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Whence Korean Denuclearization

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Andray Abrahamian
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This post was originally published by PacNet Commentary, a publication of Pacific Forum.

North Korea’s state-owned news agency ran a wire story with tremendous significance just before Christmas, making clear that unilateral denuclearization is not going to happen. As part of a detailed explanation of Pyongyang’s position, it said: “When we refer to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, it, therefore, means removing all elements of nuclear threats from the areas of both the north and the south of Korea and also from surrounding areas from where the Korean peninsula is targeted. This should be clearly understood.” The text also states that “the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula means ‘completely removing the nuclear threats of the U.S. to the DPRK.’”
 
Pyongyang has long held that their nuclear weapons are a necessary deterrent and has made similar statements in the past, but not so clearly, nor with such a detailed explanation, nor at such a crucial time. Why did they choose to do so at the very end of 2018? There is a degree of unsatisfactory speculation that must take place to try to answer such a question, but we can see a few key elements of the negotiating procedure.
 
The North Koreans have made it clear they want to deal with President Trump himself, probably correctly assessing that he is more likely to make concessions or take significant risks than are his subordinates. Moreover, working-level negotiations have moved slowly over the past several months.
 
The DPRK statement, released in a semi-public way on the newswire, might have been an attempt to get the issue clearly and squarely on the president’s desk. Perhaps the North Koreans don’t believe Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is relaying messages to Trump. Or perhaps the recent retirement of the CIA’s Andrew Kim, who has liaised with the North Koreans alongside and for Pompeo, worried Pyongyang. Stephen Biegun, the new US special representative for North Korea, is an unknown quantity to them. Pyongyang probably didn’t want to resume and rehash this year’s logjam with Biegun in the new year.
 
This shift in communication strategy fits the North Korean political calendar. The New Year Joint Editorial frames the Korean Worker’s Party’s positions for the year and all adult North Koreans study the adjustments in the party line for several weeks in January. This includes North Koreans who interface with the outside world: in 2019 they will present to their foreign interlocutors a specific set of demands based on this clearer definition of “denuclearization.”
 
This leaves President Trump in a bit of a bind. He has to decide if he wants to proceed with the peace and denuclearization process as North Korea has defined it. He could choose a couple different paths.
 
First, Trump appears to have very few deeply held beliefs about the international order, other than that the US has generally been taken advantage of on trade and multilateral defense. He certainly doesn’t care much for alliances. One could imagine him saying, “that’s fine, we could remove our nuclear umbrella from South Korea” once we move toward denuclearization of the north. This would face tremendous pushback from the policy and military communities in the US as well as from allies in Asia, however. It would be the sort of pronouncement that would leave him isolated from much of his administration, Congress, and the pundit community that comments on TV; it would be hard to sustain this position.
 
More likely, he could say, “fine, let’s talk about a freeze on your program and worry about denuclearization later.” This seems more plausible for several reasons.
 
First, his core constituency doesn’t really care about denuclearization. His base wants to see Trump keep winning and if he tells them this is a win, they will likely accept it and move on. He has shown he is rhetorically able to slip out of nooses that other presidents would have choked on. He could conceivably pivot toward a freeze and cap of the North Korean nuclear program as an attainable goal and let the experts – who again largely don’t matter to his base – fight about whether this is good enough.
 
In that regard, Trump may well have been aided by a shift in the professional North Korea-watching community. Since roughly the fall of 2017, when war rhetoric and tensions were escalating, an increasing number of commentaries, events, and lectures with titles along the lines of “living with a nuclear North Korea” began to appear. There are now clearly more voices in the analyst community willing to say that the United States can tolerate and deter a nuclear North Korea. Such an opinion was incredibly scarce in 2016.
 
This is a situation that Trump helped foster. His administration helped raise the prospect of conflict that really did highlight the absurdity of war on the Korean Peninsula. The administration was essentially saying “we are willing to risk a nuclear war to prevent a country from being able to wage nuclear war.” This focused a lot of minds and helped clarify the fact that deterrence remains viable. Whether that means seeking to cooperate or continuing to pressure and isolate North Korea remains up for debate.
 
