This commentary originally appeared in The Economist.

But even with all these improvements, it is unclear whether China could take Taiwan by force. China has not fought a war since 1979, when it made heavy weather of a “punitive” invasion of Vietnam. An amphibious attack, and to a lesser degree a blockade of the type the exercises off Taiwan were simulating, would demand complex joint operations (involving army, air force and navy), which in turn require impeccable logistics and command and control. Xi Jinping, China’s leader, launched a massive organizational reform to improve in these areas, and the PLA undoubtedly has. But the war in Ukraine may have given him heightened anxiety, given that the Russians struggled precisely with logistics and command.

For this reason, we should see the massive exercises off Taiwan less as a signal, and more as a rehearsal for combat. Mr Xi wants progress on the Taiwan issue, and domestically talk in the press is shifting from peaceful reunification to armed reunification. Chinese leaders knew the PLA had to conduct a series of large, realistic exercises to identify issues and hone their capabilities. If China had done so out of the blue, instead of using Ms Pelosi’s visit as a pretext, international opprobrium would have been stronger.

China will seize the opportunity to practice as much as possible. It has announced already that this round of exercises will continue and that another round in the Bohai Gulf/Yellow Sea is next. And it won’t just be large-scale exercises. It is unlikely that Beijing will return to its previous level of operations. Instead, China might attempt to normalize greater Chinese activity around Taiwan. That makes war more probable. Through a series of exercises the PLA, and the party leadership, might gain confidence that China’s forces are ready to take Taiwan sooner than they would otherwise have thought.

Of course, this all depends on how the exercises and operations go. From the outside, this is hard to assess. The missiles landed where they should have in recent days, and there were no accidents. But we don’t know how much and how well different groups are communicating with each other. To prepare for joint operations, air-force units need to operate in close proximity and coordinate with ground troops and amphibious elements. The PLA needs to practice providing supplies, such as prepositioned fuel stocks, and bringing munitions and medical supplies to forward locations such as Fujian, the province directly across the Taiwan Strait.

This is where the real trouble lies. If activities in the vicinity of Taiwan become more routine, not only does this heighten anxiety in Taipei (and probably other regional capitals as well) but it helps to disguise any preparations for a real military campaign. China needs an element of surprise to be able to take Taiwan before America has time to mobilize adequate forces in the region to defend the island. If China’s forces are simulating formations, blockades, attacks, and amphibious landings, it will be harder to decipher when they are preparing for the real thing. Ms Pelosi’s visit has allowed Beijing to move to a new level of military activity unchallenged, which will make it harder for America to defend Taiwan. No signal of America’s commitment to the island can fix that.

This story was last updated on August 10, 2022.

Amid warnings and condemnations from Chinese leadership, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan on August 2, 2022, becoming the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit the island since 1997. A day after Pelosi's visit, furious China began firing missiles near Taiwan in drills that appear to be a trial run for sealing off the island, and Japan said some missiles landed in its exclusive economic zone. In a series of articles and interviews, Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro examines the implications of Speaker Pelosi's visit, Beijing's response, and what the United States might do to prepare for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. 

Mastro joined CNN's Fareed Zakaria GPS to discuss what she calls the "unprecedented scale and complexity" of China's military drills near Taiwan. Over the past 20 years, China has invested in building up not only one of the most advanced and sophisticated militaries but also one that can attack and keep out the United States. So now, explains Mastro, beyond the live-fire and missile tests, the Chinese military exercises also included complex air and naval operations designed to demonstrate China's readiness to take Taiwan when it feels ready to do so. Watch:

According to Mastro, when China makes a move on Taiwan there has to be an element of surprise, so they don't want to do it right now when the United States has increased its focus and operations in the region. But we will probably see additional rounds of Chinese military exercises in the future, she predicts, "and the more they get to do it the more confident they become and the more likely we are to see Beijing initiate force against the island." 

A Question of Capability

China's round of military exercises in response to Speaker Pelosi's Taiwan visit was a bit of a “coming-out party” for Beijing, writes Mastro in an invited commentary for The Economist. After years of investments to build up and modernize the People's Liberation Army, China’s armed forces are now comparable to America’s in quality and quantity, Mastro says. But even with all these improvements, it is unclear whether China could take Taiwan by force. Chinese leaders knew the PLA had to conduct a series of large, realistic exercises to identify issues and hone their capabilities, and Pelosi's visit gave them the pretext to do exactly that. "China needs an element of surprise to be able to take Taiwan before America has time to mobilize adequate forces in the region to defend the island," Mastro notes. "If China’s forces are simulating formations, blockades, attacks, and amphibious landings, it will be harder to decipher when they are preparing for the real thing."

In an interview with BBC World News, Mastro argues that the political maneuvering intended to signal U.S. commitment to Taiwan — whether it comes in the form of Speaker Pelosi's visit or President Biden's statements that "the United States must protect Taiwan" — is ultimately unhelpful and does not address the more serious issue at hand, which is whether the United States has the military capabilities needed to defend Taiwan.

Mastro also suggested that Chinese leadership has benefited from Pelosi's visit, using the occasion for their own political purposes and to test some of their military capabilities to take Taiwan by force.

Watch the full discussion:

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According to Mastro, a noteworthy aspect of Pelosi's visit is that she chose to pursue it despite dissuasion from the Biden administration, signaling to Beijing that the U.S. model is grounded in the separation of powers and that Congress would act independently to pass legislation to supply arms or provide military funding to defend Taiwan.

Chinese Military Projection of Power

In response to Pelosi's visit, China announced military exercises in six regions around Taiwan, pressing its forces closer to the island than ever before. "They’re definitely going to use this as an excuse to do something that helps them prepare for a possible invasion,” Mastro says in a New York Times report. "Under the guise of signaling, they’re trying to basically test their ability to conduct complex maneuvers that are necessary for an amphibious assault on Taiwan.”

Mastro recently outlined the array of weaponry China has amassed for a forceful "unification" with Taiwan, pointing out that China has now the world's largest navy and that its missile force is thought to be capable of targeting ships at sea to neutralize the main U.S. tool of power projection, namely, aircraft carriers, notes a New York Times explainer.

Mastro also joined WBUR's On Point Radio host Meghna Chakrabarti to examine the fallout from China's military exercises around Taiwan, current Chinese military capabilities, and what a modern war over Taiwan would look like. Listen to the full conversation:

Artificial intelligence and machine learning will play a major role in a Taiwan contingency, and these are significant because they change much of China's perceptions of its capabilities, Mastro explains. First, the Chinese are concerned about the capabilities of their personnel, but if they can use AI-enabled systems and take the person out of the loop, then that makes them more confident in their military capabilities. Moreover, the Chinese notion of "war control" is such in which thinking through enables planning and preparing for every possible outcome and contingency in a war. "Algorithmic warfare is exactly what they have in mind. They think, 'If we have the right systems, we can project and ensure victory ahead of time.' So, from my perspective, AI is really significant because of how much more confidence it would give China in its ability to win a war."

