Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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The volatile relationship between the United States and North Korea has left the American public questioning whether North Korea is a threat or not. Existing polls suffer from poor design and, thus, provide a confusing and often contradictory narrative of U.S. public opinion on North Korea. As a result, a number of critical questions remain unanswered: Are Americans willing to live with the North Korean nuclear threat? Under what conditions would the public support using military force to accomplish what sanctions and diplomacy have not? What are the characteristics of the individuals willing to risk war against North Korea today? Professor Scott D. Sagan will discuss the findings of a recent survey experiment and offer a unique perspective to the ongoing public debate.

Scott D. Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, the Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education, and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University. From 1984 to 1985, he served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. Sagan has also served as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Sandia National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his pioneering work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons accidents and the causes of nuclear proliferation.     

 

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Scott D. Sagan <i>Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, Stanford University</i>
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By Hal Benton, Seattle Times staff reporter

Karl Eikenberry is a retired Army officer whose two tours of Afghanistan duty — and later service as ambassador to that nation — left him keenly aware of the limits of U.S. military power.

As a soldier, Eikenberry launched the still-ongoing effort to build an Afghan military force capable of fending off the Taliban. As a diplomat, he was stationed at the Kabul embassy during President Barack Obama’s surge that would eventually push American troop strength in Afghanistan to more than 100,000 service members in an attempt to improve security.

“Americans and the world have rightly been disappointed with the results of our costly military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 21st century. Hugely expensive, protracted … and damaging to our country’s prestige abroad,” Eikenberry said Thursday to a Town Hall audience in Seattle.

Read the full article in The Seattle Times.

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An SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) fighter looks over seized ISIL weapons
An SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) fighter looks over seized ISIL weapons that were found in the last stronghold of the extremist group as they were displayed at an SDF base on March 22, 2019 outside Al Mayadin, Syria.
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On the heels of the abrupt ending of the Hanoi summit between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with the future of the diplomacy of denuclearization in question, the Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC convened the 11th Koret Workshop, appropriately titled this year “North Korea and the World in Flux.”

The workshop, an annual gathering made possible through generous funding from the Koret Foundation, brought together international experts in Korean affairs for a full day of panel discussions. Participants assessed the U.S.-DPRK summit diplomacy, examined the challenges and opportunities in media coverage related to the negotiations between the two countries, and considered the prospects and pitfalls for summitry with North Korea in the near term. A report on the workshop proceedings is forthcoming.

At a midday public keynote, General Vincent Brooks, U.S. Army (Ret.), spoke before a packed audience about the challenges and opportunities in Korea. Brooks, who recently retired from active duty as the four-star general in command of all U.S. Forces in Korea, provided his unique and very-timely assessment of the situation on the Korean peninsula, and offered his insights on where the diplomacy of denuclearization may go next.

Gen. Brooks’ public address was followed by a conversation with Karl Eikenberry, director of APARC’s U.S.-Asia Security Initative.

Watch the video recording of Gen. Brooks’ remarks:

 

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U.S.-Asia Security Initiative Director Karl Eikenberry, left, questions General Vincent Brooks during 2019 Koret Workshop
U.S.-Asia Security Initiative Director Karl Eikenberry, left, questions General Vincent Brooks during 2019 Koret Workshop
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Three years into the Trump administration, “the United States and the People’s Republic of China find their bilateral relationship at a dangerous crossroads,” write Orville Schell of the Asia Society and Susan Shirk of the University of California San Diego (UCSD), co-chairs of the Task Force on U.S.-China Policy, at the opening of a recently published report, Course Correction: Toward an Effective and Sustainable China Policy. The report features the second set of findings issued by the Task Force, a group comprising China specialists from around the United States, which is convened by Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations and UCSD’s 21st Century China Center and which includes Karl Eikenberry, director of APARC’s U.S.-Asia Security Initiative.

In its first report, issued in 2017, the Task Force identified the fundamental interests of the United States in its relationship with China. Since then, more stresses and strains have beset the bilateral relations between the two countries. But while “Beijing’s recent policies under Xi Jinping’s leadership are primarily driving this negative dynamic” and the “Trump administration is justified in pushing back harder against China’s actions, note Schell and Shirk, “pushback alone isn’t a strategy. It must be accompanied by the articulation of specific goals and how they can be achieved.” The new report propose a strategy to that end, which the Task Force calls “smart competition.”