In defining that debate, if Trump decides he wants to try to change the US-DPRK relationship, he can point to the text of the Singapore Declaration that he and Kim Jong Un signed at their June 12 summit. While the declaration was much pilloried by observers as a “nothingburger,” it did promise to “establish new US–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries” and “to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” Those clauses come before a promise by both sides “to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
 
President Trump could conceivably articulate a position in which a freeze of the North Korean program is a realistic goal that takes place alongside improved relations between the two countries, putting the issues of the DPRK’s stockpile and the US nuclear umbrella in Asia off for a later date.
 
This formula would be unsatisfactory to many people, but Trump has shown a willingness to upset traditional stakeholders. Besides, this is North Korea policy. Past attempts at pressure and engagement have been unsatisfactory to one group or another. The status quo is basically unsatisfactory to many, particularly in South Korea. Satisfying everyone will be impossible. Who Trump decides to upset will define how the next round of negotiations with the DPRK goes.
 
Andray Abrahamian is the 2018-19 Koret Fellow at APARC, Stanford University. He is an adjunct fellow at Pacific Forum and Griffith Asia Institute, an honorary fellow at Macquarie University, and a member of the US National Committee on North Korea. His book, North Korea and Myanmar: Divergent Paths, was published by McFarland in 2018.
 
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North Korea and the World in Flux

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The 11th Annual Koret Workshop

A dramatic opening created by the unique strategic outlooks and personalities of Moon Jae-in, Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump instigated a series of highly symbolic summits in the early months of 2018. The process kicked off by those summits has bogged down, however, as the necessary compromises for an agreement between the United States and North Korea have proved elusive. This year's Koret Workshop will therefore invite experts from a variety of areas in order to reflect on what the stumbling blocks have been as well as prospects for overcoming them. Conference participants will work towards better understanding and supporting potential emerging solutions to the persistent conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

The workshop will consist of three sessions:

Session I: Assessments of Summit Diplomacy

Session II: Challenges and Opportunities in Media Coverage

Session III: Prospects and Pitfalls in the Near-Term

NOTE: During the conference, a keynote address is open to the general public. Please click here to register for the public event on March 15.
 
The annual Koret Workshop is made possible through the generous support of the Koret Foundation.

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APARC Scholars Respond to "Chinese Influence and American Interests" Report

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On November 29, 2018, a working group, co-chaired by Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and at the Hoover Institution, and Orville Schell, Arthur Ross director of the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations, released the report “Chinese Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance," which documents the extent of China’s influence-seeking activities in American society. The report details a range of assertive and opaque “sharp power” efforts that China has stepped up within the United States in multiple sectors. These, argue members of the working group, penetrate deeply the social and political fabric of our democratic society and exploit its openness. 

APARC’s Donald K. Emmerson and Thomas Fingar provided the Chinese international affairs website Dunjiaodu with their own commentaries on the report. English language versions of both pieces were published by IPP Review (here and here), and are provided below.

APARC also hosted a special roundtable discussion of the report's findings and recommendations, featuring Diamond and Schell. You can listen to the event's audio recording on our website.

Comment on "Chinese Influence and American Interests"
By Donald K. Emmerson
December 24, 2018

Chinese Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance is an important and timely report. It deserves translation into Chinese and wide circulation inside the PRC. It should be made available on-line for free downloading by people in China from all walks of life, including scholars, teachers, authors, entrepreneurs, and officials from Beijing down to the lowest levels of administration throughout the country. Relations between the US and China are far too important to the citizenries of our two countries to restrict access to the report to a miniscule proportion of China’s population—the elite English-reading few who enjoy privileged (uncensored) exposure to critical facts and comments regarding the Chinese government’s behavior abroad.