Under Xi Jinping, the People's Liberation Army has modernized to a point where "armed reunification" with Taiwan seems increasingly plausible. But experts differ in interpreting China's calculus on Taiwan. "When people talk about whether or not China can or cannot [invade Taiwan], they’re actually talking about something different, the level of operational cost — the loss of ships, casualties — that China would have to pay to do it," Mastro tells the New York Times. "They could do it," she added.

Paths to Deterrence

Mastro also appeared in an interview with NBC Bay Area, explaining the context for the flaring U.S.-China tensions as they pertain to Taiwan. "The issue is that the United States promised not to have official ties with the Taiwan government, and the visit by Speaker Pelosi is understood by the Chinese as an official delegation, meaning the United States is violating its promise."

Pelosi's visit is not the first time the United States has sent an official delegation to Taiwan, and the Chinese follow-up military exercises are not the first sign of Chinese retaliation. What has changed this time around, according to Mastro, is Chinese military capabilities. "China now has a formidable force that could take Taiwan, if it felt like it, and I think that is encouraging a much more aggressive posturing on the part of Beijing," she said.

Mastro emphasized that the U.S. strategy of making symbolic statements of commitment to Taiwan is misguided and does not deter Beijing from aggressive action. "China's uncertainty right now is not about U.S. commitment but is, instead, about U.S. capability [...] I'm sure the Chinese are watching [Pelosi's visit], but the lessons they're learning is not that they should back off Taiwan, but instead that they need to strengthen their position to convince the United States not to engage in these kinds of activities in the future."

For more of Mastro's analysis of the fallout from Pelosi's visit and cross-Strait tensions, visit the links below:

What Does China Want from Taiwan? 
Sky News, August 12, 2022

Will the US and China Go to War Over Taiwan 
BBC, August 11, 2022

What Are the Issues Between the U.S., China, and Taiwan? Stanford Scholar Explains 
Stanford News, August 10, 2022

China’s Military Operations Around Taiwan After Pelosi Visit Show Intent to Change Status Quo 
South China Morning Post, August 5, 2022

China ‘Convinced It Needs to Hit Us With Pearl Harbor-style Surprise Attack’ to Win War Over Taiwan, Expert Warns 
The U.S. Sun, August 5, 2022

Stanford Experts Cast Grim Predictions for U.S.-China Relations Following Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit 
The Stanford Daily, August 5, 2022

China’s War Games May Not Lead to All-out Conflict Against Taiwan... Yet 
The Telegraph, August 4, 2022

Chinese Missiles Strike Seas Off Taiwan, and Some Land Near Japan 
New York Times, August 3, 2022

Taiwan Lives Under the Threat of a Modernized and Reinforced Chinese Army 
Les Echos, August 3, 2022

China’s Military Drills Could Be a Prelude to Something Much Worse in Taiwan 
The Telegraph, August 3, 2022

Why Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit Is Raising U.S.-China Tensions 
New York Times, August 2, 2022

Pelosi's Taiwan Visit Triggering Potential Military Showdown 
VOA Chinese, August 2, 2022

China and US on a Collision Course: Tensions Over Taiwan Continue to Rise 
de volkskrant, July 29, 2022 (in Dutch)

For Taiwan, Pelosi Visit is About Us, China Controlling Risk 
CBS Bay Area, July 29, 2022

Xi Jinping's Phone Call with Biden 
BBC Chinese, July 28, 2022

Pelosi’s Rumored Taiwan Trip Sparks Uproar 
The Dispatch, July 27, 2022

Taiwan Holds Drills Amid Pelosi Visit Concern, China Tension 
AP, July 25, 2022

Guam: The Sharpening of the Spear’s Tip 
Foreign Policy Focus, July 20, 2022

Expert Voices: Interview with Oriana Skylar Mastro 
Center for Advanced China Research, July 18, 2022

Guam, the small island territory in the Pacific Ocean, plays a unique strategic role in the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy. In a new article, part of a Hudson Institute collection of essays on the challenges and motivations of defending Guam, Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro analyzes the island’s strategic importance to the United States, China’s threats to U.S. forces on the island, and the pathways to deterrence against Chinese encroachment in the region. 

Mastro enumerates a number of reasons behind Guam’s strategic importance. First, “the Chinese missile threat to U.S. regional bases, especially those located in the first island chain, enhances the operational role of those bases sufficiently distant from China to partially mitigate the threat it poses, yet also close enough to be operationally impactful.” Guam’s geostrategic potential is rooted in its proximity to China, and represents “the westernmost location from which the U.S. can project power, manage logistics, and establish command and control.” 

In a Taiwan contingency, Mastro argues that Guam would play an important role as a logistics hub and jumping-off point for combat forces headed toward the Taiwan Strait, with the caveat that U.S. forces could maintain roughly half the sortie rate from Guam as that from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan. Another reason behind Guam’s strategic utility comes from reliable base access, which is more reliable than in other Asian host countries.

Despite the U.S. force posture and the island’s protective distance from China, Guam remains vulnerable to Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile attack. According to Mastro, the U.S. has systems on the island to protect against missile threats, such as a THAAD battery, but “U.S. military commanders want much more of a guarantee that the U.S. would be able to continue operations out of Guam even under Chinese missile attack.”

Given China’s ability to threaten U.S. bases on the island, Mastro proposes an “unappreciated and underutilized” pathway to deterrence: deterrence by resiliency. Similar to deterrence by punishment, which seeks to prevent adversary attacks by employing the threat of severe penalties should the adversary do so, deterrence by resiliency is based primarily on shaping adversaries’ perceptions of one’s own capabilities. “However, unlike deterrence by punishment, the goal is not to create fear of retaliation but rather to encourage the perception that disruptive events would have little effect on an adversary.” Mastro uses the term resiliency to refer to a state’s ability to both absorb and deflect costs at a given level of violence.

Mastro argues that resilience is about signaling to China that “the benefits it would derive from a particular action would actually be less than it believes them to be. Improving defenses can enhance deterrence through this mechanism, but, given its limitations, other avenues—in particular, pursuing viable alternatives and creating redundancy—should also be pursued to ensure that an attack on Guam would not cripple a U.S. war effort.”

Guam, frequently cited as the U.S.’s viable alternative to bases within the first island chain, represents a critical strategic waypoint, but as long as the U.S. is reliant on the island to fight and win a war, “China will ensure that it can effectively target the island, thus making messaging associated with Guam’s defense key.” Mastro proposes that the language about defending Guam must expand to accomodate resilience contingencies for the island’s planned defenses, which, “once in place and even under attack […] would ensure that the US could continue operations there to the degree necessary to, for example, maintain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait.” 