APARC caught up with Ambassador Eikenberry to learn more about the report and its recommendations.

Note: the following has been edited for clarity.

How does the February 2019 report by the Task Force on U.S.-China Policy differ from its 2017 report? 

Since our Task Force’s first report was published in February 2017, the Trump Administration’s China policy has developed significantly, its defining characteristics being demonstrated in trade and economic policy and in security strategy. Our new Task Force study takes stock of the current state of U.S.-China relations and focuses on policy analysis and policy prescription. It seems clear that President Trump’s shift from a strategy of engagement to one of more explicit competition was overdue. This report suggests the best organizing principles for the management of what will likely be an increasingly competitive U.S.-China relationship in the coming years.

How does this report frame Sino-American relations?

The report underscores the fact that this is not a zero-sum game. Emphasis is placed on finding ways and means to cooperate with China when mutually advantageous—and there are many issue areas where this is or might be possible, such as climate change and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But the report also makes clear that in the domains of economic exchange, security, and political values—such as individual freedom and the primacy of the rule of law—America needs to work with like-minded allies and partners to ensure the global system that has benefitted all for over seven decades is not overturned by those seeking unilateral advantage.

Several of the report’s Task Force members were also involved in the recent China report from the Hoover Institution, Chinese Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance. Where do you think these two publications intersect and part ways?

There was some overlap among the contributors to the two reports—full disclosure, I had the opportunity to participate in both projects. I think the studies are actually complementary—the portion of Course Correction devoted to PRC overseas influence activities drew upon the findings published in Chinese Influence and American Interests.

What development is of greatest concern to you as you think about the future of Sino-American relations?

I’m most concerned about the blurring of the management of economic exchange (trade and investment issues) and security competition (which includes maintaining a technological advantage over one’s competitors). The proliferation of technologies with military applications is complicating efforts of those trying to maintain robust economic relations between China and the United States. If our economies decouple, we will have a new Cold War

 

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U.S. Secretary Of State Mike Pompeo Meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi
U.S. Secretary Of State Mike Pompeo Meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi
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North Korea is the land of punditry, controversy and bad intelligence.  Policy debates swirl in Washington over how U.S. policy should address this foreign policy challenge.  Much of these debates is informed by a mix of opinion, ideology and politics.   How do we make sense of it all? Victor Cha and his Beyond Parallel microsite at CSIS try to cut through the noise to bring data to the study of North Korea and foreign policy.  He will discuss five data points that are critical to an understanding of the North Korea problem today and its policy challenges.

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Victor Cha holds the D.S. Song-KF Professorship in Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University. In 2009, he was also named as Senior Adviser for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He left the White House in 2007 after serving since 2004 as Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council.  At the White House, he was responsible primarily for Japan, the Korean peninsula, Australia/New Zealand and Pacific Island nation affairs.  Dr. Cha was also the Deputy Head of Delegation for the United States at the Six Party Talks in Beijing, and received two Outstanding Service commendations during his tenure at the NSC.  He is the author of five books, including the award-winning Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford University Press) (winner of the 2000 Ohira Book Prize), and The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (Harper Collins Ecco, 2012) which was selected by Foreign Affairs as a “Best Book on the Asia-Pacific for 2012.” His newest book is Powerplay: Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton University Press, 2016). He has testified before Congress numerous times on Asian security issues.  In 2018, he joined NBC and MSNBC as a News Contributor.  Prior to joining NBC, he had been a guest analyst for various media including CNN, ABC, NBC, CBS, The Colbert Report, Sports Illustrated, ESPN, Fox News, PBS, Huffington Post, Wall Street Journal, MSNBC, CNBC, BBC, and National Public Radio.  His op-eds have appeared in the Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, USA Today, Foreign Policy, Japan Times, and Financial Times. He holds a B.A., an M.I.A., and a Ph.D. from Columbia University, as well as an M.A. from Oxford University.

