NBC Bay Area spoke with Shorenstein APARC director Gi-Wook Shin following a press conference held by DPRK foreign minister Ri Yong-Ho on September 25, in which Ri asserted that recent comments by President Donald Trump amounted to a "declaration of war."

The verbal barrage between North Korea and the United States has sharply escalated, with increased U.S. bomber flights near and around North Korea being met by North Korean threats to shoot down such flights, even those outside its borders.

While Shin still holds that the war of words will not turn into war, he is concerned that the escalation of rhetoric is dangerous.

"The South Korean people are really worried about the possibility of a military conflict," noted Shin. He further advised the president to deescalate personal attacks on Kim Jong-un, pointing out that Kim's "god-like" status in North Korea was effectively forcing the DPRK leader to respond to White House threats.

In his Tuesday address at the United Nations General Assembly, President Donald Trump threatened to “totally destroy North Korea” if the U.S. is forced to defend itself or its allies. Over the past month, North Korea conducted its largest nuclear test and fired its longest-traveling missile. The tension between the United States and the East Asian country continues to intensify.

Stanford News Service interviewed two Stanford experts about the escalating situation between the two countries and what options leaders have on the table when it comes to North Korea.

Michael R. Auslin is the inaugural Williams-Griffis Research Fellow in Contemporary Asia at the Hoover Institution. He specializes in global risk analysis, U.S. security and foreign policy strategy, and security and political relations in Asia.

Gi-Wook Shin is a professor of sociology, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, the United Nations and individual countries, including the U.S., have imposed several sanctions on the country. Despite those efforts to pressure North Korea to denuclearize, the country’s nuclear capabilities have steadily increased. Why do you think these previous efforts did not work?

Auslin: North Korea has been intent on getting a nuclear weapon for decades, so the basic premise that Pyongyang would bargain away its program was likely faulty. Serious, comprehensive sanctions were never tried, in part because of Chinese and Russian opposition. By effectively taking the threat of the use of force off the table, previous administrations gave Pyongyang no incentive to take negotiations seriously. Previous North Korean undermining of agreements resulted in no serious cost and instead spurred Washington and its allies to offer further negotiations.

Shin: I think that the main obstacles to the previous efforts to pressure North Korea were China and Russia’s partial support for, and not-so-full implementation of, the sanctions. For instance, despite Beijing’s announcement that it would uphold the sanctions, border trade and economic activities between China and North Korea continued, and Beijing knowingly allowed this to happen. Additionally, North Korea is so used to living under difficult economic circumstances that it has found ways to be less affected by sanctions, learning how to get around sanctions – e.g., through smuggling – instead.

What does North Korea hope to gain by amassing a nuclear arsenal?

Auslin: North Korea has wanted to prevent the possibility of any foreign attack and a nuclear capability is the best means of achieving that goal. It also seeks to use any means to intimidate its neighbors and prevent them from undertaking any anti-North Korean action. It also may hope to end its international isolation by fielding a nuclear arsenal so that it can no longer be “ignored” by the international community.

Shin: By amassing a nuclear arsenal, North Korea hopes to secure the Kim regime internally and externally. Nuclear development is a main pillar of Kim’s byeongjin policy, a policy of simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and the economy. Once North Korea obtains nuclear state status, it will try to negotiate with the U.S. and South Korea for what it really wants. This could be economic support, international recognition, a peace treaty with the U.S., etc.

Are there still diplomatic means of addressing this situation that have not been explored? What are they and what is the likelihood they would be effective?

Shin: I am a believer in diplomatic power and continue to think that we shouldn’t give up on diplomacy, but it’s true that all previous diplomatic efforts with North Korea have failed, and it is questionable whether any diplomatic approach will be effective at this point. But one possible – perhaps final – approach that has not yet been explored is a Trump-Kim summit at which the two leaders might make a “big deal” – that is, to get North Korea to denuclearize in exchange for a normalization of their relationship, i.e., a peace treaty, between North Korea and the U.S. But this would be an extremely difficult thing to pull off, both politically and diplomatically.

Auslin: No package of incentives has been effective for the past quarter-century, and both bilateral and multilateral negotiations have failed. There is little reason to believe that there are untried diplomatic means that can make a breakthrough where so many have failed.

Can a diplomatic solution be reached without the cooperation of China?

Shin: China has always advocated diplomacy with North Korea, and I believe that China’s cooperation is essential, but I would also caution against relying or counting on China too heavily. From China’s perspective, the main reason for North Korea’s nuclearization has to do with the American threat – perceived or real – to its national security.

Auslin: China has shown little appetite for constructively solving the North Korean crisis through diplomatic means. Moreover, it is unclear that China retains significant political influence in Kim Jong-un’s era, even given the importance of Chinese trade with North Korea. However, if Washington and Beijing decided that a more coercive approach was necessary, then China would have a major role to play.