Whether China would accept deterrence by resilience remains to be seen, but policymakers must employ new thinking about Guam’s defense to meet the new security challenges posed by China.

This interview with Oriana Skylar Mastro was originally published by the Center for Advanced China Research.

A little over a year ago, you pointed out in an article in Foreign Affairs that there is “no quick and easy fix” for the United States to ensure Taiwan’s security. How would you assess the United States’ Taiwan policy in the time since you wrote those words? How much progress has Washington made in improving Taiwan’s security picture and our military posture in the region?

Unfortunately, I don’t think we have made much progress in those particular areas. One of the reasons I wrote that article is that I was trying to make the argument that an assessment of US capabilities right now is largely driving Chinese thinking. They are assessing US capabilities and also their own capabilities to achieve certain military goals much more than they are assessing questions of resolve, as I wrote in that article. Chinese strategists are assuming US military intervention. Unfortunately, the Biden administration seems to still be focused on this communication of resolve aspect, and they spend a lot of their time and effort doing things like signing joint declarations about how Taiwan is important or having Biden make statements that lean much more towards strategic clarity, saying they’re going to defend Taiwan. I don’t think this enhances deterrence because this is not the primary factor that Beijing is currently considering when they’re deciding whether or not to attack Taiwan. It’s really about those capabilities.

Under the Biden administration, there’s more consideration of what Taiwan needs to defend itself, but none of that has actually come to fruition to any significant degree. There’s also more consideration about the need for more funding for things like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, but not much has actually come to fruition on that either. So I think we’re not in any better position than we were when I wrote that article.

It sounds like you feel that the communicative aspect of deterrence doesn’t matter and that it’s only capabilities that matter, but you have also argued in the New York Times that the United States would be “outgunned” in a Taiwan conflict, which you based on tabletop exercises that you’ve been a part of and other assessments. If the United States is really at a military disadvantage in a Taiwan contingency, are US capabilities really the thing that’s deterring China anymore, or is it simply the geographical challenges in conquering the island, which you also talked about? Is the US military factor not really doing the deterrence job anymore?

I see those as the same thing. I say the United States is “outgunned,” and this is more of a balance of forces type of scenario, but the most important thing to keep in mind is, I’m talking about situations under which China initiates the conflict. So if we’re in that scenario, they’re going to find a time and place that is most favorable to them and least favorable to the United States. There are many ways the war could happen that the United States wins. So it’s not the case that China wins every time, but I guess part of my argument is, China is going to try to not fight those wars that they know that they would lose and instead guide the conflict towards areas of success, and one big aspect of that is moving quickly. So the problem with the amphibious assault is, let’s just say it’s completely uncontested, you’re just talking about a couple of hours of moving ships across a narrow strait, that’s not quite so difficult. The issue is if there’s any contestation. And sure, Taiwan is a component of this, but Taiwan doesn’t really have the military means, even with the geography and difficulty of landing stuff. Taiwan has the means to impose some costs on China for the invasion but not to stop the invasion. The real question is whether or not the United States can bring the massive firepower needed in a timely manner while they're trying to conduct that invasion, and a lot of that has to do with the amount of early warning the United States gets, whether or not we can get better at more quickly deploying our assets, things of that sort. So I think the Chinese calculations about how difficult the invasion is going to be are also predicated on how quickly and with what the United States can respond once it becomes apparent that the invasion is underway.

You also talked in the New York Times article about the difficulty of responding given that we have a limited number of air bases that are within refueling range, and of course our forces are dispersed all over the globe. How dire, for lack of a better word, do you think the situation is for the US military? Is this something that we could fix with more aircraft carriers in the region, or is this something that we can only do over a longer time frame? You have mentioned trying to get more basing rights in regional partners; is this something that we really stand a decent chance of addressing in the near term, or is that something that it would just take longer to do?

It’s very dire, and it’s not even just the number of bases. As a crazy hypothetical example, let’s say that the president says tomorrow, Asia is so important that now I’m dedicating all military forces to Asia. There’s no place we could put them! These airfields, for example, can only generate so many sorties, they can only house so many aircraft. It’s not like all of a sudden you can put all these forces forward deployed in Asia.

I don’t want to say that it’s long-term because these things can happen quite quickly when there’s political will on both sides, but it really is a diplomatic problem, it really is about getting the United States more access and more flexible access to the bases we already have, because there are rules, regulations, and restrictions to what we can have certain places, what types of operations we can do. The South Koreans, for example, we have to consult ahead of time, we have all these sorts of things that slow us down, and so we do need more places from which we can operate, and we need more flexibility with our allies and partners in how we operate when the time comes. That is going to be negotiated and that is going to be paved by diplomats.

So when Secretary Blinken says he wants to lead with diplomacy, I’m all for that, but you have to actually put in that work, and I don’t see that work being put in with key countries in the region.

Given that the Biden administration has already been in office for a year and a half, do you feel that’s something that is likely to be turned around, or do you think we’re going to be stuck in neutral for the foreseeable future?

I think the Biden administration is a bit risk averse. There’s a number of very logical reasons for this. They inherited a mess domestically, just like President Obama before, having to dig our way out of economic troubles and with COVID and all these other issues. I’m not an expert on American domestic politics, but my sense is that you always need support for certain policies, and so where are you going to be pushing things forward? Is it going to be on gun reform, or is it going to be on bases in Palau? And you know that because of the hostility of our politics these days, if things aren’t easy and perfect and everything isn’t going the way it’s supposed to go, the opposing party is going to jump down your neck about it. And so I understand the reluctance, the desire to engage with countries that we already have close relationships with and that we already do things with, the easier route of less resistance, versus potentially seriously reconsidering what our force posture should look like in a Taiwan conflict, because then you’re talking about changing your relationship with countries that are not unproblematic, like Vietnam. So I get why they are reluctant. Even with diplomatic initiatives, if they put together an initiative to try to regulate military uses in outer space or in cyber for the first time, what if it failed, what if no one came along with us? Politically, that wouldn’t look good, so I understand why they’re reluctant to try and fail. But I think just in government more generally, we can’t always predict all aspects of things, and we think doing nothing is better than something. But in this competition, we can try smaller-scale stuff, see how it works out, see what happens, and then hopefully experimentation in military strategy becomes more politically viable.

What happens after a Taiwan conflict? A lot of the discussion about a war over Taiwan is predicated on the idea that it’s a vital US interest, but is there a scenario in which Taiwan gets “reunified” but the United States’ network of alliances in Asia remains intact? Or is it an all-or-nothing deal, like a lot of people assume?