 

 

 

 

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Victor Cha <i>Professor of Government, Georgetown University</i>
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Randy Schriver
Mr. Randall Schriver
is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs. Mr. Schriver was appointed as Assistant Secretary of Defense by President Donald Trump on 8 January 2018. Prior to his confirmation, Mr. Schriver was one of five founding partners of Armitage International LLC, a consulting firm that specializes in international business development and strategies. He was also CEO and President of the Project 2049 Institute, a non-profit research organization dedicated to the study of security trend lines in Asia.
 
Previously, Mr. Schriver served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He was responsible for China, Taiwan, Mongolia, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. From 2001 to 2003, he served as Chief of Staff and Senior Policy Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of State. From 1994 to 1998, he worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including as the senior official responsible for the day-to-day management of U.S. bilateral relations with the People's Liberation Army and the bilateral security and military relationships with Taiwan.
 
Prior to his civilian service, he served as an active duty Navy Intelligence Officer from 1989 to 1991, including a deployment in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. After active duty, he served in the Navy Reserves for nine years, including as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an attaché at U.S. Embassy Beijing and U.S. Embassy Ulaanbaatar.
 
Mr. Schriver has won numerous military and civilian awards from the U.S. government and was presented while at the State Department with the Order of the Propitious Clouds by the President of Taiwan for service promoting U.S.-Taiwan relations. Mr. Schriver received a Bachelor of Arts degree in history from Williams College and a Master of Arts degree from Harvard University.
 

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Randall Schriver Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs
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STANFORD, CA, March 11, 2019 — The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford University’s hub for interdisciplinary research, education, and engagement on contemporary Asia and the sponsor of the Shorenstein Journalism Award for excellence in coverage of the Asia-Pacific, is pleased to introduce an all-new selection committee for the award, comprising diverse journalistic and Asia expertise. APARC now welcomes nominations for the 2019 award. The deadline for nomination submissions is 5pm Pacific time on Friday, March 29, 2019.
 
An annual tradition since 2002, the Shorenstein Journalism Award carries a cash prize of US $10,000 and recognizes outstanding veteran journalists who have spent their careers helping audiences around the world interpret the complexities of the Asia-Pacific region. It honors the legacy of APARC’s benefactor, Mr. Walter H. Shorenstein, and his twin passions for promoting excellence in journalism and understanding of Asia. “With this award we are committed to advancing journalism that persistently and courageously seeks accuracy, deep reporting, and nuanced U.S.-Asia dialogue,” said APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin.
 
Over the course of its history, the award has recognized world-class journalists who push the boundaries of coverage of the Asia-Pacific region and help advance mutual understanding between audiences in the United States and their Asian counterparts. Recent honorees include Anna Fifield, Caixin Media, Ian Johnson, Jacob Schlesinger, Siddharth Varadarajan, and Aung Zaw. The award alternates between recipients whose work has mostly been published through American news media and recipients whose work has mostly been conveyed through news media in one or more parts of the Asia-Pacific region. The 2019 award will recognize a recipient from the latter category, which oftentimes includes candidates who work at the forefront of the battle for press freedom.    
 
APARC has recently assembled a new selection committee for the award that presides over the judging of nominees and is responsible for the selection of honorees. “I am delighted to welcome our new committee members who have all distinguished themselves in their careers and bring expertise across journalism, policy, and Asia research and reporting,” noted Director Shin.
 
The selection committee for the Shorenstein Journalism Award includes Wendy Cutler, Vice President and Managing Director, Washington, D.C. Office, Asia Society Policy Institute; James Hamilton, Hearst Professor of Communication, Chair of the Department of Communication, and Director of the Stanford Journalism Program, Stanford University; Raju Narisetti, Director of the Knight-Bagehot Fellowship in Economics and Business Journalism and Professor of Professional Practice at Columbia Journalism School; Philip Pan, Asia Editor, The New York Times; and Prashanth Parameswaran, Senior Editor, The Diplomat.
 
