Expanding the Field of Korean Studies

As he welcomed conference attendees, Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and founding director of the Korea Program, explained that the goal in gathering participants and presenters who represent deep and varied interests in Korea is to highlight the importance of Korean studies programs and build bridges between the United States and Korea, creating a lasting impact well beyond campus.

Shin, who also serves as APARC director, reflected on the efforts made to build a thriving Stanford research hub on contemporary Korea. These include establishing a Korean collection at the East Asia Library, recruiting faculty with expertise in both the social sciences and the humanities, academic publishing, offering training and fellowship opportunities, and events programming.

The conference’s dual focus on North Korea’s geopolitics and South Korea’s Hallyu reflects Shin’s commitment to expanding the range of inquiry about Korea. “To understand contemporary Korea and further Korean studies, it is critical to couple the traditional focus on the Peninsula’s security dilemma with a broader examination of Korean society and culture,” he said.

Professor of International Studies Michael McFaul, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the parent organization of APARC and the Korea Program, and Professor of Jewish Studies Gabriella Safran, the senior associate dean for humanities and arts, contributed additional welcome remarks, symbolizing the Korea Program’s bridging of both the social science and humanities fields. Safran observed that Korean studies instruction at Stanford has been designed to engage the university community broadly and highlighted the evolution of Stanford students’ understanding of popular culture, thanks in part to the rising popularity of the Korean Wave.

North Korea’s Geopolitics and Society

The morning session of the conference opened with a panel on North Korea. Attendees heard from Siegfried Hecker, professor emeritus in management science and engineering, about the prospects for a renewed diplomacy policy with North Korea; from Kim Sook, former ROK ambassador to the United Nations, about the status of inter-Korean relations and North Korea’s efforts to stave off a COVID-19 crisis; and from Joohee Cho, Seoul bureau chief at ABC News, about the challenges of reporting from and on North Korea and the need to better understand North Korean society beyond the trope of the diplomacy of denuclearization.

Reflecting Back, Looking Ahead

Ambassador Kim, who is also a former fellow with the Korea Program, is one of many Program alumni from the academic, policy, and industry sectors. Speakers on the following panel represented the scope of expertise of the Program’s alumni community and the wide-ranging training and fellowship opportunities the Program facilitates.

The panel brought together Paul Chang, associate professor of sociology at Harvard University, Joon-woo Park, former ROK ambassador to the EU and Singapore, Jong Chun Woo, former president of Stanford APARC-Seoul Forum, and Megan Faircloth, a Stanford Senior in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, to consider the Korea Program’s past, present, and vision for the future.

Hard, Soft, and Smart Power

Delivering the keynote address on the first day of the conference, former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon focused on the paradox of the two Koreas. On the one hand, the Republic of Korea has followed a remarkable national development trajectory to become a powerhouse of cultural and artistic creativity – “a global soft power pace-setter,” said Mr. Ban. On the other hand, North Korea, with its stunted development, is seen as a global pariah, and its fixation on hard power suffocates the creativity, innovation, and culture of its own people through systemic repression, state control, and censorship.

But hard power and soft power are not the only two paths, Mr. Ban stated. He went on to explain that a truly advanced country should embrace a forward-thinking national identity of smart power, combining and ultimately transcending hard power- and soft power-related attributes and characteristics. “In an uncertain future, I am certain that Korea’s ascension into a smart power can advance a common destiny for all, one rooted in peace, sustainability, and prosperity,” said Mr. Ban. The best way to achieve this vision, he concluded, is to educate new generations to embody the principles of global citizenship and help them live in harmony and peace with other human beings, irrespective of their nationality.

The soft and hard power strategies of the two Koreas are also the focus of two new documentaries commissioned by the Korea Program. Focused on K-pop and the North Korean human rights crisis, the films are intended to help scholars in teaching students about these two topics. The conference included the unveiling of the documentaries’ trailers and a discussion with film director Hark Joon Lee. The complete documentaries will be released later this year.

Hallyu Has No Borders

There is no doubt that the speaker who most charmed conference attendees and the multitudes of global viewers who watched the event livestream was SUHO, leader of K-pop group EXO. “Today, I am here as the guardian of EXO and K-pop,” SUHO said at the start of his speech, referring to the meaning of his stage name.