It completely depends on how it happens. Let’s say China moves very quickly and the United States is not able to come to Taiwan’s aid in time. That doesn’t really call into question US capability. For example, we have US forces in Japan, we have the forces necessary to defend Japan that are already there, so that’s a different scenario than the United States, with all of its might, waging major naval battles and major air battles and losing. Then, all of a sudden, I think the alliance system is more likely to fall apart because then it becomes clear to countries in Asia that the United States military no longer has the capability to stand up to the Chinese military, so then we see a lot more bandwagoning. So it kind of depends on what the United States’ role is in the actual conflict, and then a lot of it depends on the political decisions the United States makes after the conflict. One of the things I point out, for example, about the economic ramifications of a conflict or whether or not the United States has access to semiconductors and things like that, is that a lot of that depends on the US. We’re going to sanction, we’re going to prevent ourselves from engaging with the new Taiwan as punishment to China for taking Taiwan, that’s my most likely prediction of how the United States, at least politically and economically, is going to respond. We won’t recognize it, and then we’re going to try to lead some very serious decoupling economic sanctions against Beijing, so one of the ramifications of that war could be very serious economically if all of a sudden now we have two blocs and China and the United States don’t trade at all. Alternatively, it could be very minimal, if Europe and the US are like, “well, we didn’t want that to happen, but now it did, so let’s move on,” and we continue a similar economic relationship with Taiwan and China even in spite of that use of force. So whatever the situation is, it’s worse than if we defend Taiwan and win, that much I know for sure, but then in terms of how bad it would be for the United States and our allies and partners, I think that depends on so many of those factors it’s hard to say with 100% certainty what the situation will be.

Could the fear of losing all that credibility in a direct conflict with China over Taiwan create an incentive not to fight or to accept one of the phased invasions you talked about in the Foreign Affairs piece?

Yeah. I mean, that’s actually one of my biggest fears, that China moves quickly and the United States looks at the situation and says, “well, you could send this, but we know it’s not going to be enough.” So actually I think the worst-case scenario is that the United States sends some sort of token force. This is also why I’m very much against the statements Biden is making about strategic clarity, because I think it means that people in the administration are so focused on the rhetorical aspect of credibility that they might think it’s a good idea to send a token force so you can say that you tried, but it didn't work, and in my mind, that’s the worst of both worlds, because again, it might give people the impression that the United States doesn’t have the capability to defend them anymore, and then also China gets to defeat the United States. So in my mind, if the situation is such that we know we cannot win, I’m sorry to say, but I think it’s better that we don’t do anything versus sending some sort of token force to say, oh, well, you know, at least we tried.

But doesn’t the existence of that issue, the possibility that it would be more in our interest not to fight, reinforce the notion that we should have strategic clarity if we want to deter an attack?

Well, no, because again, China is not moving with the expectation that we will not fight. When they make that decision, they have to take a look at what’s going to happen if the United States counters [them], can they still win, so whether or not we do or we don’t in the end, they’re basing it on that worst-case scenario thinking. Of course, if tomorrow the United States said, we won’t defend Taiwan under any circumstances, that would impact Beijing’s calculus. I guess my point is it’s not about not saying anything at all, it’s just that in the 1990s, it used to be the case that if the United States would intervene, China could never win, and so making those clear statements would have really significantly impacted their decision-making, but that’s no longer the case.

You spoke in both those articles about the possibility of China striking US bases at the outset of a conflict. Would that create a risk of NATO allies and other US partners being drawn into the conflict, and if so, would that even be a factor for China?

So the short answer is no, which is really disturbing. I’m here speaking to you in my civilian capacity, and my views do not represent those of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. But I was just on military orders out in NATO – and I’m a China expert, so I’m with all of our NATO partners and allies, but I’m not an expert on NATO, and of course, we start talking about Article V, and I’m very curious about this exact question that you have about mutual defense if the United States or a US European presence is attacked. [Article V] very specifically makes reference to US European forward bases, so I asked explicitly if US forces are attacked in Japan, or attacked in Korea, does Article V cover that? It seems like the specification of European bases means no. They wouldn’t give me a direct answer on that. And so then I emailed some European specialists and NATO specialists at Stanford because I thought maybe they know, and they said, no, it’s very vague, you should keep on harassing them about it. So the bottom line is that Europe wants no part of this. It seems to me that the way that the NATO treaty is written, they’re not obligated to do anything, militarily I mean, and I think they’re probably not, and I’ve never heard or seen any situation in which people are considering European military involvement. So I would say no to Europe.

Now, the situation with Asian allies is a bit different. It completely depends. I mean, I have heard people in Japan, for example, Japanese government officials have told me that attacks on US bases wouldn’t necessarily constitute an attack on Japan enough to trigger the clause that allows them self-defense. But we’ve had that understanding for quite some time, I mean, we even fought a whole war in Vietnam and the Japanese wouldn’t let us use Japanese bases for combat reasons during the Vietnam war. If China attacks the United States, you could also say that that creates a lot of disincentives for countries to allow the United States to engage in military operations from their territory if China has already demonstrated the willingness to use military force against those bases. So China will also go to countries and say, “listen, we won’t do anything to you as long as you don’t allow the Americans to operate,” and then that sort of puts the burden on them to make that decision.

When you were talking about that NATO summit, was it government officials you were talking to who weren’t giving you a straight answer about that?

I was there in uniform, so it was all military members.

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Maybe a more important question related to that – would a preemptive attack on US bases in Asia have a significant impact on the United States’ willingness to fight and try to win a longer, escalated war, a la Pearl Harbor?

So that’s the thing – just like Pearl Harbor, it’s the same calculus. The United States has significant advantages in a protracted war against China. So China’s making the same calculation that the Japanese made, right? That they can win before those advantages come into play, before the United States can reconstitute its forces, before the United States can flow more forces in the region, even if the United States has the will to do that – because even strategic clarity just says you’re willing to fight, but it doesn't tell you anything about the costs we’re willing to absorb to fight. So they’re making a very similar bet, that they’ll get to Taiwan before that happens. Because once you have Chinese forces on Taiwan, it’s my view that there’s nothing we can do to get them to leave.

So you don’t think we have the military capability to get them off the island or to take any part of the island?

No, I mean, this is – it would have to be a brute force strategy, given the difference in resolve at that point. Then I think we’re kind of toast. That’s why I feel like we have to stop them from the landing.

[On an earlier point,] China would be deterred if they felt like a coalition of all European and Asian allies were going to fight against them.

That’s really what I was asking – would the deterrent effect of that outweigh the advantages of them hitting US bases in Japan?

Oh, yeah, absolutely, so you don’t even need everyone, you just need Japan. If Japan was going to fight militarily with the United States, we win. We win that war every time.

Wow, I didn’t know that – like in the tabletops?

I would just say based on my experience of thinking about planning and forces, that with the United States’ ability for allowing to operate our forces from Japan – we have one airbase, and I forget the numbers, but Japan has thirty, forty airbases – all of a sudden, where we can operate from, our sortie rates, or ability to achieve air superiority is significantly advanced. Japan also has, second to China, the most advanced Navy in the region and one of the most advanced in the world, so if they’re projecting power with their navy into the Taiwan Strait, they can hold them off on their own for a period of time. That definitely gives us enough time to flow what we need.