For the Shorenstein award, the Asia-Pacific region is defined broadly to include Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia and Australasia. Both individual journalists with considerable body of work and journalism organizations are eligible for the award. Nominees’ work may be in traditional forms of print or broadcast journalism and/or in new forms of multimedia journalism. APARC is seeking 2019 award nomination submissions from editors, publishers, scholars, journalism-related associations, and entities focused on researching and interpreting the Asia-Pacific region. The award will be presented by APARC at Stanford in the Autumn quarter of 2019.
 
For complete details about the award, nominations and procedures, and past winners, please visit the Shorenstein Journalism Award page. Submissions are accepted electronically through 5pm Pacific time on Friday, March 29, 2019, via an online form.
 
Please direct all inquiries to aparc-communications@stanford.edu.
 
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About the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) addresses critical issues affecting the countries of Asia, their regional and global affairs, and U.S.-Asia relations. As Stanford University’s hub for the interdisciplinary study of contemporary Asia, APARC produces policy-relevant research, provides education and training to students, scholars, and practitioners, and strengthens dialogue and cooperation between counterparts in the Asia-Pacific and the United States. Founded in 1983, APARC today is home to a scholar community of distinguished academics and practitioners in government, business, and civil society, who specialize in trends that cut across the entire Asia-Pacific region. For more information, visit https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu.&nbsp;
 
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An air of uncertainty remains prevalent in the Indo-Pacific region. The South China Sea continues to be in contention, with six governments exerting claims on overlapping areas. The threat of a full-blown trade war between China and the United States puts the stability of the regional (and global) economy in question. Meanwhile, the Korean peninsula appears to swing between the brink of conflict to the possibility of dramatic diplomatic breakthroughs. It was in the midst of this precarious period for the region that the third annual gathering of the U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Dialogue Series took place in Tokyo from January 30 to February 1.

The 2019 meeting was co-sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and APARC’s U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI). For the past three years, the series has convened senior Japanese and American policymakers, military leaders, scholars, and regional experts to discuss Japan's security strategy and the alliance between Japan and the United States. Support for the workshop came from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Since its inception in 2016, the dialogue series has provided a venue for in-depth discourse on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues, and has helped build bridges between American and Asian academics, government and military officials, and other defense and security policy specialists. “We have continued to expand the range of attendees from the Japanese and U.S. government and military,” said USASI Director Karl Eikenberry. “This has ensured for our dialogue even greater policy relevance with each iteration.”

“The U.S.-Japan security dialogue is unique because it combines civilians and military officers, both retired and serving, which simply does not take place elsewhere,” observed Stanford Lecturer in International Policy Daniel Sneider, a regular participant. “It also avoids the sometimes-empty rhetoric about our alliance in favor of an operational, but strategically informed, approach that gets at not only what is being accomplished, but where the gaps exist in our alliance.”

Threats, Challenges, and the Appropriate Responses

L to R: Amb. Karl Eikenberry and Lt. General Noboru Yamaguchi (Workshop Co-Chairs)

The 2019 dialogue opened with a day of discussions on many of the challenges facing the U.S.-Japan security alliance, including an assessment of the latest security trends in the Indo-Pacific, as well as Japan’s new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). Passed by the Japanese Cabinet only a month earlier, the NDPG was the focus of two sessions on day one, including a discussion of its implications for Indo-Pacific security, as well as a session on the guideline’s ramifications for concepts of Integrated Air and Missile Defense and Archipelagic Defense

“Unsurprisingly, the global rise of China—along with the U.S. and Japan’s separate and combined responses to PRC strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region—helped shape both our agenda and the selection of participants,” observed Eikenberry. “We were specifically interested in the implications for the maritime domain and certain operational aspects of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.”

The day one closing ceremony featured remarks from the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, the Honorable William Hagerty.

 

L to R: Dan Sneider, Amb. William Hagerty, and Lt. General Noboru Yamaguchi
 

Developing Policy Recommendations, Meeting with Policymakers

L to R: Major Rodger Welding and Colonel Daniel Munter (United States Pacific Air Forces), and Lt. Colonel Yuka Nakazato, (Japan Air Self-Defense Force)

Days two and three were designed for small group sessions. Referred to as “Core Group”, its U.S. and Japanese members met the morning of January 31 to review the preceding day’s workshop and develop corresponding policy recommendations. The quality and depth of the conversations underscored just how great an impact the expanded range of participants had on the resulting policy.

