North Korea successfully launched a long-range rocket Wednesday, with the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) confirming Pyongyang had "deployed an object that appeared to achieve orbit." The defiant rocket launch has prompted worldwide consternation: Japan has called for an urgent meeting of the U.N. Security Council; the Obama administration called the launch a "highly provocative act that threatens regional security" and violates U.N. resolutions; and South Korea has raised its security threat level. 

Pyongyang insists it has a right to pursue a peaceful space program and that the rocket was armed with a communications satellite to help in that endeavor. But the U.S. and its allies worry the technology could lead to an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.  

We turn to three experts on North Korea for their views on the launch: David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center; Thomas Fingar, an international intelligence expert and the Oksenberg-Rohlen distinguished fellow at FSI; and Nick Hansen, a CISAC affiliate and expert in foreign weapons and imagery intelligence who writes for Jane’s Defense and 38North.org, a website for the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS.

Why is the global community surprised North Korea has successfully launched a rocket and apparently put a satellite into orbit? 

Straub: It shouldn't come as a surprise that North Korea has finally succeeded with its fifth test of a long-range rocket, which it's been trying to do since 1998. North Korea has pursued the development of nuclear weapons and missiles with great determination and intensity over many decades, because its leaders regard these as a panacea for problems actually originating in their own failed economic and political systems. 

Fearful that domestic reform would result in their overthrow, they continue to oppress and isolate their people while using military threats to intimidate other countries. Their aim is to remain in power and eventually prevail over their rival South Korea by forcing the lifting of international sanctions and being accepted as a nuclear weapons state. It is not irrational but it is very unrealistic. Most members of the international community, including the United States, will never accept this. North Korea is thus going ever deeper down a blind alley. 

The rocket technology is dangerously close to long-range missile technology and the United Nations Security Council has issued several resolutions and forbidden North Korea from conducting any further tests. 

Was there any significance to the Dec. 10-29 launch window? 

Straub: The media is full of speculation about why North Korea announced this particular window of dates, such as that it means to send a message to the Obama administration or to influence the upcoming South Korean presidential election on December 19.  My own guess is that it is keyed to the first anniversary Kim Jong Il’s death on December 17. 

But in the end, the most important question is why the North Koreans conducted the launch. It is fundamentally because they have a long-standing missile program to which they have devoted a great deal of resources. If the leadership had devoted those resources to taking care of its citizens, it could have bought enough food on the global market to prevent hunger, instead of calling on the international community for assistance.

The North Koreans typically pick the spring or summer to test their rockets. Why did it launch now amid constraining winter weather? 

Hansen: The timing is purely political. The reasons they prefer to launch in the spring and summer are, of course, better weather conditions and longer days to work on the pad. But the anniversary of the death of Kim Jong Il, the presidential elections in South Korea, beating the south to a satellite launch or putting the DPRK back in the international spotlight – these could all have driven the decision. 

North Korea may be following the same script they used for the (failed) April 12 Unha-3 launch. If they continued at the April pace, the rocket should have been completely stacked on the pad on Dec. 7 in order to be checked out on the 8^th and 9^th and be ready to launch on the 10^th, which was the first day of the launch window. This was a tight schedule with little room for technical problems or weather delays. (The North's Korean Central News Agency announced Dec. 10 that the launch window had been extended to the 29th, thus catching many North Korea observers off guard by the earlier launch.) 

Fingar: The timing is indeed outside the normal window of relatively better weather. Possible factors include commemoration of the anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s death; a ploy to capture the attention of new administrations in Washington, Beijing, Seoul, and Japan; and intent to buttress the North’s claim to having a nuclear deterrent by demonstrating that it can launch at any time of the year. There might also have been a simpler explanation, namely that DPRK engineers thought they had found and fixed the problem that caused the previous tests to fail and persuaded Kim Jong Un that there was no technical reason to delay.

What are the larger implications of North Korea’s actions and why do these rocket launches provoke such global condemnation? 

Fingar:  Perhaps the primary reason is that North Korea is widely perceived to be dangerous and more than a little bizarre. In other words, it is an easy target and symbolic embodiment of “worst case” fears about what a defiant and “irrational” country might do with its nuclear and missile capabilities. 

The world also sees that North Korea’s attempt to launch a satellite is interpreted, not unreasonably, as defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718, which demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or launch a ballistic missile. Pyongyang argues that a rocket used for space launches is not a ballistic missile, and therefore is not proscribed by the U.N. resolution. 

Straub: North Korea has been developing medium- and long-range missiles for more than two decades, during which time it has repeatedly attacked South Korea and threatened the United States and other countries. It has also been working on its nuclear program and has already tested two nuclear devices. The fear is that North Korea is trying to miniaturize a nuclear device that could be used as a warhead on a long-range missile. 

In January 2011, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates voiced U.S. concern that North Korea was becoming a direct threat to it, and that Pyongyang could successfully develop intercontinental ballistic missile capability within five years.  