So it sounds like Japan’s involvement is really the key question, almost.

Yeah, but it’s kind of one of these, like, magic unicorns. Also, if we could all of a sudden not require fuel to conduct military operations…

Is it that unlikely, though? Because Japanese officials have been talking more about how important Taiwan is to Japan’s defense since last year.

No, I mean, even when they make those strong statements and then have meetings with Japanese government officials, I asked them about those strong statements, and often I’m like, are you actually going to do something? They say, well, no, we’re still not going to do anything, but we just want to voice our unhappiness or voice our solidarity with the United States. But it’s not like operationally things are really changing in Japan, in my understanding. I’m not an expert in Japanese domestic politics, but it’s my understanding that this is a bit of a gray area of how it would go.

What are your thoughts about China signing a security cooperation agreement with the Solomon Islands? Are Western concerns about the military consequences of that agreement overblown? Does China’s subsequent attempt to secure a multilateral security agreement with ten more Pacific Island countries suggest that it wants military bases throughout the Pacific?

I think it’s too soon to tell. You know, in my own research about Chinese military strategy, I do argue that there are many aspects of the US approach which they have not emulated to date, not because of lack of capability, but because they feel like those approaches are ineffective. And one of those is a global military presence coupled with forward military intervention as a main tool of promoting your interests. A lot of aspects of how they’ve protected overseas interests to date over the past 25 years have been fundamentally different than how the United States does it. And so I was very interested when that agreement was signed about what the actual details of those [other] agreements were. Is China preparing to engage in high-intensity combat operations from these bases, or are they more logistics hubs, or [are they] for surveillance and reconnaissance against the United States? That would still not be great, but it would be a different operating concept of how a base structure would fit into overall military strategy than what it is for the United States. And so I actually think that we shouldn’t be discouraging China from having overseas bases, because we’re at such an advantage. China is at an advantage only a couple hundred miles from its coast – 2, 3, 400 if we’re generous – but if they go any farther, we destroy-- we would knock them out of the park. So if all of a sudden China wants to start contesting us militarily in other parts of the world, I recognize that that’s uncomfortable from the perspective of a lot of other countries who are there, but my perspective as a military planner is that this is the way that we maintain our military position. China is just so far behind in its ability to project power to the degree that the United States does that this would give us a significant advantage and a significant ability to impose costs on them in the short term. So I’m not particularly concerned about it. If China does start building these bases, it means that it’s significantly shifted its thinking on military strategy, and I think towards a direction in which they’re trying to directly compete with the United States, and my research shows that whenever they try to directly compete with us, we win every time. So I’m not as concerned about that as I am about how they can be pretty entrepreneurial about exploiting US weaknesses or gaps and competing with us less directly.

Problems with Intelligence Orthodoxy

Using the case of Iran, Tarapore argues that estimates adopting the view from somewhere could have warned Washington of critical decision points while it still had leverage to act, explained how U.S. policy had inadvertently shaped the Shah’s ineffectual response to unrest, and assessed opportunities for effective policy alternatives. For Tarapore, the view from nowhere and its surrounding orthodoxy is driven by “a concern over politicization in its many forms – a concern that is fundamentally sound, but often overblown or applied dogmatically…in some cases this aspiration to a view from nowhere is itself the impediment to effective estimates.”

Tarapore rules out traditional explanations of estimative failure that suggest the fault lies with insufficient data collection, weak analysis, or unreceptive audiences. “While more data and better analysis would always be welcome, they may not materially reduce uncertainty; and explanations centering on the intelligence-policymaker relationship offer no systematic critique of the orthodoxy that keeps intelligence and policymakers at arm’s length,” he writes.

The danger of dogmatic adherence to a view from nowhere orthodoxy is that estimative assessments of the unfolding events offer little actionable insight to their policy customers when they do not take into account the policymaker’s actual and potential impact on the target. According to Tarapore, “sometimes the problem is not a simple case of customers ignoring intelligence advice, but a more fundamental flaw in the intelligence-policymaker orthodoxy, which limits the types of questions intelligence estimates address.” By explicitly accounting for customer’s actual and potential impact on the situation – in those cases where policymakers had some influence on the target – analysts would have better prepared customers for change.

Limits to the View

As with any intelligence or security concept, there are limits to the view from somewhere. First and foremost, this concept does not reduce uncertainty, Tarpore notes. Data collection and deft analysis using social science methods remain as critical elements of an effective intelligence enterprise. Another caveat is that bringing the customer to the center of the intelligence problem means that intelligence analysts must track two moving objects: the target and the customer. The desired end-states, priorities and other constraints of the customer are also dynamic – they will shift as a function of political evolution, bureaucratic arrangement, or other policy developments.

As with all intelligence advice, the intelligence community can only do so much to shape the customer’s views and prepare them for change. Policymakers, Tarapore argues, would be unwilling to act solely on the strength of early, uncertain warning signs. The view from somewhere, however, would have been a useful tool to sensitize customers to the risks of not changing course – that failing to even tentatively prepare for change could result in an even costlier policy catastrophe, as with the case of revolutionary Iran.

On May 6, APARC’s South Asia Initiative hosted its inaugural conference, on the theme of “A New Agenda for Indian Competitiveness." India faces an intensifying strategic competition with China that will affect not only Indian national security but also the nature of the international system in the Indo-Pacific region. The trajectory of that competition will hinge increasingly on emerging technologies – from artificial intelligence to biotechnology. India’s ability to research, develop, and deploy such technologies will shape not only its military power but also its resilience and self-sufficiency, which the Indian government sees as key national goals in a post-pandemic world. To develop these technologies, India’s national security establishment will need new policy settings — including new relationships with private industry — and new ways of cooperating with key partners, especially the United States.

To that end, the South Asia Initiative’s conference brought together three stakeholder groups that rarely convene in the same forum: academic researchers, government policymakers, and technology industry leaders. The conference’s aim was to create a community of interest among these groups, sensitizing them to the importance of India as a key developer and user of emerging technologies, and conversely, to the importance of those technologies for Indian security and U.S.-India relations.

The conference’s discussions were led and framed by Stanford research scholars and faculty, but they were directed towards addressing policy problems. What role do these technologies play, for example, in military power? How can government and industry best cooperate to foster innovation in defense technology? How can start-up firms navigate this rapidly evolving ecosystem? The conference did not aim to solve any of those problems, but it did seek to start the discussion that might ultimately generate new pathways for U.S.-India cooperation on technology — paths that are better suited to the nature of today’s strategic competition and more rooted in the nature of today’s technology industry.