What are the military options on the table for the U.S.?

Auslin: Very few, short of all-out war. The North Korean nuclear program is too advanced and dispersed to be taken out by pinpoint bombing, and its missiles are on road-mobile launchers when not hidden, making them difficult to track and destroy. Seoul remains at risk from thousands of conventional artillery launchers that would certainly be used in the event of an American strike inside North Korea.

Shin: There are a number of possibilities, including a surgical strike, but given that North Korea would most likely retaliate by attacking South Korea – an action that would lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of South Korean citizens, plus a good number of U.S. soldiers and citizens in the country – it’s not a tempting option. The U.S. government and its military are well aware that any military action would be very dangerous.

What potential actions could lead to even more destabilization and should be avoided?

Shin: Any major military action should be avoided, as it would put both South Korea and possibly the U.S. at great risk. Given that North Korea will continue its efforts to become a nuclear state, and given that military options are not viable, we may have to find a way to live with a nuclear North Korea. It is a reality that we have worked hard to avoid, but time is not on our side. I hear more and more South Koreans calling for South Korea to go nuclear now and a similar movement could begin in Japan. This would mean that the region is entering into a very unfortunate and dangerous situation.

As the war of words escalates between Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un amid a series of North Korean missile launches and a September 3 nuclear test, Gi-Wook Shin, director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, expressed concern that what is happening "might be more than an escalation of rhetoric. . . there may be escalation of expectations." Read the news item in the Independent here. In an interview with Deutsche Welle, Shin said "one could argue that the [Trump administration's] contradictory messages fit well with its somewhat paradoxical North Korea policy, 'maximum pressure, maximum engagement.'"

In an appearance on PBS Newshour, Kathleen Stephens, former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and William J. Perry Fellow at Shorenstein APARC's Korea Program, expressed concern that the presidential brinkmanship was undermining diplomatic efforts to deescalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Stephens suggested the U.S. President "restrain from twittering" the war of words in a recent interview with Yonhap News.

Yong Suk Lee, deputy director of the Korea Program at the Shorenstein APARC, said "the harsh rhetorics going back and forth between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump may indeed fuel the probability of military action. And it indeed seems like the hardliners are getting  a stronger voice domestically, not just in the U.S., but also in North Korea. However, the increased tension may actually serve as an opportunity. When the stakes are this high — with the possibility of a nuclear war, and for North Korea, an economy that is just starting to develop — the incentive to strike a deal may be higher." Listen to his interview with KCRW: To the Point here.

John W. Lewis, a Stanford political scientist who pioneered new ways of thinking about U.S.-China relations and launched some of the first Asian study programs in higher education, died Monday at his home on the Stanford campus. He was 86.

 

 

Lewis was a prolific scholar and one of the preeminent China specialists of his generation. His deep commitment to using insights from academic research to inform policy deliberations and solve important problems related to international relations and security led him to establish several centers and institutes at Stanford. These institutions supported collective undertakings involving scholars and officials from all over the globe and inspired dozens of graduate students to follow Lewis’ lead to make a tangible difference toward a more peaceful world.

He founded and directed the Center for East Asian Studies from 1969 to 1970, the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy (now the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center), from 1983 to 1990, and, along with theoretical physicist Sidney Drell, co-founded Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) in 1983, serving as a co-director until 1991. Stanford’s Center for International Security and Arms Control, CISAC’s precursor, was founded by Lewis and Drell in 1970. Lewis also led CISAC’s Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region.

Expert on Asia

Lewis, the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Emeritus, and a senior fellow at CISAC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), joined the Stanford faculty in 1968 after teaching for seven years at Cornell University, coming to campus as an expert on China at the apex of public unrest regarding the Vietnam War. As a teacher, he helped lead an interdisciplinary course on nuclear arms and disarmament and engaged in simulated arms control talks with students.

In addition to his work on China, Lewis was a pioneer in dealing with North Korea. He visited the North in 1986 and numerous times thereafter, always with the deep conviction that it was vitally important to listen and learn.  He opened doors long closed by inviting North Korean, South Korean and U.S. officials to meet at Stanford in the early 1990s, and afterwards hosted official North Korean delegations.

He was invited to visit the North Korean nuclear center at Yongbyon after the collapse of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework in 2002.  This and subsequent visits with Stanford colleagues provided virtually the only direct information on developments at the site, said Thomas Fingar, a Shorenstein APARC Fellow at FSI.

Sig Hecker, a CISAC senior fellow and the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, recalls traveling to North Korea with Lewis in January 2004, a significant time in the country’s nuclear program.

“I would never have gone to North Korea without John,” Hecker said. “He had developed a relationship that allowed us to establish an effective means of communication during the times our governments were not talking. I had worked closely with John on North Korea ever since. He was incredibly knowledgeable and had an intensity that motivated everyone around him.”