He went on to talk about his decade-long experience as a K-pop artist and the hard work and level of detail that go into the complex choreography of the K-pop dances, emphasizing the special, social media-driven emotional bond K-pop artists share with their global fanbase and noting how many fans take a deeper interest in Korean culture because they follow EXO.

Hallyu has no borders and no longer stops at one specific art form, concluded SUHO. “We are witnessing its expansion into our society from every angle: music, dramas, movies, food, education, and more. K-culture is more than a passing trend. It’s a global phenomenon that will continue to grow and evolve,” he said.

Joining SUHO for a discussion of the Korean Wave were Stanford’s Marci Kwon, assistant professor of art and art history, and Angela Killoren, CEO of CJ ENM America, Inc., who oversees U.S. operations for the South Korean entertainment conglomerate that is known for its multiple Academy Award-winning movie “Parasite” and popular K-dramas such as “Crash Landing on You.”

Killoren described the evolution of the global adoption of K-dramas, largely made possible by their distribution through Netflix, and offered insights into the drivers and shapers of the rise of Korean entertainment. According to Killoren, unlike the predominantly male gaze-driven entertainment forms in other cultures, Korean entertainment content caters to the female gaze, as befitting the consumer side of the Korean economy that has been driven by the purchasing power of women

From Immediate Interest to Long-Term Commitment

The second day of the conference convened leading academics to examine how to translate the wide interest in North Korea and K-pop into Korean studies. Panelists included Michelle Cho, assistant professor of East Asian studies at the University of Toronto, David Kang, professor of international relations and business at USC, and Stanford’s own Yumi Moon, associate professor of history, and Dafna Zur, associate professor of East Asian languages and cultures and director of the Center for East Asian Studies.

The panelists agreed on the importance of funding and supporting the study of Korean language in higher education, providing students with tools to articulate their knowledge and experience and help them arrive at insights that are personal, meaningful, and constructive; and fostering and supporting junior faculty. The discussion was followed by a lively Q&A session that engaged many student attendees.

Future Visions of K-pop

The conference concluded with a keynote speech by Soo-Man Lee, founder and chief producer of SM Entertainment. SM is one of South Korea's largest entertainment companies and is famous for fostering and popularizing the careers of a myriad of K-pop groups and stars — including the likes of aespa, NCT, Red Velvet, SUPER JUNIOR, and EXO — and for leading the worldwide K-pop phenomenon and the musical side of Hallyu

Lee recounted his roots as “K-pop’s first mover,” explaining how K-pop music expanded globally and how it demonstrates the power of content amid exponential technological revolution. “It connects the hearts of people around the world beyond generations and ideologies,” he said.

Lee described SM’s systematic production and management system, which he coined “Culture Technology (CT)” and which includes casting, training, content production, and marketing. This so-called CT system is the “growth engine of K-pop,” he noted.

He elaborated on his vision for a future of K-pop that centers on the “Play2Create” (P2C) ecosystem and combines metaverse technology. Within this blockchain-based ecosystem, which Lee says forms part of a new creator economy, fans, or “prosumers” can proactively use the original SM intellectual property to enjoy and create new content through recreation. The ultimate vision of K-pop and Hallyu is to contribute to human creativity, concluded Lee.

The conference made headlines in Korean media and elsewhere. Explore selected media coverage, the event press release, conference agenda, and YouTube playlist including the full livestream recordings via the links below

Selected Media Coverage

• The Stanford Daily - May 26
• Yonhap News - May 22
• Yonhap News - May 21
• Yonhap News - May 20
• Yonhap News - May 20
• SPOTV News - May 21
• Rappler - May 20

Event page and complete agenda 
Event press release 

This commentary first appeared in Foreign Policy.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been a double disaster for President Vladimir Putin, as he faces a poorly performing military combined with an inability to shield his country from economic punishment. Both of these possibilities historically have also been sources of apprehension for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). But China’s leadership turned its anxiety into action about 10 years ago, deliberately working to fix many of the problems and minimize the risks currently plaguing Russia in Ukraine.

One result is that the Chinese military is more likely to perform well even though it has not fought a war since 1979, when it lost thousands of troops in a punitive but brief invasion of Vietnam. Adding to that, China’s economy is both far larger and deliberately more diversified than Russia’s. A sanctions effort like the one presently aimed at Russia would be much harder to sustain against China. These two observations do not mean deterrence won’t hold, only that the unfolding events in Ukraine will likely do little to make Beijing more cautious.