In South Korea, the launch is unlikely to have a major impact on the presidential election December 19. Conservative South Koreans regard North Korean behavior as stemming from the nature of its system, while progressives also blame the policies of the United States and conservative South Korean administrations for making North Korea feel insecure. Each side will simply interpret the launch from its longstanding perspective on North Korea.  

In Japan, where concern about North Korea runs deep both because of the nuclear and missile programs and North Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens, the launch will likely further strengthen the front-running conservatives in the Lower House election on December 16.

How is the international community responding to the launch? 

Straub: The United States has already signaled that it will seek even stronger international sanctions against North Korea. If China is unwilling to agree in the U.N. Security Council, the United States and its allies will pursue increased sanctions on their own. 

China has again been embarrassed by North Korea, but there is no indication that it will change its basic policy of supporting North Korea for fear it might collapse, creating an unpredictable situation on China's border. Even if China agrees to some increased sanctions against North Korea in the UN Security Council, its record of actually enforcing international sanctions is decidedly mixed. In any event, it has dramatically increased its economic support for and engagement with North Korea since that country's first test of a nuclear device in 20006. 

Is there anything more that Washington can do to prevent these provocations by the North aside from pushing the Six Party Talks and threats of greater sanctions? 

Fingar:  Probably not. Some argue that Pyongyang’s goal is to use the provocations to persuade the United States to negotiate directly with North Korea, but its conditions for doing so include U.S. acknowledgment – and acceptance – of the North’s self-proclaimed status as a nuclear weapon state. That is not likely to happen. I think the best course for the United States would be to avoid over-reacting and to focus attention on Pyongyang’s defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions.

There is speculation that a third underground nuclear test will follow the rocket launch if it fails to put a satellite into orbit.

Hansen: I believe they will test regardless of the successful launch.  I have been following the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri all November. Details from a Nov. 19 image show that part of the dirt road into the complex from the valley is unusable, as three bridges have been washed out. Instead they have upgraded an old road that runs up the west side of the valley and enters the complex just in front of the new south tunnel. Imagery on Nov. 24 revealed some changes. The new road is still being used and there appears to be more vehicle tracks going to the support area. The most significant development is the probable clearing of snow at the entrance to the south tunnel. It also appears that the mine cart tracks are being reinstalled on the spoil pile to carry dirt out from the tunnel, but I can't be sure of that. 

See our interactive timeline on key events in North Korea here at Storify.com 

Hansen Interview with the Australia Broadcasting Corp. 

Hansen's Q&A with Popular Science with Popular Science on Why Launch Doesn't Spell Doom 

Fresh off his re-election victory, Barack Obama—the “Pacific President”—became the first president to visit Myanmar and Cambodia when he traveled to the Southeast Asian countries in November.

The trip highlights the region’s importance to the United States and signals that Obama’s second term will significantly focus on Asian trade, security and governance issues.

Eight Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center scholars sat down to discuss reactions to the election in Asia, and possible directions for U.S.-Asia relations and foreign policy during the second Obama administration.

How do you think countries in Asia view the outcome of the U.S. presidential election?

Karl Eikenberry: Overall, I think the countries of Asia will view President Obama’s reelection as positive, including because of the likely continuity in American policy toward the region.

Thomas Fingar: Beijing is troubled by Obama’s policies toward Asia because it sees them as directed against China and detrimental to its interests. But it was more troubled by Romney’s rhetoric during the campaign and probably interprets the election outcome as portending more continuity than change in U.S. policy. On balance, Beijing would rather deal with a devil it knows than cope with the uncertainties of a new U.S. administration.

Gi-Wook Shin: There was some concern in South Korea that Mitt Romney would have reverted to the hardline North Korea policy of George W. Bush’s first term. It would have created a bit of tension between the United States and South Korea, so in that context many Koreans are relieved that Obama was re-elected.

David Straub: Interestingly, President Obama personally is overwhelmingly popular in South Korea, but opinion polls show that most South Koreans continue to have complex, even critical views of American foreign policy under him.

Is President Obama likely to make major changes to Asia policy in his second term?

Eikenberry: Some of the people in key positions in the second Obama administration will change, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, but President Obama will of course be in office for four more years. He has been in Asia and knows the players. He has a clear strategy, so overall I expect continuity in his administration’s Asia policy. 

Michael H. Armacost: Events are really what shape foreign policy, and developments can occur that are hard to predict.

Henry S. Rowen: We tend to assume there is a continuity or gradual evolution to events, but there are also discontinuities. Something could happen in North Korea, for example. Unexpected events do happen from time to time, and the question is to try to figure out what they might be.

How could U.S. China policy develop?

Fingar: If President Obama has a clear plan for his second term, its goals and priorities are not yet clear to the Chinese. They worry that he may continue, or ratchet up, efforts they see as designed to constrain China’s rise. That said, they know that steady relations with the United States are essential for their own continued economic success and will respond positively to U.S. efforts to reduce distrust and enhance strategic stability. They will be troubled, however, by likely—and overdue—U.S. pressure to secure enforcement of China’s intellectual property and other trade-related commitments, and by likely U.S. efforts to deepen trade relations with other countries.