I willingly attended a meeting of the Working Group on Chinese Influence Activities in the United States. My academic specialty is Southeast Asia, including its relations with China, so I chose not contribute text to the report. Understandably, not every sentence in its the 199 pages exactly matches what I might have preferred to read or decided to write. (Relevant is my “Singapore and Goliath?” in the April 2018 Journal of Democracy.) But I supported the Working Group’s work and I agree with its outcome.

Included in the report is a dissenting opinion by Susan Shirk. I respect her view. But I am less concerned than she that the report risks “putting all ethnic Chinese under a cloud of suspicion.” The word “constructive” in the report’s subtitle explicitly conveys the Working Group’s desire neither to stereotype nor denigrate people of Chinese descent. At the meeting I attended, this wish was repeatedly expressed. I endorse and appreciate the editors’ caution that, alongside our critique, we “must be mindful to do no harm,” and that the report should not be misused to disparage ethnically Chinese people, who have indeed, as the editors state, made “enormous” contributions to American progress. I would merely enlarge that gratitude to include the economic, political, and cultural benefits attributable to ethnic Chinese individuals, historically and now, throughout the world—my own specialty, Southeast Asia, notably included.

"Flies and Barriers": On the China-U.S. Relationship
By Thomas Fingar
December 20, 2018

The recent report of the Working Group on Chinese Influence Activities in the United States was not timed to coincide with the 40th anniversary of Reform and Opening and the restoration of US-China diplomatic relations but it provides “teaching moment” opportunities for reflection on the ways in which China and the United States have managed the challenges of deeper engagement. I hope that the full report will be available in China and urge readers of this commentary to read it and to think about the issues it raises. I had no role in the preparation of the report but concur with the views expressed by Susan Shirk in her dissenting opinion.

One cluster of issues centers on important asymmetries in the US-China relationship. The report describes numerous ways in which Chinese entities interact with institutions and individuals in the United States and correctly notes the almost complete absence of legal and procedural impediments to such interaction. One cannot say the same about China. Four decades into the era of reform and opening, China remains far less open to foreign ideas, interaction, and influence than is the United States. I encourage readers to ask why that is the case and to consider the consequences and implications for China’s future development. To paraphrase Deng Xiaoping, the concerns raised in the Working Group report represent “flies” that entered the United States through the window of extensive engagement with China. The report calls for dealing with the flies, not closing the window. China seems increasingly determined to prevent the intrusion of foreign “flies” by erecting (or failing to lower) barriers.

Asymmetries in access are not limited to the dimensions of US-China relations discussed in this report. The US economy remains far more open to goods, investment, and ownership from China than China is to comparable forms of engagement by Americans. For decades, US laws, policy, and citizens accepted — even fostered — such asymmetries to strengthen our allies and partners. China has benefitted from this asymmetry, as have dozens of other countries. Policies to make our partners and allies stronger and more prosperous were designed to — and did — enhance American security and prosperity, but almost three decades after the end of the Cold War, many Americans understandably ask why we continue to accept such a high degree of inequality. What made sense during the Cold War and before our partners became stronger and more prosperous now seems unfair and unwise. As a result, American thinking about the ways we interact with other nations is shifting from acceptance of asymmetries to demands for reciprocity and equal treatment.

Some Chinese commentaries on the Working Group report have asserted that it reflects waning self-confidence and fear of China’s rise. Such assessments are wrong. Belief that we should receive essentially the same treatment from other countries as they accord to the United States and American citizens, firms, NGOs, and other entities reflects the strength of our commitment to fairness, not fear of competition. The long-held consensus that US policy should treat all countries (except explicit enemies, which China was from 1950 until the late 1960s) equally regardless of how they treated the United States has eroded significantly. That consensus is being replaced by calls for stricter reciprocity and treating other countries in the same way that they treat us. This sentiment is not limited to engagement with China but the Working Group report captures the emerging consensus by noting that Chinese media have far greater access to the United States than American reporters, newspapers, and broadcasts have to Chinese audiences. That is a fact, not an expression of paranoia or lack of confidence. Indeed, readers of this commentary might reflect upon why it is that China seems to lack confidence in the ability of its people to make their own judgments about foreign ideas and compete with foreign firms.