“Participants weren't afraid to address sensitive, big-picture questions,” said Phillip Lipscy, a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford, “like the slow growth of Japanese military spending in the face of increasing regional threats and the challenges posed by unpredictable US administration policies.”

“Even as an expert of Japanese politics, I found the dialogue extremely informative and stimulating,” shared Lipscy.

Sneider agreed as well. “One thing that stood out this year, in contrast to the previous years, was a greater willingness on the part of our Japanese colleagues to air their sense of unease about and even opposition to the direction of American foreign and security policy under the Trump administration,” he said. “In the past, the American participants were much more open about their criticism of their own government, the Japanese tended to be polite—not so much this year, which made for a lively exchange on many issues.”

In the afternoon, core U.S. participants again met with the US Ambassador, along with his embassy team, as well as with senior Cabinet Office officials from the government of Japan.

Field Testing Ideas

During the second annual gathering in 2018, the dialogue began including a visit by the core workshop participants to a combined U.S. military—Japanese Self Defense facility. As part of the 2019 dialogue, the Core Group spent their third and final day visiting Yokota Air Base, the headquarters of both United States Forces Japan and Japan Air Self Defense Force Air Defense Command.

“These visits allow us to better understand Alliance operational challenges in the field,” noted Eikenberry. “Just as importantly, it affords us an immediate opportunity to test out some of the very ideas discussed during the preceding days.”

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Yokota Air Base, Japan

Chatham House Rules applied to the dialogue, but a workshop report is forthcoming.

View the reports from the first and second annual workshops.

The U.S.-Asia Security Initiative is part of Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC). Led by former U.S. Ambassador and Lieutenant General (Retired) Karl Eikenberry, USASI seeks to further research, education, and policy relevant dialogues at Stanford University on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues.

(L to R: Karl Eikenberry, Michael McFaul, Major Marcus Morgan (U.S. Army LNO to Japan Ground Self Defense Force Northern Army and Stanford University Center for East Asian Studies MA ’18), Phillip Lipscy, Daniel Sneider)

 

 

 

 

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Following the abrupt ending of the highly anticipated second bilateral summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Hanoi, APARC and CISAC scholars evaluate the result of the summit, its implications for regional relations in Northeast Asia, and the opportunities moving forward towards the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

This Q&A with Noa Ronkin features Andray Abrahamian, the 2018-19 Koret Fellow in Korean Studies at APARC, whose work with the nonprofit Choson Exchange has taken him to the DPRK nearly 30 times; Siegfried S. Hecker, top nuclear security expert, former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Research Professor of Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus, and Senior Fellow at CISAC/FSI, Emeritus; and Gi-Wook Shin, Professor of Sociology, William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, Director of APARC, and founding Director of the Korea Program.

Q: What is your assessment of the summit outcome? Considering Trump's decision to end the summit early, do you support that “no deal is better than a bad deal?” Do you think the summit would have been better off with even a small deal just significant enough to keep the momentum going? 
 
Abrahamian: It's a disappointment, but we don't know yet if it is a catastrophe. I think that, ideally, once it was clear that both sides were escalating towards a grand bargain no one was ready for, the U.S. and DPRK teams could have taken a break and reconvened to attempt something less ambitious. For both sides it is better domestically to go back and be able to look tough rather than concede too much, but I do wonder why there was no intermediary position available between no deal and something too big.
 
Hecker: I am disappointed, but still optimistic. Disappointed because the opportunity to take concrete steps toward denuclearization and normalization was missed. Optimistic, because Trump and Kim did not return to the ‘fire and fury’ days of 2017. They left Hanoi on good terms. I don’t believe it was a question of bad deal or no deal. Rather, it appears the two sides were actually quite close to taking important steps, but couldn’t quite get there this time. It is not clear whether time just ran out or if President Trump’s challenge to Kim Jong-un to “go bigger” moved the goal posts at the last minute. 
 
