the solidification of Taiwanese identity and collapse of the Kuomintang — also appear to have driven an aggressive shift in Beijing’s approach to political influence operations to include pressure on international companies. The shift in intensity and tactics raises important questions about Taiwan’s future and dealing with an increasingly powerful PRC.
Gi-Wook Shin, director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and of the Korea Program, regularly writes on Korean affairs for Korean audience. His recent articles in Munhwa Ilbo, a South Korean daily newspaper, are listed below. Note: these articles are written in Korean.
Three ambiguities should be resolve in Hanoi (Gi-Wook Shin, February 13, 2019)
Come and See Silicon Valley, the Front Line for the U.S.-China Technology War (Gi-Wook Shin, January 23, 2019)
The Danger of the Administrative Politicization of the Moon Government (Gi-Wook Shin, January, 9, 2019)
Populism Politics and Democracy in Korea (Gi-Wook Shin, November 28, 2018)
BTS and Kim Jong Un are well-known to Americans (Gi-Wook Shin, November 7, 2018)
North Korea nuclear issue: A chronic disease (Gi-Wook Shin, October 17, 2018)
This time North Korea must take the opportunity missed 20 years ago (Gi-Wook Shin, September 19, 2018)
The Danger of a Compromised Alliance (Gi-Wook Shin, August 1, 2018)
With Trade War, Will U.S. and China Fall into Thucydides Trap? (Gi-Wook Shin, July 18, 2018)
Three Track approach is still valid in dealing with North Korea nuclear issues (Gi-Wook Shin, July 4, 2018)
Withdrawal of US troops from South Korea now becomes an option (Gi-Wook Shin, June 20, 2018)
Risky game between North Korea and U.S. (Gi-Wook Shin, May 30, 2018)
After his secret meeting with President Xi Jinping of China in March, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un is set to meet with President Moon Jae-in of South Korea on April 27 at Peace House, south of the military demarcation line. This would make Kim Jong-un the first North Korean leader to set foot in South Korea since the Korean War. A panel of Korea experts will engage in discussion about outcomes and implications of this historic summit.
Panelists:
Gi-Wook Shin, Director of Shorenstein APARC; Senior Fellow at FSI; Professor of Sociology, Stanford University
Kathleen Stephens, William J. Perry Fellow at Shorenstein APARC; former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea
Philip Yun, Executive Director and Chief Operation Officer of Ploughshares Fund; former vice president at The Asia Foundation
Yong Suk Lee (moderator), Deputy Director of Korea Program, Shorenstein APARC; SK Center Fellow at FSI, Stanford University
The Taiwan Relations Act, along with the three U.S.-China joint communiques, remains the foundation for U.S. policy toward, and engagement with, Taiwan. Through this framework, the United States and Taiwan have built a comprehensive, durable, and mutually beneficial partnership, grounded in shared interests and values. Ambassador Moriarty, Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, will review the current state of this unique, “unofficial” relationship in the security, economic, and people-to-people realms. He will discuss the U.S. government’s support for Taiwan’s efforts to participate in and contribute to the international community. At this time of increased tensions between the PRC and Taiwan, Ambassador Moriarty will underscore the United States’ longstanding interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo, and insistence on the peaceful resolution of differences.
Ambassador Moriarty served as Special Assistant to the President of the United States and Senior Director for Asia at the National Security Council (2002-2004). In that role, he advised the President and coordinated U.S. policy on East Asia, Southeast Asia, the Pacific, and South Asia. Moriarty served previously as Director for China Affairs at the National Security Council (2001-2002). He led the political sections at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing (1998-2001) and the American Institute in Taiwan (1995-1998). In Beijing, he helped negotiate agreements that put to rest tensions resulting from the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the collision of a Chinese fighter jet with a U.S. EP3. In Taipei, he helped create the template for the United States to work with a democratically-elected Taiwan administration. Moriarty was U.S. ambassador to Bangladesh (2008-2011) and Nepal (2004-2007).
Since retiring from the Foreign Service in 2011, Ambassador Moriarty has worked in the private sector and as an independent consultant. He has spoken on U.S.-Asia relations, including at universities, in public fora, and before U.S. Congressional committees. Living in Jakarta in 2013-2014, Ambassador Moriarty set up PROGRESS, a U.S. Government project to build capacity in ASEAN’s political/security and social/cultural communities. Since 2016, Ambassador Moriarty has been the Country Director for the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, a coalition of North American importers of ready-made garments. As Country Director, Moriarty provides oversight and strategic guidance to a $50-million initiative that is building a sustainable culture of worker safety in Bangladesh.
"Moon's proposal of a trilateral summit between the two Koreas and the United States, undermining China's influence, turned out to be nothing more than a pipe dream," said researchers at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in a recently published article. "The series of summits that began with Kim's visit to Beijing should lead to Four Party Talks — involving the two Koreas, the United States, and China."
The full article in The Diplomat is available here.
For directions to the Jen-Hsun Huang Engineering Center, please click here.
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) commenced operations on January 16, 2016. The Bank has approved 24 projects totaling US$4.26 billion to date, and its approved membership totals 84 with 64 members having completed all membership requirements and 20 prospective members in the process of finalizing their membership.
President Jin Liqun will give his assessment of the bank’s first two years – its accomplishments and challenges – and the future direction of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. What is the potential impact of AIIB’s financing for regional infrastructure, trade connectivity and economic relations? How can multilateral institutions and various stakeholders best address the US$26 trillion infrastructure gap (from 2016 to 2030) in Asia? How is the AIIB distinguishing itself from other multilateral development banks like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank? What is the AIIB’s commitment and contributions toward global economic governance and best international practices?
Mackenzie Room
Jen-Hsun Huang Engineering Building, 3rd Floor
475 Via Ortega, Stanford, CA 94305
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a project of breathtaking scale that aims to reshape economic geography and enhance China’s centrality in the world. Estimates for the costs of infrastructure to create a sea and land network linking more than 60 countries from Asia to Europe run upwards of US $6 trillion. To date, China has committed several hundred billion yuan and created financial institutions to carry out the Belt and Road vision, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund, alongside the China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank, and state-owned commercial banks.
Does China have the financial wherewithal to implement this grand scheme?
This talk examines China’s recent development and places the BRI in the long arc of fiscal expansion since the turn of the century. Under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the government spent lavishly on boosting public services, especially in the rural areas, using buoyant revenues that grew from ¥1.34 trillion to ¥8.3 trillion during the decade of 2000-2010. The BRI is a signature program in Xi Jinping’s assertive foreign policy, likewise conceived in an era of high growth and high foreign reserve accumulation. What happens when China’s growth slows? Will China’s fiscal institutions be robust enough to manage the transition and avoid overextending its finances under the BRI?