Nearly everyone overestimated Russia’s military capabilities—including probably Putin himself. During its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s air-ground coordination has been ineffective, and Russian forces have shown risk-adverse tendencies in the air. Russia has also struggled with logistics and keeping its military supplied. Notably, it appears that Russia acted on bad intelligence and therefore did not believe initial strikes that maxed out its firepower were necessary. Furthermore, many Russian weapons platforms are outdated (for example, its Cold War-era tanks), and modern Su-57 fighter jets and T-14 Armata tanks only exist in comparatively small numbers.

The Chinese military used to clearly exhibit the same deficiencies. But over the past decade, it has embraced significant reforms, creating a much more capable fighting force that should give even the United States pause.

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First, while Russia allowed its conventional capabilities to atrophy, Chinese military spending has exploded over the past three decades, increasing by 740 percent (in comparison to Russia’s 69 percent) from 1992 to 2017. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China spent almost four times on its military in 2020 than Russia ($244.9 billion to $66.8 billion). In 1999, less than 2 percent of its fighter jets were fourth-generation, 4 percent of its attack submarines were modern, and none of its surface ships were. Twenty years later, not only did China have much more of everything, but the majority was the most advanced, modern versions available—with China exhibiting advantages over Russia, even in combat aircraft, a traditional area of weakness for China.

Indeed, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commentators often refer to China’s economic might as one of the reasons their military would outperform Russia’s—Russia has been “stingy” with its military modernization and production of precision-guided munitions primarily because of a lack of resources. By contrast, China has more than 2,200 conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles, making the PLA Rocket Force the world’s largest ground-based missile force. Estimates place the number of missiles positioned against Taiwan alone at around 1,000.

Russia’s poor performance does remind us that it takes more than just a lot of fancy systems to win a war (though having more advanced systems and more of them surely would have helped). The human element of Russia’s failures is front and center. Putin probably did not have an open and honest communication channel with the military, which was fearful of providing unfavorable information to the erratic leader. Russian troops were largely considered incompetent, but Putin thought superior technology could overcome human deficiencies.

Chinese President Xi Jinping identified similar training and competency issues in the PLA 10 years ago. But under his command, the PLA has been proactively implementing significant reforms to avoid similar pitfalls. And unlike Putin, who apparently believed technology could overcome deficiencies in personnel, Xi came to the opposite conclusion. When he came to power, he took one look at the military and recognized that with all its fancy equipment, the PLA probably could not fight and win wars and perform the missions it had been assigned. Of particular importance, according to China’s national military strategy, was to fight local wars under informationalized conditions. This meant that the network between platforms and people—the ease of connectivity—was the main feature of modern warfare. China needed the best equipment; an advanced command, control, computers, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network; and tons of precision-guided munitions. But perhaps most importantly, it needed troops that could leverage these systems to conduct seamless operations across services and top-down through the chain of command.

What followed was a series of slogans—the two incompatibles, two inabilities, two big gaps, the five incapables—all designed to point out the organizational and personnel issues of the military and focus leadership attention and resources on fixing the issue. A massive military reorganization followed with moves such as reorganizing effective combat units to be smaller so that they can mobilize more quickly and can remain self-sufficient for long periods of time. This means, in contrast with the Russian military, the PLA will likely have less reliance on generals at the front lines. China also established theater commands to facilitate joint operations and prioritized realism in its military exercises to help it prepare for real combat. Part of all of this was Xi’s demand that the military communicate its failures and weaknesses so that they could be addressed. Moreover, to improve command and control, China has moved toward engaging in multidomain joint operations all while standing up a new joint operations center that will ensure that, unlike with the Russian military, orders will be communicated and understood at the lowest levels. Indeed, the main reason that Xi has not yet made a play for Taiwan is likely his desire to hone this command and control structure and practice joint operations in realistic conditions for a few more years—a cautious and pragmatic approach that the situation in Ukraine only encourages further.

The PLA itself acknowledges that it still has some distance to go with training, particularly with regard to joint operations, but it looks as if the hard work is paying off. The complexity and scale of China’s national military exercises are eye-opening. It takes a great deal of planning, synchronization, and coordination to take service-level operations to the joint level. China appears to have made great strides in this area. The United States has observed, for example, China executing deep-attack air operations in its exercises that have combined intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with multi-domain strike; lift for rapid mobility and advanced fighter manuevers. Russia has relied heavily on artillery and tanks, now and historically, while the PLA is showing a more balanced approach to combined arms operations.