I was in China when the report was published and many Chinese interlocutors depicted its findings and recommendations as “proof” that the United States had abandoned engagement and reverted to containment policies designed to thwart China’s rise. Both their characterization of the report and their assertions about American policy are wrong. None of these interlocutors had read the report (their opinions were based on negative commentary), and I suspect that many would change their assessment if they had a chance to do so. I also suspect that many in China would change their minds about whether the United States is attempting to “contain” China if they had access to more — and more accurate — information about American willingness to acknowledge and manage the “flies” of engagement and Chinese efforts to erect barriers to Western ideas.

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Dual Labor Markets and Economic Globalization: Theory and Evidence from Japanese Manufacturing

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Labor market duality refers to the coexistence of temporary workers with low dismissal costs and permanent workers with high dismissal costs within the same firms. The prevalence of temporary employment is a common feature in several countries, such as Continental European countries. Further, since the 1980s, the Japanese labor market has been experiencing a substantial increase in temporary jobs. The quality of temporary jobs tends to be lower than that of permanent jobs (e.g., the former includes lesser job security, lower wages, and fewer training opportunities compared to the latter). For this reason, the causes and consequences of widespread temporary employment have both policy and academic implications. To date, most of the research on this topic has focused on the supply side of labor markets (demographic changes in workforce), macroeconomic impacts (business cycles), and labor-market institutions. However, since the majority of temporary workers tends to be involuntary, the demand-side analysis is important, as well. It has rarely been examined how market competition would affect firms’ demand for temporary and permanent labor, particularly within the context of economic globalization.

Our study attempts to fill this gap. By proposing a heterogeneous-firm trade model with a dual labor market, we examine the relations between the demand for temporary and permanent workers and economic globalization. Our model highlights intensified product market competition as a driving force behind the shift in demand from permanent to temporary workers. In addition, our model demonstrates that international outsourcing effectively reduces labor adjustment costs, which decreases the demand for permanent workers. Using industry-level data from the Japanese manufacturing sector, we empirically test the relations between the demand for temporary and permanent workers and economic globalization and find that they support most of our theoretical predictions.

 

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Hitoshi Sato joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) during the 2018–2019 academic year from the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO), a national research institute in Japan, where he currently serves as a senior chief research fellow. Sato’s field of study is international trade, and his current research interests include the relationships between internationalization of firms and labor markets. His research efforts have been published in journals, books, and policy reports, including the Journal of Japanese and International Economies. Further, Sato has been appointed as a consulting fellow by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry since 2013. He received his PhD in economics from the University of Wisconsin–Madison in 2006.

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Hitoshi Sato

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Dr. Hitoshi Sato joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) for the 2018 year from the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO) in Japan, where he serves as Senior Chief Research Fellow.  He will be working on the internationalization of firms, management practices, and development.  Dr. Sato received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. 
Visiting Scholar at APARC
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Gi-Wook Shin Appointed William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea

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Stanford Korean studies expert Gi-Wook Shin has been named the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, an endowed professorship established jointly by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the School of Humanities and Sciences (H&S). Shin is a professor in the Department of Sociology, senior fellow at FSI, director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at FSI, and the founding director of the Korea Program within APARC.
 
“Gi-Wook is richly deserving of this appointment,” said FSI Director Michael McFaul. “He is a remarkable colleague and scholar who established a unique Korean studies program at Stanford and, within a relatively short period of time, built it into a leading research hub on contemporary Korea and U.S.-Korea relations. Grounded in the social sciences, the program’s approach to exploring issues of vital importance to policymaking in the United States and Korea from cross-regional and comparative perspectives is at the forefront of FSI’s efforts to foster global engagement through research and teaching.”
 