India’s Defence Secretary, Dr. Ajay Kumar, in the conference’s opening keynote address, laid out some of the challenges facing India. He noted that a handful of large and inefficient Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) account for some 90-95% of Indian defense production, but those DPSUs have a negligible presence in the global market. In large part this is because Indian defense production has comprised of licensed manufacturing or simply assembly and integration of foreign-sourced components, traditionally but decreasingly from Russia. To realize the objective of greater national self-reliance in defense, India recognizes the need to cultivate greater private-sector technology development, and harness the economic potential of dual-use (civilian and military) technologies. India could even seek to leapfrog generations of technology, by focusing on developing the digital technologies that lie at the center of much of contemporary defense innovation. This will only be possible if India encourages greater private-sector research and development, reduces onerous government regulations, and fosters a healthier start-up ecosystem.

Dr. Kumar also reflected on the lessons of the ongoing war in Ukraine. He suggested that it underscored to India the importance of national self-reliance; India now sees its dependence on Russia as a challenge. It also revealed the importance of surprise, not only tactically but in the asymmetric or innovative capabilities a country is able to field against its enemy.

In the conference’s other keynote address, the Under-Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, Jose W. Fernandez addressed the role of technology in broader U.S.-India bilateral relationship. Technology is at the heart of addressing climate change, one of the most pressing strategic challenges facing the United States and India. The two countries are prioritizing the development and protection of cyberspace and telecommunications, as engines of the burgeoning digital economy across the world. From climate to cyberspace, cooperation on technology policies and facilitating private sector cooperation is not only central to the bilateral relationship but also a vital alternative to other actors that seek to use technology for their own, less democratic interests. To address these challenges, India and the United States must strike the right regulatory balance, to support transparent governance, and foster innovation; they must widen their cooperation to include other like-minded countries; and they must facilitate a more balanced flow of educational exchange to strengthen people-to-people links.

Mr. Fernandez further noted that the United States and India work together through various mechanisms. The Quad, for example, is a key multiplier for both U.S. and Indian policy, and India has deepened its cooperation with the Quad. Strategic competition with China requires a common positive vision for the region — an agenda spanning, for example, health, infrastructure, and food security.

The South Asia Initiative’s inaugural conference succeeded in bringing together a new constellation of stakeholders concerned with the role of technology in India’s strategic competitiveness. It initiated a vital conversation on how policymakers and industry can promote defense innovation, in the context of the wider US-India relationship. Critically, for APARC, it also spotlighted some complex issues that merit further scholarly investigation. The South Asia Initiative will incorporate those observations as it continues to develop its lines of research effort in the coming months and years.

This essay originally appeared in Korean on May 20 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as the second in a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download.

To successfully chart a safe course for South Korea in its foreign relations, the Yoon Suk-Yeol government must be highly attuned to the twists and turns of today’s geopolitical undercurrents. A new international order defined by an ideological struggle between democracy and authoritarianism will leave no room for strategic ambiguity, Seoul’s hitherto strategy for balancing its relationships with the U.S. and China. Slogans such as “the United States for security and China for the economy” will be rendered obsolete. Policy visions of South Korea as a mediator for North Korea or Seoul being in the “driver’s seat” on the peninsula could become a fantasy. It is vital to consider South Korea’s economic interests with China and account for the unique characteristics of inter-Korean relations. However, South Korea should pursue a foreign policy rooted in international norms and based on values such as human rights, democracy, and sovereignty.

Russia’s War Crimes

As a responsible member of the international community, South Korea cannot remain a bystander to Russia’s imperialistic behavior. Through its own painful history, Korea knows what it means for the right to self-determination—recognized by the international community—to be trampled upon by a great power. In particular, South Korea must raise its voice in unequivocally condemning the widespread war crimes that are being committed in Ukraine.

War crimes refer to criminal acts that take place during armed conflict. This includes deliberate attacks against civilians or civilian structures such as homes and hospitals, rape and enforced prostitution, and the use of poisonous weapons, all of which constitute serious violations of human dignity. The horrific atrocities committed by the Russian military across Ukraine since its invasion on February 24 are profoundly disturbing. It has committed mass murder against civilians in Bucha, Borodyanka, Motyzhyn, and other locations; it has shelled humanitarian corridors intended to provide safe passage for refugees; and it has launched airstrikes against maternity hospitals and schools, taking the lives of Ukrainian children. The world has been taken aback by the unthinkable brutality of Russia’s military forces.

On April 7, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said “more and more credible reports of rape, killings, torture are emerging” every day.[2] He implied that the true scale of Russia’s atrocities may be much larger than currently understood.

This is certainly not the first time that the world has seen war crimes. After World War II, there were war crimes in Vietnam, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Syria, and Myanmar. However, the brutality inflicted by Russian forces in Ukraine is incomparable in its severity and intensity. Unlike war crimes committed during a civil war, Russia has committed crimes against the citizens of another sovereign state. In an April interview with The Times, former White House advisor Fiona Hill noted that Putin “has switched from trying to capture the country to ‘annihilation.’”[3] President Biden has also labeled the Russian military’s actions as “genocide.”

It is not yet possible to determine whether Russia truly has genocidal aims against the Ukrainian people, but there are growing calls in the international community to bring Putin to justice for war crimes. The most direct way to achieve this would be for him to stand trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC). In March, the ICC announced that it had begun its investigation into alleged war crimes committed by the Russian military. However, Russia formally withdrew from the ICC in 2016. The ICC does not have the authority to act on its own, and it requires the cooperation of relevant states to arrest suspected war criminals. It seems highly unlikely that Putin will ever face trial at The Hague. Because the ICC does not hold trials in absentia, a trial cannot proceed unless Putin is arrested within Russian territory. After the wars in the former Yugoslavia, former President Slobodan Milošević stood trial before an international criminal tribunal on charges of genocide and war crimes. Unlike in the case of Milošević, prosecuting Putin does not appear to be a feasible option at this time. Even so, South Korea must actively join the international community in sanctioning Russia for its actions in Ukraine.

The Threat of Sharp Power

It is especially troubling to note that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is taking place in the midst of a worldwide democratic recession. According to Freedom House’s latest annual report, for the past 16 years, more countries experienced a decline in freedom than countries that saw a growth in freedom.[4] The Third Wave of democratization, which began in the 1970s, has now given way to the “Third Reversal.”

There has been an authoritarian shift during the COVID-19 pandemic, in which governments claimed a public health rationale to infringe upon individual freedoms or delay elections. In Hungary, one of the most prominent examples of democratic decline in recent years, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán achieved a landslide victory in the April 3 parliamentary elections to secure a fifth term in office.

In particular, there are growing concerns about the consequences of “sharp power,” which China and Russia have deployed across the world. Unlike traditional “hard power” (military and economic) or “soft power” (cultural), sharp power refers to the use of covert means to exercise influence. Dark money, economic leverage, and intelligence operatives are used to coerce a target state into complying with particular demands. Authoritarian regimes have engaged in information and ideological warfare as part of this effort.