Shin: Trump made the right move. No deal is better than a small or pointless deal that could hamper future negotiations. His decision sent a warning signal to North Korea that he wouldn’t let the country continue to set the tone and pace for the negotiations. Also, he gained more domestic political slack than the alternative would have gained him. The misfortune in Hanoi may impart a new, different kind of momentum to what is destined to be a fluctuating, arduous diplomatic process.
 
Q: So what's next? What do you expect from the US and DPRK given this new dynamic? What do you think needs to be done at the working level and at the leadership level? And what do you think will be the biggest hurdle in future negotiations? 
 
Abrahamian: Both sides carefully left future talks open through their statements after the summit. If one is searching for a positive outcome, it's that the leaders perhaps now realize that much, much more will have to be agreed upon before they meet again. This should help empower working-level talks. But time is short: a U.S. election looms next year and Donald Trump faces political challenges at home. This was a missed opportunity to consolidate a relationship-building process.
 
Hecker: The American and North Korean statements following the summit paint different pictures of the final bargaining positions, but both were positive and committed to return to the bargaining table. These differences should be surmountable at the bargaining table, but it will take time and a more concerted effort. So long as North Korea ends nuclear and missile testing, we have time to come to a proper compromise, but it must clearly involve some sanctions relief for the North Korean economy. One of the biggest hurdles on the American side is to overcome internal political divisions.
 
Shin: A return to hostility is unlikely. Both sides have refrained from escalating tension and are still committed to a diplomatic solution. The negotiations will resume. The Hanoi summit served as an opportunity for a much-needed reality check, for both sides, of the lingering divergences. The biggest hurdle continues to be how to define the terms and scope of denuclearization and the U.S. corresponding measures (simultaneous and parallel actions). Now that the discrepancies have become more apparent and starker, the working-level discussions need to agree on basic yet fundamental concepts and principles, while Trump and Kim should continue the process of trust-building; confidence and trust are a must in a top-down setting.
 
Q: Are there some roles that other key players can play, such as South Korea and China? Are there any impacts of this outcome on regional relations in Northeast Asia, such as inter-Korean and China-DPRK relations? 
 
Abrahamian: Perhaps South Korea can play a bridging role again, the way it did before the Singapore summit, when Trump "pre-emptively pulled out." In that case, President Moon's intervention helped get things back on track. It is unclear if he has the political capital with either side to make that happen again, but I suspect he will try. The collapse impacts a Kim Jong-un visit to Seoul, as now it would seem to be pressure on the US, rather than operating in space the US created. China is relatively marginalized, but happy to see no secondary sanctions threats or additional testing of missiles. Japan is perhaps the most pleased of all, given how isolated it has become on North Korea issues.
 
Hecker: The Moon Jae-in administration was hoping for a more positive outcome to allow it to promote economic cooperation with the North, which I consider to be one of the most important elements of achieving a peaceful Korean Peninsula. The Hanoi outcome may require an intensified North-South dialogue to assist the North-U.S. deliberations. I am not sure how all of this will affect China-DPRK relations. I would have preferred an outcome that allows DPRK to move closer to South Korea through some sanctions relief, than to have it depend more on China through continued maximum pressure. 
 
Shin: The outcome is clearly a major setback for South Korea, as it was anticipating progress on core issues that could jumpstart inter-Korean projects. It also became unclear whether Kim would make the planned visit to Seoul anytime soon. At the same time, this might be a perfect time for South Korea to play a meaningful role. So far, the country has been seen as advocating North Korea’s position with regards to an end-of-war declaration and to a lifting or easing of sanctions. This time around, President Moon needs to convince Chairman Kim that North Korea’s bold move toward denuclearization cannot be delayed if he wishes not to lose this rare opportunity with a U.S. president who is eager to make a “big” deal.
 
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For more U.S.-DPRK diplomacy analysis and commentarty by APARC scholars, see our recent media coverage.
 
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South Koreans watch TV screen reporting on the U.S. President Donald Trump press conference at Seoul Railway Station on February 28, 2019 in Seoul, South Korea
South Koreans watch TV screen reporting on the U.S. President Donald Trump press conference at Seoul Railway Station on February 28, 2019 in Seoul, South Korea.
Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images
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