The William J. Perry professorship of contemporary Korea was established thanks to a generous gift from Jeong H. Kim, a technology entrepreneur passionate about education and public service, in honor of Professor William Perry, his mentor and friend, who played a significant role in encouraging Kim’s entrepreneurship. Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) at Stanford and senior fellow at FSI. An expert in U.S. foreign policy, national security, and arms control, Perry was the 19th U.S. Secretary of Defense, serving during the 1994 crisis on the Korean peninsula. He has long worked inside and outside of government toward a peaceful resolution to the conflict on the Korean peninsula, an effort that he continues today as director of the Preventive Defense Project at FSI. Having witnessed the growth of the Korea Program under Gi-Wook Shin’s leadership, Kim decided to endow a professorship on contemporary Korea, which was named after Perry upon his retirement.
 
A prolific scholar, Shin is the author and editor of more than twenty books and numerous articles. Some of his recent books include Strategic, Policy and Social Innovation for a Post-Industrial Korea: Beyond the Miracle (2018); Superficial Korea (2017); Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific War (2016); Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea (2015); and Troubled Transition: North Korea’s Politics, Economy, and External Relations (2013). Due to the wide popularity of his publications, many of them have been translated and distributed to Korean audiences. He frequently contributes expert commentary and analysis on the two Koreas and U.S.-Korea relations in both American and Korean news outlets. 
 
Shin is currently leading a multi-year research cluster that advocates for a “New Asia” of social, cultural, and economic maturity. It includes several projects that analyze a host of issues, such as flows of talent across national boundaries and talent management practices and policies harnessed by leading Asia-Pacific countries to compete in the new global knowledge economy; migration and diversity programs and policies of Asia-Pacific universities, corporations, and governments, and their impact on innovation and creativity; and the interests and policy environments of the two Koreas and their neighbors in relation to the North Korean nuclear problem, the U.S.-DPRK dialogue, the U.S.-ROK alliance, the rise of China, and Korean reunification.
 
“I am honored to become the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea,” said Shin. “As a Korean American scholar, my mission has been to strengthen the bonds between the two countries to which I am most attached. It has been a blessing to work together with collogues, friends, and partners at Stanford and in the United States and Korea to deliver on that mission through the Korea Program research, education, and outreach. I am proud of our accomplishments to date and look forward to addressing the challenges ahead and building on our record of achievement.”
 
Previously Shin held the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies. His appointment as the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea concludes a long search for a candidate to fill the position. “We are thankful to Gi-Wook for his patience throughout the search process,” said McFaul. “This professorship is especially important at a time when changing regional relations and geopolitical developments around the Korean peninsula are front and center to U.S. and international interests.”
 
Media contact:
Noa Ronkin, Associate Director for Communications and External Relations
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research center
 
 

 

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Ketian Zhang

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Ketian Vivian Zhang joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as the 2018-2019 Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow in Contemporary Asia. Ketian studies coercion, economic sanctions, and maritime territorial disputes in international relations and social movements in comparative politics, with a regional focus on China and East Asia. She bridges the study of international relations and comparative politics and has a broader theoretical interest in linking international security and international political economy. Her book project examines when, why, and how China uses coercion when faced with issues of national security, such as territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, foreign arms sales to Taiwan, and foreign leaders’ reception of the Dalai Lama. Ketian's research has been supported by organizations such as the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation.

At Shorenstein APARC, Ketian worked on turning parts of her book project into academic journal papers while conducting fieldwork for her next major project: examining how target states of Chinese coercion respond to China's assertiveness, including the business community and ordinary citizens.

Ketian received her Ph.D. in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2018, where she is also an affiliate of the Security Studies Program. Before coming to Stanford, Ketian was a Predoctoral Research Fellow in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. Ketian holds a B.A. in Political Science and Sociology from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and was previously a research intern at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., where she was a contributor to its website Foreign Policy in Focus.