Larry Diamond, a professor at Stanford University and a renowned scholar of democracy, warns in his book Ill Winds that the future of democracy will be bleak if liberal democracies, including the United States, do not defend against China and Russia’s sharp power. In 2016, the Russian government interfered in the U.S. presidential election in a blatant display of its sharp power. If fascism from Germany on the right and Bolshevism from the Soviet Union on the left threatened to destroy the international order in the 20th century, it is now China and Russia’s sharp power that poses the most serious danger to democracies across the world. It is in this context that Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine.

The End of Globalization

Russia’s invasion may have sounded the death knell for globalization. Joining a growing chorus of observers, David Brooks declared in his New York Times column on April 8 that “globalization is over.”[5] After the end of the Cold War, it seemed that the United States would usher in a new era of globalization, with the whole world coming together as one. During the presidency of Kim Young-Sam (1993–98), South Korea also joined this rising tide by pursuing a policy of globalization. A seemingly unstoppable wave of neoliberal globalization swept across the entire world in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. While the September 11 attacks were truly devastating and were later followed by the Iraq War, these events did not fundamentally alter the international order.

Today, we face a much greater challenge. Democracy is in retreat across the world, and barriers to trade are on the rise. Anti-immigration sentiments are widespread across the West, including in the United States. Brexit and the rise of Trumpism embody these global trends. Moreover, the pandemic has disrupted global supply chains. Cross-border exchanges are being slowed by rising trade barriers, and many countries are suffering from high inflation as prices skyrocket. The South Korean economy, which relies heavily on international trade, is being pummeled by these economic shocks. If countries take steps to reduce their dependence on other countries, then globalization gradually unravels.

Populist leaders have seized this moment, marching under the banner of chauvinistic nationalism. Twenty-first-century populist leaders are defined by two traits: anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. By challenging the West and opposing a pluralistic world, China and Russia have emerged as “populist” powers on a global scale. Just as the Korean War marked the beginning of the Cold War in earnest, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may prove to be the first test of resolve for democracies in their struggle against authoritarianism.

The powerful sanctions enacted by the United States and the European Union against Russia underscore this sense of urgency. With the UN Security Council in paralysis, Washington coordinated with Brussels to impose a series of sanctions against Moscow. Only two days into the invasion, Russia’s Central Bank was removed from SWIFT. These “shock and awe” sanctions, which President Biden called the most powerful and wide-ranging sanctions ever imposed in history, were rolled out with the speed and precision of a sophisticated military operation. The ruble tanked as over $1 trillion of Russian assets were frozen. The 11th-largest economy in the world was pushed to the edge of a sovereign default. More than 300 global companies, including Apple, Google, ExxonMobil, and Mcdonald's, have shuttered their operations in Russia. During a recent conversation, a senior Google executive told me in no uncertain terms that “it will be difficult to return to Russia, even after the end of the war.”

The international community’s support, as well as the devastating sanctions imposed against Russia, have shored up Ukrainian morale as its people rally around President Zelensky. International public opinion is firmly behind Kyiv as more and more people around the world seek to help Ukrainians in their struggle against the Russian dictator.

The Rebirth of Sinocentrism?

The crisis in Ukraine has had a decisive impact on U.S. foreign policy. The Biden administration’s flagship Indo-Pacific Strategy is centered on working with its partners in the Quad—Japan, Australia, and India—to check the rise of China. Until early this year, the prevailing concern in the United States had been the possibility that China would launch an invasion of Taiwan. Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, in the face of heavy criticism from home and abroad, was motivated by a need to focus on the Indo-Pacific Strategy. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has vigorously revived the transatlantic relationship, the United States now has to contend with both Russia and China at once. India’s reluctance to fully participate in sanctions against Russia, despite its key role in the Quad, is also cause for concern in Washington.

While Putin envisions the re-establishment of the Soviet Empire, Xi dreams of a rebirth of Sinocentrism. Having forcibly imposed its will on Hong Kong, there are growing concerns that China could use military force to bring Taiwan under its thumb. Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative evidently seeks to go beyond economic cooperation and form a new China-led bloc built on economic assistance. In addition to bilateral trade disputes, decoupling between the United States and China in the high-technology sector is accelerating. The Biden administration is taking steps to bolster economic security, with the so-called Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) as its strategic centerpiece.[6]

While China is currently pursuing a relatively loose form of cooperation with Russia, Putin and Xi, both populist leaders on the global stage, could join forces in earnest to upend the international order. At the same time, Prime Minister Modi of India, another populist leader, is taking an ambiguous stance. He has kept his distance from Washington and Brussels in terms of imposing sanctions against Russia, and he has stepped in to expand India’s imports of cheaper Russian oil.[7]

Since Russia’s invasion, there has been a sense of crisis among European capitals about the dangers of excessive energy dependence on Moscow. There is also growing apprehension about a national security crisis emanating from China. Although Europe and China have clashed in recent years over the repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and bans on Chinese technology, there was an underlying consensus about maintaining friendly economic relations. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has significantly altered Europe’s calculus, however. In Germany and elsewhere, there are deepening fears that maintaining close economic ties with China, which remains friendly toward Russia, could become a critical weakness for Europe. Michael McFaul, a colleague at Stanford and a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, has stressed that the outcome of the war will have lasting implications for the future of the liberal international order. In other words, a Russian victory will further entice China to invade Taiwan, with profound global consequences.

South Korea cannot afford to remain an idle spectator to the conflict in Ukraine. There could be serious repercussions for Seoul, much sooner than expected. At a moment when the international order could rapidly change, it would be highly imprudent to sit on the sidelines or take a position of strategic ambiguity. Over the past five years, the Moon Jae-In administration adopted an ambiguous stance in its foreign policy, with a disproportionate focus on North Korea. The end result was diplomatic isolation. Moreover, Russia’s invasion reminds us once again of the importance of values and norms in international politics. The right to self-determination—the right of citizens of a given state to determine their own destiny—is a basic principle of the international community, enshrined in Article 1 of the UN Charter.

The Need for a Consensus on “Core Interests”

The once-popular paradigm of an-mi-gyeong-joong (“the United States for security, China for the economy”) is now obsolete. It is time for South Korea to seriously consider a foreign policy based on common values. While accounting for economic interests, it is critical to formulate a consensus on its “core interests”—that is, on fundamental political values. The rising tide of anti-China sentiment among South Korea’s youth is rooted in their rejection of China’s illiberal, authoritarian modus operandi.[8] They want to stand side-by-side with fellow liberal democracies, in opposition to authoritarian powers. This is part of a global trend. According to a 2021 poll of 17 advanced economies by the Pew Research Center, unfavorable views of China were near “historic highs.” 88% of respondents in Japan, 80% in Sweden, 78% in Australia, 76% in the United States, 63% in the United Kingdom, and 71% in Germany held unfavorable views of China. 77% of respondents in South Korea indicated the same—the highest ever recorded by Pew for Korea.[9]

In its policy toward North Korea, Seoul should avoid overemphasizing the “special” nature of inter-Korean relations on the basis of belonging to the same ethnic nation. It should also abandon the illusion that it can act as a mediator between Pyongyang and Washington. Seoul’s North Korea policy should be cognizant of the larger context of today’s international politics, which is defined by competition between authoritarian regimes (Russia, China, North Korea) and liberal democracies (United States, European Union, South Korea). As transatlantic cooperation on security issues intensifies, South Korea should also strengthen its ties with Europe. It was thus timely for Yoon Suk-Yeol, while he was president-elect, to send special envoys to the United States, Japan, and the European Union. The U.S.-South Korea alliance should also serve as a basis for Seoul to broadly solidify its relations with fellow democracies across the world.