For all these reasons, we should not expect the Chinese military to perform as poorly in its first real military operation since 1979. The PLA is structurally superior to the Russian military. And the Chinese know it. Granted, it’s hard to know whether some of the outlandish claims in the Chinese media are true—that the PLA Air Force would actually “be able to take out the Ukrainian air force in one hour.” But one thing is for certain—the Chinese military is learning lessons from Ukraine, whether it is to stockpile more precision-guided munitions, ensure solid command and control, or cut off internet access to prevent the leaking of information to the West, which will only serve to improve its warfighting capability in the future.

The Korea Program at Stanford's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) will mark its 20-year anniversary with a conference focused on North Korea’s geopolitics and South Korea’s pop culture wave (Hallyu), two aspects of Korea that continue to intrigue the public. Exploring how to translate this public attention into an increased academic interest in Korea, the conference will be headlined by Ban Ki-moon, former United Nations Secretary-General, and Soo-Man Lee, Founder and Chief Producer of SM Entertainment, who will join a lineup of speakers including SUHO, leader of K-pop group EXO. The two-day event will take place on May 19 and May 20, 2022, at Stanford’s Bechtel Conference Center, and is free and open to the public.

Breaking with the format of a traditional academic conference, the event will bring together scholars and experts to envision new horizons for the field of Korean Studies. It will include panel discussions on issues such as security on the Korean peninsula, North Korean human rights, U.S.-DPRK relations, and the rising global popularity of South Korea’s soft power, with a focus on K-dramas and K-pop. Scholars from Stanford and other prestigious North American universities will join on-stage conversations with leading practitioners including Joohee Cho, Seoul Bureau Chief at ABC News, and Angela Killoren, CEO of CJ ENM America, as well as government officials including Kim Sook, the former South Korean Ambassador to the UN, and Joon-woo Park, the former South Korean Ambassador to the EU, both former visiting fellows at the Korea Program.

Kim Hyong-O, the former speaker of South Korea’s National Assembly as well as a Korea Program alum, and Geun Lee, the president of the Korea Foundation, will deliver remarks at a private dinner event, which will recognize major donors and supporters of the Program.

“We are delighted to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Korea Program with such an outstanding lineup of speakers,” says Gi-Wook Shin, William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea at Stanford and the Program’s founding director. “For the past two decades, the Program has produced exceptional research on pressing issues, fostered connection between scholars and policymakers, and nurtured numerous students,” Shin notes. These accomplishments will be on display in the Korea Program’s new digital archives, which will be unveiled at the conference.

The event will also feature previews of two brand new documentaries, one on K-pop and the other on North Korean human rights, directed by Hark Joon Lee. “It is our hope that these documentaries will deepen global understanding of these issues and be used to help teach the next generation of students about Korea,” says Shin, who provided input on the films along with his research team at the Korea Program.

“We are incredibly grateful to those who have helped the Korea Program thrive over the past two decades,” notes Shin. “This conference will be an opportunity to share our thanks and reflect on our achievements while looking forward to the Program’s future.”

For conference registration, as well as the full agenda and speaker list, please visit the event page. Registration will open on Monday, May 2, 2022, at 9:00 a.m. PDT.

The conference will be live-streamed on APARC's YouTube channel.

About the Korea Program

The Korea Program at Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center is a West Coast hub of scholarship on contemporary Korea and the issues shaping the future of the Korean Peninsula and U.S.-Korea relations. Our work examines these topics from regional and comparative perspectives through cultural, political, and economic lenses. We train and support emerging Korea scholars and convene experts from academia, government, business, and civil society for dialogue, research, and publishing activities that inform policymakers in the United States and Korea and strengthen the bonds between the two countries. For more information, visit our website.

Media Advisory and Press Contact

Journalists interested in covering the conference should contact Shorenstein APARC’s Associate Director for Communications and External Relations Noa Ronkin at noa.ronkin@stanford.edu by May 17 at 9:00 a.m. PT to register. At the venue, they will be required to present a press credential from an established news organization. Freelance reporters should email a letter from the news organization for which they work to Noa Ronkin by the May 17 deadline. The press area is limited and press seating is not guaranteed.