2018-2019 Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow in Contemporary Asia

Indonesian Foreign Policy: Between Two Reefs Again?

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The National Monument in Jakarta City, Indonesia. Photo: Ali Trisno Pranoto via Getty Images.

“Now and in years to come, Indonesia will do well to avoid shackling itself to a reactive-passive neutrality between the US and China,” writes Donald K. Emmerson for The Jakarta Post ahead of the 2018 Conference on Indonesian Foreign Policy, held on October 20 in Kota Kasablanka, Jakarta. “Indonesia should feel free to be free and proactive, adopting the foreign policy that best serves its interests, including its interest in helping to heal an all too plausibly broken — or breaking — and rapidly warming world.”
 
 
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Eun Young Park

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Eun Young Park joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) during the 2018-2019 academic year from the law firm of Kim & Chang where he serves as a partner and co-chair of international arbitration and litigation practice group.  Dr. Park has served as Judge in the Seoul District Court during the Kim Young Sam government. After joining Kim & Chang he has focused on international dispute resolution including trade sanctions, transnational litigation, and international arbitration. He was appointed to Vice-President of the London Court of International Arbitration and a Member of the Court of Arbitration of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre. He has taught in many universities including SKK University School of Law as an adjunct professor. His research focuses on the possibility of establishing dispute resolution mechanism in the transition of East Asian countries. The research interests encompass decisions from international tribunal arising out of international and transnational disputes of various areas including boundaries, economic disputes, and reparation arising out of transitional justice; trends and efforts to establish an independent judicial body to cope with conflicts and disputes in the region. Dr. Park is an editor of Korean Arbitration Review and has published articles including "Appellate Review in Investor State Arbitration," Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century and "Rule of Law in Korea," Taiwan University Journal of Law. He is an author of a book entitled "The Analysis of the Iran Sanctions Act of the United States and the Strategy of the Overseas Construction Project” (in Korean). 

He holds a J.S.D. and LL.M. from NYU School of Law and M. Jur. and B. Jur. from Seoul National University.

Visiting Scholar at APARC

Taiwan’s National Security Strategy during a Time of Uncertainty

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With the looming great power competitions, Dr. Huang will discuss the concept of “free and open Indo-Pacific,” China’s rapid expansion of economic and military sphere of influence, and a critical examination of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” agenda from Taiwan’s perspectives. He will then inform and explain Taiwan’s current national security strategy, defense policy and the military modernization directions. Lastly, Dr. Huang will address current issues across the Taiwan Strait and the prospect of presidential elections in 2020.

SPEAKER:
Dr. Alexander C. Huang, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Alexander C. Huang

BIO:
Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang is a professor and has been director of the Institute of Strategic Studies and the Institute of American Studies at Tamkang University, Taiwan. He is also a senior associate at CSIS with the Freeman Chair in China Studies. Dr. Huang previously served in the Taiwan government as deputy minister of the Mainland Affairs Council and has worked closely with consecutive governments on foreign and security policy matters. He spent nearly 15 years in the United States before moving back to Taiwan in 2000. He was a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS (1999–2000) and a visiting fellow in the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution (1998–1999). In addition, he taught Chinese foreign policy and U.S. security policy at the University of Maryland at College Park (1998–2000). Between 1993 and 1998, he was a senior consultant on political and security affairs for the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington, D.C. 

Dr. Huang received his master’s degree from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and his doctorate from the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He specializes in Asian and Chinese foreign and security affairs and is a nationally syndicated columnist for the United Daily, the Journalist, and Want China News in Taiwan. He has also been frequently interviewed by local and international media on security, foreign, defense, and cross-strait affairs. As a leading specialist in war-gaming, Dr. Huang has designed and directed more than 30 senior-level interagency political-military war games for the Taiwan government.
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Alexander Huang <i>Senior Associate (Non-resident), Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies</i>
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