How could the possible election of a more conservative Japanese government during the second term of the Obama administration affect U.S.-Japan relations?

Armacost: The Trans-Pacific Partnership is an issue where we both have potential constraints on the extent to which Japan can be included, and it is not certain whether that will change very much under a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration. Secondly, there is the longstanding Okinawa base issue. The LDP did not do anything about the base from 1996 onward, and that will probably also be the case if the LDP comes into power again. Finally, the United States will probably push Japan to take more of a stand on the ongoing Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with China.

After the failure of the United States’ Leap Day agreement with North Korea this year, and especially with the election of a new South Korean government next month, do you think that Obama’s second term could bring a renewed effort in diplomacy with North Korea?

Shin: It will be important to watch the outcome of the South Korean election. If the opposition party wins, they will move very quickly to engage with North Korea and the question then will be how the United States will respond.

Straub: In any event, the United States periodically reaches out to North Korea, to test it or just because time has passed. It may do so again after the election, particularly since there is a still fairly new leadership in North Korea, and also because there are elections or leadership changes in all the countries in the region. A number of the Six Party Talks member states, likely including South Korea, may also push harder for a resumption of those talks, which were never held during President Obama’s first term. But the Obama administration will be cautious because it was burned by North Korea’s breaking of their Leap Day agreement.

What direction might U.S. policy toward South Asia take?

Eikenberry: Our presence in Afghanistan is going to remain an important part of our overall military posture in Central, South, and East Asia. Managing properly the transition to full Afghan responsibility for their internal security will remain very high on President Obama’s agenda. At the same time, it will be important to keep some U.S. counterterrorism capability in Afghanistan, with the permission of the Afghan government.  

The nature of our security dialogue with Pakistan will change in emphasis from one that since 9/11 has mostly been informed by international terrorism. If we continue to make progress against Al Qaida, I expect our conversation with Pakistan will place more emphasis on its nuclear weapons programs and deployments. This is a potentially destabilizing issue and a concern not only to India, but also to China.

There has been a steady appreciation in the current and future importance of India. It will continue to be key in terms of the administration’s broader Asia-Pacific policy, but with a clear understanding of the limits of defense engagement with India.

Will the rebalancing, or “pivot,” toward Asia continue to be a central theme in U.S. foreign policy in Obama’s second term?

Eikenberry: Last year, when President Obama announced the rebalancing to Asia, I think this was done in part to signal to the world that we were putting the decade of costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan behind us and looking forward—that the U.S. “was back.” I do not believe we will see any short-term major change in the deployment of military capabilities to the Asia-Pacific region, but the rebalancing could have profound consequences in the longer term. It will likely inform the prioritization of our future defense modernization and the development of military doctrine, which in turn drives procurement.

Donald K. Emmerson: Asia will continue to loom large on Washington's policy horizon. Although the pivot was originally all about security, the rebalance has since been "rebalanced" to encompass economic concerns. In July 2012 when Secretary Clinton went to Phnom Penh to attend the security-focused ASEAN Regional Forum, she brought along the largest delegation of American businesspeople ever to visit Southeast Asia. Their presence upgraded the profile of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Forum, which met the following day. The Obama administration has also taken the lead in promoting a Trans-Pacific Partnership to liberalize Asia-Pacific trade. 

President Obama's mid-November trip to Southeast Asia is further evidence of the pivot's continuation. In mid-November he will become the first U.S. president ever to have visited Myanmar and Cambodia. He will stop in Thailand as well. In Phnom Penh he will attend the U.S.-ASEAN Summit and the East Asia Summit. A key issue at these meetings will be the quarrels over sovereignty in the South China Sea between China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. To the extent that the United States appears to be intervening against Beijing in these disputes, the "pivot" will be interpreted as a move to check China.

Armacost: There is no doubt that the Asia rebalancing strategy will endure, but the components and the apportionment of resources may change. President Obama may have initially overplayed engagement with China, and now he is probably hedging too much. But it does not change the fact that there is a lot at stake in terms of our relationship with China and that we have to engage the government. So it is a question then of where to strike a balance between hedging and engagement. After the election, there is also the question now of what happens to U.S. trade policy, and whether the Trans-Pacific Partnership will include India, China, and Japan.

Daniel C. Sneider: If you look at the president’s broader message and the one he carried in the campaign, he is very focused on restructuring and moving toward a more innovation-centered U.S. economy to develop new sources of employment. In addition to being concerned about climate change, he is also seriously looking at alternative energy resources as a source of real growth in the U.S. economy and as a way to move away from foreign fossil fuel dependency. Focusing more on the Asia-Pacific region is also quite consistent with these goals.

As the East Coast cleans up from super-storm Sandy, Phillip Lipscy and Kenji E. Kushida point to important lessons from Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster. They say more must be done to safeguard U.S. nuclear plants from natural disasters.