Passion for peace

Lewis was extremely active in his retirement, visiting his CISAC office in Encina Hall daily, writing books, giving lectures and archiving his materials. While recovering from a recent fall, Lewis was constantly on the phone with colleagues and continued to collaborate until he lost his ability to speak, said his daughter, Amy Tich, BA ’85.

Above all, he was an advocate of peace, education and talking with – and learning about – the nature of one’s perceived rivals, such as China and North Korea, instead of allowing misinformation and misunderstandings to spread. The word “cooperation” in the title of CISAC emanates from this belief.

How ironic, said Tich, that her father’s death came at a time when relations between the U.S. and North Korea over the North’s nuclear tests are filled with tension.

“He had amazing relationships all across Asia,” Tich said. “He believed in what he was doing to the core of his being. He wanted world peace, to save the world from nuclear war.”

John’s son, Stephen Lewis, AB ’80, MS ’80, MBA ’84, said, “He lived a remarkable life. He made enormous strides in Korean relations and Chinese relations. And he did it with a sense of humor and humility that earned him the right to push because only from pushing through issues do you get answers.”

A Renaissance scholar

Lewis was the Renaissance scholar who bridged the gap between the academic and policy worlds. In the 1970s, he was a major player in the restoration of academic exchanges with China and established ties between U.S. and Chinese academic and governmental institutions that continue today.

In the 1980s, he built enduring ties with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Moscow that enhanced understanding and collaboration among Americans, Russians, and Chinese.  He launched a project to gather medical expertise at Stanford to deal with North Korea’s severe drug-resistant tuberculosis problem, a project that took him twice to Mongolia to explore the possibility of a regional effort against TB.

Lewis was never satisfied with simply having a problem discussed, said Fingar. He ended every meeting with assembled experts on North Korean issues with a prodding, “A useful discussion. Now, what can we do?”

Lewis helped American business executives, academics, government officials and military officers establish contacts and networks in China. He also led two congressional delegations to Asia. In recognition of his impact, Lewis was invited to serve on the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences; the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council; and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.

The Stanford scholar also did consulting work for the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the U.S. Department of Defense, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress.

Born in King County, Washington, in 1930, Lewis gained his first exposure to international issues and institutions as a teenage page at the San Francisco meeting that established the United Nations. His interest in China was inspired by the stories and achievements of missionary relatives who built schools for Chinese girls. After graduating from Deep Springs College (California) in 1949, Lewis earned  his bachelor’s degree (1953), master’s degree (1958) and doctorate (1962) at UCLA. His service as a gunnery officer in the U.S. Navy (1954-1957) kindled his interest in security issues and Korea.

Publications, research

Lewis wrote and co-authored numerous influential books on Asia and international security, including Leadership in Communist China (1963); and  The United States in Vietnam (1967) (with George Kahin); and China Builds the Bomb (1988).

“John’s numerous books about Chinese decision-making regarding nuclear weapons and the Korean War were path-breaking,” said Scott Sagan, a professor of political science and senior fellow at CISAC and FSI. “His work permitted us to see behind ‘the bamboo curtain’ and understand Mao [Zedong] and his successors with more clarity than was possible before.”

Lewis received numerous letters from colleagues and former students in his final days and Tich read all of them to him. Among the praise bestowed on Lewis was his “ability to inspire in me and others profound curiosity and dedication to scholarship,” that he provided “a model of how to bring values to bear on scholarship and global citizenship,” and “[He] represented the perfect mix of academic research and real-time involvement with the world.”

CISAC co-director and FSI Senior Fellow Amy Zegart remembers Lewis’ generosity and enthusiasm.

“I can still remember knocking on John’s door as a young grad student 20 years ago and sheepishly asking if he might be willing to conduct a directed reading course with me about China’s foreign policy,” Zegart said. “He said ‘yes’ immediately. His generosity of spirit and commitment to teaching still infuse CISAC today, and will shape Stanford students for generations to come. It is a true honor to co-direct the center that John and Sid Drell created.”

Lewis is survived by Jacquelyn Lewis, his wife of 63 years; his children Stephen Lewis, Amy Tich and Cynthia Westby; and five grandchildren, Brian, BA ’15, Taryn, Kylie, Katie and Rhys.

In keeping with his life-long commitment to teaching students and training successors, the family requests that anyone wishing to honor Professor Lewis do so by contributing to the John and Jackie Lewis Fund at Stanford University, which supports funding for Stanford graduate students and postdoctoral fellows  doing research on matters related to Asia. Donations to the fund should be made out to Stanford University and sent to the John and Jackie Lewis Fund, in care of Scott Nelson, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, 616 Serra Street, Stanford, California, 94305.

In an oral history interview with the Stanford Historical Society, Lewis recounts his earlier days on campus and the impact of his career. Videos of an 80th birthday celebration for Lewis can be found here.