This does not imply that South Korea must proclaim an “anti-China” policy stance. It is also unnecessary to needlessly provoke North Korea. Nonetheless, South Korea should clearly declare to the world its resolve to honor and defend universal values, including democracy, human rights, sovereignty, and core international norms. It will face difficult decisions in its relations with Beijing, especially due to economic considerations, and it will be impossible to treat North Korea just like any other country. As will be the case with every other democracy, South Korea will have to confront vexing challenges as it seeks to pursue its interests while upholding its values.

Since 1945, South Korea has been the largest beneficiary of the post-WWII liberal international order. It is time for South Korea to defend democratic norms and help uphold the rule-based international order. There is no free ride. As the tenth-largest economy in the world, South Korea’s economic heft alone entails certain responsibilities. If democracy is defeated by authoritarianism, there will be no future for South Korea. Intellectuals and policymakers in the United States are keeping a close eye on how South Korea responds to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. They are hoping that Seoul will join hands with its fellow democracies in their arduous struggle against authoritarian powers.

The Lessons of Korea’s History

Watching Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brings to mind the painful and bitter history of Korea’s recent past, which was marked by the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), and the Korean War (1950–53). South Korea did not succumb to adversity, however. It overcame formidable obstacles to become the economic and cultural powerhouse that it is today. As a result of its failure to appropriately respond to trends in international politics in the late 19th century, Korea lost its sovereignty. Amidst the chaos of division in 1945, the foundations for South Korea’s remarkable development were laid when it aligned with the United States instead of the Soviet Union. In 1991, at the end of the Cold War, South Korea pursued peace on the Korean Peninsula through its “Northern Policy,” also known as Nordpolitik.[10] It is especially interesting to note that at key junctures in the history of the modern international order, conservative leaders (Syngman Rhee in 1945 and Roh Tae-Woo in the 1990s) played a decisive role in steering South Korea in the right direction.

Faced with the relentless march of imperialism across the world, Korea’s leaders and intellectuals in the late 19th century responded in one of three ways. The first group advocated for Western-oriented reform, calling for the adoption of Western institutions and practices to achieve modernization. Seo Jae-Pil and Syngman Rhee were prominent figures in this camp. Second, there were those who called for Asian solidarity. Under this view, Korea would join hands with China and Japan to resist Western imperialism. An Jung-Geun’s vision of “Peace in East Asia” is a famous example. Lastly, some responded with a focus on Korean nationalism. Sin Chae-Ho and Park Eun-Sik made significant contributions to this strain of thought.

In the end, Korea was unable to coalesce around a unifying vision for the country. The Joseon Dynasty failed to achieve modernizing reforms, and Korea became a colony of Japan. Seo Jae-Pil and Syngman Rhee left for the United States. Furious at Japan’s betrayal, An Jung-Geun assassinated Itō Hirobumi, a leading advocate of Asian solidarity, at Harbin in October 1909. Korean nationalism evolved in controversial directions under colonial rule, as reflected by Yi Kwang-Su’s theory of national reconstruction.[11] Sin Chae-Ho, who wrote influential works of nationalist historiography, eventually turned to anarchism in his later years. This is the tragic portrait of a country, and of national leaders, who failed to gauge and adjust to shifting geopolitical winds.

With Japan’s defeat in 1945, the Korean Peninsula was once again thrown into a political vortex. Liberated from colonial rule, Korea was divided due to the strategic calculations of great powers. There was a tremendous loss of life not only during the Korean War, but also in the political instability that followed liberation. As the Cold War order began to take shape, North Korea stood with the Soviet Union. Fortunately, South Korea sided with the free world. Syngman Rhee played a critical role in this regard. Rhee was not well acquainted with Korea’s domestic politics, but he was perhaps the most perceptive Korean leader when it came to international politics. It is terrifying to imagine what may have transpired if South Korea had joined the communist bloc. Although Rhee’s legacy has been stained by his authoritarian rule, it is important to acknowledge his prescience in international affairs.

Storms on Both Fronts

As the Cold War order collapsed in the 1990s, South Korea once again stood at a geopolitical crossroads. The Berlin Wall unexpectedly fell in 1989, and the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991. Amidst this sea change in international affairs, the Roh Tae-Woo administration seized a historic opportunity. South Korea established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1990, entered the United Nations at the same time as North Korea in 1991, and normalized ties with the People’s Republic of China in 1992. By pursuing this audacious “Northern Policy” in the face of staunch opposition from some conservatives, the Roh Tae-Woo administration laid the foundations for sustainable development and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps the present moment, in which China and Russia are disrupting the international order, calls for a new Northern Policy that redefines Seoul’s relationship with Moscow and Beijing. The core of this new Northern Policy, of course, must be rooted in solidarity with fellow democracies against authoritarianism.

It is difficult to anticipate how the geopolitical storm set off by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may develop. For the time being, it appears quite likely that this storm will grow into a major typhoon instead of fizzling out, but it is hard to tell how powerful it will be or what direction it will take. What is certain is that the international order will not be the same, and this change will have significant repercussions for South Korea.

In fact, South Korea may already be at the center of this storm. There is momentary calm in the eye of a typhoon, but the full force of its impact will be felt in due course. When South Koreans finally experience the damage from this storm in a few years, it may be too late.

The Yoon administration has barely sailed out of the harbor, but it is already being battered on two fronts. As noted in last month’s essay, which focused on domestic issues, South Korea’s democracy is heading into troubled waters. This essay has examined an external shock: the geopolitical storm raging across the world since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Both present formidable challenges for South Korea.

History unfolds in mysterious ways. Just as in 1945 and 1991, a conservative leader is once again in the wheelhouse as South Korea heads into a geopolitical storm. The Yoon Suk-Yeol administration must keep its eyes wide open and firmly grasp the helm as it navigates these troubled waters. Syngman Rhee and Roh Tae-Woo turned geopolitical crises into opportunities for South Korea. I sincerely hope that Yoon Suk-Yeol will also be able to chart a safe course for South Korea through the coming storm